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FOREWORD 
 
American politics and governance has in recent years been thrown into turmoil by the emergence 
of a strong Libertarian streak, exemplified by the Tea Party. Libertarians, as their name implies, 
believe that we are free. Libertarians tend to believe that we are autonomous beings whose free 
choices create our futures; we fully own ourselves; we owe nothing to others. They accordingly 
tend to advocate laissez-faire capitalism, protection of private property, and ethical egoism (that 
moral agents ought to seek their own self-interest). They believe that the poor are poor because 
of bad choices and that an unequal society may nonetheless be a just one. 
 
Ayn Rand, a Russian expatriate whose best-selling novels include Atlas Shrugged (New York: 
Random House, 1957), is Libertarianism’s patron saint. In her collection of essays, The Virtue of 
Selfishness (New York: New American Library, 1964), Rand argues against altruism because it 
is the enemy of self-fulfilment: “if a man accepts the ethics of altruism, his first concern is not 
how to live his life but how to sacrifice it” (p. 27). Among her many admirers is the current 
Speaker of the House of Representatives (and third in line for the Presidency), Paul Ryan, who 
required staffers to read Atlas Shrugged. Hard-line Libertarians such as Ron Paul and his son, 
Kentucky Senator Rand Paul (named after the novelist) have had little success in running for 
President, but only slightly more moderate Libertarians running under the Tea Party banner have 
had strong showings. 
 
I mention all of this because, as this volume makes very clear, the Buddha was the original anti-
Libertarian. Several essays collected here show that the Buddha refuted the underlying premise 
	   viii	  
of Libertarianism, namely, that we are autonomous moral agents. There are no autonomous 
moral agents in the first place because no agent is persistent; the Buddha’s analysis of the person 
demonstrates (in the way now reflected in Western post-modern thought) that ‘self’ is something 
merely imputed to the changing components of body and mind. And second, there is no 
autonomous moral agent because everything and everyone is highly conditioned by many causes 
and conditions. Hence, the premises upon which Libertarianism in any of its forms is founded 
are false, even absurd. 
 
The Buddha taught that we are conditioned beings, the product of biological imperatives, the 
history of our relationships, the norms and customs of our societies, and all of our experiences. I 
might think that I am making choices of my own free will. But what if someone knew me very, 
very well? What if, for instance, I had a twin who had always been my constant companion and 
with whom I had always freely shared my feelings and thoughts? Is there any doubt that he could 
almost always predict exactly how I would make choices and even what I would say in a 
particular situation? If I am in fact so completely determined, how could I in any meaningful 
sense call my choices ‘free’? On the other hand, the Buddha taught that our fate is not inevitable; 
we can change the trajectory of our lives. His Eightfold Path offers that possibility. Does that 
mean that I do, in fact, have some kind of free will? 
 
This is the first volume ever to collect the wide range and nuances of Buddhist thinking on the 
matter of free will. Here, readers will find many fascinating questions discussed. Certainly the 
Buddha was a determinist, but was he a ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ one? The former excludes the possibility 
of free will, whereas the latter admits at least the possibility of it. Does the answer to that 
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question turn on whether we refer to the Buddha of the Pāli scriptures or the Buddha of the 
Mahāyāna? Does the process of developing insight and virtue ‘soften’ determinism or does it 
replace one type of determinism (the force of countless lifetimes of delusion, ill-will, and greed) 
with another (the force of compassion)? Does the Buddhist assertion that there is no permanent, 
independent self, controller of mind and body, mean that there is no sense in talking about ‘free 
will’ in the first place? Nevertheless, since ‘free will’ is a concept almost universally accepted in 
the world, is it ‘conventionally true’ even if ultimately there is no agent whose will could be 
free? If there is no free will, is there no moral responsibility? Might revealing to people that they 
have no free will discourage them from pursuing a spiritual path? 
 
This volume is also important because it brings Buddhist thought into dialogue with Western 
philosophers such as Harry Frankfurt, J.M. Fischer, Galen Strawson and Peter Strawson. It is 
also notable that many of the contributors, while specializing in Buddhism, have their training in 
Western philosophy. Although Owen Flanagan laments, “I am wary of asking Buddhists to talk 
about our problem of free will because it is a bad and idiosyncratic problem”, others have found 
it more fruitful to use Western categories to explore Buddhist thought.  
 
Rick Repetti has been thinking about these issues for many years. I know, because he published 
several articles in the Journal of Buddhist Ethics, of which I am the editor, surveying all of the 
writing done by Buddhist scholars on the subject of free will over the past century. He is now 
drafting a monograph on the subject, to which the present volume will be the companion. He is 
almost ideally placed to bring together the many points of view represented here and has 
skillfully sequenced them so that each after the first may be seen as commenting on the one 
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prior. This book will provoke discussion on the subject of free will in relation to Buddhism for 
many years to come. 
 
Daniel Cozort 
Carlisle, PA 
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PREFACE 
 
The research project that led to this book began when, at age 15, during my first meditation I had 
a life-changing out-of-body experience, after which I took up a very serious meditation practice 
that led to many repeated mystical experiences, a number of which involved extremely complex, 
highly improbable series of vividly accurate precognitions, each equivalent to hitting the lottery 
100 times in a row, some involving others who had the identical precognitive experiences as me. 
Such experiences challenge our ordinary conception of the relationship between free will, time, 
and causality: If I have free will, how can the future—which involves choices I, and others, have 
yet to make—cause my perception of it now? My attempts to understand these puzzles led to my 
dissertation on free will at the CUNY Graduate Center, but my meditation-based insights were 
either couched in Western terms or significantly relegated to the footnotes. Since then, most of 
my research and writing have been explicitly about Buddhism, meditation, free will, and mental 
freedom, as well as their interrelationships. After writing several articles on the subject, mostly 
for the Journal of Buddhist Ethics, JBE’s editor Daniel Cozort suggested I have enough material 
for a book, and this book project was born, along with a corresponding monograph, in progress. 
All of this, ironically, reveals ways in which conditions causally influence experiences and 
choices, but does not seem to determine them.  
 
Though I argue for the philosophical plausibility of certain positions on the free will issue, my 
personal ‘jury is still out’ on free will, particularly given what originally prompted my interests 
and how little anyone has to say about those features of it. Protagoras said “Concerning the gods, 
I have no means of knowing whether they exist or not or of what sort they may be. Many things 
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prevent knowledge including the obscurity of the subject and the brevity of human life.” (Diels 
and Kranz 1985, 80b4) My thinking about free will is slightly more optimistic, but my 
arguments, both in the Introduction and in my own two articles here, are, so to speak, made 
arguendo.  
 
The issue of Buddhist thought about free will—which some of our contributors think involves 
some kind of category error—further complicates matters, and is in its relative infancy. In the 
histories of both Western and Asian philosophy, it is often the case that the first few individuals 
to pose dilemmas, construct arguments, or level counterexamples significantly shape enduring, 
sometimes paradigm-forming trajectories of dialectic generated therefrom. The positive or 
negative value of these influences aside, this philosophical domain is in that fertile early period. 
Perhaps it is with this sensitivity to the potential hijacking of opinion that some of the writers 
here figuratively beat a loud drum, myself included, but that is because it matters to us. For this 
reason, I am privileged to contribute to, and more so to be entrusted editing, this collection. For 
the same reason, I am sometimes less neutral than an editor should be. Regardless of our 
arguments, however, it is the reader who ultimately must decide what makes the most sense. 
 
Let’s talk first about why free will is an issue of general philosophical interest, that is, 
independently of such things as precognition and one-way temporal succession (time), then 
about why Buddhist thought on the subject may be enlightening. Prior to philosophical 
reflection, even if some elements of our lives seem beyond control, most of us exert significant 
control over other elements, such as being able to move our eyes, limbs, and, among others, 
vocal chords, at will, satisfying our desires, bringing about changes in the world. Studies suggest 
	   xxiv	  
that children age 4 consider free will being able to do what you want; around age 6 they 
understand free will as being able not to act on desires (Kushnir, Gopnik, Chemyak, Seiver, and 
Wellman 2015). As we mature, we come to think free will includes but surpasses these abilities, 
but specifying what that entails is the challenge of defining free will: What makes some choices 
and actions (if any) free? What is free will? If we cannot be clear on what free will is, then how 
can we know if we have any? 
 
Though we know we are shaped by contingent constellations of experience, biology, and 
apparently random circumstances that influence our character, one key element in our thinking 
we have free will is the feeling that what we do is up to us somehow. Whether performing a 
mindless action, deliberating consciously about a major decision, or confronted with a dilemma 
pulling us in opposite directions, it seems, the action we consider free is one we intended: its 
occurrence didn’t happen to us: we caused it; it would not have occurred had we not made it 
happen. Forces influence us, but we seem able to resist such influences, as if not subject to 
physical laws, though our bodies are. How could that be? If causal laws govern our neurons the 
way they govern electrons and galaxies, where whatever happens is the lawful consequence of 
prior conditions, then the sense that our doings are up to us seems illusory. Conversely, if our 
choices result from purely random processes (in our brains, circumstances, etc.), the neural 
equivalent of coin tosses, how can we think we authored them? Does the person suffering from 
epilepsy author a seizure? For us to truly be the way we experience ourselves, must we possess 
nonphysical minds, souls? Could we be free even if determinism is true and we are entirely law-
governed physical beings, akin to complicated wasps, self-driving vehicles, or robots? Must 
determinism—the scientific view that all events (on our—non-quantum—level) are lawfully 
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necessitated by prior events—be false? If indeterministic chance infects choice, how can choice 
be up to us? This is the free will puzzle. 
 
Since the latter quarter of the previous century, Buddhist and Western philosophers have begun 
to explicitly discuss Buddhism and free will together. Interestingly, however, this issue has not 
puzzled Buddhist philosophers since the very beginnings of Buddhism, roughly 2,500 years ago, 
perhaps because the Buddha explicitly rejected what may be understood as inevitable 
causation—by fate, chance, karma, gods, and matter. Could it be that the Buddha’s rejections of 
inevitabilism sufficed to render the issue closed? If not, why haven’t Buddhists thought about it 
until recently? Either way, can Buddhist philosophy—with its rich philosophical psychology, 
philosophies of mind and action, metaphysics, epistemology, phenomenology, logic, philosophy 
of language, and related tools for understanding and transforming the mind and attaining what 
they take to be the maximum of mental freedom, nirvāṇa—help us answer these questions? Do 
Buddhists think we have something like free will, as the Buddha’s rejection of inevitabilism 
seems to suggest? The answers to these questions are not black and white, as this collection is 
designed to reveal. 
 
Supposing Buddhism has sophisticated explanations about all things necessary to explicate 
agency, the glaring problem in the core of Buddhist understanding is that the agent/self is a 
psychological fiction—indeed, the central illusion responsible for all our suffering. How could 
the agent/self have free will, if there is no agent/self? How can the things ‘I’ do be up to ‘me’ if 
‘my’ sense of ‘myself’ is an illusion? Has the key question that drives this book—about what 
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Buddhists think about free will—been answered in the previous sentence? If so, the idea that our 
choices and actions are genuinely brought about by us—that we have free will—is false.  
 
The reader might think the rest is redundant, but may be mistaken, for at least three reasons: the 
Buddha rejected inevitabilism (an opposite of free will), Buddhist philosophers disagree about 
whether we have free will, and there are many related issues that complicate their disagreement: 
Buddhist causation (dependent origination, similar to determinism), ultimate versus conventional 
truths, karma, moral responsibility, personhood, enlightened (agentless) agency, and, inter alia, 
Buddhist meditation and the highly-effective self-regulative powers it cultivates. In the 
Introduction, I offer initial indications of how some of these subjects connect, why they are 
philosophically interesting, the Buddhist traditions some contributors reflect in addressing them, 
points of critical contact with contemporary Western philosophy and science, and some (possibly 
biased) evaluative comments.  
 
This collection is significantly but not entirely a menu of Buddhist positions on the free will 
issue, but also an attempt to engage the latest Western philosophical thinking about free will with 
Buddhist thinking about it, and vice versa. For that reason, some primarily Buddhist 
contributions lack the textual/historical grounding (in Pāli, Sanskrit, and other Buddhist language 
translations, terms, and citations) otherwise typical of Buddhist philosophical scholarship in 
English. Some Buddhist scholars are implicitly addressing the Western philosophical 
community, informing them of what their Buddhist tradition thinks about free will, or informing 
other members of their own community about the other tradition’s thinking about free will and of 
how such thought squares with their own on this issue. Some are written in fairly strict accord 
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with publishing norms of Buddhist scholarship; I have inserted parentheticals or notes explaining 
most such terms or standards where those authors may have not.  
 
Likewise, some of the Western contributions lack the sort of dialectical formality and traction 
typical of contemporary Western philosophical publications in which claims are tightly 
connected with previous arguments, publications, and related discourse conventions, for the 
simple reason that these philosophers are intending to present simplified, intuitive models of 
otherwise elaborate Western argument threads to Buddhists, without the usual terminological and 
logical hieroglyphics. As with some of the Buddhist terms, I have likewise inserted 
parentheticals or notes explaining some of the Western philosophical jargon. Inevitably, scholars 
on both sides will find simplifications and generalizations applicable to their own areas of 
expertise somewhat wanting, but putative remedies would swell the collection to unmanageable 
proportions and render much of the text impenetrable to all but a handful that specialize in 
Western and Buddhist philosophy. For similarly pragmatic reasons, the issues of compatibility 
between free will and theological philosophies, or with other Asian philosophies, etc., however 
interesting in their own right, are mostly excluded here. 
 
Most articles here ought to be informative to scholars of both types and to the average intelligent 
reader or student interested in either free will or Buddhist philosophy. That these intended 
communications with different imagined audiences are at work, in varying degrees on both sides, 
ought to become clear when I overview the main focal points of each of the contributed articles 
in the Introduction. That this is also the first collection of articles on Buddhism and free will 
justifies presenting it in as broadly accessible a format as possible, for maximum inclusiveness.  
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This collection presents ten articles written exclusively for this collection, as well as seven 
writings from seminal thinkers that have already been published but which their authors have 
modified to better fit this collection, whose inclusion renders the collection comprehensive. To 
date, there are no other books on Buddhist theories of free will (apart from my own draft 
monograph in progress, intended to complement this collection). This collection aims to bring 
Buddhist philosophy more explicitly into the Western philosophical discussion of free will, both 
to render more perspicuous Buddhist ideas that might shed light on the Western philosophical 
debate, and to render more perspicuous the many possible positions on the free will debate that 
are available to Buddhist philosophy.  
 
In my introduction—written from a perspective shaped by my Western analytic philosophical 
training, my personal interests in Buddhist philosophy, and my multiple-decades meditation 
practice—I identify most of the main issues and arguments in broad strokes, explaining why they 
were placed where they appear, and noting some problems that might face some of them. The 
general sequence of the articles was selected so as to loosely resemble a philosophical dialogue, 
such that each article somehow either supports the previous or subsequent article, or undermines 
it, but any of the articles may be read in any sequence. No other organizational structure (e.g., 
Part I, II, III: Skeptical Theories, Optimistic Theories, etc.; Theravāda, Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, 
etc.) would cohesively parse the articles into groupings that would make their division into parts 
fitting, as many of the articles defy those sorts of categorizations. After reading the Introduction, 
readers may be better equipped to select their own sequences. The collection may be read as an 
elaborate presentation of most of the extant competing Buddhist theories of free will —
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optimistic, skeptical, and metaphilosophical. Together, the collection promises to touch on a 
multitude of dimensions relevant to the topic.  
 
There are some overlapping threads across the articles, as to be expected, as each article was 
written to be read independently; thus, many will share foundational or introductory ideas and 
terms. However, some overlapping happens in some articles’ main arguments or conclusions, 
which illustrates some convergence, if not consensus. Conversely, there is relatively equal 
divergence in other articles, illustrating that Buddhist philosophical thought on the topic is as 
complex and dialectically open as Western philosophical thought.  
 
Some remarks about Buddhist texts, Sanskrit and Pāli, and ‘Buddhism’ are in order. The 
originally orally recorded writings of Buddhism were first written in Pāli, and most subsequent 
Buddhist writings were written in Sanskrit (although others were translated into Chinese, 
Japanese, Tibetan, etc.). If a contributor is quoting a Pāli text or enmeshed in that tradition, then 
that is the language they typically will use, and so on. Some Sanskrit words are more popular in 
English, so they are used more universally, such as karma, nirvāṇa, and sutra (instead of the 
Pāli: kamma, nibbana, and sutta), or sometimes vice versa, such as vipassanā and sati (instead of 
vipaśyanā and smṛti). Authoritative and canonical Buddhist texts are standardly referred to 
without publication information, the way Plato’s Republic or Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, 
for example, might be, in their first occurrence, and if to be repeated are defined by their first 
letter or letters (e.g., “R” or “NE”), as well as regarding numeric references to original divisions 
of sections, verses, etc. Different contributors prefer slightly different annotation methods 
regarding punctuation with these abbreviated methods; I have done what I can to make them not 
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only internally consistent, but as consistent with the rest of the volume as possible while 
honoring their preferences.  
 
Buddhism is not a singular thing, not unlike Western philosophy, theism, or empiricism. 
Flanagan, for instance, uses the term ‘the Buddhisms’ to acknowledge this while glossing over 
irrelevant differences. The context ought to make clear the sense intended. There are major 
divisions within Buddhism, though most forms accept certain core ideas, teachings, principles, 
figures, and texts. The original texts constitute the Pāli Canon, universally regarded as 
authoritative within Buddhism; most subsequent Sanskrit (and other language) texts are typically 
authoritative for later, Mahāyāna schools. When a contributor uses the term ‘Buddhist’ or its 
derivatives, ideally they are using it in the sense shared by most Buddhists, or, it should be 
obvious which tradition they are explicitly using as their reference for the term, without 
needlessly repeating some qualifier. While this may be a nuisance for learned Buddhist scholars, 
nonetheless they will know immediately if such references are insufficiently detailed, and they 
will likely also be able to make any necessary mental adjustments relative to the background 
tradition that informs that contributor. The real worry is that novices will erroneously think that 
all Buddhists adhere to a certain idea when only some do; for example, even the no-self doctrine 
is conceived differently by different traditions, and one early school—long without followers, 
but originally rather widespread—advocated a real-person doctrine (Pudgalavāda). But the same 
worry arises when Western philosophers speak about free will, fatalism, chance, in/determinism, 
in/compatibilism, and so on. That there are more such problems in collections that include 
multiple theoretical frameworks than in those restricted to a single tradition ought to be no 
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surprise, and to a certain extent cannot be avoided. If I have done my work adequately, the extent 
to which this is tedious is reasonably manageable. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
Hermeneutical Koan—What Is the Sound of One Buddhist Theory of Free Will? 
 
 
Some of the major reasons that motivate philosophers to think that the idea of free will is 
problematic, as well as why the issue has caught the attention of Buddhist philosophers and 
scholars, have been explained in some detail already in the Preface, so I will not repeat them 
here. Many of them will arise in connection with my discussion below of the articles in this 
collection. Instead, therefore, here I summarize the main arguments set forth by our 
contributors, I offer some observations about how they relate to the articles immediately 
preceding or following them, as well as strengths and weaknesses of some of them. As 
mentioned in the Preface, I have sequenced the articles to loosely resemble a philosophical 
dialogue, placing each where they afford either supporting or opposing views regarding the 
immediately adjacent articles.  
 
The earlier articles question whether the very concept of a Buddhist ‘theory’ of free will 
(“FW”) is coherent, with mixed responses and qualifications, and some that presuppose the 
falsity of the notion of FW, then some that split Buddhist attitudes across two dimensions 
(ultimate and conventional, the former of which is negative about FW and the latter positive), 
culminating with articles that advocate increasingly FW-friendly views.  
 
To ask “What is the sound of one Buddhist theory of free will?” is to implicitly acknowledge 
that the issue involves a conceptual knot, if not a non-starter. After all, Buddhism has 
remained ‘mostly’ silent for over two millennia about FW. More problematically, since 
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Buddhism rejects the reality of the self, isn’t the notion of an autonomous agent incoherent? 
If not, is, was, can there be, or ought there to be an implicit/explicit Buddhist theory of FW?  
 
Christopher Gowans places the main issue of this text—the meta-question of how to think 
about the propriety of Buddhist theoretical considerations about FW—into the appropriately 
problematic but explanatory context of its historical absence: until recently, Buddhism mostly 
ignored FW, despite vast resources to address it. Gowans argues that the main reason is that 
Buddhist philosophical analysis is limited by soteriological parameters: whatever promotes 
enlightenment. Gowans concludes, however, that if Buddhism must pronounce on any 
theoretical position, it would only be justified as ‘skillful means’—the doctrine whereby 
beliefs, speech, and actions otherwise known by the wise to be avoided may be justified if 
they have soteriological utility, a view shared by Goodman, below—but Buddhism 
nevertheless would remain silent on the metaphysics.  
 
However, a Buddhist ethical theory might be soteriologically justified, yet Buddhism has 
none, except recently. Additionally, whatever justifies the many extant Buddhist (often 
metaphysical) theories of intentionality, phenomenology, and so on, arguably justifies FW 
theory. Arguably, these theories arose historically against competing views, and are thereby 
soteriologically warranted. If so, however, in its present historical encounter with West, 
Buddhism may acquire soteriological warrant for free will theorizing. 
 
Contrary to this soteriologically restrictive view, as well as to some of the increasingly 
restrictive views to follow his, perhaps casting aside hermeneutical caution, Repetti offers 
three arguments in support of the idea that there ought to be a Buddhist FW theory. First, the 
Buddhist path to mental freedom prescribes meditation and related methods for cultivating 
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virtuoso-level, self-regulation-increasing abilities associated with (naturalistic) FW, e.g., 
mind-control, volitional/metavolitional regulation, reason-responsiveness, etc. Intuitively, if 
the virtuoso has greater FW-related skills than the average non-practitioner, the virtuoso has 
(naturalistic) FW, which increases, paradoxically, proportionate to the decrease in the self-
sense, and peaks in total mental freedom, nirvāṇa, the cessation of the self-sense. Repetti 
argues that this skill undermines the most powerful FW skepticism, ‘hard incompatibilism’, a 
view Goodman advances (immediately below) to the effect that there is no autonomy 
regardless of whether we are determined, because either we are, and thus not responsible for 
our choices or we’re not, and thus our choices are random and thus not up to us. The 
meditation virtuoso, however, can escape from previous and present mental state 
conditioning, irrespective of its causal history. That virtuosos cultivate skills that theoretically 
defeat the most powerful FW skepticism justifies a Buddhist FW theory.  
 
Second, proper understanding of agency, even if that understanding is negative, say, denying 
agency altogether, implies a (negative) FW theory, but proper understanding of agency is 
constitutive of enlightenment. And third, an abundance of Buddhist teachings are multi-
leveled and progressive, prescribing a soteriological ‘path’ designed to take individuals from 
where they are, at a conventional level of understanding that presupposes agency, and to 
guide them to more subtle, ultimately impersonal levels of understanding. Relative to this 
progressive path, a theory of agency that capitalizes on the corresponding Buddhist 
distinction between relative, conventional truth and absolute, ultimate truth, serves a skillful-
means-type therapeutic function for those at the conventional level, rather than simply 
deflating their pragmatically necessary belief in agency and evitabilism by assaulting non-
Buddhists or initiates with an unremitting FW skepticism. In a somewhat striking analogy, 
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Repetti likens this unto the therapeutic use of methadone for heroin-addiction recovery, one 
point the next author might accept. 
 
Taking a strongly opposing view except on the last point, one of the first Buddhist 
philosophers to argue forcefully that Buddhism flat-out rejects FW, Charles Goodman has 
argued that Buddhism is hard incompatibilist (it considers FW impossible whether 
determinism or indeterminism is true, though he thinks Buddhist causation is deterministic). 
He repeats that argument here, but now allows that the doctrine of skillful means might 
sanction Buddhist belief in FW, which Gowans suggested earlier. A step in the right 
direction, some would think, but Jay Garfield and Owen Flanagan, the next two contributors, 
would disagree.  
 
Garfield would likely reject Goodman’s view, that Buddhism is implicitly hard 
incompatibilist, for Garfield argues that Buddhism, especially, Madhyamaka (later, ‘Middle 
Way’) Buddhism, lacks a FW theory because it lacks a monotheistic theodicy, thus requires 
no conception of the agent operating outside the causal nexus, needed to relieve God from 
blame for evil, which could be threatened by a deterministic model of causation. For 
Garfield, absent the Western theodicy that generated the FW conception, the problem does 
not and cannot arise in Buddhism: there’s no framework in which the discussion may 
legitimately arise, so no grounds even for a negative theory (like Goodman’s).  
 
However, contra Garfield, Mādhyamikas (followers of Madhyamaka) endorse the view that 
because there is no metaphysical foundation enabling the naïve realist’s worldview to be 
reduced or eliminated, it makes as much sense to say there are tables as to say there are table-
like phenomenological appearances that reduce to aggregates of atomistic psychophysical 
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tropes, which foundational binary is what many earlier Buddhists assert when they bifurcate 
reality or truth according to the understanding of the unwise and the wise, respectively. Thus, 
it arguably makes as much sense for Mādhyamikas to say people have FW, something 
Siderits, who we will get to further below, argues for, yet precisely from the earlier Buddhist 
reductionist foundationalist perspective Mādhyamikas reject.  
 
Independently, but functioning like a tag team, Flanagan next argues against allowing any 
inroads into agency-free—in his view, therefore philosophically superior—Buddhism from 
Western FW conceptions tainted by their genesis within a monotheistic theodicy Buddhism 
lacks, echoing Garfield’s argument that Buddhism has done fine over two millennia without 
any FW conception, doesn’t need one, and is better off without one. What Flanagan adds is 
an independent argument from elimination in which he offers four hermeneutics for cross-
cultural philosophical appropriation, so to speak, rejecting each as invalid for FW/Buddhism 
exchange. I’m not so sure his own writings elsewhere, about Buddhism naturalized, would 
make it through his argument from elimination, but I leave that to the reader to assess, as well 
as whether the other theorists to follow somehow violate his hermeneutic provisos and, if so, 
whether that invalidates them. 
 
However, suppose arguendo that ‘theory T’ is the best theory on free will: the scientific 
community asserts T. Suppose Buddhism implies the opposite, ~T, or worse: neither T nor 
~T. Is it cultural hubris to ask whether Buddhists ought to believe T? I don’t think so. With 
exceptional exceptions, we should believe the truth. If T is the best we have, we/they ought to 
accept T. Do they? Can they? Are there resources in Buddhism that could support T? If T is 
true, and Buddhism implies ~T, does one cease to be a Buddhist if she accepts T? 
Importantly, we’re still disputing what ‘FW’ means; it’s more like T1, T2, T3, etc. Buddhism 
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has interesting things to say about T1, T2, T3, etc., objections notwithstanding. We’re dealing 
with different conceptual frameworks, but I doubt we’re dealing with the sort of limitations 
Quine imposed on his hypothetical ‘radical translator’, such that he couldn’t find out enough 
about the hypothetical natives’ use of the term ‘gavagai’ to differentiate between their 
possible meanings of ‘rabbit’ or ‘nondetached rabbit parts’ (2013, pp. 23-72). After all, there 
seem to be what Quine would consider ‘native bilinguals’ contributing to this debate. 
 
Considering Repetti’s methadone/skillful means analogy above, the next two contributors 
may be said to prefer the metaphorical cold turkey of unremitting FW skepticism: they either 
outright deny FW or have doubts about its consistency with Buddhist philosophy. Galen 
Strawson (1986) was one of the first Western philosophers to link the Buddhist view of the 
unreality of the self with the unreality of FW. Strawson’s FW skepticism rests implicitly on 
his earlier (1994) impossibility argument, which he takes to refute ‘strong’ FW (“SFW”), the 
belief that we are the ultimate originators of our choices/actions. Here Strawson focuses on 
determinism, and how even deterministic skeptics find determinism hard to assimilate into 
their daily lives. Unlike Peter Strawson, who argued (1962) that we cannot adopt the 
skeptical perspective in our daily lives because it’s too alien to our interpersonal reactive 
attitudes (e.g., resentment), Galen Strawson thinks Buddhism represents a way of life that 
embodies that perspective. Reminiscent of Descartes suggesting we imagine an evil demon so 
as to sustain doubt against and thereby loosen up our habitual credence, Strawson proposes a 
thought experiment whereby we are to continuously attend to the impersonal deterministic 
causation of each thought, desire, action, to bring the resilience of our habitual agential 
thinking to light. When we see how we cannot maintain the perspective, Strawson advises us 
to take up the Buddhist practice of meditation, thought to reduce the gravitational pull of 
agential thinking.  
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Strawson rightly identifies a relationship between the Buddhist denial of the self and FW. 
However, Strawson’s prescription may be premature: prognosis precedes prescription. Before 
we prescribe FW’s post-mortem procedures, so to speak, FW must be dead. This reminds me 
of a scene from Monty Python and the Holy Grail (1975). A cart-man passes through a 
plagued medieval village collecting corpses while announcing, “bring out your dead!” He is 
about to prematurely collect someone’s infirmed associate, who protests, “I’m not dead”. The 
two negotiate a fee, the cart-man clubs the infirmed man, collects him on the cart, and 
continues on his way, “bring out your dead!” Oddly enough, this attitude has become quite 
fashionable among Western analytic philosophers of late (ed. Caruso 2013). 
 
Coincidentally, Susan Blackmore suggests that meditation—precisely what was just 
prescribed to undo the FW belief—has contributed to her non-agential experience, implicitly 
confirming Galen Strawson’s assertion, disconfirming Peter Strawson’s, with her life 
depicted as a sort of proof of concept for the agentless view. Blackmore implies that the more 
she attends to her experience, the less she experiences agency. She draws the reader into an 
ongoing phenomenological analysis of ‘doing’ by attending to her ordinary activities and 
portrays how it is as difficult to locate any ‘doing’ as it is to locate the ‘self’. Her essay is 
mostly narrative, a fresh alternative to ‘arguments’, but with many obvious implications for 
the arguments at issue here that seem to fall right out of her phenomenological scrutiny.  
 
Or do they? This is a meta-question, at least for the non-Buddhist: meditative awareness 
resembles phenomenological reduction, as Coseru shows (2012), in which ‘conceptual 
proliferation’ is bracketed, but does meditation render putatively-existing agency invisible or, 
worse, disassemble it—a kind of psychic suicide practice? To return to Monty Python, does 
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the Buddhist version of the not-dead-yet person hit herself in the head with the metaphorical 
Zen bamboo staff, rendering her ‘self’ actually fit for the death-cart?  
 
A Buddhist-doctrine-based objection (that might be an ad hominem) could be: that’s just 
clinging to ego. Perhaps, but the tables may be turned on this objection by noting that many 
meditation virtuosos attest, and there is much in Buddhism to support their claim, that 
meditation-theoretic self-regulative skills increase with practice, e.g., greater distance 
between impulse and action and, among others, ability to disapprove of, detach from, and 
thereby diminish the force of unwholesome volitional elements. These things arguably 
illustrate a psychologically functional, naturalistic ‘agent-lite’ or ‘self-lite’, not the ātman 
(immaterial self/soul) that the Buddha rejected. The agent/self-lite’s self-regulative abilities 
may be considered weak FW (“WFW”). In Buddhist terms, the virtuoso’s conventional self 
becomes more functional, not less. Arguably, then, like Blackmore, the virtuoso’s belief in 
SFW diminishes, but, unlike Blackmore, her WFW increases. Or so would argue Harvey, 
Meyers, and Repetti, further below.  
 
True, SFW has bigger problems and presumably no place in Buddhism, but agency-lite 
threatens moral-responsibility-lite, a standard objection to WFW theories: they are too thin to 
support anything stronger than utilitarian or pragmatic justifications for moral responsibility, 
since, if there is no real self, nobody is truly responsible, thus nor does anyone deserve praise 
or blame. Christian Coseru, for instance, immediately below, and Ben Abelson, further down, 
find problems with WFW’s ability to carry the load imposed on it by the requirements of a 
genuinely justified—that is, desert-based, as opposed to a merely utilitarian—moral 
responsibility. 	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Coseru	  thinks	  Buddhism’s	  impersonal	  causal	  model	  compromises	  the	  notion	  of	  responsibility	  that	  requires	  a	  more	  robust	  FW	  that	  demands	  that	  a	  moral	  agent	  participate	  in	  interpersonal	  relationships	  and	  act	  in	  self-­‐regulating	  ways	  relative	  to	  norms	  and	  reasons.	  Coseru	  argues	  that	  the	  compatibilist	  idea	  that	  we	  can	  dispense	  with	  SFW,	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  weaker	  notion	  of	  responsibility	  informed	  by	  cognitive	  science,	  compromises	  the	  notion	  of	  moral	  agency	  by	  eliminating	  responsibility	  from	  the	  purview	  of	  the	  truly	  enlightened,	  the	  Buddhist	  saint.	  Implicitly	  relying	  on	  his	  (2012)	  work	  with	  Buddhist	  phenomenology	  and	  the	  first-­‐person	  (rather	  than	  the	  impersonal)	  perspective,	  Coseru	  offers	  interesting	  alternative	  ways	  of	  conceiving	  Buddhist	  ethics	  and	  agency,	  and	  explores	  an	  alternative	  view	  in	  which	  genuine	  responsibility	  is	  an	  ineliminable	  feature	  of	  moral	  agency.	  Whether	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  this	  line	  of	  thinking	  might	  be	  used	  to	  develop	  a	  Buddhism-­‐friendly	  SFW	  I	  leave	  to	  the	  reader	  to	  discern.	  
 Possibly	  indirectly	  supporting	  some	  of	  Coseru’s	  ideas	  about	  enlightened	  agency,	  Marie	  Friquegnon	  argues	  that	  there	  are	  three	  distinct	  understandings	  of	  agency	  and	  freedom	  in	  various	  forms	  of	  Buddhism.	  First,	  all	  Buddhists	  understand	  agency	  as	  unconstrained	  by	  divine	  power	  or	  material	  causality,	  a	  point	  emphasized	  by	  subsequent	  contributors	  (Wallace	  and	  Repetti).	  Second,	  all	  Buddhists	  see	  unethical	  actions	  as	  the	  direct	  result	  of	  mental	  states	  (ultimately	  impersonally,	  deterministically)	  governed	  by	  anger/hatred,	  jealousy/attachment,	  and	  ignorance/fear.	  For	  instance,	  as	  Goodman	  (above)	  and	  Siderits	  (below)	  each	  emphasizes,	  Śāntideva	  asserts	  that	  we	  can	  no	  more	  blame	  someone—under	  the	  impersonally	  caused	  influence	  of	  such	  mental	  states—than	  we	  can	  blame	  fire	  for	  causing	  smoke	  or	  the	  liver	  for	  producing	  bile.	  And	  third,	  in	  all	  later	  (Mahāyāna)	  Buddhism	  this	  determinist	  attitude	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  ‘selfless’	  actions	  flowing	  from	  enlightened	  nature,	  what	  Repetti	  describes	  as	  ‘agentless	  agency’.	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Friquegnon	  outlines	  the	  grounds	  for	  these	  divergent	  views	  of	  freedom,	  explores	  their	  implications	  within	  Buddhist	  thought,	  and	  articulates	  contributions	  they	  can	  make	  to	  the	  discipline	  of	  philosophy.	  We	  will	  see	  shortly	  some	  bifurcations	  and	  trifurcations	  that	  her	  distinctions	  have	  presaged.	  	  	  Another	  one	  of	  the	  first	  luminaries	  to	  call	  attention	  to	  this	  aspect	  of	  Buddhist	  thinking	  about	  freedom	  was	  B.	  Alan	  Wallace.	  Wallace	  reviews	  how	  the	  Buddha	  rejected	  then-­‐prevalent	  inevitabilist	  views	  about	  fatalism	  and	  chance	  that	  resemble	  determinism	  and	  indeterminism,	  respectively.	  Subsequent	  to	  this	  early	  Buddhist	  rejection	  of	  the	  subject,	  Wallace	  sees	  the	  Buddhist	  tradition	  taking	  a	  pragmatic	  turn,	  he	  explores	  ways	  we	  can	  acquire	  greater	  freedom	  to	  make	  choices	  conducive	  to	  well	  being,	  and	  highlights	  soteriological	  practices	  of	  Mahāyāna	  Buddhism	  that	  point	  toward	  mental	  freedom.	  One	  is	  the	  cultivation	  of	  mind-­‐control,	  the	  ability	  to	  deliberately	  focus	  attention	  with	  continuity	  and	  clarity;	  another	  is	  the	  cultivation	  of	  insight	  into	  how	  attitudes	  shape	  experience,	  allowing	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  altering	  not	  only	  the	  way	  we	  experience,	  but	  how	  we	  are	  influenced	  by	  memory.	  	  	  Wallace’s	  pragmatism	  rests	  on	  a	  liberating	  form	  of	  Mahāyāna	  metaphysics	  that	  emphasizes	  the	  ‘pristine	  awareness’	  or	  ‘substrate’	  dimension	  of	  consciousness	  transcending	  conceptualization	  and	  the	  causal	  nexus—and	  its	  determinism/indeterminism	  dichotomy.	  As	  alluring	  as	  Wallace’s	  dichotomy-­‐transcending	  perspective	  is,	  and	  despite	  that	  it	  arguably	  supports	  Repetti’s	  ‘soft	  compatibilism’	  (the	  opposite	  of	  hard	  incompatibilism),	  infra,	  Wallace’s	  interpretation	  of	  the	  substrate	  consciousness	  is	  disputed	  even	  within	  Tibetan	  Buddhism,	  and	  his	  model	  resembles	  SFW	  (possibly	  stringer	  than	  Coseru’s	  implied	  genuine	  agency)	  as	  a	  causality-­‐
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transcendent	  consciousness	  in	  which	  free	  actions	  may	  be	  initiated.	  Wallace’s	  transcendental	  metaphysics	  aside,	  his	  pragmatic	  insight	  seems	  plausible:	  Buddhist	  soteriological	  practices	  at	  least	  generate	  a	  soteriologically	  pragmatic	  form	  of	  WFW,	  if	  not	  a	  SFW	  as	  well,	  regardless	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  causality.	  	  These	  views	  are	  getting	  complex,	  further	  evidencing	  the	  difficulty	  of	  grouping	  them.	  Thus,	  it	  might	  help	  to	  consider	  a	  Western	  philosophical	  term	  that	  applies	  to	  some	  of	  them,	  a	  term	  no	  Buddhist	  FW	  theorists,	  apart	  from	  Repetti	  (2012,	  2015)	  and	  Harvey	  (briefly,	  this	  volume),	  have	  entertained,	  ‘semi-­‐compatibilism’.	  In	  most	  Western	  usage,	  ‘semi-­‐compatibilist’	  denotes	  incompatibility	  between	  determinism	  and	  SFW,	  but	  compatibility	  between	  determinism	  and	  moral	  responsibility	  (or	  WFW	  in	  the	  moral-­‐responsibility-­‐entailing	  sense).	  Fischer	  (2006)	  argues	  that	  SFW	  presupposes	  ability	  to	  do	  otherwise	  under	  identical	  causal	  circumstances,	  implying	  indeterminism—obviously	  incompatible	  with	  determinism.	  However,	  Fischer	  argues	  that	  moral	  responsibility	  is	  compatible	  with	  determinism,	  as	  Frankfurt	  (1969)	  famously	  argued:	  an	  agent	  can	  voluntarily	  do	  X	  even	  if	  determined	  to,	  so	  long	  as	  the	  agent	  would	  have	  done	  X	  even	  if	  she	  could	  have	  done	  otherwise—and,	  Fischer	  adds,	  so	  long	  as	  she	  was	  ‘moral-­‐reasons-­‐responsive’	  (able	  to	  respond	  to	  moral	  reasons	  for	  doing	  or	  not	  doing	  X),	  she	  is	  morally	  responsible	  for	  doing	  X.	  Prior	  to	  Frankfurt	  (and	  Fischer’s	  emendations),	  most	  philosophers	  took	  responsibility	  and	  FW	  to	  be	  inseparable.	  Thus,	  some	  philosophers	  below	  are	  semi-­‐compatibilists	  in	  this	  narrow	  (Fischer’s)	  sense,	  though	  seemingly	  unaware	  of	  the	  term.	  However,	  some	  may	  be	  semi-­‐compatible	  in	  a	  broader	  sense	  of	  thinking	  Buddhist	  (impersonal)	  causation—as	  opposed	  to	  determinism—is	  compatible	  with	  some	  sense	  of	  agency	  and/or	  moral	  responsibility.	  Most	  readings	  to	  follow	  are	  semi-­‐compatibilist	  in	  both	  senses.	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  Developing	  his	  earlier	  view,	  Martin	  T.	  Adam	  concurs	  with	  an	  implicitly	  semi-­‐compatibilist	  line	  of	  thought,	  based	  on	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  no-­‐self	  doctrine	  and	  of	  Frankfurt’s	  view.	  Adam	  argues	  that	  the	  Buddha’s	  views	  and	  those	  in	  the	  Pāli	  sutras	  (discourses	  of	  the	  Buddha)	  regarding	  the	  ‘no-­‐self’	  doctrine	  are	  patently	  incompatible	  with	  SFW,	  but	  compatible	  with	  the	  sort	  of	  WFW	  and	  moral	  responsibility	  connected	  with	  the	  possibility	  of	  spiritual	  freedom,	  a	  point	  most	  of	  the	  subsequent	  contributors	  would	  likely	  accept.	  Relying	  on	  distinctions	  between	  freedom	  of	  the	  person,	  of	  the	  will,	  and	  of	  action	  he	  attributes	  to	  Frankfurt,	  Adam	  argues	  that	  Buddhist	  freedom	  admits	  of	  degrees	  relative	  to	  the	  individual’s	  spiritual	  development.	  	  	  My	  only	  uncertainty	  here	  concerns	  Adam’s	  attributing	  his	  triple	  distinction	  to	  Frankfurt,	  as	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  Frankfurt	  identifies	  a	  ‘freedom	  of	  the	  person’	  in	  Adam’s	  terms,	  and	  this	  might	  pose	  a	  problem	  for	  his	  overall	  argument.	  However,	  I	  will	  not	  develop	  that	  objection	  further	  here.	  	  Mark	  Siderits	  is	  one	  of	  the	  earliest,	  seminal,	  and	  lasting	  voices	  in	  the	  contemporary	  dialectic	  on	  Buddhist	  views	  of	  FW.	  Siderits	  advances	  a	  uniquely	  semi-­‐compatibilist	  view,	  in	  the	  broad	  sense,	  based	  on	  the	  Buddhist	  doctrine	  of	  ‘two	  truths’,	  the	  ultimate	  and	  conventional.	  Simplifying,	  the	  conventional	  is	  analogous	  to	  the	  naïve	  realist	  worldview	  and	  the	  ultimate	  is	  analogous	  to	  the	  scientific	  worldview,	  but	  in	  Buddhism	  the	  ultimate	  is	  what	  is	  real	  to	  the	  enlightened	  view.	  Conventionally,	  there	  are	  whole	  persons,	  but	  ultimately	  (within	  Abhidharma	  reductionism,	  which	  he	  focuses	  on)	  there	  are	  only	  deterministic	  atomistic	  psychophysical	  parts	  (tropes).	  Siderits	  argues	  that,	  ultimately,	  determinism	  applies	  and	  there	  are	  no	  person-­‐level	  wholes	  that	  could	  have	  FW,	  but,	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conventionally,	  there	  are	  persons	  who	  sometimes	  exhibit	  strong	  agency,	  SFW—unlike	  most	  other	  Buddhist	  compatibilists,	  who	  think	  conventional	  FW	  is	  WFW.	  To	  this	  he	  adds	  an	  argument	  for	  semantic	  insulation	  between	  the	  two	  discourses,	  violations	  of	  which	  threaten	  incoherence,	  from	  which	  it	  follows	  that	  impersonal-­‐parts-­‐determinism-­‐discourse	  cannot	  have	  any	  consequences	  for	  whole-­‐person-­‐agency-­‐discourse	  whatsoever,	  thus	  there	  can	  be	  no	  incompatibilism.	  	  	  However,	  nowadays	  science-­‐talk	  and	  person-­‐talk	  increasingly	  mesh,	  particularly	  in	  the	  West,	  so	  it	  might	  be	  more	  parsimonious	  to	  say	  we	  have	  WFW	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  science-­‐friendly,	  but	  it	  is	  questionable	  whether	  that	  can	  coherently	  be	  expressed	  on	  Siderits’s	  semantic	  insulationism.	  Additionally,	  insofar	  as	  disagreement	  is	  impossible	  for	  two	  people	  (languages/discourses)	  who	  cannot	  communicate	  or	  compete	  for	  a	  zero-­‐sum	  truth-­‐value,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  Siderits’s	  ‘paleocompatibilism’	  constitutes	  a	  genuine	  ‘compatibilism’,	  whereas	  the	  traditional	  in/compatibilism	  debate	  is	  about	  two	  who	  can	  communicate/compete.	  	  Ben	  Abelson	  considers	  a	  different	  challenge	  to	  Siderits	  that	  resembles	  Coseru’s	  concerns	  about	  tension	  between	  Buddhist	  metaphysics	  and	  ethics.	  On	  Siderits’s	  reductionism,	  persons—ultimately	  unreal,	  but	  which	  reduce	  to	  impersonal	  psychophysical	  processes—have	  conventional	  existence	  because	  grouping	  some	  such	  parts	  as	  wholes	  rather	  than	  others	  has	  utility.	  Buddhist	  reductionists	  are	  committed	  to	  an	  ‘Impersonal	  Description’	  (ID)	  thesis:	  a	  complete	  description	  of	  reality	  need	  not	  denote	  persons.	  Siderits	  defends	  against	  the	  charge	  that	  the	  ID	  thesis	  implies	  the	  ‘extreme	  claim’	  that	  central	  features	  of	  our	  person-­‐regarding	  practices	  cannot	  be	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rationally	  justified,	  such	  as	  interest	  in	  one’s	  survival,	  concern	  for	  one’s	  future,	  holding	  people	  responsible,	  and	  compensation	  for	  past	  burdens.	  	  	  Abelson	  focuses	  on	  Siderits’s	  defense	  against	  the	  responsibility	  part	  of	  the	  objection,	  which	  appeals	  to	  ‘shifting	  coalitions’	  of	  self-­‐revision	  processes	  in	  an	  individual	  which	  could	  provide	  enough	  agency	  to	  ground	  responsibility	  without	  violating	  elements	  of	  the	  no-­‐self	  doctrine.	  Abelson	  argues	  that	  while	  the	  ‘shifting	  coalitions’	  idea	  successfully	  disarms	  part	  of	  the	  objection,	  it	  cannot	  account	  for	  the	  robust	  responsibility	  Siderits	  wants,	  though	  it	  may	  ground	  a	  more	  modest—I	  think,	  semi-­‐compatible—responsibility	  still	  stronger	  than	  the	  sort	  Siderits,	  like	  Coseru,	  dismisses	  as	  too	  weak.	  	  	  Somewhat	  sharpening	  his	  earlier—implicitly	  broadly	  semi-­‐compatibilist—view,	  Peter	  Harvey	  claims	  here	  the	  Buddhist	  FW	  problem	  concerns	  whether	  its	  impersonal	  conception	  of	  the	  person	  is	  compatible	  with	  moral-­‐responsibility-­‐entailing	  agency,	  the	  issue	  Coseru	  problematized.	  Restricting	  his	  analysis	  to	  Theravāda	  (the	  oldest	  surviving	  form	  of	  early	  Buddhism),	  Harvey	  concludes	  Theravāda	  is	  semi-­‐compatibilist,	  a	  ‘middle	  way’	  between	  seeing	  a	  person’s	  actions	  as	  so	  impersonally	  conditioned	  as	  to	  lack	  the	  sort	  of	  proximal	  agency	  or	  WFW	  ordinarily	  understood	  as	  minimally	  required	  for	  moral	  responsibility	  and	  seeing	  the	  person	  as	  a	  strong	  self	  with	  SFW.	  Harvey	  adds	  that	  the	  Theravāda	  view	  identifies	  various	  factors	  that	  increase	  such	  agency,	  a	  point	  developed	  by	  the	  following	  contributors.	  Recalling	  Monty	  Python,	  Harvey	  could	  provide	  a	  different	  death-­‐cart	  prognosis:	  “There’s	  a	  cure	  for	  this	  man”.	  	  Also	  appealing	  to	  a	  Mahāyāna	  perspective	  focused	  on	  Buddhist	  practices	  designed	  to	  regulate	  something	  typically	  thought	  in	  the	  West	  to	  be	  inaccessible	  to	  the	  will—namely,	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emotion—Emily	  McRae	  explores	  how	  we	  can	  exercise	  choice	  regarding	  emotional	  experiences	  and	  dispositions.	  Drawing	  on	  mind-­‐training	  practices	  advocated	  by	  Tsongkhapa,	  McRae	  argues	  that	  Tsongkhapa’s	  analysis	  shows	  successful	  intervention	  in	  negative	  emotional	  experiences	  depends	  on	  four	  factors:	  intensity	  of	  the	  emotional	  experience,	  ability	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  the	  workings	  of	  one’s	  mind	  and	  body,	  knowledge	  of	  intervention	  practices,	  and	  insight	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  emotions.	  Echoing	  Friquegnon’s	  observations	  about	  Śāntideva,	  McRae	  argues	  that	  this	  makes	  sense	  of	  Tsongkhapa’s	  seemingly	  contradictory	  claims	  that	  the	  meditator	  can	  and	  should	  control	  (and	  eventually	  abandon)	  her	  anger	  and	  desire	  to	  harm	  others,	  and	  that	  harm-­‐doers	  are	  ‘servants	  to	  their	  afflictions’.	  McRae	  concludes	  with	  some	  (I	  think,	  semi-­‐compatibilist)	  implications	  of	  Tsongkhapa’s	  account	  of	  choice	  in	  emotional	  life	  for	  the	  place	  of	  FW	  in	  Buddhism.	  	  In	  a	  similar	  effort,	  Karin	  Meyers	  argues	  for	  a	  somewhat	  more	  nuanced	  implicitly	  semi-­‐compatibilist	  view,	  an	  agency	  that	  is	  not	  so	  ‘lite’,	  grounded	  earlier	  in	  the	  Abhidharma,	  in	  Vasubandhu’s	  theories	  of	  karma,	  causation	  and	  liberation.	  Meyers	  argues	  that,	  though	  they	  differ	  from	  modern	  positions	  on	  FW	  (and	  the	  views	  of	  other	  Buddhists),	  Vasubandhu	  describes	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  powers	  of	  mind,	  agency,	  and	  action—particularly	  those	  able	  to	  be	  cultivated	  to	  virtuoso	  levels	  of	  mind-­‐control	  far	  beyond	  those	  typically	  associated	  even	  with	  SFW—that	  is	  nonetheless	  compatible	  with	  causation.	  On	  her	  analysis,	  everything	  is	  caused	  (perhaps	  not	  explicitly	  deterministically),	  and	  mental	  qualities	  explain	  FW	  and	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  	  In	  the	  final	  selection,	  Repetti	  claims	  that	  Buddhists	  may	  accept	  semi-­‐compatibilism,	  but	  they	  can	  also	  assert	  a	  broader	  ‘soft	  compatibilism’	  based	  on	  the	  Buddha’s	  rejection	  of	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inevitabilism	  (noted	  by	  Wallace	  and	  Harvey),	  and	  on	  a	  strong	  form	  of	  evitabilist	  agency	  noted	  by	  Meyers	  concerning	  the	  meditation	  virtuoso’s	  ability	  to	  attain	  ‘mind	  mastery’.	  Hard	  incompatibilism,	  recall,	  asserts	  that	  FW	  is	  incompatible	  with	  both	  determinism	  and	  indeterminism,	  but	  soft	  compatibilism	  is	  the	  equally	  comprehensive	  negation	  of	  that	  view:	  FW	  is	  compatible	  with	  both.	  The	  meditation	  virtuoso,	  as	  Repetti	  argued	  earlier,	  exhibits	  mental	  freedom	  regardless	  of	  the	  causal	  nature	  and	  genesis	  of	  her	  mental	  states.	  From	  a	  Buddhist	  perspective,	  to	  the	  extent	  ordinary	  folks	  unreflectively	  satisfy	  desires,	  they	  tend	  to	  decrease	  mental	  freedom,	  because	  doing	  as	  one	  pleases	  fortifies	  the	  chief	  culprit	  in	  our	  suffering,	  the	  false	  sense	  of	  self.	  Conversely,	  as	  we	  increase	  mental	  freedom	  from	  the	  ego-­‐volitional	  complex,	  we	  increase	  self-­‐regulative	  ability,	  subsequently	  exercising	  will	  less	  in	  the	  service	  of	  the	  ego-­‐complex.	  Thus,	  the	  closer	  one	  gets	  to	  mental	  freedom,	  the	  greater	  one’s	  self-­‐regulative	  abilities.	  	  But—and	  here’s	  the	  paradoxical	  rub—as	  one	  attains	  the	  limit	  condition	  of	  mental	  freedom	  (nirvāṇa),	  one	  reaches	  maximum	  self-­‐regulative	  ability,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  longer	  any	  sense	  of	  ego-­‐volitional-­‐self	  in	  need	  of	  regulation.	  Thus,	  the	  maximum	  of	  mental	  freedom	  and	  self-­‐regulation	  (WFW)	  coincides	  with	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  sense	  of	  ego/self,	  a	  kind	  of	  agentless	  agency	  noted	  in	  connection	  with	  Friquegnon’s	  third	  kind	  of	  freedom:	  a	  form	  of	  reason-­‐responsiveness	  that	  is	  entirely	  dharmic	  (in	  accord	  with	  Dharma),	  or	  ‘Dharma	  responsiveness’.	  Reason-­‐responsiveness	  is	  the	  central	  criterion	  in	  semi-­‐compatibilist	  accounts;	  Dharma-­‐responsiveness	  thus	  grounds	  a	  Buddhist	  form	  of	  semi-­‐compatibilism.	  As	  Buddhist	  practitioners	  become	  increasingly	  dharmic	  (through	  soteriological	  practice),	  they	  not	  only	  increasingly	  approximate	  (or,	  on	  some	  views,	  instantiate)	  nirvāṇa,	  they	  increasingly	  approximate/instantiate	  soft	  compatibilist	  WFW,	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agentless	  agency.	  Whether	  Repetti’s	  account	  makes	  sense,	  I	  must	  leave	  to	  the	  reader	  to	  ‘decide’.	  	  	  
	  	  	  
	   18	  
References	  	  Caruso,	  G.D.,	  ed.,	  2013.	  Exploring	  the	  illusion	  of	  free	  will	  and	  moral	  responsibility.	  Lanham,	  MD:	  Lexington	  Books.	  	  Coseru,	  C.,	  2012.	  Perceiving	  reality:	  consciousness,	  intentionality,	  and	  cognition	  in	  
Buddhist	  philosophy.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  Fischer,	  J.M.,	  2006.	  My	  way:	  essays	  on	  moral	  responsibility.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  Frankfurt,	  H.,	  1969.	  Alternate	  possibilities	  and	  moral	  responsibility.	  Journal	  of	  
Philosophy,	  66(23),	  pp.	  829-­‐39.	  	  
Monty	  Python	  and	  the	  Holy	  Grail,	  1975.	  [Film]	  Directed	  by	  T.	  Gilliam	  and	  T.	  Jones.	  UK:	  Python	  (Monty)	  Pictures.	  	  Quine,	  W.V.O.,	  2013.	  Word	  and	  Object.	  New	  ed.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  MIT	  Press.	  	  Repetti,	  R.,	  2012.	  Buddhist	  reductionism	  and	  free	  will:	  paleo-­‐compatibilism.	  Journal	  
of	  Buddhist	  Ethics,	  19,	  pp.	  33-­‐95.	  	  	  Repetti,	  R.,	  2015.	  Buddhist	  meditation	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  free	  will.	  Science,	  Religion	  &	  
Culture,	  2(2),	  pp.	  81-­‐98.	  	  
	  	  	  
	   19	  
Strawson,	  G.,	  1986.	  Freedom	  and	  belief.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  	  Strawson,	  G.,	  1994.	  The	  impossibility	  of	  moral	  responsibility.	  Philosophical	  Studies,	  75(1-­‐2),	  pp.	  5-­‐24.	  	  Strawson,	  P.F.,	  1962.	  Freedom	  and	  resentment.	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  British	  Academy,	  48,	  pp.	  1-­‐25.	  
 1	  Why	  the	  Buddha	  Did	  Not	  Discuss	  ‘the	  Problem	  of	  Free	  Will	  and	  Determinism’	  	  Christopher	  W.	  Gowans	  	  	  It	  is	  widely	  recognized	  that	  the	  problem	  of	  free	  will	  and	  determinism,	  a	  standard	  topic	  in	  contemporary	  Western	  philosophy,	  was	  not	  addressed	  in	  traditional	  Buddhist	  thought.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  propose	  some	  reasons	  for	  this	  lacuna	  in	  the	  teaching	  of	  the	  Buddha	  as	  represented	  in	  the	  four	  primary	  Nikāyas	  (baskets	  or	  collections)	  of	  the	  Pāli	  Canon.	  The	  heart	  of	  the	  reason	  is	  the	  Buddha’s	  practical	  orientation:	  he	  said	  he	  would	  only	  discuss	  topics	  that	  directly	  pertain	  to	  overcoming	  suffering,	  and	  little	  in	  his	  teaching	  about	  this	  directly	  brought	  the	  problem	  into	  focus.	  	  	  	  
The	  Practical	  Nature	  of	  the	  Buddha’s	  Teaching	  	  The	  place	  to	  begin	  is	  “The	  Shorter	  Discourse	  to	  Mālunkyāputta”	  (Cūḷamālunka	  Sutta)	  (Majjhima	  Nikāya	  (“MN”)	  I	  426-­‐32;	  references	  to	  MN	  are	  to	  Ñāṇamoli	  &	  Bodhi	  (1995)).	  In	  this	  well-­‐known	  text,	  Mālunkyāputta	  observes	  with	  disapproval	  that	  the	  Buddha	  has	  not	  taken	  a	  position	  on	  ten	  ‘speculative	  views’.	  These	  pertain	  to	  whether	  the	  world	  is	  eternal	  or	  infinite,	  the	  relationship	  of	  body	  and	  soul,	  and	  the	  postmortem	  existence	  of	  the	  Buddha.	  Mālunkyāputta	  says	  that	  he	  will	  continue	  as	  a	  disciple	  of	  the	  Buddha	  if,	  and	  only	  if,	  the	  
	  	  	  
	   21	  
Buddha	  takes	  a	  position	  on	  these	  views	  or	  at	  least	  declares	  that	  he	  does	  not	  know	  what	  to	  say.	  	  In	  response,	  the	  Buddha	  says	  that	  he	  never	  claimed	  he	  would	  take	  a	  position	  on	  these	  views.	  By	  way	  of	  explanation,	  he	  offers	  a	  famous	  simile.	  Suppose	  a	  man	  wounded	  by	  an	  arrow	  covered	  with	  poison	  was	  brought	  to	  a	  doctor.	  The	  man	  then	  said	  he	  would	  not	  allow	  the	  doctor	  to	  treat	  the	  wound	  until	  he	  knew	  various	  facts	  about	  the	  attack,	  such	  as	  the	  name	  of	  the	  person	  who	  wounded	  him,	  his	  height,	  where	  he	  lived,	  the	  kind	  of	  bow	  and	  shaft	  he	  used,	  etc.	  It	  was	  observed	  that	  the	  man	  might	  well	  die	  before	  coming	  to	  know	  all	  these	  facts.	  	  	  The	  immediate	  point	  of	  the	  simile	  is	  evident:	  Mālunkyāputta’s	  requirement	  that	  he	  will	  follow	  the	  Buddha	  only	  if	  he	  first	  takes	  a	  position	  on	  the	  ten	  speculative	  views	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  wounded	  man’s	  requirement	  that	  he	  will	  allow	  the	  doctor	  to	  treat	  him	  only	  if	  he	  first	  knows	  the	  facts	  about	  the	  attack.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  requirement	  is	  unreasonable	  because	  the	  knowledge	  demanded	  is	  not	  needed	  to	  address	  the	  practical	  issue	  at	  hand.	  In	  order	  to	  survive	  the	  attack,	  the	  wounded	  man	  needs	  proper	  medical	  care,	  and	  knowledge	  of	  the	  name	  of	  the	  person	  who	  attacked	  him	  and	  many	  other	  pieces	  of	  information	  about	  the	  attack	  are	  not	  relevant	  to	  this.	  Likewise,	  the	  Buddha	  says,	  in	  order	  to	  overcome	  suffering	  Mālunkyāputta	  needs	  to	  know	  the	  Four	  Noble	  Truths,	  and	  understanding	  the	  speculative	  views	  is	  not	  relevant	  to	  this.	  Specifically,	  the	  Buddha	  says	  that	  he	  has	  declared	  the	  nature	  of	  suffering,	  its	  origin,	  its	  cessation,	  and	  the	  way	  leading	  to	  its	  cessation,	  since	  understanding	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these	  leads	  to	  enlightenment	  and	  Nibbāna	  (Pāli;	  Sanskrit:	  nirvāṇa).	  And	  he	  has	  not	  declared	  a	  position	  on	  the	  speculative	  views	  because	  understanding	  these	  does	  not	  have	  this	  benefit.	  	  There	  are	  several	  texts	  in	  which	  the	  Buddha	  declines	  to	  answer	  questions	  that	  are	  put	  to	  him.	  The	  point	  of	  these	  texts	  varies.	  Often	  the	  point	  is	  that	  the	  questions	  have	  a	  false	  presupposition,	  and	  sometimes	  it	  is	  that	  any	  answer	  would	  be	  misunderstood	  by	  the	  questioner.	  There	  are	  other	  texts	  in	  which	  the	  ten	  speculative	  views,	  among	  others,	  are	  discussed.	  Once	  again,	  the	  point	  of	  these	  texts	  varies.	  In	  one	  prominent	  case	  it	  is	  to	  warn	  against	  the	  dangers	  of	  contact	  and	  craving	  (see	  Dīgha	  Nikāya	  (“DN”)	  I	  41-­‐45;	  references	  to	  DN	  are	  to	  Walshe	  (1987)).	  These	  diverse	  purposes	  often	  complement	  one	  another	  and	  need	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  signs	  of	  conflict.	  	  	  The	  Mālunkyāputta	  discourse	  has	  been	  interpreted	  in	  different	  ways.	  But	  the	  most	  straightforward	  reading	  is	  that	  the	  Buddha’s	  sole	  concern	  is	  to	  enable	  us	  to	  overcome	  suffering	  and	  so	  he	  will	  only	  discuss	  matters	  that	  pertain	  to	  this	  preeminently	  important	  practical	  concern.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  he	  will	  never	  discuss	  any	  ‘speculative	  views’.	  It	  means	  that	  he	  would	  do	  so	  only	  if	  this	  would	  help	  us	  to	  overcome	  suffering.	  After	  all,	  a	  dominant	  theme	  in	  the	  Nikāyas	  is	  the	  importance	  of	  having	  ‘right’	  rather	  than	  ‘wrong’	  views	  (views	  that	  reduce	  or	  promote	  suffering,	  respectively).	  Nonetheless,	  one	  message	  of	  this	  text	  is	  clear:	  don’t	  be	  distracted	  by	  matters	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  urgent	  practical	  task	  at	  hand.	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Another	  important	  feature	  of	  the	  Mālunkyāputta	  discourse	  is	  that	  the	  Buddha’s	  teaching	  is	  compared	  to	  the	  medical	  practice	  of	  a	  doctor	  (see	  Gowans	  2010).	  Just	  as	  a	  doctor	  heals	  physical	  ills	  of	  the	  body,	  so,	  too,	  the	  Buddha	  heals	  the	  broader	  ills	  encompassed	  by	  the	  term	  ‘suffering’	  (dukkha).	  This	  medical	  analogy	  is	  reinforced	  by	  other	  texts	  in	  which	  Nibbāna	  is	  compared	  to	  a	  state	  of	  health	  and	  the	  Buddha	  is	  compared	  to	  a	  doctor	  (MN	  I	  510-­‐12,	  II	  260).	  Texts	  such	  as	  these	  are	  in	  the	  background	  of	  Buddhaghosa’s	  (1999)	  use	  of	  a	  medical	  simile	  to	  interpret	  the	  Four	  Noble	  Truths:	  	  	   “the	  truth	  of	  suffering	  is	  like	  a	  disease;	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  origin	  is	  like	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  disease,	  the	  truth	  of	  cessation	  is	  like	  the	  cure	  of	  the	  disease,	  and	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  path	  is	  like	  the	  medicine”	  (Visuddhimagga	  XVI	  87).	  	  The	  implication	  of	  the	  medical	  analogy	  is	  that	  the	  Buddha’s	  teaching,	  the	  Dhamma	  (Pāli;	  Sanskrit:	  Dharma),	  should	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  practical	  or	  craft	  knowledge	  similar	  to	  medicine.	  From	  this	  perspective,	  his	  teaching	  has	  two	  important	  features:	  it	  has	  a	  specific	  practical	  goal	  (overcoming	  suffering),	  and	  it	  is	  based	  on	  purported	  knowledge	  that	  enables	  us	  to	  achieve	  this	  goal.	  The	  teaching	  is	  first	  and	  foremost	  knowledge	  of	  how	  to	  do	  something:	  it	  is	  a	  program	  of	  spiritual	  exercises	  directed	  to	  the	  attainment	  of	  enlightenment.	  But	  the	  program	  is	  based	  on	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  world,	  especially	  human	  nature.	  The	  Mālunkyāputta	  text	  tells	  us	  that	  the	  Buddha	  was	  only	  interested	  in	  discussing	  issues	  that	  were	  pertinent	  to	  his	  teaching	  so	  understood.	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My	  suggestion	  is	  that	  these	  considerations	  provide	  a	  helpful	  framework	  for	  thinking	  about	  the	  Buddha’s	  teaching	  in	  relationship	  to	  the	  contemporary	  problem	  of	  freedom	  and	  determinism.	  In	  Western	  philosophy,	  this	  problem	  usually	  arises	  because	  it	  is	  thought	  that	  there	  is	  at	  least	  prima	  facie	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  human	  beings	  have	  free	  will,	  that	  everything	  that	  happens	  is	  causally	  determined,	  and	  that	  these	  contentions	  conflict	  with	  one	  another.	  Beliefs	  about	  free	  will	  are	  usually	  supported	  by	  intuitions	  people	  have	  about	  making	  choices	  and	  assumptions	  they	  make	  about	  the	  presuppositions	  of	  moral	  responsibility.	  Beliefs	  about	  determinism	  are	  usually	  maintained	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  scientific	  understanding	  of	  the	  world	  (at	  least	  above	  the	  quantum	  level)	  and	  sometimes	  by	  appeal	  to	  theological	  beliefs	  about	  the	  power	  of	  God.	  Determinism	  is	  thought	  to	  imply	  that	  whatever	  happens	  must	  happen	  in	  the	  way	  it	  does	  because	  it	  is	  causally	  determined	  by	  scientific	  laws	  or	  God.	  The	  concern	  about	  conflict	  stems	  from	  the	  thought	  that	  an	  exercise	  of	  free	  will,	  a	  free	  choice,	  is	  at	  least	  in	  some	  respect	  not	  causally	  determined	  in	  this	  sense.	  	  Is	  there	  any	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  the	  Buddha	  would	  or	  should	  have	  shared	  these	  or	  similar	  concerns?	  It	  is	  worth	  reminding	  ourselves	  that	  the	  Buddha’s	  enlightenment	  was	  not	  based	  primarily	  on	  the	  development	  of	  a	  philosophical	  theory.	  In	  a	  canonical	  account	  of	  his	  enlightenment,	  the	  Buddha	  first	  attains	  the	  four	  jhānas	  (states	  of	  deep	  meditative	  attainment),	  thereby	  passing	  through	  but	  stilling	  “sustained	  thought”,	  and	  then	  reaching	  “neither-­‐pain-­‐nor-­‐pleasure	  and	  purity	  of	  mindfulness	  due	  to	  equanimity”	  (MN	  I	  21-­‐24;	  cf.	  MN	  I	  247-­‐49).	  In	  this	  purified	  state,	  he	  achieves	  three	  forms	  of	  “true	  knowledge”:	  that	  of	  his	  past	  lives,	  the	  operation	  of	  karma	  and	  rebirth,	  and	  the	  Four	  Noble	  Truths.	  It	  was	  through	  a	  form	  of	  meditation,	  then,	  that	  the	  Buddha	  saw	  the	  way	  to	  overcome	  suffering.	  His	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enlightenment	  was	  based	  more	  on	  a	  kind	  of	  observation	  than	  on	  rational	  analysis.	  And	  he	  said	  that	  his	  teaching	  was	  “unattainable	  by	  mere	  reasoning”	  (MN	  I	  167).	  	  Philosophy	  enters,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  does,	  in	  the	  Buddha’s	  articulation	  of	  what	  he	  observed	  and	  especially	  his	  willingness	  to	  discuss	  challenges	  to	  the	  coherence	  of	  his	  teaching	  and	  its	  consistency	  with	  commonly	  held	  beliefs	  or	  prominent	  philosophical	  views	  of	  other	  traditions.	  This	  willingness	  is	  constrained	  by	  the	  pragmatic	  orientation	  of	  the	  Mālunkyāputta	  text,	  but	  the	  import	  of	  the	  discussions	  in	  the	  Nikāyas	  is	  a	  substantial	  account	  of	  human	  beings,	  our	  susceptibility	  to	  suffering	  and	  our	  ability	  to	  overcome	  it	  through	  enlightenment.	  	  	  	  
Dependent	  Origination	  	  The	  heart	  of	  this	  account	  is	  a	  causal	  understanding	  of	  human	  life.	  The	  doctrines	  of	  karma	  and	  rebirth	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Four	  Noble	  Truths	  are	  crucially	  based	  on	  observations	  of	  causal	  regularities.	  The	  Buddha	  called	  these	  phenomena	  ‘dependent	  origination’	  (paṭicca	  
samuppāda:	  Pāli;	  Sanskrit:	  pratītyasamutpāda).	  In	  a	  widely	  quoted	  brief	  formulation	  of	  dependent	  origination,	  he	  says:	  	  	   “When	  this	  exists,	  that	  comes	  to	  be;	  with	  the	  arising	  of	  this,	  that	  arises.	  When	  this	  does	  not	  exist,	  that	  does	  not	  come	  to	  be;	  with	  the	  cessation	  of	  this,	  that	  ceases.”	  (MN	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II	  32;	  cf.	  Saṃyutta	  Nikāya	  (“SN”)	  II	  28,	  65,	  70,	  78,	  and	  95-­‐6;	  references	  to	  SN	  are	  to	  Bodhi	  (2000))	  	  	  This	  idea	  is	  the	  beginning,	  and	  in	  many	  ways	  the	  end,	  of	  the	  Buddha’s	  teaching:	  “one	  who	  sees	  dependent	  origination	  sees	  the	  Dhamma;	  one	  who	  sees	  the	  Dhamma	  sees	  dependent	  origination”	  (MN	  I	  190-­‐91).	  	  Dependent	  origination	  is	  sometimes	  interpreted	  as	  a	  form	  of	  causal	  determinism.	  If	  this	  were	  correct,	  the	  Buddha	  would	  have	  been	  committed	  to	  one	  important	  part	  of	  what	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  contemporary	  problem	  of	  free	  will	  and	  determinism.	  However,	  this	  interpretation	  attributes	  far	  more	  to	  the	  Buddha	  than	  we	  are	  encouraged	  to	  suppose	  in	  the	  
Nikāyas.	  The	  brief	  formulation	  is	  a	  summary	  of	  a	  longer	  statement	  that	  elaborates	  eleven	  factors	  that	  explain	  the	  arising	  and	  cessation	  of	  suffering.	  The	  arising	  part	  of	  the	  statement	  says:	  	  	   “That	  is,	  with	  ignorance	  as	  condition,	  formations	  [come	  to	  be];	  with	  formations	  as	  condition,	  consciousness;	  with	  consciousness	  as	  condition,	  mentality-­‐materiality;	  with	  mentality-­‐materiality	  as	  condition,	  the	  sixfold	  base;	  with	  the	  sixfold	  base	  as	  condition,	  contact;	  with	  contact	  as	  condition,	  feeling;	  with	  feeling	  as	  condition,	  craving;	  with	  craving	  as	  condition,	  clinging;	  with	  clinging	  as	  condition,	  being;	  with	  being	  as	  condition,	  birth;	  with	  birth	  as	  condition,	  ageing	  and	  death,	  sorrow,	  lamentation,	  pain,	  grief,	  and	  despair	  come	  to	  be.	  Such	  is	  the	  origin	  of	  this	  whole	  mass	  of	  suffering.”	  (MN	  III	  63-­‐4)	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  This	  statement	  is	  immediately	  followed	  by	  the	  cessation	  part.	  This	  begins	  by	  stating,	  “but	  with	  the	  remainderless	  fading	  away	  and	  cessation	  of	  ignorance	  comes	  the	  cessation	  of	  formations”,	  and	  it	  concludes	  by	  saying	  “such	  is	  the	  cessation	  of	  this	  whole	  mass	  of	  suffering”	  (MN	  III	  64).	  Since	  the	  Second	  Noble	  Truth	  says	  that	  craving	  is	  the	  source	  of	  suffering,	  and	  the	  Third	  Noble	  Truth	  refers	  to	  the	  cessation	  of	  suffering,	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  these	  longer	  formulations	  of	  dependent	  origination	  are	  expansions	  of	  the	  basic	  ideas	  in	  standard	  formulations	  of	  the	  Second	  and	  Third	  Noble	  Truths	  (see	  Aṅguttara	  Nikāya	  (“AN”)	  I	  176-­‐7	  for	  this	  connection;	  references	  to	  AN	  are	  to	  Bodhi	  (2012)).	  	  	  The	  longer	  formulation	  has	  been	  a	  source	  of	  perplexity	  both	  because	  of	  what	  is	  and	  is	  not	  included	  on	  the	  list	  and	  because	  of	  its	  apparently	  rigid	  linear	  sequence.	  A	  traditional	  interpretation	  based	  on	  a	  literal	  reading	  understands	  it	  as	  referring	  to	  a	  succession	  of	  three	  lives.	  However,	  though	  the	  longer	  formulation	  appears	  frequently	  in	  the	  texts	  (see	  especially	  “The	  Book	  of	  Causation”	  in	  SN),	  perhaps	  we	  should	  not	  be	  so	  preoccupied	  with	  a	  literal	  reading	  of	  it.	  There	  are	  variations	  of	  the	  longer	  formula	  that	  refer	  to	  other	  factors	  (for	  example,	  see	  SN	  II	  29-­‐32),	  and	  in	  general	  in	  the	  Buddha’s	  teaching	  many	  items	  beyond	  the	  eleven	  factors	  in	  the	  longer	  formulation	  are	  referred	  to	  as	  pertaining	  to	  the	  arising	  and	  cessation	  of	  suffering.	  	  In	  any	  case,	  these	  interpretive	  questions	  should	  not	  obscure	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  brief	  formulation	  is	  a	  summary	  device	  for	  referring	  to	  the	  Buddha’s	  rather	  extensive	  analysis	  of	  why	  suffering	  arises	  and	  how	  we	  can	  overcome	  it.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  that	  the	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Buddha’s	  teaching	  concerning	  dependent	  origination	  has	  two	  parts.	  The	  first	  part	  says:	  these	  are	  the	  causal	  conditions	  of	  suffering.	  Many	  of	  these	  conditions	  involve	  deeply	  ingrained	  habits	  that	  govern	  the	  lives	  of	  most	  ordinary	  adult	  human	  beings	  (ignorance,	  formations,	  craving,	  clinging,	  etc.).	  But	  the	  second	  part	  says	  in	  effect:	  you	  can	  use	  knowledge	  of	  these	  conditions	  as	  part	  of	  a	  training	  program	  to	  change	  your	  habits	  so	  as	  to	  reduce	  and	  eventually	  eliminate	  suffering.	  This	  is	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  Buddha’s	  practical	  teaching:	  knowledge	  of	  human	  nature	  that	  is	  put	  to	  practical	  use.	  	  	  The	  doctrine	  of	  karma,	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  Buddha’s	  enlightenment	  experience,	  also	  conforms	  to	  this	  model.	  In	  the	  cycle	  of	  rebirth,	  morally	  good	  actions	  bring	  about	  greater	  well	  being	  and	  morally	  bad	  actions	  bring	  about	  lesser	  well	  being.	  But	  we	  can	  make	  use	  of	  these	  causal	  conditions	  to	  improve	  our	  lives:	  by	  living	  better	  morally	  we	  can	  increase	  our	  well	  being	  in	  the	  future.	  Dependent	  origination	  is	  central	  to	  both	  saṁsāra	  (the	  delusional	  reincarnational	  cycle)	  and	  liberation	  from	  saṁsāra.	  	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  Buddha’s	  teaching	  in	  its	  proper	  context,	  as	  a	  form	  of	  practical	  knowledge,	  it	  will	  be	  helpful	  to	  consider	  a	  comparison	  from	  agriculture	  (a	  frequent	  source	  of	  similes	  in	  the	  Buddha’s	  thought,	  e.g.	  SN	  I	  227).	  Suppose	  a	  group	  of	  farmers	  often	  complained	  that	  their	  crops	  were	  doing	  quite	  badly.	  In	  response,	  a	  wise	  farmer	  made	  a	  series	  of	  careful	  observations	  about	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  crops	  did	  and	  did	  not	  do	  well.	  He	  then	  reported	  back	  by	  saying	  that	  poor	  crops	  are	  the	  result	  of	  planting	  seeds	  at	  the	  wrong	  time,	  inadequate	  nutrition	  in	  the	  soil,	  improper	  water,	  heat	  and	  light,	  damage	  from	  animals,	  insects	  and	  disease,	  and	  harvesting	  at	  the	  wrong	  time.	  Conversely,	  good	  crops	  will	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result	  from	  reversing	  these	  conditions:	  planting	  at	  the	  right	  time,	  providing	  adequate	  nutrition	  in	  the	  soil,	  etc.	  The	  wise	  farmer	  claims	  to	  provide	  some	  valuable	  practical	  knowledge,	  and	  the	  main	  test	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  he	  has	  done	  so	  is	  basically	  practical—whether	  or	  not	  reversing	  the	  conditions	  brings	  about	  good	  crops.	  	  	  	  Someone	  might	  say	  that	  the	  wise	  farmer’s	  claims	  presuppose	  the	  philosophical	  theory	  of	  causal	  determinism,	  noting	  that	  he	  had	  summed	  up	  his	  account	  with	  the	  brief	  formulation	  of	  dependent	  origination,	  and	  then	  demand	  that	  he	  defend	  this	  philosophical	  theory.	  In	  response,	  the	  farmer	  might	  well	  say,	  I	  am	  showing	  you	  how	  to	  have	  good	  crops,	  and	  I	  don’t	  need	  to	  defend	  that	  theory	  in	  order	  for	  you	  to	  grow	  better	  crops.	  Just	  focus	  on	  improving	  your	  soil,	  planting	  at	  the	  right	  time,	  etc.	  If	  this	  improves	  your	  crops,	  that	  is	  all	  that	  matters.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  improving	  our	  crops,	  we	  don’t	  need	  to	  resolve	  philosophical	  questions	  about	  causality,	  for	  example,	  about	  whether	  Hume	  or	  Kant	  or	  someone	  else	  had	  it	  right.	  Surely	  this	  would	  be	  a	  proper	  response.	  	  My	  suggestion	  is	  that	  we	  regard	  the	  Buddha’s	  teaching	  about	  dependent	  origination	  in	  a	  similar	  way.	  He	  had	  observed	  some	  causal	  regularities,	  both	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  moral	  quality	  of	  our	  actions	  and	  our	  future	  well	  being	  (karma),	  and	  about	  the	  steps	  needed	  to	  achieve	  enlightenment	  and	  overcome	  suffering	  (the	  Four	  Noble	  Truths,	  especially	  the	  Eightfold	  Path).	  It	  is	  important	  that	  he	  understood	  the	  regularities	  correctly,	  and	  the	  Buddha	  was	  quite	  prepared	  to	  discuss	  this.	  But	  all	  that	  really	  mattered	  is	  that	  the	  teaching	  was	  effective:	  that	  we	  could	  improve	  our	  well	  being	  by	  being	  more	  virtuous,	  and	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that	  we	  could	  overcome	  suffering	  by	  following	  the	  Eightfold	  Path	  (and	  related	  practical	  advice).	  	  	  If	  some	  Mālunkyāputta	  figure	  demanded	  that	  the	  Buddha	  take	  a	  position	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  dependent	  origination	  was	  a	  form	  of	  causal	  determinism,	  he	  might	  well	  have	  said	  that	  we	  do	  not	  need	  to	  resolve	  this	  question	  in	  order	  to	  follow	  and	  benefit	  from	  his	  teaching.	  Just	  as	  the	  wise	  farmer’s	  advice	  could	  be	  put	  to	  good	  use	  without	  resolving	  these	  philosophical	  perplexities,	  so	  too	  the	  Buddha’s	  teaching	  could	  have	  valuable	  results	  without	  engaging	  these	  philosophical	  concerns.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  dependent	  origination,	  as	  the	  Buddha	  understood	  it,	  does	  not	  raise	  philosophical	  questions.	  It	  and	  the	  wise	  farmer’s	  teaching	  might	  well	  do	  so.	  However,	  understood	  as	  forms	  of	  practical	  or	  craft	  knowledge,	  pursuing	  such	  philosophical	  questions	  is	  a	  distraction	  from	  the	  main	  point:	  it	  will	  not	  help,	  but	  will	  simply	  delay,	  overcoming	  suffering	  and	  improving	  our	  crops.	  	  	  It	  might	  seem	  that	  the	  brief	  formula	  of	  dependent	  origination	  and	  other	  texts	  cannot	  be	  read	  otherwise	  than	  as	  implying	  strict	  causal	  determinism.	  But	  they	  have	  been	  read	  in	  other	  ways.	  Moreover,	  if	  we	  think	  about	  the	  observations	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  been	  behind	  these	  texts	  we	  can	  see	  that	  this	  reading	  is	  not	  required.	  In	  contemporary	  psychology,	  experimental	  work	  establishes	  statistical	  correlations	  between	  observed	  factors	  that	  are	  expressed	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  correlation	  coefficient	  (a	  number	  between	  -­‐1	  and	  1,	  indicating	  negative	  and	  positive	  correlations).	  Additional	  evidence	  is	  often	  thought	  to	  support	  judgments	  about	  direction	  of	  causality.	  It	  is	  reasonable	  to	  think	  that	  the	  texts	  about	  what	  contributes	  to	  suffering	  and	  overcoming	  suffering	  were	  based	  on	  observations	  by	  the	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Buddha	  of	  what	  he	  took	  to	  be	  significant	  correlations	  indicating	  causality	  similar	  to	  those	  in	  contemporary	  psychology.	  For	  example,	  the	  Buddha	  saw	  that	  craving	  increases	  suffering,	  and	  that	  reducing	  craving	  decreases	  suffering.	  	  In	  fact,	  judging	  from	  the	  texts	  we	  have,	  with	  their	  multiple	  and	  partially	  overlapping	  lists,	  he	  discovered	  a	  complex	  array	  of	  relevant	  phenomena.	  For	  example,	  he	  said	  that	  there	  are	  five	  hindrances	  to	  enlightenment	  (sensual	  desire,	  ill	  will,	  sloth	  and	  torpor,	  restlessness	  and	  remorse,	  and	  doubt)	  and	  seven	  factors	  of	  enlightenment	  (mindfulness,	  investigation-­‐of-­‐states,	  energy,	  rapture,	  tranquility,	  concentration	  and	  equanimity)	  (MN	  I	  60-­‐62,	  III	  85-­‐8).	  Such	  phenomena	  are	  often	  presented	  in	  a	  standard	  order	  in	  the	  texts,	  and	  it	  is	  sometimes	  suggested	  that	  there	  is	  a	  linear	  causal	  sequence,	  with	  one	  factor	  causing	  another,	  which	  then	  causes	  another,	  etc.	  (as	  in	  the	  longer	  formulation	  of	  dependent	  origination).	  But	  such	  ordering	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  reflect	  rhetorical	  strategies	  of	  presentation	  of	  relevant	  factors	  in	  an	  oral	  teaching	  than	  literal	  reports	  of	  observations	  of	  strict	  causal	  sequences.	  	  	  None	  of	  this	  shows	  that	  the	  Buddha	  rejected	  the	  philosophical	  theory	  of	  determinism.	  Complex	  statistical	  correlations	  by	  themselves	  neither	  undermine	  nor	  support	  philosophical	  positions	  about	  determinism.	  But	  recognizing	  that	  observation	  of	  such	  correlations	  must	  have	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Buddha’s	  teaching	  helps	  us	  to	  see	  why	  the	  brief	  formulation	  of	  dependent	  origination	  need	  not	  be	  read	  as	  an	  endorsement	  of	  determinism.	  It	  is	  a	  quick	  summary	  device	  reminding	  us	  that	  there	  are	  causes	  of	  suffering	  and	  corresponding	  ways	  of	  intervening	  to	  overcome	  suffering	  (the	  arising	  and	  cessation	  parts	  of	  the	  formula),	  as	  the	  Buddha	  has	  explained	  in	  detail	  in	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various	  places.	  The	  Buddha’s	  teaching	  was	  primarily	  a	  practical	  instruction,	  based	  on	  observation,	  about	  the	  origin	  of	  suffering	  and	  how	  to	  overcome	  it.	  “Take	  these	  steps,”	  the	  Buddha	  was	  saying,	  “and	  they	  will	  enable	  you	  to	  attain	  enlightenment	  and	  end	  suffering”.	  This	  did	  not	  require	  a	  philosophical	  theory	  of	  causal	  determinism	  any	  more	  than	  the	  wise	  farmer’s	  advice	  on	  growing	  good	  crops	  required	  such	  a	  theory.	  	  
	  
‘It	  Is	  Up	  To	  You’	  	  Several	  passages	  sometimes	  thought	  to	  be	  in	  the	  neighborhood	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  free	  will	  and	  determinism	  offer	  support	  for	  this	  interpretation.	  For	  example,	  the	  Buddha	  rejects	  the	  view	  of	  Makkhali	  Gosāla,	  that	  the	  defilement	  and	  purification	  of	  beings	  have	  “no	  cause	  or	  condition”	  because,	  according	  to	  this	  view:	  	  	   “There	  is	  no	  power,	  no	  energy,	  no	  manly	  strength,	  no	  manly	  endurance.	  All	  beings,	  all	  living	  things,	  all	  creatures,	  all	  souls	  are	  without	  mastery,	  power	  and	  energy;	  moulded	  by	  destiny,	  circumstance,	  and	  nature,	  they	  experience	  pleasure	  and	  pain	  in	  the	  six	  classes.”	  (MN	  I	  407;	  see	  also	  DN	  I	  53-­‐4)	  	  	  The	  point	  here	  is	  that	  what	  we	  do	  and	  subsequently	  experience	  as	  pleasant	  or	  painful	  (on	  account	  of	  karma)	  are	  not	  the	  result	  of	  destiny,	  circumstance	  and	  nature.	  Our	  own	  mastery,	  power,	  energy,	  etc.	  also	  play	  a	  role.	  Elsewhere	  the	  Buddha	  denies	  that	  everything	  we	  experience	  is	  caused	  by	  what	  we	  have	  done	  in	  the	  past	  or	  by	  God’s	  creative	  activity	  (AN	  I	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173-­‐5).	  The	  problem	  with	  these	  views,	  the	  Buddha	  says,	  is	  that	  those	  who	  hold	  them	  “have	  no	  desire	  [to	  do]	  what	  should	  be	  done	  and	  [to	  avoid	  doing]	  what	  should	  not	  be	  done,	  nor	  do	  they	  make	  an	  effort	  in	  this	  respect”	  (AN	  I	  174-­‐5).	  If	  we	  think	  that	  the	  quality	  of	  our	  future	  experiences	  depends	  entirely	  on	  what	  we	  have	  already	  done,	  or	  on	  God,	  then	  we	  will	  have	  no	  desire	  now	  to	  act	  so	  as	  to	  affect	  these	  experiences,	  as	  the	  doctrine	  of	  karma	  explains.	  	  	  The	  thought	  that	  animates	  these	  passages	  is	  that	  the	  belief	  that	  it	  is	  not	  now	  up	  to	  me	  (because	  of	  destiny,	  past	  actions	  or	  God)	  how	  to	  act	  so	  as	  to	  have	  more	  or	  less	  positive	  future	  experiences	  would	  undermine	  my	  ability	  and	  motivation	  (power,	  energy,	  desire,	  etc.)	  to	  act	  well	  so	  as	  to	  increase	  pleasure	  and	  decrease	  pain.	  This	  pragmatic	  point	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  there	  are	  no	  other	  reasons	  for	  rejecting	  these	  views.	  But	  it	  makes	  evident	  the	  Buddha’s	  concern	  to	  address	  issues	  that	  could	  destroy	  our	  confidence	  that	  we	  can	  change	  our	  lives.	  If	  it	  were	  suggested	  that	  the	  Buddha’s	  own	  understanding	  of	  dependent	  origination	  would	  have	  a	  similar	  effect	  (as	  is	  sometimes	  said	  about	  theories	  of	  determinism),	  then	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  he	  would	  have	  said	  the	  same	  thing:	  the	  arising	  part	  of	  dependent	  origination	  should	  not	  be	  understood	  as	  undermining	  our	  ability	  and	  motivation	  to	  act	  on	  the	  cessation	  part.	  	  	  Recall	  that	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  longer	  formulation	  of	  dependent	  origination	  has	  the	  implicit	  message,	  to	  each	  of	  us:	  it	  is	  up	  to	  us	  to	  overcome	  suffering	  by	  undoing	  these	  conditions,	  for	  example,	  by	  following	  the	  Eightfold	  Path.	  Many	  expressions	  of	  the	  Buddha’s	  teaching	  about	  karma	  and	  attaining	  enlightenment	  make	  this	  kind	  of	  point	  explicitly.	  Of	  course,	  that	  your	  actions	  are	  up	  to	  you	  is	  often	  taken	  to	  be	  a	  central	  intuition	  in	  support	  of	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free	  will,	  and	  it	  is	  frequently	  said	  in	  contemporary	  discussions	  that	  the	  Buddha	  implicitly	  accepted	  some	  notion	  of	  free	  will.	  But	  what	  exactly	  do	  people	  mean	  by	  saying	  this?	  	  The	  Buddha	  thought	  that	  human	  beings	  were	  capable	  of	  reflecting	  on	  and	  understanding	  his	  teaching,	  accepting	  it	  on	  this	  basis,	  forming	  intentions	  to	  carry	  it	  out,	  and	  acting	  on	  these	  intentions.	  This	  was	  the	  basic	  presupposition	  of	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  longer	  formulation	  of	  dependent	  origination.	  When	  it	  is	  said	  that	  the	  Buddha	  accepted	  a	  notion	  of	  free	  will,	  perhaps	  this	  is	  all	  that	  is	  meant.	  Roughly	  speaking,	  this	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  thing	  many	  compatibilists	  say	  when	  they	  endorse	  a	  notion	  of	  free	  will:	  human	  beings	  ordinarily	  can	  reflect,	  form	  intentions	  on	  this	  basis,	  and	  then	  act	  on	  these	  intentions,	  etc.	  If	  this	  were	  the	  only	  sense	  in	  which	  it	  was	  said	  that	  the	  Buddha	  accepted	  free	  will,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  objection	  to	  the	  claim.	  	  	  However,	  to	  say	  this	  is	  not	  to	  ascribe	  to	  him	  a	  libertarian	  conception	  of	  free	  will	  according	  to	  which	  exercises	  of	  free	  will	  are	  in	  some	  sense	  uncaused.	  Nothing	  the	  Buddha	  says	  directly	  endorses	  such	  a	  conception.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  Buddha	  was	  committed	  to	  a	  form	  of	  compatibilism.	  Rather,	  he	  saw	  no	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  the	  two	  sides	  of	  his	  teaching	  (why	  we	  suffer	  and	  what	  we	  can	  do	  about	  it)	  might	  be	  incompatible.	  None	  of	  the	  elements	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  the	  contemporary	  free	  will	  problem	  was	  clearly	  in	  view.	  So,	  no	  solution	  to	  the	  problem,	  such	  as	  compatibilism,	  was	  required.	  	  	  Libertarians	  argue	  that	  the	  compatibilist	  understanding	  of	  free	  will	  is	  inadequate	  because	  it	  cannot	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  ‘it	  is	  up	  to	  you’	  intuition	  (among	  other	  reasons).	  If	  it	  were	  thought	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that	  this	  is	  correct,	  and	  that	  this	  intuition	  requires	  uncaused	  actions,	  then	  a	  question	  might	  arise	  about	  how	  the	  Buddha’s	  assumption	  that	  it	  is	  up	  to	  us	  to	  follow	  the	  Eightfold	  Path	  comports	  with	  the	  arising	  part	  of	  dependent	  origination.	  But	  this	  was	  not	  recognized	  in	  the	  
Nikāyas:	  libertarian	  free	  will	  was	  no	  more	  on	  the	  scene	  than	  was	  the	  Newtonian	  determinism	  that	  concerned	  Kant.	  And	  the	  pragmatic	  orientation	  of	  the	  Mālunkyāputta	  text	  suggests	  that	  the	  Buddha	  would	  have	  resisted	  being	  drawn	  into	  any	  such	  debate.	  Even	  if	  there	  were	  an	  important	  philosophical	  issue	  on	  the	  horizon,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  resolving	  it	  would	  facilitate	  overcoming	  suffering	  any	  more	  than	  doing	  so	  would	  help	  us	  grow	  better	  crops.	  	  
	  
The	  No-­‐Self	  Teaching	  	  It	  might	  be	  thought	  that	  a	  problem	  with	  this	  interpretation	  arises	  from	  the	  Buddha’s	  teaching	  about	  ignorance	  and	  wisdom.	  Recall	  that	  ignorance	  and	  the	  cessation	  of	  ignorance	  are	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  longer	  statements	  of	  dependent	  origination.	  For	  the	  Buddha,	  the	  heart	  of	  our	  ignorance—more	  accurately,	  delusion—is	  the	  mistaken	  belief	  that	  we	  are	  selves,	  and	  the	  key	  to	  enlightenment	  is	  the	  realization	  that	  we	  are	  not	  selves.	  It	  might	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  no-­‐self	  teaching	  is	  a	  philosophical	  theory	  and	  that	  it	  puts	  into	  question	  the	  Buddha’s	  assumption	  that	  ‘it	  is	  up	  to	  you’	  to	  undertake	  the	  Eightfold	  Path.	  Here,	  it	  may	  be	  objected,	  is	  an	  important	  disanalogy	  with	  the	  wise	  farmer:	  the	  causal	  regularities	  in	  farming	  concerned	  plants,	  not	  human	  beings,	  and	  so	  while	  there	  was	  no	  conflict	  with	  the	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farmer’s	  advice,	  there	  was	  conflict	  with	  the	  implicit	  ‘it	  is	  up	  to	  you’	  assumption	  of	  the	  Buddha’s	  teaching.	  	  	  The	  Mālunkyāputta	  text	  precludes	  discussing	  philosophical	  questions	  only	  if	  doing	  so	  is	  not	  relevant	  to	  overcoming	  suffering.	  The	  no-­‐self	  teaching	  and	  the	  considerations	  put	  forward	  in	  support	  of	  it	  surely	  amount	  to	  at	  least	  a	  proto-­‐philosophical	  position.	  So	  this	  is	  an	  important	  challenge.	  Karin	  Meyers	  (2014)	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  no-­‐self	  teaching	  is	  incompatible	  with	  the	  implicit	  ‘it	  is	  up	  to	  you’	  message	  in	  the	  Buddha’s	  various	  statements	  to	  his	  followers	  because	  the	  message	  presupposes	  an	  ‘autonomous	  agent’	  that	  the	  no-­‐self	  teaching	  denies.	  She	  argues	  that	  the	  problem	  can	  be	  resolved	  by	  appealing	  to	  the	  distinction	  between	  ultimate	  and	  conventional	  truth:	  there	  are	  no	  selves	  in	  the	  former,	  but	  there	  are	  autonomous	  agents	  in	  the	  latter.	  However,	  though	  this	  may	  well	  be	  an	  apt	  resolution	  for	  later	  Buddhist	  traditions,	  in	  the	  Buddha’s	  teaching	  in	  the	  Nikāyas	  the	  distinction	  between	  ultimate	  and	  conventional	  truth	  had	  not	  yet	  been	  explicitly	  articulated.	  How	  might	  the	  Buddha	  have	  considered	  this	  issue?	  	  The	  Buddha’s	  basic	  position	  is	  that	  what	  we	  call	  the	  ‘self’	  is	  nothing	  but	  an	  ensemble	  of	  ever-­‐changing	  and	  causally	  dependent	  processes	  that	  he	  categorized	  as	  the	  ‘five	  aggregates’	  (material	  form,	  feeling,	  perception,	  formations	  and	  consciousness).	  There	  is	  no	  distinct	  and	  unchanging	  self	  over	  and	  above	  these,	  or	  somehow	  at	  the	  center	  holding	  all	  of	  them	  together.	  The	  discovery	  that	  this	  was	  so,	  that	  no	  such	  self	  could	  be	  observed,	  was	  important,	  he	  believed,	  because	  it	  undermined	  the	  primacy	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  what	  is	  and	  is	  not	  ‘me	  and	  mine’	  in	  practical	  deliberation.	  In	  particular,	  the	  Buddha	  discovered	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that	  living	  our	  lives	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  dichotomy	  between	  what	  is	  and	  is	  not	  ‘me	  and	  mine’	  gives	  rise	  to	  greed	  and	  aversion,	  which	  in	  turn	  gives	  rise	  to	  suffering.	  The	  realization	  that	  there	  is	  no	  self	  is	  crucial	  to	  dismantling	  this	  conditioning:	  when	  what	  is	  ‘me	  and	  mine’	  loses	  its	  practical	  salience,	  greed	  and	  aversion,	  and	  consequently	  suffering,	  decline.	  This	  analysis	  conforms	  to	  the	  basic	  arising	  and	  cessation	  model	  of	  dependent	  origination	  discussed	  earlier.	  	  In	  the	  Buddha’s	  teaching,	  the	  processes	  that	  are	  mistakenly	  interpreted	  as	  selves	  are	  not	  randomly	  distributed	  across	  the	  universe.	  That	  they	  are	  organized	  in	  some	  significant	  way	  is	  implicit	  in	  the	  idea	  that	  they	  are	  causally	  conditioned	  (especially	  as	  exemplified	  in	  karma).	  From	  these	  patterns	  of	  organization	  arises	  the	  mistaken	  thought	  that	  “I	  am	  a	  self”,	  that	  these	  particular	  processes	  (and	  not	  those	  other	  ones)	  belong	  to	  ‘me’	  or	  ‘myself’.	  When	  the	  Buddha	  addressed	  the	  not-­‐yet-­‐enlightened	  and	  assumed	  that	  they	  could	  understand	  and	  accept	  his	  teaching,	  form	  intentions	  to	  carry	  it	  out,	  and	  act	  on	  those	  intentions,	  he	  would	  have	  supposed	  that	  all	  this	  could	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  processes	  of	  aggregates.	  Of	  course,	  he	  would	  have	  recognized	  and	  taken	  into	  account	  that,	  insofar	  as	  his	  followers	  were	  still	  deluded,	  they	  would	  have	  tacitly	  assumed	  that	  it	  was	  their	  selves	  as	  agents	  who	  were	  thinking,	  intending,	  acting,	  etc.	  This	  was	  part	  of	  their	  delusion,	  and	  perhaps	  in	  striving	  to	  follow	  the	  Buddha’s	  teaching	  they	  sometimes	  experienced	  some	  cognitive	  dissonance	  concerning	  this	  issue.	  But	  for	  the	  most	  part	  confidence	  (saddhā)	  in	  this	  teaching	  concerning	  the	  self	  evidently	  sustained	  the	  conviction	  among	  his	  disciples	  that	  with	  enlightenment	  they	  would	  come	  to	  observe	  and	  understand	  the	  explanation	  in	  terms	  of	  processes	  of	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aggregates.	  We	  see	  here	  one	  of	  the	  roots	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  ultimate	  and	  conventional	  truth.	  	  Those	  who	  are	  naturally	  drawn	  to	  philosophical	  inquiry	  might	  well	  think	  that	  this	  account	  raises	  philosophical	  questions.	  However,	  in	  a	  similar	  vein,	  the	  Buddha’s	  teaching	  about	  rebirth	  might	  raise	  questions	  about	  body	  and	  soul,	  and	  his	  teaching	  about	  escaping	  the	  cycle	  of	  rebirth	  might	  raise	  questions	  about	  the	  postmortem	  existence	  of	  an	  enlightened	  person.	  Yet	  these	  are	  precisely	  the	  questions	  the	  Buddha	  declined	  to	  answer	  in	  response	  to	  Mālunkyāputta’s	  challenge.	  His	  pragmatic	  orientation	  is	  a	  guide	  to	  what	  he	  might	  have	  said	  had	  his	  followers	  expressed	  perplexity	  about	  how,	  if	  there	  is	  no	  self,	  no	  agent,	  they	  could	  act	  on	  his	  teaching.	  The	  Buddha	  might	  have	  said	  that	  they	  should	  focus	  their	  attention,	  less	  on	  developing	  a	  philosophically	  cogent	  explanation	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  action,	  and	  more	  on	  acting	  selflessly,	  on	  living	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  distinction	  between	  what	  is	  and	  is	  not	  ‘me	  and	  mine’	  is	  not	  salient	  in	  deciding	  how	  to	  act—that	  is,	  on	  living	  with	  compassion	  and	  loving-­‐kindness	  for	  all	  beings.	  	  	  From	  this	  perspective,	  the	  emphasis	  of	  the	  no-­‐self	  teaching	  was	  as	  much	  ethical	  as	  it	  was	  metaphysical.	  It	  was	  first	  and	  foremost	  a	  practical	  teaching	  about	  living	  without	  greed	  and	  aversion	  so	  as	  to	  overcome	  suffering.	  Though	  it	  depended	  on	  an	  understanding	  of	  persons,	  this	  understanding	  was	  based	  more	  on	  meditative	  awareness	  than	  on	  metaphysical	  analysis.	  The	  wisdom	  of	  the	  Buddha,	  from	  this	  perspective,	  was	  primarily	  a	  practical	  rather	  than	  a	  theoretical	  wisdom,	  more	  a	  knowing	  how	  than	  a	  knowing	  that.	  This	  is	  why,	  on	  this	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reading,	  the	  Buddha	  was	  not	  concerned	  with	  free	  will	  and	  how	  it	  might	  be	  reconciled	  with	  no-­‐self,	  dependent	  origination,	  or	  other	  aspects	  of	  his	  teaching.
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 2 Why There Should Be a Buddhist Theory of Free Will 
 
Rick Repetti 
 
 
As reflected in some of the other contributions to this volume, some Buddhist scholars think 
Buddhism rejects free will, or they deny there is, was, or should be a Buddhist free will theory or 
even any Buddhist inquiry into free will. I disagree. I argue for a certain Buddhist theory of free 
will in chapter 17 of this volume that could but won’t be repeated here: here I argue why there 
should be such a theory (see ch. 17). 
 
The Buddhist path contains methods for cultivating virtuoso degrees of abilities that exhibit self-
regulative agency—e.g., volitional/metavolitional regulation, reason-responsiveness—touted by 
contemporary philosophers sympathetic to naturalistic or ‘compatibilist’ free will, that is, the sort 
of free will that is compatible with scientific views of causation or nature. For Buddhists, false 
understanding of self-agency is considered the central cause of dukkha (suffering, existential 
unsatisfactoriness), and correct understanding is its antidote. The elimination of dukkha, 
coextensive with enlightenment, is the principal aspiration of Buddhist soteriology. Thus, 
whether free will is part of correct understanding of self-agency is a valid question; its answer, 
positive or negative, arguably constitutes a ‘Buddhist free will theory’, just as the answer to the 
question whether the self is real constitutes ‘the Buddhist theory of the self’. 
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The unanalyzed self-sense is not that of a passive witness,1 but of one that wants, deliberates, 
resists, wills, chooses, acts, and whose actions are up to it. This reified understanding of self-
agency, Buddhists claim, perpetuates dukkha. All Buddhist teachings and practices seek to 
disentangle this self-conception, sorting its illusory and non-illusory elements. It is not choice, 
action, etc. that disappear upon enlightenment, but the illusory misconception that one is the 
ontologically independent ātman (immaterial, changeless soul/self) that (virtually telekinetically) 
generates them. 
 
Whether, to what extent, and how elements/abilities of agency are self-regulating, though the 
‘agent’ is not considered metaphysically substantive, are questions the answers to which would 
provide a theoretical understanding of self-agency and of whether such elements/abilities 
constitute moral-responsibility-entailing free will, and thus a Buddhist free will theory that may 
be described as involving ‘agentless agency’. Such a theory is soteriologically warranted, among 
other reasons, but even if for no other reason than that individuals presumably would want to 
understand how it is that they can alter their lives in certain ways to attain enlightenment if there 
is no such thing as the individual agent. Such a theory also promises to illustrate the explanatory 
purchase of Buddhist psychology, metaphysics, and ethics regarding one of the most—if not the 
most—intractable of problems in analytic Western philosophy. 
 
Āryas (advanced Buddhist practitioners) are meditation virtuosos, and they have cultivated great 
self-control, an element of free will that—at least theoretically—doesn’t require a substantive 
agent-self. According to Buddhist thought, the average non-practitioner is so heavily conditioned 
by the three poisons (greed, hatred, and delusion) as to be virtually determined—whether 
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determinism is universally applicable or not—insofar as they lack the sort of proximal self-
regulative abilities the virtuoso exhibits. The virtuoso exercises self-regulation dharmically (in 
accord with Dharma, Buddhist teachings), reducing dukkha and cultivating enlightenment, not 
only not feeding ego-volitions, but diminishing them.  
 
The most powerful free will skeptical argument in Western philosophy, ‘hard incompatibilism’, 
denies autonomy regardless of whether we are determined: if choices are determined, we’re not 
ultimately responsible for them; if they’re random, we cannot claim to author them. An example 
is Strawson’s ‘impossibility argument’: we choose as a function of our present mental state; we 
cannot be the cause of our first mental state; so, it’s impossible to be ultimately responsible for 
mental states we’re in when we choose, or for such choices (Strawson 1994).  
 
Most Buddhists would accept most of Strawson’s claims, given their doctrine of dependent 
origination: whatever arises does so in dependence on everything else that has arisen or is 
simultaneously arising. That choices are conditioned by mental states is axiomatic, as is the idea 
that conditioning extends backwards indefinitely through previous mental states, choices, and 
actions; indeed, Buddhist philosophy considers this temporal sequence beginningless. Add to this 
the tautology that self-creation ex nihilo is impossible, and it seems to follow that nobody can be 
ultimately responsible for any mental state, choice, or action.  
 
The central insight of Buddhism is that total mental freedom is possible in nirvāṇa, the antidote 
to dukkha. The meditation virtuoso thus can escape from the influences of previous and current 
mental states—irrespective of deterministic or random causes—contradicting Strawson’s 
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impossibility argument. Non-Buddhists might deny anyone attains nirvāṇa, but evidence 
supports some Buddhist meditation claims; to mention just one relevant study, Zen practitioners 
(trained to be ceaselessly responsive to the present) exposed to repetitive stimuli show no 
reduction in responsiveness, whereas control groups ignore repetitive stimuli after brief exposure 
(Kasulis 1985). Hundreds of studies conducted on Buddhist meditators similarly confirm their 
claims (Lutz, Dunne and Davidson 2007; Lutz and Thompson 2003; Thompson 2015). These 
studies indirectly render plausible the claim that the arhat—the enlightened being, the limit case 
meditation virtuoso—is free of mental state influences, with minor exceptions (Harvey 2007), 
and to the extent they approximate nirvāṇa, so are the not-yet-enlightened āryas. Buddhist 
metacognitive training thus cultivates a skill that theoretically defeats the most powerful free will 
skepticism in analytic Western philosophy: this alone justifies a Buddhist free will theory, but 
there are other justifications. 
 
Gowans (this volume) rejects the idea of a Buddhist theory of free will, with one pragmatic 
exception—shared by Goodman (this volume), but for different reasons—because Buddhism 
restricts inquiry to the soteriologically relevant, and Gowans assumes an understanding of free 
will is not generally soteriologically relevant. But Westerners are not committed to the principle 
that only what is soteriologically relevant is warranted. Non-Buddhists—and Buddhists alike—
clearly may benefit from a Buddhist theoretical understanding of free will that promises to be 
enlightening. Moreover, it is possible that by seeing the complexity of Buddhism Westerners 
might be drawn to it. Many who came to debate the Buddha were drawn into the Dharma (the 
Buddhist teaching) upon hearing how it handled philosophical puzzles. If Buddhism is 
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enlightening in general, then anything that brings listeners toward the Dharma is soteriologically 
relevant and thus justified. 
 
Garfield and Flanagan (both this volume) cite theodicy in the Western genesis of the free will 
belief as a basis for rejecting its relevance to godless Buddhism, adding that the free will meme 
survives—implicitly, as a doxastic appendage—in the West, independent of the decline of its 
genesis in monotheism. If they are right, perhaps this Western meme may be rehabilitated by a 
Buddhist free will theory that denies the ultimate reality and causal autonomy of the self, but 
advocates that we may control our volitions, cultivating an agency that leads to its own 
transcendence in total mental freedom, nirvāṇa. What could be wrong with that, from a Buddhist 
perspective? 
 
Regardless of its genesis, however, which is technically irrelevant to the validity of a concept, 
most of us have the free will meme, and even if we come to doubt it upon reflection (something 
that also arguably has a genesis only in Western thought), we tend to live as if it is true, with few 
exceptions, including Blackmore (this volume), who claims she doesn’t experience free will, and 
Harris (2013), who claims that even the belief that we experience free will is illusory, because 
phenomenological examination shows that choice is mysterious. Blackmore and Harris are both 
long-term Buddhist meditation practitioners, so perhaps the genetic invalidation of ideas (based 
on their origin) actually does apply to them, in reverse.  
 
For one key Buddhist meditation instruction—clearly based on traditional Buddhist 
assumptions—is to pay nonjudgmental attention to the impersonal arising of mental states. Thus, 
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what Buddhist meditation practitioners consider discovered or verified in phenomenological 
experience actually may be entirely generated by Buddhist-theory-laden conceptual expectations. 
Thus, unless one is an arguably Buddhism-biased meditator, our pre-theoretical agential 
phenomenology arguably universally depicts choices and actions as up to us: even Buddhism 
agrees that desires and thoughts that typically arise spontaneously may be regulated. In the two 
traditions’ mutual search for truth, no holds are barred—in either direction. 
 
Most of us experience some sort of free will: our beliefs and desires inform our choices and 
volitions, and these—we all seem to think we experience—cause our behavior. However, many 
branches of contemporary science reveal unconscious biases, errors, and illusions distorting our 
experience. Anyone thus informed must navigate repetitive cognitive dissonance between these 
findings and our humanistic self-conceptions. Anxiety accompanies existential uncertainty about 
the pre-theoretical narrative that no longer seems to sufficiently explain our place in the vast 
universe, our communities, bodies, brains, and minds. 
 
These narrative voids in many Westerners’ lives may be filled with Buddhist philosophy, which 
does not require belief in implausible myths about divine creation and human origins ex nihilo, 
anachronistic moral rules, crumbling folk psychology, soul, or self, but nonetheless presents a 
long-flourishing way of life guided by a comprehensive way of understanding one’s place in a 
meaningful world that is comfortable with such seemingly depersonalized implications. 
Buddhism offers hope to anyone in an existential doxastic impasse, unable to maintain outmoded 
moral, religious, and other humanistic beliefs, but reluctant to embrace what they suspect is the 
narrative bankruptcy of value-free scientific inquiry. Buddhism offers an equally sobering but 
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simultaneously coherent existential, psychological, philosophical, ethical, and soteriological 
narrative. 
 
Compare the strategy of trying to forge a truce between religion and science, exemplified in 
Gould’s ‘non-overlapping magisteria’ (“NOMA”) thesis: science reigns over empirical fact, 
religion over values and meaning (2011). But most major religions—with the possible exception 
of Buddhism—assert claims about the history of the world and humanity that contradict facts in 
astrophysics, geology, and genetics, among others (ed. Caruso 2014). Most versions of 
Buddhism are immune to this criticism, and some versions of Buddhism (e.g., emerging Western 
versions) may count more as philosophies than religions, but most have far fewer claims that 
contradict scientific facts, and the few that threaten to contradict science have yet to be refuted, 
and are not core tenets. Buddhism is committed to empirically validated truth, dating to 
injunctions from the Buddha not to accept anything on authority, but on investigation.  
 
Two major exceptions are karma and reincarnation, though some Buddhists do not take these 
literally. Flanagan suggests a naturalized Buddhism, ‘Buddhism without hocus pocus’ (Flanagan 
2011), which would eliminate supernatural and related metaphysical elements but which would 
likely appear to traditional Buddhists as ‘Buddhism without Buddhism’. Nonetheless, Buddhism 
is a humanistic and spiritual philosophy that satisfies many human needs typically satisfied by 
religion, and much if not all of its supernaturalism is plausibly optional. Indeed, revisionary 
Western forms of Buddhism that take Flanagan’s naturalism for granted are emerging, despite 
traditionalists’ objections (eds. Purser, Forbes and Burke 2016). 
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Buddhism naturalized instantiates a valid NOMA case. Buddhism as is almost qualifies for the 
status NOMA erroneously affords all religions. Buddhism is probably attractive to Westerners 
today because it mostly qualifies for NOMA status: without conflicting with science, it answers 
to deep needs for humanistic self-understanding; it is mostly consistent with contemporary moral 
thinking, unlike most religions; and it arguably supports a discounted but palatable view of 
agency or free will that coheres with that moral framework.  
 
Loosely analogous to NOMA’s bifurcation is the ‘two truths’ doctrine in Buddhism that Siderits 
(this volume) applies to free will. Simplifying, the two truths parallel the distinction between 
pragmatic and scientific levels of description in Western philosophy. (The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy has an excellent entry on the “Two Truths”.) Conventionally 
(pragmatically), there are tables and people, though ultimately only atoms configured certain 
ways, which we conveniently designate ‘tables’ and ‘people’. Most forms of Buddhism treat the 
conventional similarly, but Madhyamaka (later) Buddhists deny, and Theravāda (earlier) 
Buddhists assert, that the ultimate is metaphysically substantive. Theravāda denies ultimate 
reality to partite wholes it views as reducing to mere aggregations of momentary atomistic 
psychophysical tropes it sees as ultimately real. On both Buddhist views, what appear to 
constitute independently existing macro-level wholes are viewed as constructed projections of 
our—dualistic and therefore illusory—conceptualizations, lacking metaphysically substantive or 
objectively real essences but, for Madhyamaka, everything lacks substance, all the way up and 
all the way down, so to speak: as Friquegnon notes (this volume), on this view nirvāṇa and 
saṃsāra (the world of cyclical reincarnational wandering in primal confusion, as perceived by 
the unenlightened) are one, simply viewed differently. 
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On analysis, almost everything Buddhism claims is only conventionally true, which implies not 
ultimately true, except perhaps the respective understandings about the ultimate. A Buddhist 
NOMA issue is arguably whether conventional Buddhist truth (e.g., Buddhist religion) is non-
overlapping with ultimate Buddhist truth (akin to science). Applying this reasoning to free will, it 
is probably ultimately illusory (in agreement with many scientists and philosophers) but 
conventionally real (in agreement with the folk), a position made explicit by Siderits (this 
volume), who insists the two domains are non-overlapping, semantically insulated from each 
other—both ‘true’ under different conceptions of what it means to be true, or true in different 
discourse domains—yet, importantly, conventional truth may be thought true because it (mostly) 
supervenes on ultimate truth.  
 
Any ways the two domains seem non-insulated are, on analysis, increasingly sophisticated 
conventional discourses, say, analogous to fiction or implicit meta-language, all ultimately false. 
Only statements describing ultimate reality are strictly true, and these reflect the insubstantiality 
of everything (except, for Theravāda, psychophysical atomistic tropes). Enlightenment consists 
in the embodied/integrated realization of metaphysical insubstantiality or ‘emptiness’. Buddhism 
aims at this negative realization—everything is ‘empty’ of ‘self-nature’ or metaphysical 
substance—and prescribes a way of life devoted to its attainment, conceived as life affirming and 
maximally liberating.  
 
There is an ancient contemplative saying, “Before enlightenment, chop wood and carry water; 
after enlightenment, chop wood and carry water” (Roth and Montgomery 2007, p. 141), 
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suggesting enlightenment involves the same world, mental freedom being the difference. It’s not 
that post-enlightenment there’s no wood, water, chopping: these remain, but one doesn’t 
misapprehend their insubstantiality. This applies to free will. It’s not that post-enlightenment 
there’s no considering consequences, choosing, acting: these remain, but one doesn’t 
misapprehend their insubstantiality. There is effective agency, but no substantive agent—
‘agentless agency’. Or so I argue, despite being unenlightened and thus barely ‘pointing at’ this 
putatively nondualistic reality.  
 
Though this is a possibly misleading comparison, Buddhism may be likened—for anyone 
‘recovering’ who turns to Buddhism—to methadone, which helps transition from heroin 
addiction, insofar as Buddhism provides enough doxastic scaffolding to support a transformative 
process from faith in the (post-monotheistic-religious) conventional, humanistic, folk view of 
self and world to one consistent with ultimate reality. The two-tiered and multi-dimensional 
elements of Buddhist thought facilitate transition from simpler to more complex levels of 
understanding, enabling beginners to latch onto initially palatable doctrines that upon further 
inquiry reveal deeper insights that require (typically meditative) work to assimilate. Perhaps this 
is why Buddhism is essentially a (progressively developmental) ‘path’. 
 
For example, beliefs in reincarnation and karma fill a theodicy void in recovering Western 
theists who might still subscribe to a ‘just world’ thesis, for they assuage fear of death and 
existential injustice, respectively, and present a morally superior worldview. A Newtonian 
karmic law guaranteeing a just world and an infinite number of incarnations until enlightenment 
is more compassionate than eternal damnation for one bad life. From an impartial vantage, 
	  	  	  
	  	   52	  
Buddhism has the best theodicy among all the world’s religions, however oxymoronic (if one 
defines ‘theodicy’ to require a deity). We can call Buddhist godless theodicy ‘soteriodicy’, its 
soteriological theory of cosmic justice.  
 
That’s the methadone part of the analogy. After ‘drying out’ on the metaphorical methadone of 
simplistic belief in karma and reincarnation, according to maturity and readiness, budding 
Buddhist converts come to understand these doctrines more subtly (say, there’s no self that 
reincarnates or bears karma, or, subsequently, if there’s no reincarnation, it’s like reincarnation 
moment to moment anyway). Admittedly, this enables a bait-and-switch strategy, but that 
millions of Westerners are drawn to Buddhism and that Buddhism has spread globally without 
force, adapting to different cultures throughout history, is likely significantly explained by this 
progressive soteriodicy.  
 
Buddhism may play a transformative role in the lives of many such Westerners and possibly a 
greater role if it had a well-worked out explanation for the dynamics of agency that captures 
something of our folk psychological sense that our lives are significantly up to us, particularly in 
light of its pragmatic arts of self-regulation, while it eases us through its hierarchy of levels of 
understanding about the ultimately agentless nature of agency, the latter of which converges 
upon the sort of deflationary pictures of ourselves being delivered to us increasingly from the 
latest scientific research. Buddhism already does this levels-of-complexity transition when it 
comes to its theory of the self: ultimately there is no metaphysically substantive thing that is a 
self, but conventionally talk of the self is pragmatic. As Siderits argues (this volume), ultimately 
there is no free will because there is no self, but conventionally we have free will because we are 
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persons (who act voluntarily, etc.). Coseru (this volume) sketches what might, in my view, make 
for an intermediate level Buddhist understanding of our essentially subjective/phenomenological 
first-personal agency. This two-tiered hierarchy comports with the need to balance our everyday 
conceptions of ourselves as social agents with our understanding of the impersonal ultimate 
reality revealed by science. If Flanagan and Garfield are right that the Western free will meme is 
a post-theodicy doxastic appendage, then Buddhism’s complex, tiered theoretical understanding 
of agency may serve as its therapy. 
 
A Buddhist free will theory may also be supported by Buddhist ethics. According to Goodman 
(2009), the Buddhist canon implies negative consequentialism: the reduction of suffering is its 
prime directive. Whether he is right, Buddhism is consistent with negative consequentialism. 
Buddhist ethics thus may be taken to indirectly support negative consequentialist arguments to 
the effect that doing x is morally acceptable if it leads to the reduction of suffering. Thus, if a 
Buddhist free will theory promises to reduce suffering, then it is dharmic. The Buddhist path is 
classically likened unto a raft constructed on the teachings of the Dharma, used to cross over 
saṃsāra, the sea of delusional/reincarnational wandering, and reach the shore of nirvāṇa (Repetti 
2010a). Constructing a Buddhist free will theory promises to help the aspirant understand the use 
of the paddle.  
 
My earlier argument (Repetti 2010a), that Buddhist meditation increases both a form of free will 
and its more wholesome exercise, confirms the paddle-use justification for a Buddhist free will 
theory. Buddhist meditation cultivates the ability to detach from first-order intentions (base-level 
cravings, impulses, desires, wants, etc.) by the repeated discipline of simply observing them, 
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which generates a causal/functional experiential distance between first-order intentions and 
awareness of them, enabling the practitioner to take those intentions virtually off-line from their 
typical, habituated, online dynamics of leading mindlessly into action, and thus to make wiser, 
more dharmic choices, approving some and disapproving others, forming dharmic second-order 
intentions (meta-intentions), to borrow Frankfurt’s first-/second-order distinction—not to 
advocate a Frankfurt-style Buddhist theory of free will, contra Flanagan (this volume) and Tuske 
(2013).  
 
Whether the process is deterministic or ultimately insubstantial is irrelevant to the fact that 
practitioners cultivate powerful self-regulation skills enabling them to reduce mindlessly acting 
on first-order intentions otherwise leading to further addictive tendencies and suffering, as 
Meyers, Wallace, and Harvey (all this volume) would agree—skills most consider forms of 
autonomy. Buddhist meditation therefore reduces suffering and increases self-regulation. Thus, 
Buddhist meditation supports a conventional conception of autonomy as self-regulation that is 
ultimately agentless, though the term ‘autonomy’ need not imply a real self. Some heating 
systems have thermostats; they’re self-regulating, though lacking a self. The usual counter is that 
thermostats don’t program themselves, but Buddhism suggests, as Wallace and McRae (both this 
volume) argue and I argued (2010a, 2010b), that we can reprogram ourselves to increase our 
freedom. I’m noting that doing so increases free will. 
 
Because much recent interest in Buddhism is driven by interest in meditation, an analysis of the 
dynamics of meditation in a Buddhist free will theory promises to support that interest, and 
attract more individuals toward the Dharma by virtue of its explanatory elegance, promising to 
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reduce suffering, satisfying Buddhism’s negative consequentialism. Buddhist free will theory 
promises to help Western meditators understand how their discipline enables them to increase 
psychological/functional (conventional) agency on the path to (ultimate) agentlessness—to 
freedom from the adharmic, ego-driven elements of the will.2 
 
Many Western intellectuals are drawn to Buddhism because it espouses a philosophically 
sophisticated deflationary understanding and doctrine of the illusory nature of the self, together 
with a similarly sophisticated psychology, metaphysics, and ethics that provide its broader 
framework.3 Buddhism exemplifies a long-established, socially/culturally stable set of lived 
traditions in which that understanding is normalized. The worry among many Westerners who 
resist scientific findings is that our humanistic self-conception and corresponding way of life 
cannot withstand these sobering truths.4 But Buddhism has thrived for millennia after embracing 
sobering truths about the self, the world, the gods, etc. The implication is that Buddhism 
facilitates wholesome assimilation of enlightening truths, even about our dearest illusion—the 
self. Unless we are enlightened, each of us is the main protagonist in the narrative of our lives, 
the center of our perspectival universe (Coseru 2012). 
 
The notion of free will—autonomy, self-governance—rests intuitively on the notion of the self. 
Since the self and free will are interdependent, as Goodman (2002) argues when he says because 
there is no self there cannot be free will, and since Buddhism has done such a great job 
transitioning folks from belief in the self to belief that the self-illusion is the chief cause of 
suffering, Buddhism can play the same role with belief in free will. This transition might be 
smoother than with the self, because the process is supported by a set of mindfulness-cultivating 
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and mindlessness-weakening practices that increase self-regulation: practitioners 
experience/cultivate more effective agency as practice deepens (Aronson 2004), to the point 
where the sense of metaphysically autonomous agency is predicted to shed spontaneously with 
the shedding of the sense of a substantive self, at a natural, wholesome pace.  
 
An analogy might help make the point. In psychotherapy, a wholesome interpretation of ‘defense 
mechanisms’ as ‘coping strategies’ may be preferable, insofar as one may use them when one 
feels the need to, if understood as crutches the client will drop when healthier/stronger. The 
Buddhist path may be understood not only as a raft, but a crutch—training wheels for cycling 
toward enlightenment. If a Buddhist free will theory promises to function as upāya, 
soteriologically instrumental, it is dharmic.  
 
Technically, there is no singular Buddhism, only different forms of Buddhism, so the sort of free 
will theory that comports with one form of Buddhism may not comport with another, as with 
even some core tenets. But each form of Buddhism might formulate its own version, and each 
might be justified by variations on these arguments. 
 
Another obstacle is that Buddhism is essentially a collection of strategies for attaining freedom 
from the will’s typically mindless, adharmic expression, so Buddhism seems prima facie 
diametrically opposed to the idea of ‘free’ will, on grounds seized upon by philosophers quick to 
oppose the idea outright. For example, one everyday pre-philosophical free will conception 
involves being able to do as you please, to act on desires, to spontaneously express in action 
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whatever you feel like doing, etc., but, from a Buddhist perspective, if that’s free will, Buddhism 
is out to eliminate it because feeding ego-desires causes suffering.  
 
Another free will conception, often embraced by religious believers and others as a knee-jerk 
reaction to the idea that we have no free will, is a ‘libertarian’ view that we can act against all 
causal influences, ‘contracausally’ injecting free will from the nonphysical mind/soul into the 
physical world, like mini-god/soul-egos. Ideas like these account for the greatest resistance to the 
idea that there should be a Buddhist free will theory. But similar ideas were rejected by Buddhist 
metaphysics in its encounters with the Orthodox Indian ātman concept thousands of years ago 
(Federman 2010)—another reason to think there was an implicit Buddhist free will theory, 
however negative, from Buddhism’s inception.  
 
Considerations such as these lead to metaphilosophical questions about the various concepts of 
‘free will’, what each really means and entails, whether any are true, and so on. I have articulated 
my views on that in detail elsewhere (Repetti 2010b), so I will not do so here. But, based on a 
fairly representative sampling of the state of dialectical affairs in the free will literature (ed. 
Caruso 2013), the most brilliant thinkers who specialize in the subject are in respectful 
disagreement on almost all such matters, so the issues are mostly open regarding the oldest, most 
discussed issue in Western philosophy. Few contemporary Western philosophers embrace 
ātman-like models of self-agency early Buddhists rejected, and few would endorse the pre-
philosophical view that free will just consists in choice making.  
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Rather, arguments for the psychophysical models of mind and action in early and subsequent 
Buddhist texts are complex, compatible with, and/or presage those in contemporary Western 
philosophy, neuroscience, cognitive science, and the social sciences (Coseru 2012, Garfield 
2015). This is one of the main reasons researchers and scholars in these fields have found 
Buddhism interesting. Thus, not only is no bar against Buddhism entering the Western dialectic, 
Buddhism has much to offer it; Garfield makes this argument convincingly (2015), despite his 
exception regarding free will (this volume). And while there is no already-explicit free will 
theory in Buddhism, the elements to be deployed in its construction abound in Buddhist 
psychology, action theory, metaphysics, and ethics. As I argue in chapter 17 (this volume), the 
Buddha explicitly rejected several contraries of free will: the notions of inevitable causation by 
matter, gods, fate, karma, and chance. By double negation, this implies a favorable attitude 
toward free will. 
 
A talking point frequently repeated by critics and defenders of free will in the West is that the 
only sort of free will that matters is one that grounds moral responsibility. Why this line has been 
pressed is too complex to explore here at length, but one reason is that it emerged during the 
heyday of logical empiricism, which inclined philosophers to censor purely metaphysical issues 
as if they violated empirical meaning and thus standards of dialectical legitimacy, rendering free 
will suspicious if not wedded to something with pragmatic value, such as moral responsibility. 
Accordingly, there can be no moral responsibility without free will. Now, free will defenders 
worry that if eliminative forces from the sciences undermine free will, morals collapse with it. 
Buddhism, however, has flourished in the absence of an explicit free will theory, and most of its 
psychology and metaphysics suggest we ultimately lack free will, but Buddhism has managed to 
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remain a richly moral tradition. So, Buddhism illustrates that morals can survive eliminative 
attitudes towards belief in the self and free will. Therefore, a Buddhist free will theory promises 
to bring morals to the table even though its views on agency may be closer to being eliminativist 
than they are to being nonreductively substantive; they may be seen, as Harvey argues (this 
volume), as somewhere in the (‘semi-compatibilist’) middle between these two extremes. 
 
A parallel to whether there is or should be a Buddhist free will theory concerns Buddhist ethical 
theory. Despite how richly ethical Buddhist doctrine is, there is no explicit theory of ethics in 
historical Buddhism, no metaethics, and no prescriptive theory, though many have recently 
attempted to discern whether such theories may be inferred from Buddhist prescriptions. 
Possibly violating his own hermeneutical criteria (Flanagan, this volume), Flanagan (2011) has 
argued that Buddhist ethics is a kind of aretaic ethics, Goodman (2009) has argued that it is a 
negative form of consequentialism, and Garfield (2015) suggests a narrative model. We need not 
debate that, but simply note it as an important parallel to our question about a Buddhist free will 
theory. The point is that there has been no theoretical component to Buddhist ethics throughout 
its history, but there is enough in Buddhist ethics to render the project of adducing a Buddhist 
theory relevant, interesting, and worthy of pursuit. By analogy, it would be interesting and 
worthy of pursuit to find out what Buddhism can contribute to our understanding of free will. 
 
For all these reasons, there can and should be a Buddhist theory of free will (or theories, given 
different forms of Buddhism). Some Buddhists disagree, but they seem to conflate a negative 
theory with no theory, though it is standard in Buddhism to treat the negative theory about the 
self as a theory, rather than as no theory; meanwhile, several other Buddhists are proposing such 
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theories (largely filling this volume). Indeed, their disagreement counts as evidence that there is 
room in Buddhism for the variety of free will theories analogous to those in Western philosophy, 
since a similar variety is emerging among Buddhists attempting a Buddhist position on free will. 
The remainder of this collection contains a number of them. I argue in chapter 17 (this volume) 
that the Buddha seemed to imply one. 
 
 
Notes 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 However, in meditation one trains in passive witnessing, construable as practicing 
enlightenment. 
2 See Aronson (2004) on the difference between the psychological/functional self, which 
becomes increasingly effective and well integrated along the Buddhist path, and the 
metaphysical self, which is increasingly seen as an illusion as one advances along that path. 
3 See Garfield (2015) for an excellent argument in support of much of what is philosophically 
attractive in Buddhism for Western philosophers.  
4 Some, like Peter Strawson (1962), deny we can lose our humanistic self-conception. Galen 
Strawson (this volume) argues we can, and Blackmore (this volume) appears to have done so, 
with some success. 
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 3 Uses of the Illusion of Agency: Why Some Buddhists Should Believe in Free Will 
 
Charles Goodman 
 
 
What if the free will issue was never really about determinism? What if the only reason 
determinism ever seemed relevant to the question of whether our actions are truly our own is that 
causal chains stretching far back into our past constitute a vivid way of showing that our actions 
belong to the universe? What if the absence of free will is just a special case of the frightening, 
liberating truth that nothing is our own, because there is no self? That might explain why the free 
will issue seems intractable: despite the enormous attention lavished on it, philosophers haven’t 
fully understood it. It might help explain recent surprising empirical results suggesting that belief 
in free will and in determinism are not opposed, but represent two largely statistically 
independent factors (Nadelhoffer and Tocchetto 2013, p. 126). It might explain why critiques of 
free will feel threatening: they have the potential to undermine the one thing we are most 
invested in, our false belief in a real self. 
 
Since what is most philosophically distinctive about Buddhism is its rejection of that false belief, 
Buddhists should be committed to the nonexistence of free will. Many scholars appear reluctant 
to accept this conclusion, though, perhaps because they overestimate how destructive and 
revisionary it would be. I have proposed that the most defensible Buddhist view of free will 
would be a form of ‘hard incompatibilism’ (Goodman 2009), the view that free will is 
incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism (Pereboom 2007). Hard incompatibilists 
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do not claim that we cannot change, or that our actions make no difference, or that making an 
effort to improve is pointless. Instead, they reject the existence of basic desert and regard 
interpersonal reactive attitudes such as anger and resentment as cognitively inappropriate. 
 
We can be said to deserve many things: praise, blame, rewards, punishments, and so on. The 
specific form of desert that Pereboom says we should reject, considered in relation to blame or 
credit, is basic in the sense that the agent, to be morally responsible, would deserve the blame or 
credit just because she has performed the action (assuming she understands its moral status), and 
not by virtue of consequentialist or contractualist considerations (2007, p. 86). 
 
Thus, Pereboom does not want to issue a blanket ban on blaming or praising, or to say that no 
one deserves anything. Practices of holding people responsible can have socially beneficial 
consequences that can create derivative, institutional, non-basic forms of desert and 
responsibility. What Pereboom denies is that our actions could give rise to reasons to treat us 
well or badly independently of the consequences resulting from such treatment. The issue about 
praise and blame is, in its direct practical implications, almost trivial; the rubber meets the road 
when we consider the justification of punishment and systems of criminal justice. 
 
Note that much blame consists of accurate descriptions of a person’s character. So, for instance, 
in a world without basic desert or deep moral responsibility, someone might persistently neglect 
his responsibilities due to laziness. To tell that person “You are lazy!” would be an accurate 
description, and ‘appropriate’ as such. But no amount of laziness could cause that person to 
deserve, in a basic sense, the distress it might cause him to be told so. We should tell him, 
	  	  	  
	   67	  
truthfully, he is lazy only if that would be helpful, and never simply to hurt his feelings, no matter 
how much havoc his laziness has caused. 
 
Hard incompatibilism includes a claim I summarize by saying that anger, resentment, and other 
interpersonal reactive attitudes are cognitively inappropriate. When I say that a particular 
emotion is cognitively inappropriate, I mean it is partly constituted by a judgment that is false 
and unwarranted. Thus, a hard incompatibilist could say that anger at person X for doing action 
A involves construing X as being, in some deep and ultimate sense, the source of A; but we are 
never the sources of our actions in this sense. 
 
It’s hard to deny that Buddhists disapprove of anger and resentment; but few Buddhist texts 
consider the free will problem in any recognizable form—few, but not none. Many scholars 
agree that the problem is raised explicitly by Śāntideva in ch. VI of his Bodhicaryāvatāra 
(“BCA”; all references to BCA are to the Crosby and Skilton (1995) translation).  (Goodman 
2009, ch. 8, examines this in detail.) Here’s one crucial verse from Śāntideva’s discussion of the 
issue: 
 
“In this way everything is dependent upon something else. Even that thing upon which 
each is dependent is not independent. Since, like a magical display, phenomena do not 
initiate activity, at what does one get angry like this?” (BCA VI.31; Crosby and Skilton 
1995, p. 52) 
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This verse looks like an argument for incompatibilism. But we must ask: What is being claimed 
to be incompatible with what? On my interpretation, the core of this argument is the claim that 
the availability of an impersonal, causal level of description of actions is incompatible with the 
cognitive appropriateness of anger.  
 
We might try to formalize part of the argument in BCA VI as follows: 
 
1. Anger towards entity X is cognitively appropriate only if X is the independent, 
autonomous initiator of its actions. 
 
2. That entity X is the independent, autonomous initiator of its actions is incompatible 
with X’s agency being constituted by impersonal causal processes. 
 
3. The agency of every sentient being is constituted by impersonal causal processes. 
 
4. Therefore, anger towards sentient beings is never cognitively appropriate. 
 
From this perspective, it is irrelevant whether the impersonal, causal processes appealed to in 
describing how X’s agency is constituted are deterministic. What matters is that there is no basic, 
irreducible self. Since there is no such self, we are not responsible in any way that would 
generate basic desert or sustain the appropriateness of anger. 
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Even some readers who find these ideas somewhat compelling may be reluctant to publicly 
proclaim such a message. Far too many people find themselves leading chaotic, violent and 
miserable lives due to their systematically poor choices. And the nonexistence of free will seems 
to be the last thing they should hear. Dennett tells us that if one is confronted with someone who 
admits he is a ‘despicable villain’, one should urge him to change his ways and reform his life; 
but, 
 
“[i]f, on the other hand, one was interested in compounding his misery (at whatever cost 
to society), one could urge on him a vision of his own utter degradation and helplessness, 
and foster in him an attitude of apathy and fatalism, thereby achieving (perhaps) an 
almost complete dissociation of his reflection from his deeds and projects and 
encouraging in him a cynical tolerance of his own worst side” (Dennett 1984, p. 167).  
 
This concern is intuitively plausible, and psychological evidence supports it. For example, 
Baumeister, Masicampo and DeWall set out to test a hypothesis they expressed, in part, as 
follows: 
 
“Feelings of responsibility and accountability may make people feel that they ought to 
behave in socially desirable ways, such as performing prosocial acts of helping and 
restraining antisocial impulses to aggress against others. The deterministic belief 
essentially says that the person could not act otherwise, which resembles a standard form 
of excuse (‘I couldn’t help it’) and thus might encourage people to act in short-sighted, 
impulsive, selfish ways.” (2009, p. 261) 
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These authors’ experimental results supported their hypothesis. Subjects who read statements 
supportive of determinism subsequently expressed, in a survey, diminished willingness to help 
others (p. 262). In a second experiment, the authors found that people who held long-term views 
about the absence of free will volunteered fewer hours when asked to help someone in need (p. 
265). Finally, they found that people who had read statements supportive of determinism were 
more prone to aggression, in the form of putting extra hot salsa in the food of people who had 
expressed a dislike of spicy tastes (p. 266). The authors’ interpretation was that those who had 
been primed to take a deterministic stance that negated free will would be less likely to exert 
effort to inhibit their anger. 
 
Against these findings we may set the well-established fact that our intuitive mechanisms for 
attributing responsibility are skewed in a highly morally problematic way. Psychologists have 
known for decades that we suffer from a pervasive cognitive distortion called ‘the fundamental 
attribution error’ (Ross 1977). It involves a strong tendency to attribute others’ mistakes and 
morally problematic choices to their character, even when these are due to unfortunate 
circumstances. We cut ourselves far more slack: if I make a mistake, I will look for features of 
the situation that might causally explain my poor decisions, rather than attributing them to deep-
seated character patterns. 
 
Suppose we acknowledge the following. First, anger towards others can be very destructive to 
our relationships, our happiness, and our spiritual path. Second, given the psychology of us 
ordinary people, holding ourselves responsible for our own choices can be crucially important in 
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motivating ourselves to do better. Third, we are biased in our own favor, too often regarding our 
mistakes as caused by circumstances while being harshly judgmental towards others’ mistakes. 
For someone with that kind of personality, the most spiritually beneficial attitude to cultivate 
about the issue of free will would correct the mistakes we are most prone to make, and so would 
need to be asymmetric along two dimensions: self versus other, and good versus bad actions. 
 
Remarkably, if we read Śāntideva’s BCA in a philosophically naïve way, the picture we get has 
this double asymmetry. On the resulting view, I should hold myself fully and robustly 
responsible for my destructive actions: “Therefore, this is just what I deserve, I who have caused 
distress to other beings” (BCA VI.42; Crosby and Skilton 1995, p. 53; see BCA II passim, 
especially II.29 and II.54). But I should take no responsibility for my own good actions and 
virtues: “As a blind man might find a jewel in heaps of rubbish, so too this Awakening Mind has 
somehow appeared in me” (BCA III.27; Crosby and Skilton 1995, p. 22).  
 
Meanwhile, I should not hold others responsible for their wrongdoing, seeing this as non-
culpable because it results from a combination of causes and conditions (the main thrust of BCA 
VI.22-33; Crosby and Skilton 1995, pp. 52-53) and was brought about by the madness of 
emotional reactivity: “When, driven insane by their defilements, they resort to killing 
themselves, how is it that not only have you no pity but you become angry?” (BCA VI.38; 
Crosby and Skilton 1995, p. 53) Yet I should rejoice in the virtuous character traits and actions 
of others (e.g. BCA III.1-3; Crosby and Skilton 1995, p. 20) and express this delight in 
conversation: “One should speak of others’ virtues in their absence, and repeat them with 
pleasure” (BCA V.76; Crosby and Skilton 1995, p. 40). In short: “One should acknowledge 
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oneself as having faults and others as oceans of virtues” (BCA VIII.113; Crosby and Skilton 
1995, p. 98). 
 
Considered as philosophy, a view with this structure is extremely implausible. It runs aground on 
the very consideration Śāntideva uses to refute our innate inclination to selfishness: the 
undeniable fact that others and I are fundamentally alike (see BCA VIII.94-96; Crosby and 
Skilton 1995, p. 96). But as medicine for self-cherishing, such a view could have important 
advantages. The doubly asymmetric view is distorted, but directly opposed to the distortions of 
our asymmetrical biases. Cultivating the doubly asymmetric view could therefore potentially 
correct these serious flaws in our makeup.  
 
But if our innate attitudes about responsibility and the doubly asymmetric view bend in opposite 
directions, what kind of mental attitude would count as straight? For Buddhists, the undistorted 
condition, free from error, is a state of wakeful presence. In such a state, there is no sense of 
being a person who acts; rather, actions emerge through spontaneous responsiveness and are thus 
appropriate to the situation and expressive of compassion for all who suffer, without any feeling 
of agency or choice, and entirely free from the illusion of free will. 
 
This state of wakeful presence also involves certain emotional attitudes towards others. These are 
summed up beautifully by the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra: 
 
“Like Mount Sumeru, you are unmoved by honor or scorn. 
You love moral beings and immoral beings equally. 
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Poised in equanimity, your mind is like the sky. 
Who would not honor such a precious jewel of a being?” (Thurman 2008, p. 14) 
 
In this sky-like equanimity, there is no room for resentment (BCA VI.64; Crosby and Skilton 
1995, p. 55). Instead of resentment, an awake person would experience boundless and equal 
compassion for all sentient beings, regardless of their past actions.  
 
To be in this state of wakeful presence does not require endorsing hard determinism; indeed, 
many Buddhists would say the fully awake do not have philosophical views. But to recommend 
this state, to hold it up as an ideal, is to endorse a version of hard determinism that commends the 
abandonment of resentment, and of the interpersonal reactive attitudes in general. 
 
It is, of course, perilous for someone like me to offer any description of an awakened state. But I 
think the claims I am making about that state are well motivated textually and philosophically. 
Frankly, would any Buddhist really assert that a buddha would spend her time consumed by guilt 
over her own past actions, or seething with resentment at another’s? 
 
As regards their standing within a Buddhist understanding of free will, the different components 
of the doubly asymmetric view are not on a par. When that view tells us to hold ourselves deeply 
responsible for our mistakes and others for their virtues, it is giving advice we will eventually 
need to transcend. But when the doubly asymmetric view tells us to let go of pride that flows 
from taking responsibility for our accomplishments and virtues, to view the mistakes of others 
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with compassion, and to abandon resentment by recognizing the lack of ultimate responsibility, it 
is giving advice that describes aspects of the goal of the Buddhist path. 
 
This account reveals the insights and the limitations of Daniel Breyer’s ‘Buddhist 
Perspectivalism’, which is asymmetric along one of the two dimensions I have discussed: he 
recommends that each practitioner regard herself as fully responsible for her choices, and others 
as not responsible (2013, p. 377). How could we justify this seemingly irrational view? If we 
assume Buddhist anti-realism, Breyer suggests, this will be easy: since there is no way the world 
is, all views are justified by their role in enabling successful practice, and for the reasons 
discussed above, an asymmetric view of free will can enable successful practice.  
 
If we assume instead Buddhist realism, our task will be harder. Breyer attempts, with limited 
success, to refute the arguments I (and others) have offered for the claim that Buddhist realists 
are committed to determinism.1 Breyer suggests they should instead hold that the existence of 
morally significant freedom is highly improbable, but physically and epistemically possible (p. 
375). Then, since an asymmetric view leads to successful practice, we are warranted both in 
regarding others as not responsible, guided by the probabilities, and in holding ourselves 
responsible, guided by the bare possibility that we really are. 
 
Breyer’s article is an important contribution, and its ideas helped me to formulate the doubly 
asymmetric view. But Breyer misses the reasons for thinking that any asymmetric view of free 
will can have only a limited and provisional role in Buddhism. For practitioners in certain stages 
of spiritual development, the attitudes recommended by Buddhist Perspectivalism could lead to 
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successful practice. But at a higher level, an even more successful form of practice can result 
from the full abandonment of the ascription of responsibility and the illusion of agency. Thus, 
any asymmetric view, including Breyer’s, should be seen as a mere upāya (skillful means), 
whereas Buddhists can assert without qualification the nonexistence of basic desert and ultimate 
responsibility. 
 
As I have explicated hard incompatibilism, it commits us to asserting the inappropriateness of all 
instances of anger and resentment. One way to cast doubt on this view would be to argue that the 
appropriateness of at least some instances of anger is guaranteed by the fact that the occurrence 
of this emotion leads, in some specifiable kinds of circumstances, to socially beneficial 
consequences. We need anger to achieve certain goals; so there must be one important sense in 
which anger is appropriate. Moreover, since both Śāntideva and I are consequentialists about 
normative ethics, we ought to regard this form of argument as a reasonable one.  
 
We know, however, that Śāntideva would resist this argument. In his Training Anthology, 
Śāntideva asks and answers a relevant question: 
 
“But suppose you are strongly motivated to bring about benefit to others, or some very 
weighty benefit to yourself. And suppose that although you are overpowered by anger 
while scolding somebody else, immediately afterwards, you make a vow not to do the 
same thing again from now on. If you can prevent some harm through anger, what’s the 
problem?  
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Well, there’s the problem of giving that reactive pattern an opportunity to work. There’s 
the problem of losing your compassion. And as we will see later on, there’s the problem 
of, while cutting that, cutting your own roots. Even if your anger was helpful to that 
sentient being, because of the loss of the bodhisattva’s compassion, great benefits to 
sentient beings would be lost as a consequence.” (Goodman forthcoming, p. 165, my 
translation)  
 
Thus, Śāntideva holds that, for a bodhisattva (a being dedicated to awakening for the sake of all 
sentient beings), the deleterious karmic and psychological consequences of angrily reproaching 
others always outweigh whatever benefits might result from such speech. But some readers may 
not share his religious and/or psychological premises, and may think that in some situations we 
need anger to get things done, so that its overall consequences will be positive. For them, I offer 
the example of a yet-to-be-invented appliance called ‘the Moderately Futuristic Toaster’. What 
follows is a description of this interesting device. 
 
The Moderately Futuristic Toaster will make a wide variety of ready-to-eat preparations out of 
bread and other ingredients: buttered toast, French toast, grilled cheese sandwiches, and many 
other things. It has no general intelligence and no consciousness, and its internal workings are 
deterministic. But it is capable of adjusting how it prepares its products in response to voice 
commands. However, because of whimsical and mischievous design choices on the part of its 
maker, it will not respond to commands spoken in a calm tone. The toaster listens only to 
commands that exhibit sonic properties characteristic of angry speakers. Its settings are 
adjustable by pushing buttons and turning dials, but this process has deliberately been made 
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baroque and confusing. The easiest, quickest way to get the toaster to make what you want is to 
yell at it. 
 
Surely it will be widely agreed that anger towards the toaster has a purpose: you get your French 
toast made how you want it. But I expect most readers will agree that there’s something silly 
about getting angry with a toaster. It may be a complex machine, but it’s just a toaster. If we 
know how the machine works, we easily see that there is nothing to get angry at: not having a 
self, the toaster contains no appropriate object of anger. For the owner of a Moderately Futuristic 
Toaster who is hurrying to make breakfast so that she can get to work on time, the most 
appropriate and rational response to its peculiar design would be to feign anger: deliberately to 
put on a mock-angry voice that is convincing enough to activate the device, but without feeling 
any resentment towards it. 
 
Now suppose I can’t feign anger well enough to fool the Moderately Futuristic Toaster. The only 
way to cause the device to make toast properly would be to get angry at it. My inability to feign 
anger wouldn’t make it the case that anger at the toaster would be cognitively appropriate, for it 
has no self, intelligence or consciousness.  
 
Nevertheless, there might be desirable results if I did get angry at it, and so I would have some 
reason to allow anger to arise, or to arouse it deliberately. This would be a case of rational 
irrationality, in Parfit’s sense; in getting angry at the toaster, even though the toaster is not an 
appropriate object of anger, I would be somewhat like a parent who foils the threats of a 
murderous robber by taking a drug that makes him temporarily irrational (Parfit 1987, pp. 6-13). 
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So if it turns out, for example, that in certain types of negotiations expressions of anger tend to 
lead to more concessions from the other side—a result found by many psychological studies 
(Adam and Brett 2015, p. 48)—that would not show that anger is cognitively appropriate. It 
would show at most that negotiators might sometimes have reason to feign anger, and if they are 
unable to do so convincingly, to allow anger to arise for its consequences and despite its 
cognitive inappropriateness. Hence, even if anger is often useful, that would not refute 
Śāntideva’s argument for hard incompatibilism presented above. And if we take all the relevant 
considerations together, it should be easy to motivate to everyone’s satisfaction the claim that 
cases in which anger is genuinely helpful are far rarer than cases in which it is dangerous, 
seductive, and destructive. 
 
Finally, let’s consider some textual evidence from the Bodhicaryāvatāra that has been thought to 
count against my view. Near the end of the crucial passage in chapter VI in which Śāntideva 
argues against the cognitive appropriateness of anger, we find this verse:  
 
“If it is argued that to resist anger is inappropriate, for ‘who is it that resists what?’, our 
view is that it is appropriate: since there is dependent origination there can be cessation of 
suffering” (BCA VI.32; Crosby and Skilton 1995, p. 53). 
 
Mark Siderits cites this verse, also pointing out that “throughout the chapter on forbearance 
Śāntideva heaps scorn on those who respond to provocation with anger” (Siderits 2008, p. 34). 
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Now it is hard to deny that, to be worthy of scorn, people must be blameworthy, and to be 
blameworthy, they must be responsible. So, Siderits concludes, 
 
“while the self-determination argument may prove to be a useful tool in developing 
forbearance toward others, it does not establish that the reactive attitudes are never 
justifiable. This in turn suggests that Śāntideva believes people can, at least in certain 
contexts, be deemed responsible for their actions.” (Siderits 2008, p. 34) 
 
As Siderits interprets Śāntideva, by including verse VI.32, and also by criticizing those who fail 
to control their anger, Śāntideva indicates that there must be a perspective from which people 
really are responsible. The rest of Siderits’ article explicates what he takes to be the relationship 
between these two perspectives. 
 
The evidence from the rest of BCA VI shows far less than Siderits seems to assume. Here are, I 
think, the passages he has in mind, or at least a fair sample of them: 
 
“5. Even friends shrink from him. He gives, but is not honored. In short, there is no sense 
in which someone prone to anger is well off.” (Crosby and Skilton 1995, p. 50) 
 
“67. Some commit offenses out of delusion. Others, deluded, grow angry…” (p. 56). 
 
“83. How can one who is angry at the good fortune of others possess the Awakening 
Mind?” (p. 57). 
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Nowhere in BCA VI does Śāntideva express resentment towards those who give in to anger. He 
does criticize such persons, describing them as deluded, miserable, and lacking the Awakening 
Mind. But his way of criticizing them does not constitute a form of blaming that would conflict 
with hard indeterminism. These are (arguably) accurate descriptions intended to be helpful to the 
reader of BCA. Providing them does not in any way commit Śāntideva to the appropriateness of 
anger or the existence of basic desert.  
 
Moreover, BCA VI.32 cannot mean what Siderits thinks it means. Here’s the very next verse, 
VI.33: 
 
“Therefore, even if one sees a friend or an enemy behaving badly, one can reflect that 
there are specific conditioning factors that determine this, and thereby remain happy” 
(Crosby and Skilton 1995, p. 53). 
 
This verse is an expression of a hard incompatibilist conclusion. And it starts with a word for 
‘therefore’ (Sanskrit: tasmād) (ed. Vaidya 1988, p. 94). So, on textual grounds, the preceding 
verse, VI.32, should not be interpreted as an expression of a perspective that contradicts hard 
incompatibilism. 
 
Instead, it is a response to an objection against hard incompatibilism: that hard incompatibilism 
implies we should feel free to act on impulse or to abandon efforts to improve. This objection is 
misguided. As a descriptive psychological matter, and due to our deep-seated confusion and 
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irrationality, for us to accept the absence of basic desert and ultimate responsibility might turn 
out in practice to sap our motivation to restrain anger and cultivate goodness. But not being 
responsible could not give us a good reason to act destructively or abandon self-restraint and 
moral discipline.  
 
Few would be fooled if the issue at stake were their own welfare. Suppose I will soon travel to a 
tropical country where Japanese encephalitis is endemic. Stipulate that if I fail to get vaccinated 
and contract the disease, I will not be ultimately responsible for this. It would be a mistake to feel 
guilty about it, and I would not basically deserve the resulting suffering. If we accept these 
claims, does that in any way weaken the reasons I have to get the vaccine? Fatalism might imply 
that it will make no difference whether I get vaccinated, since my fate is sealed regardless of 
what I do; hard incompatibilism could never imply this. Similarly, fatalism might imply there is 
no point trying to resist my desire to act out of anger; hard incompatibilism could never imply 
this. 
 
As Śāntideva points out in VI.32, even though hard incompatibilism is true, it is still appropriate 
to apply remedies to overcome anger and do whatever would benefit sentient beings. If we were 
free from the illusion of selfhood, we would, in one sense, never ‘act’ at all; meanwhile, we 
would move flexibly and spontaneously in appropriate and responsive ways. Until then, since 
most of us aren’t sufficiently moved by reasons to act well, it can be helpful to drive ourselves 
towards goodness with a variety of psychologically effective techniques and tricks. For those just 
setting out on the path, a naïve view that uncritically accepts free will and responsibility might be 
the most helpful approach. For somewhat more advanced students, a doubly asymmetric view 
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could be valuable medicine. Even though it is never rational to get angry, for a master having to 
deal with students who are ordinary people, it could sometimes be helpful to feign anger, so as to 
get the students to shape up.  
 
Many people fear the possibility that responsible agency might turn out to be an illusion. But 
liberation from suffering into compassion and joy involves many forms of abandonment, and 
among them is abandoning our sense of being responsible agents. In the meantime, though 
agency is an illusion, it does have its uses. If we cling to views of free will, they may keep us 
from being swept away into chaos and misery. But someday, perhaps, the time will come when 
we can let go of the delusion of free and responsible agency, and relax into selfless and 
spontaneous freedom. 
 
 
Note 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I had argued that South Asian Buddhists thought the Buddha had ‘omniscience’ (Skt. sarvajña, 
literally ‘complete knowing’ or ‘knowing everything’), and interpreted sarvajña to include full 
knowledge of the future. But if the Buddha knows everything, the future cannot be open; there 
must already be a fact of the matter about what everyone will do at all future times. Breyer’s 
reply consists of pointing out that Dharmakīrti rejected a robust understanding of sarvajña, 
holding that all we need to claim is that the Buddha knows everything that is necessary for 
salvation (Breyer 2013, p. 361). However impressed we may be with Dharmakīrti for advancing 
this view, we should recognize that it was an unusual position among Indian Buddhists. In 
particular, Śāntideva, whose views I am trying to interpret, accepts a very ambitious 
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interpretation of sarvajña, one that, plausibly, entails determinism. See, e.g., BCA V.31; Crosby 
and Skilton (1995), p. 36.  
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  4 Just Another Word for Nothing Left to Lose: Freedom, Agency and Ethics for 
Mādhyamikas 
 
Jay Garfield 
 
 
1 Free Will and Theodicy1 
 
The free will problem appears to modern Western sensibility as obvious and natural, as a 
perennial philosophical puzzle arising upon reflection. But it is a Western cultural/religious 
artifact. For it to arise, one needs a will, a sense of uncaused agent causation, and a thesis of 
determinism. Only then can one ask the question whether that will is deterministic or capable of 
causing acts without being caused. 
 
Once the question arises one can perform the philosophical rope trick and ask whether the will is 
compatible with determinism, if so, how, and if not, whether to opt for libertarianism or 
determinism. The free will question has engendered a massive literature in the West, remaining 
active topics of philosophical research. (See ed. Watson 2003; Campbell, O’Rourke, and Shier 
2004; ed. Kane 2005; Pereboom 2009; and Meyers 2010 for discussion of this meta-issue.) It is 
not my purpose to survey that literature or weigh in on these questions. 
 
This problem never arose in Buddhism (cf. Davids 1898; Gómez 1975; Harvey 2007), not 
because Buddhist philosophers were less astute, nor because they solved it, but because the 
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presuppositions that raise these questions are not satisfied in Buddhism. Such considerations may 
lead us to a hermeneutic distance that allows us to see the problem as peculiar, and set it aside in 
favor of more productive inquiry. I hope attention to another philosophical tradition can help 
here. My plan is to show why the free will problem—as construed in the Christian context, and 
subsequently in the Western philosophical tradition—cannot arise in the context of 
Madhyamaka, and how concerns related to those that motivate the problem arise and are 
addressed within Madhyamaka. 
 
The will is ubiquitous in the West, in technical philosophical, religious, and legal discourse, and 
popular culture. “Did you perform this act of your own free will?” we might ask when deciding 
whether to blame or to excuse an apparent wrongdoer, or when notarizing a document. We 
explain our inability to stop smoking or lose weight as weakness of will (another topic with a 
vast literature: see Hoffman 2008; see also the “Weakness of Will” entry in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Even contemporary cognitive science is concerned to locate and 
understand the will, or our conception thereof (Dennett 1984, 1992, 2003; Libet 1985, 1999; 
Mele 1995, 2001, 2010).   
 
But what is the ‘will’? We do not come by the idea that we have wills through observation of 
ourselves or of others. Try introspecting and finding a will. What does it feel like? Nor is it the 
theoretical posit of any science. Nor has it always been in Western intellectual history that 
persons took themselves to have wills—faculties of action. Despite the influential translation of 
akrasia (non-control) as weakness of will, Aristotle never identified a faculty of will. 
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The will is the legacy of St. Augustine and his struggle to solve the theodicy problem raised by 
the Fall of Adam and Eve. If God is the omniscient cause of all, then God caused the Fall, but 
then God would not be omnibenevolent, since he punished Adam, Eve, and the human race, 
consequently. To preserve God’s omnibenevolence, thought Augustine, Adam’s and Eve’s 
disobedience had to be authored by them, not God. Augustine posited a faculty of uncaused 
(free) action to show how that could be the cause, and argued that only action produced by that 
faculty is morally praiseworthy or blameworthy; all other behavior, being heteronomously 
caused, is mere natural event. (Stump 2001) 
 
This linkage of morality, personhood, and freedom runs through Aquinas to Kant, grounds 
Enlightenment political and legal theory, and infuses high and popular culture with a 
presupposition of the reality of the will and its freedom. It leads us to presuppose we are persons 
insofar as we are free, and that responsibility requires freedom.  
 
Many take the Fall seriously, and are sanguine about the foundation of this aspect of our culture 
and the nest of philosophical problems it motivates. But this genealogy of metaphysical freedom 
suggests need for reassessment. If there are reasons to worry about free will, and reasons to ask 
what Mādhyamikas think about it, Christian theodicy is not a resource. 
 
 
2 Why Worry about Free Will? 
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We do not worry about free will because of cultural concerns with theodicy. The motivations for 
most modern thought on free will are twofold. The first is metaphysical—to understand agency 
and personhood, and the distinction between what we do and what happens. The second—
closely connected—is ethical and legal. We distinguish between actions for which we are 
responsible and events for which, though we may be causally implicated, we are not responsible. 
This distinction is often taken to be that between free will and caused behavior. Determinism is 
taken to be a threat on both fronts. All of this is well-worn territory, and none of my reflections 
are original. It is, however, useful to recall what is at stake in this discussion before turning to 
Madhyamaka.  
 
Consider the metaphysics. When we take ourselves to be agents, we take ourselves to be capable 
of directing our actions, choosing between alternatives, acting for reasons; we don’t view our 
behavior as caused by external events.2 This authority over actions makes us who we are. But 
choice seemingly requires the alternatives we consider are accessible, and that deliberation is an 
effective consideration of reasons for each—not a sham to which we are spectators. Multiple 
alternatives are genuine possibilities just in case one can choose any of them, instead of 
performing causally determined behavior. So, it seems, agency requires exemption from 
determinism; freely willed actions cannot have sufficient causes, for these entail the explanation 
is outside the agent. (Plantinga 1967, p. 134) 
 
Similar considerations are advanced in defense of responsibility. The locus classicus is Kant’s 
Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Kant argues that freedom is a transcendental 
condition on moral responsibility, and to think of ourselves as responsible, we must regard 
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ourselves as free. He argues we cannot know we are free, we are morally responsible, and hence 
we must assume we are free. This freedom is determination of the will not by causes, but by 
reasons. (Kant 1785) 
 
Thus, if someone acts in a blameworthy way, and we can find no exculpatory external cause for 
her action, we take her action to have been free, and hold her responsible. If she is able to defend 
herself by appealing, say, to mental illness, or a horrible childhood, and if we agree that those are 
the causes of her behavior, we absolve her, arguing she was causally compelled, not free to act. 
Determination by causes undermines agency; if ethical assessment is possible, we require that 
agent causation be exempted from determinism. The Kantian transcendental argument joins with 
the premise that ethical and legal assessment must be possible to yield the conclusion that the 
will is free. 
 
There is an older analysis of freedom in Locke, with ancestry in Aristotle: for an act to be free 
(Locke) or chosen (Aristotle) is for its cause to be the intention or desire of the agent, not for the 
salient cause to be external to the agent. This criterion is absence of constraint. The advantage of 
this approach over Kant’s is that, instead of uncaused agent causation, it ties responsible agency 
to the kinds of causes operative: when actions are determined by our intentions they are free; 
when they are otherwise caused, they are not—the will is uninvolved.3 When I deliberate and 
decide I’m better off dead and jump from the window, I act freely; when you toss me from the 
window, my defenestration is unfree: the relevant distinction is captured by the most salient 
proximal cause of my exit.  
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This view is problematic, however. Two considerations challenge its ability to articulate a robust 
free/unfree distinction sufficient to underwrite agency and responsibility. First, suppose you 
don’t toss me from the window, but threaten to torture my children if I don’t jump. Plausibly, I 
jump freely, preferring that to living with the knowledge that my children are being tortured. But, 
conversely, I did not freely commit suicide; I was driven to it by threat: you caused my death. 
There is no need to figure out which intuition is better; they are both robust, and a clean 
distinction may not be forthcoming.   
 
Second is the problem of extended causal chains. I worry about the future of the world, what 
with global warming, etc., and decide to end it all. It looks free, and if this is an immoral decision 
I appear responsible because it is free, and neither caused by force nor coerced. The cause is my 
desire to avoid suffering, but if that desire is uncaused, it is a random occurrence for which I 
cannot be responsible, and if caused, it must be caused by prior events, many of which (global 
warming, etc.) lie outside me. I fail to meet the conditions of agent causation. These 
considerations motivate an uncaused will acting purely on reasons and imply that anything that 
counts as a genuine action (for which we are responsible) cannot be causally determined.  
 
Freedom seems necessary for these categories of personhood, and inconsistent with determinism. 
But as Schopenhauer claimed in Essay on the Freedom of the Will (1841)—an argument Dennett 
rediscovered (1984), encapsulating ideas developed by Frankfurt (1969) and Davidson (1980)—
free will is not only compatible with, but demands, determinism. Thus, when we say an action is 
free, we mean it is caused by our desires. If not, it would not be ours and we would not be 
responsible for it. When we want freedom, we don’t want our bodies and mouths moved 
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randomly; we want to cause them to move as we desire. We want those desires to be caused; 
randomly occurring conative states do not make us free: they make us insane—not responsible, 
but excusable. We want our desires—the proximal causes of our actions—to be caused by our 
beliefs, traits, etc., which are desirably caused, and so on. Freedom is not absence of 
determination, but self-determination. It is not inconsistent with determinism, but entails it.   
 
Are we chasing our tails? Freedom requires determinism; determinism entails our actions spring 
from chains of causation originating outside us; authority and responsibility require agent-
causation through choice among real alternatives (Plantinga 1967; Pereboom 2009). These three 
premises suggest freedom in the moral-responsibility-entailing sense is impossible. It seems talk 
of free will and determinism may be a dead end, a relic of a theodicy of little interest to 
Buddhists.4 I think a Madhyamaka account of action might give us what we care about: making 
sense of our moral lives and our agency. 
 
This set of problems presupposes another metaphysical doctrine anathema to Buddhists—that of 
a self or soul as center of agency. For Augustine, the soul’s existence requires no argument, and 
for many of his successors, such as Kant, while the idea of a transcendental subject or agent may 
require argument, that argument was provided. While these ideas are independent (unfree souls 
and soulless free agents are conceivable), the soul doctrine is connected to the Western idea of an 
autonomous entity, capable of initiating its actions, and ultimately responsible. We can then draw 
the distinction between responsible human agents and non-responsible animals on the basis of 
soul-possession, and provide the hope for reward or punishment on the ground of the soul’s 
responsibility and post-mortem survival. Since a distinctive feature of Buddhist philosophical 
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systems is their rejection of the view that there is a metaphysical soul (the doctrine of anātman), 
there is no Buddhist basis for formulating the free will problem. 
 
 
3 Pratītyasamutpāda in Action: Why These Problems Cannot Arise for a Mādhyamika 
 
Given that what motivates the free will and determinism puzzle are these Western assumptions, 
this problem cannot arise in Buddhism. A fundamental tenet of Buddhism is pratītyasamutpāda, 
the idea that all phenomena are ‘dependently originated’. In Madhyamaka, following Candrakīrti 
(1992, 2003), this is glossed three ways.   
 
(1) “All phenomena arise and cease in dependence on causes and conditions. 
All things arise in dependence on causes and conditions, and this is the meaning of 
dependent origination.” (Prasannapadā 2b)5 
 
(2) “All wholes and parts are interdependent. 
Although both from the standpoint of reality and from that of everyday life, 
… a chariot cannot be established, 
In everyday life, without analysis  
It is designated in dependence on its parts…. 
 
If the chariot were not to exist, 
Without that which possesses parts, there would be no parts either. 
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Just as when the chariot is burned, there are no longer any parts, 
When the fire of understanding consumes the chariot, it consumes its parts as well.” 
(Madhyamakāvatāra VI: 159-161) 
 
(3) Entities depend for existence on conceptual imputation; mereological interdependence 
is related to this (Madhyamakāvatāra VI: 169), a theme taken up in subsequent verses 
and comments in this text. (Garfield 1994; Cowherds 2010)   
 
“…Therefore, although dependent origination is generally maintained to be dependence 
upon conditions…, [t]his is not inconsistent with it also being dependence upon mundane 
nominal conventions…. In this context, to be recognized in everyday life, the 
conventional designation is clearly understood without the slightest bit of analysis 
necessary.” (Madhyamakāvatāra-bhasya, 259) 
 
The universality of pratītyasamutpāda ensures that persons, psychophysical states, and actions 
arise interdependently. The emptiness or insubstantiality of persons—absence of soul/self—is a 
central moral and metaphysical insight on the Buddhist path. As Candrakīrti put it: 
 
“In the same way, although in everyday life, the self is maintained to be 
The appropriator of the aggregates, it is designated on the basis of  
The aggregates, the sensory domains and the six sense faculties. 
The appropriated taken as the object and the self as the agent.” (Madhyamakāvatāra VI: 
162) 
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“Since it does not exist, it is neither continuous 
Nor discontinuous, neither arisen nor ceased; 
It has no properties such as permanence, 
Existence, nonexistence, identity or difference.” (VI: 163) 
 
“The self is simply whatever it is towards which 
Beings constantly develop the attitude of ego-grasping. 
The self arises out of the attitude that something is mine. 
Since it becomes manifest unreflectively, it arises from confusion.” (VI: 164) 
 
So long as one takes oneself to be a substantial center of subjectivity or agency, as opposed to a 
causally connected stream of momentary psychophysical phenomena, one is mired in primal 
confusion that makes the cultivation of compassion and the liberation from suffering impossible. 
Only by recognizing that our identities arise from our imposition of unity and coherence on a 
complex, multifaceted stream of events and processes can we escape that confusion. (Siderits 
2005; Garfield 2010)  
 
This position entails that all actions, thoughts, intentions, and character traits are causally 
dependent, and any unity we ascribe to ourselves is imputed. Thus, any ethical assessment is of 
caused events or merely conventionally designated persons. Libertarian agent causation is 
incoherent in this framework. Buddhist psychology posits no faculty for action—no ‘will’.6 
(Siderits 1987, 2008) With no theodicy problem to solve, ‘will’ is unnecessary. Actions, 
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according to Buddhist psychologists, are caused by intentions, but this causation does not require 
mediation by any special conative faculty. So without an agent, a category of uncaused events, 
and a will, the ‘free will problem’, and its question of compatibility with determinism, cannot be 
formulated. 
 
However, Mādhyamikas such as Nāgārjuna, Candrakīrti, and Śāntideva are committed to the 
view that we are responsible for our situations and destinies: this is the karma doctrine. Buddhist 
texts such as Ratnavalī, Catuhṣatakatikka, and Bodhicāryāvatāra are replete with admonitions to 
perform or refrain from various actions, and accounts of mental episodes as the primary causes 
of actions. Reconciling this with pratītyasamutpāda is a concern to Mādhyamikas. 
 
 
4 Some Bad Arguments for Supposed Buddhist Doctrines of Free Will 
 
That it’s impossible to formulate the free will thesis in a Buddhist framework has not stopped 
recent Buddhist philosophers from doing so. These attempts are motivated by the desire to 
present Buddhism as a ‘modern’—Western—doctrine that comes to similar conclusions. Here is 
a brief sampler. Meyers (2010) offers an extensive survey and critique. Davids (1898), Potter 
(1963), and Bodhi (Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 1995) argue that pratītyasamutpāda is consistent with 
free will because dependent origination is not deterministic. The idea is that dependent 
origination specifies only that conditions occasion events, not that they cause them: they 
somehow give rise to events, but do not necessitate them. Given that there is no necessitation, 
there is room for freedom to choose. This argument looks best in the Madhyamaka context of 
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Nāgārjuna’s critique of causal powers (Garfield 1994, 1995), but is still implausible. All 
Buddhist philosophers give universal scope to the pratītyasamutpāda thesis that ‘when this 
arises, so does that; when this fails to arise, so does that’, that any event can be completely 
explained by reference to prior and simultaneous causes and conditions. In opening his 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Nāgārjuna rejects arising from nothing at all. 
 
A cousin to this argument is Griffiths’ (1986) claim that dependent origination entails that causes 
or conditions are necessary for the arising of events, but not sufficient: initiation of an action 
may require many conditions, but these are not sufficient. An act of free will is required. This is 
implausible. First, there is no textual evidence of a Buddhist doctrine of necessary but 
insufficient conditions, or of the necessity of an uncaused act to potentiate action. But second, 
even if this constituted a rational reconstruction of Buddhist action theory, it would be incoherent 
because the posited act of free will would require conditions, and those would be insufficient, 
resulting in a self-defeating regress. 
 
Jayatilleke (1963) argues that karma necessitates free will. Karma (in the sense of karmaphala) 
is the reward or punishment for action, which would be unjust if action were caused.7 Since 
karma is central to Buddhist ethics and a doctrine of reward and punishment, Buddhist ethics 
requires free will. But many who disagree about Buddhist ethics agree that karmic consequence 
is not reward or punishment, but purely causal consequence (Keown 2001; Goodman 2009; 
Garfield 2010). Justice is inapplicable to a billiard ball moving after struck by a cue ball. Thus, 
karma cannot motivate free will. 
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Payutto (1990) argues that since all Buddhist schools agree that action is caused by cetanā, 
which can be translated as choice, choice is essential to Buddhist action theory; since choice 
entails ability to opt for alternatives, Buddhists are committed to free will. Cetanā is difficult to 
translate (Meyers 2010), but broad consensus is that its central meaning is intent, wanting, 
volition, none of which entails choice. Even if it meant choice, it would require heavy lifting to 
argue that Buddhist understanding of choice is causeless. While this is only a sample of 
arguments to this conclusion, it suggests that it is hard to generate a discourse of freedom in the 
libertarian, Augustinian, or Kantian sense in Buddhism. For an account of agency and 
responsibility in Madhyamaka thought, we must look elsewhere. 
 
 
5 Madhyamaka and Persons: The Two Truths 
 
Central to Madhyamaka philosophy is the doctrine of the two truths8 (Newland 1992, 2009; 
Cowherds 2010). Many Buddhist schools distinguish between two truths, in different ways for 
different purposes. Sautrantikas and Vaibhāṣikas argue that conventional reality is erroneous 
because it comprises composite entities, which they regard as illusory, fabricated: forests aren’t 
real; trees are; trees aren’t real; leaves and trunks are; and so on. But, for them, these 
conventional entities reduce to ultimately real, simple, momentary, causally interacting micro-
constituents of reality, dharmas. Things that might be conventionally true about wholes (say, the 
persistence of the person) are false, but reduce to true claims about dharmas (the momentary 
micro-constituents of persons). 
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Perhaps some measure of conventional freedom and responsibility reduces to ultimately 
impersonal causal processes (Siderits 1987, 2008), but the Madhyamaka account of the two 
truths neither exempts the conventional from dependent origination nor leaves us with an 
ultimate truth comprising fundamental constituents. Madhyamaka is not reductionist (Garfield 
2006). For Madhyamaka, nothing exists ultimately, and to say truly that anything exists is to say 
that it exists conventionally. As Nāgārjuna puts it,  
  
“That which is dependent origination 
 Is explained to be emptiness. 
That, being a dependent designation 
Is itself the middle way. 
 
There does not exist anything 
That is not dependently arisen. 
Therefore there does not exist anything 
That is not empty.” (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā XXIV: 18, 19; Garfield 1995) 
 
(See Garfield 1995; Cowherds 2010.) An account of agency and responsibility in Madhyamaka 
only addresses the realm of dependent origination, of conventional truth. 
 
This applies to persons, and it is the freedom, responsibility and agency of persons we consider. 
Candrakīrti, in Madhyamakāvatāra-bhāṣya (1992; see also Huntington and Wangchen 1989), 
argues that the person is neither identical to the psychophysical aggregates, not different from 
	  	   100	  
them, not one of them, nor the collection, nor the owner, controller or possessor of them. None of 
these can be made intelligible. Instead, the person is a conceptual imputation, a convenient 
designation, with no reality apart from that designation.  Candrakīrti (1992) puts it this way in 
Madhyamakāvatāra: 
 
 “The self is not the aggregates; and the aggregates 
 Are not the self. If there were any difference 
 Between them, such ideas would make sense. 
 But since there is no such difference, these are just ideas.” (VI: 142) 
 
 “The self cannot be maintained to be the possessor of the body; 
 Because the self does not exist, it cannot be the possessor of anything. 
 Only where there is difference can there be possession, as when one has a cow. 
Or without difference, as in the possession of the body; but the self is neither different 
nor non-different from the body.” (143) 
 
“The self is not the body; the self does not possess the body; 
The self is not in the body; the body is not in the self; 
All four aggregates are to be understood in this fourfold way” (144). 
 
“Therefore, the basis of self-grasping is not an entity. 
It is neither different from the aggregates nor the essence of the aggregates. 
It is neither the basis of the aggregates nor their possessor. 
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Instead, it is posited in dependence on the aggregates.” (150) 
 
“The self can thus be said to be no different from a chariot. 
It, in the same sense, is neither different from, nor identical with its parts. 
Nor does it possess its parts; it does not contain them, and they do not contain it. 
Nor is it the mere structure or mereological sum of its parts.” (151)  
 
We are, as Dennett (1992) put it, ‘centers of narrative gravity’. That is not to say that persons or 
their actions do not exist, but rather to say that our mode of existence is conventional, imputed. 
(Garfield 2006; Newland 2009) 
 
If Mādhyamikas are to ascribe agency and responsibility, or engage in moral evaluation, they 
will ascribe agency and responsibility to nominal entities, evaluating actions without ultimately 
existent agents. One might despair of any discourse of ethics and agency within this framework. 
But even Mahāyāna Buddhism—perhaps especially Madhyamaka—has the path to liberation at 
its core, and that involves the cultivation of moral qualities and a commitment to the welfare of 
all sentient beings, expounded by Śāntideva in Bodhicāryāvatāra.  
 
 
6 Agency and Responsibility in Madhyamaka 
 
For a Mādhyamika, selves are constructed through the appropriation of aggregates, through 
recognizing a body, thoughts, values, dispositions, and intentions as mine. In turn, those physical 
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and cognitive processes are constructed in relation to that appropriating self. That appropriation 
and narration of a life is not a solo affair. We narrate and construct each other in the 
hermeneutical ensemble act of social life. (See Hutto (2008), and Bogdan (2011), but as 
Nehamas (1985) notes, this idea goes back to Nietzsche.) None of us is innocent in our creation; 
but none of us is autonomous in it. Our identities are negotiated, fluid and complex because 
marked by the three universal characteristics of impermanence, interdependence, and absence of 
self. It is context-governed interpretive appropriation—not autonomous, substantial selfhood—
that sets the metaphysical and moral questions regarding agency and responsibility in 
Madhyamaka. 
 
To act is for our behavior to be determined by reasons, by motives we regard as ours. For 
Madhyamaka, it is for the causes of our behavior to be part of the narrative that makes sense of 
our lives, as opposed to being part of the vast uninterpreted milieu in which our lives are led. 
This distinction is not metaphysical but literary, and so a matter of choice, sensitive to 
explanatory purposes. That means the choice is not arbitrary. We can follow Nietzsche here. For 
what do we take responsibility and for what are we assigned responsibility? Those acts we 
interpret—or others interpret for us—as ours, as constituting part of the basis of imputation of 
our identities. 
 
When I consider jumping out the window to avoid living through global warming, etc., the 
conditions that motivate my act are cognitive and emotional states I take as mine, and which 
others who know me would regard as mine. The narrative that constructs the conventional self 
that is the basis of my individuation includes them, in virtue of our psychology and social 
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practices. This is an action. When you toss me from the window against my will, the causes of 
my trajectory lie in what we would, on conventional, hermeneutical grounds, interpret as parts of 
your biography—no action of mine. The agency lies with you, not on metaphysical, but 
conventional grounds: not on discovery of agent causation in your will, but based upon the 
plausible narrative we tell of the event and of each other’s lives as interpretable characters.9 
 
The interesting questions concern intermediate cases of coercion, where you threaten my 
children with torture if I do not jump. There are two ways to take this case, and many ways to 
construct a narrative here. In one, I am the passive victim of your blackmail; here we read the 
causes of my jumping as your actions, not mine: agency is assigned to you, not me. In another, I 
make a sacrifice in the face of circumstances beyond my control. Here we explain the jumping 
by reference to my character and desires, locating agency in me, not you. In a more nuanced 
story we say that while I may not be responsible for the circumstances that forced me to make 
the sacrifice, when faced with the hard choice I made it. How to choose between narratives in 
particular legal or moral discourses is interesting and difficult. But the Madhyamaka point is that 
in asking how best to tell this story and where to assign agency, we are never forced to look to a 
will, its freedom, or agent causation. 
 
On this Madhyamaka understanding of personal identity established through imputation—a view 
with affinities to Hume and Nietzsche—we do make choices, perform acts that merit moral 
assessment, assign responsibility to agents for their actions and absolve others, and assess acts 
morally. But none of this requires talk of free will.  These practices can be better understood in 
the framework of pratītyasamutpāda: a choice occurs when we experience competing motives, 
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consider alternative reasons, some of which could, if dominant, occasion alternative actions, and 
one set of reasons dominates, causing the action, and was caused to cause the action by our 
background dispositions, cognitive and conative states. Some actions are expressive of and 
conducive to virtue, happiness, liberation and the welfare of others and merit praise, others not. 
But there need be no more to it.10 What the post-Augustinian libertarian West buys with the gold 
coin of free will—at the expense of its metaphysical problems—is bought by the Mādhyamika 
more parsimoniously with the paper currency of mere imputation. 
 
 
7 Freedom on the Path; Freedom from Saṃsāra 
 
Mādhyamikas do talk about freedom—from suffering, cyclic existence, the kleśas (maladaptive 
psychological processes). This is a kind of freedom: of actions—mental, verbal, physical—from 
determination by those aspects of our personality we wish to write out of the narrative. Many of 
my actions are driven by fear, anger, despair, greed, etc., states I appropriate or others assign me 
as part of my biography. Consequently, I interpret a great deal of the events I participate in as 
occasioned by the acts of others—those who threaten, annoy, or compete with me, and react to 
them accordingly. This is the basis of vice. (Garfield 2010) 
 
The path to liberation, for a self that is mere conceptual imputation, is a path to the authorship of 
a narrative in which a better self is the protagonist, a self whose actions are conditioned by 
compassion, sympathetic joy, generosity and confidence, by responsiveness as opposed to 
reaction. The self I imagine at the higher stages of the path is free in ways the self I construct 
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now is not. More of its acts are actions it claims to author, and the conditions of those actions are 
morally salutary rather than counterproductive.  
 
However, the freedom achieved through the cultivation of this path, understood in the 
Madhyamaka framework of Candrakīrti and Śāntideva, is not a freedom of the will, but 
authority—freedom of a conceptually imputed person from the bars of a self-constructed prison, 
a freedom that demands no indeterminism. And when that freedom is complete, there is nothing 
left to lose. 
 
 
Notes 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Mādhyamikas are followers of Madhyamaka, later ‘Middle Way’ Buddhism. This paper is a 
condensation of a longer version for which I express my thanks to the publisher for permission to 
reproduce here: “Just Another Word for Nothing Left to Lose: Freedom, Agency and Ethics for 
Mādhyamikas”, in Free Will, Agency and Selfhood In Indian Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), edited by Matthew R. Dasti and Edwin F. Bryant, pp. 164-85 
(www.oup.com). Thanks to Edwin Bryant, John Connolly, Matthew Dasti, Bronwyn Finnigan 
and Karin Meyers for very helpful comments on earlier drafts. 	  
2 That is, external to the self, the agent, not the body. Being caused to act by a device implanted 
in the brain or disease would count as externally, heteronomously, determined. This parallels the 
distinction between being determined by reasons versus causes. So, following Locke and Kant, 
an action is thought free insofar as we can provide reasons for it, and it is for those reasons that 
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we undertake it. An action is unfree insofar as it is caused, and its causes are not reasons we give 
for acting. This distinction is transformed in the Madhyamaka account of responsibility below.	  
3 Such positions are compatibilist. Baker (2003) contrasts libertarianism and compatibilism 
positions clearly: libertarians require agency not be ultimately exogenous, whereas compatibilists 
permit it, depending on the details.	  
4 This is not to say the post-Fall theodicy is the only root of puzzles about agency, but that in the 
West this root gives them their character, and it is plausible that there are traditions in which they 
do not arise or arise differently.	  
5 All translations are my own, from Tibetan.	  
6 Or anything corresponding to Augustinian voluntas or Kantian Wille.	  
7 Augustine (1993) makes an argument of exactly this sort.	  
8 The Sanskrit ‘satya’ is ambiguous between the English ‘truth’ and ‘reality’, an ambiguity not 
salient in Sanskrit philosophy.	  
9 Not all narratives are equally good. Some make sense of our lives; some are incoherent, facile 
and self-serving, profound, or revealing. It is possible to disagree about whether a particular 
event is an action, or about the attribution of responsibility, to wonder about whether we should 
feel remorse for a particular situation. These are questions about which narratives make the most 
sense. While these questions may not always be easy (or possible to settle), that they arise saves 
this view from the facile relativism that would issue from the observation that we can always tell 
some story on which this is an action of mine, and some story on which it is not, so that there is 
no fact of the matter, and perhaps no importance to the question.	  
10 This also indicates why, on a Madhyamaka view, persons can be held responsible for actions 
even when they involve no explicit choice. Choice is not necessary in this account.	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  5	  Negative	  Dialectics	  in	  Comparative	  Philosophy:	  The	  Case	  of	  Buddhist	  Free	  Will	  
Quietism	  	  Owen	  Flanagan	  	  	  
“‘You	  sound	  to	  me	  as	  though	  you	  don’t	  believe	  in	  free	  will,’	  said	  Billy	  Pilgrim.	  ‘If	  I	  hadn’t	  spent	  so	  much	  time	  studying	  Earthlings,’	  said	  the	  Tralfamadorian,	  ‘I	  wouldn’t	  have	  any	  idea	  what	  was	  meant	  by	  free	  will.	  I’ve	  visited	  thirty-­‐one	  inhabited	  planets	  in	  the	  universe,	  and	  I	  have	  studied	  reports	  on	  one	  hundred	  more.	  Only	  on	  earth	  is	  there	  any	  talk	  of	  free	  will.’”	  (Vonnegut	  1969,	  p.	  86)	  	  	  
Negative	  Dialectics	  	  ‘Negative	  dialectic’	  (Adorno	  2003)	  expresses	  the	  idea	  that	  not	  all	  pressures	  to	  debate	  a	  topic	  through	  the	  famous,	  canonical	  process	  of	  thesis	  and	  antithesis	  result	  in	  a	  positive	  synthetic	  outcome.	  I	  think	  the	  request	  that	  Buddhism	  speak	  about	  and	  declare	  a	  position	  on	  our	  problem	  of	  free	  will	  is	  likely	  a	  case	  where	  the	  dialectic	  will	  yield	  an	  unfortunate	  result,	  stating	  a	  position	  of	  a	  problem	  that	  is	  better	  left	  alone,	  as	  the	  culturally	  idiosyncratic	  topic	  it	  is.	  There	  is	  a	  consensus,	  with	  a	  few	  notable	  exceptions	  (Davids	  1898;	  Gómez	  1975;	  Harvey	  2007)	  that	  classical	  Buddhism	  does	  not	  theorize	  what	  we	  in	  Western	  analytic	  philosophy	  and	  philosophical	  theology	  call	  the	  ‘problem	  of	  free	  will’.	  I	  am	  wary	  of	  asking	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Buddhists	  to	  talk	  about	  our	  problem	  of	  free	  will	  because	  it	  is	  a	  bad	  and	  idiosyncratic	  problem.	  	  	  The	  situation	  is	  a	  bit	  like	  that	  of	  Vonnegut’s	  Tralfamadorians	  who	  have	  been	  around	  the	  cosmos	  and	  find	  discussion	  on	  free	  will	  only	  on	  earth.	  Even	  on	  earth	  it	  is	  a	  rare	  problem.	  Abrahamic	  lineages	  talk	  about	  free	  will.	  Confucians,	  Daoists,	  Platonists,	  Aristotelians,	  Stoics,	  Cynics,	  Epicureans,	  Hindus,	  Jains,	  and	  Buddhists	  don’t.	  	  	  Since	  the	  greater	  part	  of	  this	  volume	  contains	  arguments	  for	  what	  the	  Buddhist	  view	  of	  free	  will	  is	  or	  would	  be	  if	  they	  had	  one,	  take	  my	  paper	  as	  proposing	  caution,	  as	  an	  exploration	  of	  the	  possibility	  that	  this	  particular	  cross-­‐cultural	  discussion	  might	  incur	  the	  cost	  of	  asking	  a	  tradition	  to	  entertain	  and	  discuss,	  even	  to	  make	  a	  place	  for,	  a	  bad	  idea	  that	  it	  did	  not	  previously	  or	  traditionally	  entertain.	  Here	  is	  my	  view	  in	  outline.	  	  1. Discussion	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  free	  will	  in	  Western	  analytic	  philosophy	  and	  the	  Abrahamic	  theological	  traditions—probably	  in	  the	  philosophical	  case	  because	  it	  inherits	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  theological	  case—requires	  agent	  causation	  to	  be	  a	  contender,	  a	  thesis	  in	  the	  dialectic.	  	  2. Any	  dialectic	  that	  starts	  with	  powerful	  pressure	  to	  treat	  the	  idea	  of	  agent	  causation	  as	  a	  serious	  option,	  a	  thesis,	  is	  off	  to	  a	  bad	  start.	  It	  has	  promise	  for	  being	  a	  negative	  dialectic.	  	  3. Buddhism	  has	  no	  need	  for	  the	  agent	  causation	  thesis,	  and	  never	  entertains	  it.	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4. Because	  agent	  causation	  is	  a	  bad	  idea	  that	  never	  stops	  giving,	  it	  is	  best	  not	  read	  into	  or	  imported	  into	  Buddhism.	  	  5. Therefore,	  don’t	  import	  it	  into	  Buddhism.	  	  	  
The	  Hermeneutic	  Situation	  	  	  One	  compelling	  piece	  of	  evidence	  that	  something	  is	  fishy	  or,	  what	  is	  different,	  that	  something	  is	  off	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  Buddhism	  and	  free	  will	  comes	  from	  observing	  the	  set	  of	  answers	  considered	  by	  the	  Western	  philosophers	  who	  ask	  about	  the	  Buddhist	  view	  on	  free	  will,	  who	  claim	  to	  find	  or	  think	  they	  are	  entitled	  to	  say	  what	  Buddhists	  say,	  think,	  or	  should	  say	  or	  think	  about	  free	  will.	  These	  readings	  all	  occur	  inside	  a	  consensus	  that	  there	  is	  no	  theorizing	  inside	  classical	  Buddhism	  about	  free	  will	  (Garfield	  2014).	  Here	  is	  a	  brief	  tour.	  	   1) Charles	  Goodman’s	  original	  view	  (2002)	  was	  that	  Buddhism	  is	  a	  form	  of	  hard	  determinism.	  Goodman’s	  recent	  view	  (this	  volume)	  is	  that	  it	  might	  be	  useful,	  a	  matter	  of	  upāya,	  skillful	  means,	  given	  the	  make-­‐up	  of	  certain	  contemporary	  Buddhists,	  raised,	  for	  example,	  in	  cultures	  where	  believing	  in	  hard	  determinism	  would	  be	  depressing,	  to	  have	  them	  believe	  or	  make-­‐believe	  that	  they	  have	  free	  will.	  	  2) Mark	  Siderits	  says	  Buddhism	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  compatibilism,	  ‘paleo-­‐compatibilism’:	  free	  will	  exists	  at	  the	  conventional	  level;	  it	  does	  not	  exist	  at	  the	  ultimate	  level	  (2008).	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3) Rick	  Repetti	  (2010)	  says	  Buddhism	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  sophisticated	  hierarchical	  compatibilism	  a	  la	  Frankfurt	  (1971).	  	  4) Paul	  Griffiths	  (1982)	  says	  Buddhists	  hold	  (would	  hold)	  a	  libertarian/agent	  causation	  view:	  “Buddhalogy	  …	  as	  formally	  identical	  with	  Christian	  theology”	  (1994,	  p.	  182;	  see	  also	  Wallace	  2011).	  	  	  5) Galen	  Strawson	  says	  Buddhism	  is	  either	  a	  kind	  of	  hard	  determinism/incompatibilism	  or	  otherwise	  committed	  to	  the	  falsity	  or,	  what	  is	  different,	  incoherence	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  free	  will	  (2010).	  	  6) Sam	  Harris	  (2012)	  thinks	  Buddhism	  holds	  that	  free	  will	  is	  an	  illusion.	  	  	  What	  is	  going	  on	  here?	  What	  explains	  the	  fact	  that	  very	  smart,	  conscientious	  philosophers	  claim	  that	  every	  position	  ever	  entertained	  in	  Western	  philosophy	  is	  either	  there	  or	  can	  be	  extracted	  from	  Buddhism?	  My	  argument	  here	  situates	  the	  source	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  consensus	  to	  a	  perfect	  storm	  comprised	  of	  indifference	  of	  the	  Buddhist	  tradition	  to	  our	  problem	  of	  free	  will,	  projection	  of	  various	  preferred	  solutions	  to	  our	  problem	  of	  free	  will	  onto	  some	  one	  among	  the	  types	  of	  Buddhism	  (hereafter,	  “Buddhisms”),	  and	  lack	  of	  clarity	  and	  carefulness	  about	  method	  in	  comparative	  philosophy.	  	  	  
Topics	  Better	  Under-­‐	  or	  Un-­‐theorized?	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Imagine	  someone	  asks:	  What	  is	  the	  analytic	  philosophical	  consensus	  on	  karmic	  rebirth,	  on	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  sentient	  beings	  recycle	  for	  eons	  as	  other	  sentient	  beings,	  animal	  and	  human,	  and	  that	  they	  do	  so	  based	  on	  the	  moral	  quality	  of	  their	  lives?	  One	  answer	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  consensus	  inside	  analytic	  philosophy	  about	  karmic	  rebirth	  because	  karmic	  rebirth	  is	  not	  a	  topic	  we	  talk	  about.	  Another	  answer,	  perhaps	  more	  intellectually	  honest,	  is	  that	  it	  is	  an	  implication	  of	  things	  we	  do	  talk	  about,	  and	  have	  opinions	  about,	  that	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  karmic	  rebirth.	  In	  either	  case,	  it	  might	  be	  judged	  best	  for	  us	  not	  now	  to	  talk	  about	  karmic	  rebirth,	  at	  least	  not	  very	  much,	  and	  not	  as	  a	  sustained	  and	  serious	  topic	  of	  discussion	  in	  contemporary	  metaphysics,	  in	  theorizing	  now	  about	  what	  there	  is	  and	  how	  it	  is.	  	  	  This	  sort	  of	  philosophical	  ethnocentrism	  would	  not	  be	  the	  end	  of	  the	  matter.	  It	  leaves	  room	  for	  karmic	  rebirth	  as	  a	  central	  topic	  in	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy,	  in	  philosophical	  anthropology	  and	  in	  comparative	  philosophy,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  important	  project	  of	  getting	  what	  other	  great	  wisdom	  traditions	  have	  thought	  about	  the	  nature	  and	  fate	  of	  persons,	  as	  well	  as	  understanding	  important	  folk	  philosophical	  views,	  which	  are	  still	  in	  the	  blood	  and	  bones	  of	  many	  Hindus,	  Jains,	  and	  Buddhists,	  and	  which	  animate	  their	  morals,	  their	  folk	  metaphysics,	  and	  their	  soteriological	  thinking.	  And	  obviously	  it	  is	  a	  sign	  of	  a	  healthy	  critical	  philosophical	  environment	  to	  always	  be	  willing	  to	  wonder	  and	  discuss	  whether	  ideas	  that	  other	  communities	  have	  explored	  might	  be	  good	  for	  us	  now,	  in	  our	  current	  situation.	  	  	  The	  situation	  with	  the	  topic	  of	  karmic	  rebirth	  is	  similar	  to	  our	  topic	  of	  free	  will	  in	  the	  other	  direction.	  Free	  will	  is	  a	  central	  topic	  in	  Western	  philosophy	  since	  roughly	  the	  time	  of	  St.	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Augustine	  and	  largely	  for	  reasons	  internal	  to	  a	  certain	  set	  of	  theological	  and	  eschatological	  assumptions.	  Free	  will	  is	  a	  topic	  we	  were	  led	  to	  inside	  a	  certain	  very	  particular,	  parochial	  language	  game.	  Philosophizing	  inside	  the	  Abrahamic	  tradition(s)	  compelled	  asking	  the	  question	  what	  a	  person	  must	  be	  like	  for	  an	  all	  loving,	  all	  knowing,	  all	  good	  creator	  God	  to	  justifiably,	  consistent	  with	  his	  infinite	  goodness,	  eternally	  reward	  or	  punish	  individuals	  for	  how	  they	  lived.	  	  	  Here	  are	  some	  canonical	  statements	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  capacity	  that	  persons	  must	  have	  in	  order	  to	  solve	  this	  problem.	  Each	  articulates	  the	  libertarian	  view	  of	  free	  will,	  which	  sure	  looks	  like	  the	  only	  option	  that	  can	  answer	  the	  question	  in	  a	  way	  that	  keeps	  God	  from	  being	  capricious,	  even	  cruel.	  Libertarianism,	  or	  agent	  causation,	  is	  not	  of	  course	  the	  only	  view	  of	  free	  will	  in	  Western	  analytic	  philosophy,	  but	  it	  historically	  defines	  the	  shape	  of	  our	  problem.	  	  “But	  the	  will	  is	  so	  free,	  that	  it	  can	  never	  be	  constrained…	  And	  the	  whole	  action	  of	  the	  soul	  consists	  in	  this,	  that	  solely	  because	  it	  desires	  something,	  it	  causes	  a	  little	  gland	  to	  which	  it	  is	  closely	  united	  to	  move	  in	  a	  way	  requisite	  to	  produce	  the	  effect	  which	  relates	  to	  this	  desire.”	  (Descartes	  1649,	  p.	  41)	  	  “If	  we	  are	  responsible	  …	  then	  we	  have	  a	  prerogative	  which	  some	  would	  attribute	  only	  to	  God:	  each	  of	  us	  when	  we	  act,	  is	  a	  prime	  mover	  unmoved.	  In	  doing	  what	  we	  do,	  we	  cause	  certain	  things	  to	  happen,	  and	  nothing—or	  no	  one—causes	  us	  to	  cause	  those	  events	  to	  happen.”	  (Chisholm	  1964,	  p.	  32)	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   “Free	  will	  …	  is	  the	  power	  of	  agents	  to	  be	  the	  ultimate	  creators	  or	  originators	  and	  
sustainers	  of	  their	  own	  ends	  and	  purposes	  .…	  [W]hen	  we	  trace	  the	  causal	  and	  explanatory	  chains	  of	  action	  back	  to	  their	  sources	  in	  the	  purposes	  of	  free	  agents,	  these	  causal	  chains	  must	  come	  to	  an	  end	  or	  terminate	  in	  the	  willings	  (choices,	  decisions,	  or	  efforts)	  of	  the	  agents,	  which	  cause	  or	  bring	  about	  their	  purposes.”	  (Kane	  1998,	  p.	  4;	  italics	  his)	  	  This	  puffed	  up	  view	  of	  human	  agency	  is	  invariably	  on	  stage	  as	  a	  live	  option	  as	  soon	  as	  our	  topic	  of	  free	  will	  is.	  Of	  course,	  the	  dialectical	  situation	  typically	  involves	  trying	  to	  tame	  this	  option,	  making	  the	  world	  safe	  for	  compatibilism,	  for	  example.	  The	  trouble	  is	  that	  no	  view	  other	  than	  the	  libertarian	  view	  will	  solve	  the	  theological	  problem.	  And	  that	  problem	  haunts	  our	  discussions	  of	  free	  will.	  It	  comes	  as	  the	  inevitable	  penumbra	  of	  our	  problem	  of	  free	  will.	  It	  is	  always	  in	  the	  shadows	  as	  long	  as	  our	  problem	  of	  free	  will	  is	  in	  view.	  	  	  Here	  is	  Nietzsche’s	  admittedly	  polemical	  diagnosis	  of	  the	  raison	  d’etre	  of	  our	  conversation,	  which	  I	  think	  is	  more	  or	  less	  on	  the	  mark:	  	  “Might	  it	  not	  be	  the	  case	  that	  that	  extremely	  foolhardy	  and	  fateful	  philosophical	  invention,	  first	  devised	  for	  Europe,	  of	  the	  ‘free	  will’	  of	  man’s	  absolute	  freedom	  (Spontaneitat)	  to	  do	  good	  or	  evil,	  was	  chiefly	  thought	  up	  to	  justify	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  gods,	  in	  man,	  in	  man’s	  virtue,	  could	  never	  be	  exhausted”	  (Nietzsche	  1887,	  2nd	  essay,	  p.	  7).	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   “The	  causa	  sui	  is	  the	  best	  self-­‐contradiction	  that	  has	  been	  conceived	  so	  far:	  it	  is	  a	  sort	  of	  rape	  and	  perversion	  of	  logic.	  But	  the	  extravagant	  pride	  of	  man	  has	  managed	  to	  entangle	  itself	  profoundly	  and	  frightfully	  with	  just	  this	  nonsense.	  The	  desire	  for	  ‘freedom	  of	  the	  will’	  in	  the	  superlative	  metaphysical	  sense,	  which	  still	  holds	  sway,	  unfortunately,	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  half-­‐educated;	  the	  desire	  to	  bear	  the	  entire	  and	  ultimate	  responsibility	  for	  one’s	  actions	  oneself,	  and	  to	  absolve	  God,	  the	  world,	  ancestors,	  chance,	  and	  society	  involves	  nothing	  less	  than	  to	  be	  precisely	  this	  causa	  
sui	  and,	  with	  more	  than	  Baron	  Münchhausen’s	  audacity,	  to	  pull	  oneself	  up	  into	  existence	  by	  the	  hair,	  out	  of	  the	  swamps	  of	  nothingness.”	  (Nietzsche	  1886,	  §21)	  	  This—“desire	  for	  ‘freedom	  of	  the	  will’	  in	  the	  superlative	  metaphysical	  sense”—is	  not	  a	  need	  the	  Buddhisms	  have.	  There	  is	  no	  creation	  ex	  nihilo.	  And	  there	  is	  no	  omnipotent,	  all	  loving,	  all	  good	  God;	  nor	  is	  there	  eternal	  reward	  or	  punishment.	  The	  question	  of	  how	  persons	  must	  be,	  what	  they	  must	  be	  like,	  for	  God	  not	  to	  be	  capricious	  and	  evil	  is	  not	  a	  question	  internal	  to	  the	  Buddhisms.	  There	  is	  of	  course	  a	  series	  of	  rebirths	  that	  track	  moral	  quality,	  but	  in	  Buddhism	  quality	  of	  rebirth,	  as	  well	  as	  eventual	  release	  from	  suffering,	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  the	  operation	  of	  impersonal	  causal	  laws.	  Finally,	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  from	  psychology	  that	  anything	  like	  the	  “desire	  for	  ‘freedom	  of	  the	  will’	  in	  the	  superlative	  metaphysical	  sense”	  is	  a	  normal	  or	  natural	  human	  desire	  absent	  a	  certain	  background	  theological	  or	  philosophical	  framework.	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If	  this	  is	  right,	  it	  provides	  a	  much-­‐too-­‐quick	  and	  admittedly	  superficial	  explanation	  for	  why	  the	  Buddhisms	  do	  not	  theorize	  free	  will.	  The	  philosophical	  tradition,	  core	  metaphysics,	  epistemology,	  and	  ethical	  thinking	  that	  comprise	  the	  Buddhisms,	  does	  not	  require	  the	  kind	  of	  dialectic	  that	  generates	  our	  problem	  of	  free	  will.	  This	  helps	  explain	  why	  there	  is	  close	  to	  consensus	  among	  scholars	  that	  across	  the	  varieties	  of	  Buddhism	  there	  is	  no	  direct	  or	  systematic	  reflection	  on	  the	  problem	  of	  free	  will	  as	  we	  conceive	  it,	  that	  the	  concepts	  we	  use	  in	  Western	  philosophy	  to	  discuss	  the	  topic,	  forget	  about	  full-­‐on	  theorizing,	  are	  not	  present	  in	  traditional	  East,	  South,	  and	  Southeast	  Asian	  Buddhisms.	  My	  diagnosis	  is	  that	  there	  isn’t	  systematic	  reflection	  on	  the	  problem	  of	  free	  will	  because	  Buddhists	  never	  had	  the	  internal	  philosophical-­‐theological	  problems	  that	  engendered	  such	  theorizing	  for	  us.	  And	  thus	  English	  translations	  of	  the	  Pali	  Canon	  or	  of	  commentaries	  in	  Pali,	  Sanskrit,	  Chinese,	  Korean,	  Japanese	  and	  so	  on,	  do	  not	  use	  terms	  that	  clearly	  mark	  our	  topic	  of	  free	  will.	  	  	  Some	  analytic	  philosophers	  think	  it	  unfortunate	  that	  the	  Asian	  Buddhisms	  do	  not	  have	  views,	  let	  alone	  theories,	  about	  free	  will.	  My	  view	  is	  that	  it	  is	  good—minimally	  good	  dialectically—that	  Buddhists	  do	  not	  have	  theories	  about	  free	  will.	  It	  shows,	  among	  other	  things,	  that	  wondering	  about	  free	  will	  is	  not	  as	  inevitable	  as	  wondering	  about	  the	  furniture	  of	  the	  universe,	  about	  chickens,	  goats,	  rivers,	  mountains,	  fire	  and	  rain.	  Free	  will	  is	  a	  theoretical	  object,	  an	  explanatory	  device,	  not	  a	  basic	  phenomenon	  or	  feature	  of	  the	  world	  in	  need	  of	  explanation.	  Once	  free	  will	  is	  theorized	  as	  something	  that	  humans	  uniquely	  must	  be	  possessed	  of	  in	  order	  to	  accept	  a	  certain	  theological	  and	  eschatological	  picture,	  specifically	  an	  all	  good,	  loving,	  and	  powerful	  God	  who	  doles	  out	  eternal	  reward	  or	  damnation,	  then	  there	  is	  a	  lot	  of	  further	  explaining	  to	  do	  about	  how	  it,	  free	  will,	  is	  possible,	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and	  thus	  the	  free	  will	  industry	  in	  Western	  analytic	  philosophy	  is	  born	  and	  then	  fed.	  But	  free	  will	  really	  is	  something	  about	  which	  Buddhist	  traditions	  are	  unopinionated	  or,	  as	  likely,	  something	  which—if	  we	  find	  ways	  of	  speaking	  of	  it	  inside	  the	  traditional	  Buddhism—will	  seem	  odd,	  awkward,	  unsuited,	  possibly	  incoherent	  or	  meaningless,	  perhaps,	  at	  the	  limit,	  just	  an	  empty	  idea.	  That	  said,	  if	  I	  were	  a	  Buddhist	  comparative	  philosopher	  I	  would	  be	  very	  curious	  to	  understand	  what	  we	  think	  free	  will	  is	  and	  why	  we	  care	  so	  much	  about	  it.	  I	  have	  just	  sketched	  how	  that	  answer	  will	  look	  and	  where	  it	  will	  come	  from.	  	  There	  is	  an	  immediate	  and	  formidable	  objection	  to	  the	  tactic	  I	  am	  hinting	  at,	  the	  tactic	  of	  leaving	  well	  enough	  alone,	  where	  what	  is	  well-­‐enough	  is	  that	  Buddhism	  avoids	  one	  of	  the	  black	  holes	  of	  Western	  philosophy,	  the	  topic	  of	  free	  will.	  The	  objection	  is	  straightforward:	  There	  are	  internal	  and	  external	  questions	  that	  can	  be	  asked	  of	  any	  philosophical	  tradition.	  Inside	  Greek	  atomism,	  the	  question	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  subatomic	  particles	  doesn’t	  arise,	  unless,	  of	  course,	  such	  particles	  are	  the	  atoms.	  But	  once	  atomism	  meets	  elementary	  particle	  physics,	  the	  atomist	  must	  speak,	  offer	  an	  account,	  of	  phenomena—protons,	  electrons,	  etc.—we,	  the	  believers	  in	  subatomic	  particles,	  claim	  are	  there,	  particles	  that	  split	  what	  was	  formerly	  thought	  to	  be	  unsplittable.	  	  	  One	  of	  the	  amazing,	  beautiful,	  and	  helpful	  things	  about	  the	  spaces	  where	  theories,	  scientific	  or	  philosophical,	  meet	  is	  that	  they	  are	  called	  to	  account	  for	  what	  their	  mates,	  neighbors,	  or	  competitors	  see	  or	  theorize	  as	  real,	  as	  mattering.	  So,	  suppose	  it	  is	  true	  that	  the	  classical	  Asian	  varieties	  of	  Buddhism	  do	  not	  theorize	  free	  will.	  These	  varieties	  now	  have	  Western	  branches,	  largish	  footprints	  in	  North	  America	  and	  Europe.	  And	  thus	  we	  are	  allowed	  to	  ask	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our	  questions	  of	  the	  tradition.	  So	  we	  ask	  what	  do	  Buddhists	  think	  about	  free	  will?	  Are	  you/is	  the	  tradition	  (which	  strand?)	  committed	  to	  libertarianism,	  compatibilism,	  weak	  free	  will,	  or	  strong	  free	  will?	  What	  about	  responsibility,	  heavy	  or	  light?	  We	  will	  ask	  and	  reconstruct	  answers	  that	  suit	  us,	  Buddhism’s	  answers	  to	  our	  questions,	  answers	  that	  are	  at	  a	  minimum	  not	  inconsistent	  with	  Buddhism.	  Furthermore,	  I	  am	  certain,	  it	  is	  a	  guaranteed	  consequence	  of	  smart	  people	  reading	  vast	  tracts	  of	  ancient,	  hard-­‐to-­‐decipher,	  often	  poetic	  speech	  that	  they	  will	  find	  answers	  to	  their	  questions:	  what	  the	  Buddha	  thought	  about	  free	  will,	  what	  he	  would	  have	  said	  about	  free	  will.	  Seek	  and	  ye	  shall	  find	  here;	  oh,	  also,	  you	  will	  find	  every	  answer,	  as	  many	  articles	  in	  this	  book	  attest.	  And	  thus	  I	  realize	  that	  I	  am	  fighting	  a	  rear-­‐guard	  action	  insofar	  as	  we	  will	  ask	  these	  questions	  and	  demand	  answers.	  	  	  The	  dialectical	  situation	  is	  one	  in	  which	  we	  can	  learn	  a	  lot.	  There	  is	  a	  similarity	  to	  lessons	  we	  might	  be	  in	  the	  process	  of	  learning	  from	  the	  vast	  amount	  of	  recent	  work	  asking	  for	  Buddhism’s	  ethical	  theory,	  which	  is	  sometimes	  based	  on	  the	  lament	  that	  for	  all	  the	  richness	  of	  the	  tradition,	  it	  does	  not	  declare	  whether	  it	  is	  a	  virtue	  theory	  or	  a	  kind	  of	  consequentialism	  or	  deontology.	  But	  note	  what	  is	  assumed	  here,	  that	  a	  unified	  ethical	  theory	  is	  desirable,	  a	  sensible	  demand	  for	  a	  philosophy.	  Analytic	  philosophers	  have	  recently	  assimilated	  the	  Buddhisms	  to	  varieties	  of	  Aristotelian,	  consequentialist,	  and	  even	  Kantian	  ethics.	  The	  fits	  don’t	  work	  perfectly.	  There	  are	  two	  directions	  one	  can	  go	  here.	  One	  can	  lament	  that	  Buddhism	  doesn’t	  have	  a	  unified	  ethical	  theory.	  Or,	  one	  can	  wonder	  whether	  this	  latter	  fact	  might	  teach	  us	  something	  important	  about	  the	  ethical	  domain,	  for	  example,	  that	  it	  resists	  unified	  theorizing,	  that	  our	  impulse	  to	  theorize	  moral	  life	  is	  the	  problem,	  not	  Buddhism’s	  under-­‐theorizing.	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  An	  even	  better	  example	  pertains	  to	  the	  particular	  question	  of	  human	  rights.	  The	  current	  Dalai	  Lama	  is	  one	  of	  the	  foremost	  proponents	  of	  universal	  human	  rights.	  But	  as	  Christopher	  Kelley	  (2015)	  has	  shown	  in	  his	  important	  dissertation,	  there	  is	  absolutely	  no	  discussion	  of	  rights	  and	  no	  conceptual	  space	  for	  Enlightenment-­‐style	  inalienable	  rights	  inside	  Buddhism.	  The	  language	  of	  ‘intrinsic’	  and	  ‘inalienable’	  can	  find	  no	  comfortable	  home	  inside	  Buddhism	  to	  warrant	  agreement	  that	  there	  really	  are	  such	  things	  as	  inalienable	  rights.	  That	  said,	  there	  could	  be,	  indeed	  there	  is,	  a	  modus	  vivendi,	  a	  practical	  agreement	  on	  universal	  human	  rights,	  that	  Buddhists	  sometimes	  lead.	  But	  the	  best	  way	  to	  read	  the	  situation	  is	  not	  that	  Buddhists	  really	  believe	  in	  universal	  human	  rights	  in	  the	  ways	  and	  for	  the	  reasons	  that	  we	  children	  of	  Kant	  do.	  Not	  at	  all.	  They	  don’t.	  And	  the	  lesson	  is	  not	  that	  ultimately	  we	  can	  force	  them	  to	  agree	  to	  our	  conception,	  to	  conceive	  of	  rights	  as	  we	  do.	  We	  cannot,	  and	  they	  cannot	  (and	  won’t).	  What	  we	  can	  gain	  is	  some	  agreement	  from	  polite	  people	  to	  behave	  as	  if	  they	  share	  a	  consensus,	  which	  for	  all	  practical	  purposes	  they	  do.	  The	  situation	  might	  be	  similar	  in	  the	  case	  of	  free	  will	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  there	  is	  agreement	  about	  how	  persons	  ought	  to	  feel,	  think,	  and	  be	  (loving,	  compassionate),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  moral	  and	  legal	  institutions	  will	  hold	  people	  accountable	  without	  any	  shared	  theory	  about	  free	  will.	  	  	  
Four	  Frameworks	  for	  Comparative	  Philosophy	  	  One	  way	  to	  think	  through	  our	  question	  is	  to	  think	  of	  four	  kinds	  or	  approaches	  to	  comparative	  philosophy	  or,	  what	  is	  different,	  four	  roles	  for	  comparative	  philosophy;	  call	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these	  Classical,	  Fusion,	  Cosmopolitan,	  and	  Liberal	  (Flanagan	  2011).	  They	  are	  not	  mutually	  incompatible.	  
	  
Classical	  comparative	  philosophy	  tries	  to	  enter	  into	  a	  form	  of	  life,	  typically	  through	  its	  canonical	  texts,	  and	  say	  in	  an	  idiom	  we	  can	  comprehend	  how	  the	  world	  view,	  form	  of	  life,	  is	  (sometimes	  was)	  for	  the	  people	  who	  live	  inside	  that	  world,	  that	  set	  of	  practices	  and	  traditions,	  and	  who	  abide	  the	  ways	  of	  feeling,	  thinking,	  and	  being	  expressed	  in	  the	  world	  that	  those	  texts	  describe	  or	  aspire.	  	  
	  
Fusion	  comparative	  philosophy	  takes	  two	  or	  more	  classically	  well-­‐understood	  traditions	  and	  asks	  what	  you	  get	  when	  you	  bring	  them	  together.	  Is	  it	  something	  good,	  new	  and	  interesting,	  or	  it	  is	  un-­‐blendable	  like	  oil	  and	  water,	  or	  a	  bad	  mix	  like	  lemon	  juice	  and	  milk?	  Who	  would	  have	  known	  that	  French	  and	  Vietnamese	  cuisine	  could	  go	  so	  well	  together?	  So	  we	  work,	  let	  us	  suppose,	  at	  trying	  to	  mix	  the	  Indian	  virtue	  of	  ahimsa,	  non-­‐violence,	  with	  American	  foreign	  policy	  discourse	  to	  see	  if	  something	  good	  happens	  from	  blending	  these	  seemingly	  foreign	  ingredients	  together.	  Perhaps	  it	  does;	  perhaps	  it	  is	  like	  oil	  and	  water	  or	  lemon	  and	  milk,	  a	  bad	  mix	  in	  different	  ways	  for	  different	  reasons.	  Or,	  we	  ask,	  as	  many	  East	  Asians	  are	  now	  asking,	  whether	  classical	  Confucianism	  and	  liberal	  democratic	  theory	  can	  be	  blended	  into	  something	  new,	  improved,	  even	  better	  than	  either	  alone.	  Some	  fusions	  are	  conceptually	  impossible	  if	  one	  makes	  certain	  demands	  on	  maintaining	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  original	  ingredients;	  for	  example,	  one	  cannot	  be	  a	  Christian	  Trinitarian	  and	  a	  Muslim,	  and	  both	  of	  these	  are	  incompatible	  with	  Greek	  or	  Hindu	  polytheism.	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Cosmopolitan	  comparative	  philosophy	  is	  open	  to,	  attuned	  to,	  opportunities	  for	  fusion,	  but	  looks	  in	  the	  first	  instance	  for	  a	  solution	  to	  this	  problem:	  In	  many	  great	  cities,	  think	  of	  NYC	  and	  London	  for	  starters,	  people	  from	  very	  different	  traditions	  intersect	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.	  There	  is,	  or	  needs	  to	  be,	  at	  a	  minimum,	  a	  modus	  vivendi.	  For	  that,	  it	  is	  good	  to	  ‘get’	  each	  other,	  to	  understand	  what	  we	  are	  each	  doing,	  feeling,	  and	  thinking.	  Sometimes	  this	  will	  involve	  something	  very	  much	  like	  classical	  understanding.	  The	  Polish	  Catholics	  ‘get’	  how	  their	  Sufi	  neighbors	  think	  and	  vice	  versa,	  although	  it	  all	  seems	  very	  alien	  on	  both	  sides,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  fusing	  or	  merger.	  Other	  times,	  there	  might	  be	  fusions.	  The	  African	  Americans,	  Irish,	  and	  Italians	  in	  Queens	  see	  among	  their	  Chinese	  neighbors	  a	  kind	  of	  respect	  for	  elders,	  
xiao,	  which	  they	  think	  would	  make	  family	  and	  civil	  life	  go	  better	  if	  they	  could	  get	  some	  such	  virtue	  or	  set	  of	  understandings	  and	  practices	  into	  the	  blood	  and	  bones	  of	  their	  kids,	  possibly	  using	  Confucian	  reasons,	  possibly	  using	  reasons	  closer	  to	  home	  that	  are	  now	  lost	  or	  hidden.	  
	  
Liberal	  comparative	  philosophy	  can	  make	  use	  of	  classical,	  fusion,	  and	  cosmopolitan	  methods,	  but	  it	  responds	  to	  this	  sort	  of	  situation,	  and	  applies	  especially	  to	  the	  present	  case	  of	  Buddhism	  and	  free	  will.	  Imagine	  a	  young	  Jewish	  woman	  from	  Brooklyn	  (I	  have	  many	  such	  friends	  who	  call	  themselves	  ‘Bu-­‐Jews’)	  who	  is	  also	  a	  Ph.	  D.	  candidate	  in	  philosophy	  at	  the	  CUNY	  Graduate	  School,	  and	  who	  is	  now	  a	  convert	  to	  Buddhism.	  (Imagine,	  unlike	  many	  Americans	  who	  say	  they	  are	  Buddhists,	  she	  knows	  something	  about	  Buddhism	  and	  doesn’t	  think	  it	  just	  involves	  meditation.)	  She	  asks	  herself	  what	  Buddhism	  says	  or	  would	  say	  about	  the	  problem	  of	  free	  will.	  Here	  I	  picture	  the	  individual	  responding	  to	  the	  personal	  question	  of	  how	  her	  commitments	  to	  the	  letter	  or	  spirit	  of	  some	  version	  of	  Buddhism	  sits	  with	  her	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other	  commitments,	  some	  from	  her	  Jewish	  upbringing,	  and	  some	  from	  her	  philosophical	  training	  and	  her	  exposure	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  free	  will.	  	  	  
Liberal	  allows	  her,	  and	  especially	  so	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Buddhism,	  which	  is	  a	  living,	  non-­‐creedal	  tradition,	  to	  say	  whatever	  suits	  her	  so	  long	  as	  it	  does	  not	  contradict	  a	  core	  belief	  in	  Buddhism.	  Here	  the	  situation	  is	  revealing.	  I	  think	  she	  can	  say	  pretty	  much	  anything	  she	  wants	  about	  free	  will	  and	  carry	  on	  because	  the	  classical	  varieties	  of	  Buddhism	  are	  so	  utterly	  un-­‐opinionated	  about	  the	  matter.	  If	  the	  shared	  core	  across	  the	  varieties	  of	  Buddhism	  (Flanagan	  2011)	  consists	  of	  the	  Four	  Noble	  Truths,	  the	  Eightfold	  Path,	  and	  the	  four	  immeasurable	  virtues	  (compassion,	  loving-­‐kindness,	  sympathetic	  joy,	  and	  equanimity),	  then	  every	  position	  on	  free	  will	  is	  compatible.	  If	  the	  shared	  core	  also	  includes,	  as	  I	  think,	  commitment	  to	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  dependent	  origination,	  impermanence,	  and	  no	  self,	  the	  situation	  may	  be	  the	  same,	  although	  I	  think	  agent	  causation	  might	  be	  conceived	  as	  an	  incoherent	  option,	  a	  nonstarter	  right	  out	  of	  the	  gate.	  	  	  The	  key	  feature	  of	  liberal	  is	  that	  it	  takes	  a	  step	  into	  the	  space	  where	  things	  are	  not	  yet	  fixed	  for	  a	  living	  tradition.	  A	  liberal	  can	  say	  traditional	  Buddhists	  don’t	  talk	  about	  free	  will,	  but	  say	  that	  they	  are	  a	  Buddhist,	  perhaps	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  Buddhist:	  a	  Westerner	  born	  inside	  an	  Abrahamic	  religion,	  trained	  in	  analytic	  philosophy,	  now	  trying	  to	  be	  a	  Buddhist,	  and	  wanting	  to	  think	  through	  what	  they	  are	  allowed	  to	  say	  about	  the	  problem	  of	  free	  will.	  They	  get,	  when	  they	  wear	  their	  classical	  hat,	  that	  the	  topic	  is	  not	  discussed	  in	  traditional	  South,	  Southeast,	  or	  East	  Asian	  Buddhism,	  and	  they	  get	  when	  they	  wear	  the	  fusion	  and/or	  
cosmopolitan	  hats,	  that	  free	  will	  is	  not	  a	  problem	  that	  their	  Thai	  Buddhist	  neighbors	  here	  in	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Brooklyn	  need	  help	  from	  them	  on.	  This	  person	  is	  trying	  to	  find	  out	  for	  herself,	  and	  other	  members	  of	  this	  new	  community,	  what	  they	  can	  allow	  themselves	  to	  permissibly	  think	  or	  say	  about	  a	  problem	  they	  have	  because	  of	  where	  they	  are	  coming	  from.	  	  	  	  
Detecting	  Frameworks	  	  With	  this	  matrix	  of	  frameworks	  in	  place,	  we	  can	  ask	  what	  is	  going	  on	  with	  the	  discussion	  of	  Buddhism	  and	  free	  will	  in	  general	  and	  each	  particular	  view	  listed	  in	  the	  inventory	  of	  positions	  above.	  Is	  a	  scholar	  claiming	  that	  there	  are	  discussions	  of	  free	  will	  in	  canonical	  texts,	  in	  the	  Pali	  Canon,	  say?	  Extracting	  such	  discussions	  would	  be	  something	  classical	  could	  do	  if	  the	  discussions	  are	  actually	  there,	  internal	  to	  the	  tradition.	  Perhaps	  scholars	  are	  claiming	  that	  the	  problem	  of	  free	  will	  must	  be	  there,	  has	  to	  be	  there,	  because	  the	  problem	  of	  free	  will	  is	  visible	  to	  everyone	  everywhere	  in	  the	  way	  rivers	  and	  mountains	  and	  rabbits	  are,	  in	  which	  case	  classical	  will	  necessarily	  unearth	  such	  a	  discussion	  (just	  as	  we	  better	  find	  terms	  and	  concepts	  for	  rivers	  and	  mountains	  and	  rabbits),	  even	  if	  we	  don’t	  see	  it	  at	  first.	  It	  is	  a	  hermeneutical	  axiom	  that	  it	  must	  be	  there!	  	  	  We	  can’t	  be	  sure	  whether	  when	  the	  natives	  say	  ‘gavagai’	  that	  they	  are	  referring	  to	  rabbits,	  or	  undetached	  rabbit	  parts,	  or	  rabbit	  time	  slices,	  but	  they	  better	  say	  something	  when	  those	  thingamajigs	  we	  call	  ‘rabbits’	  do	  the	  thing	  we	  call	  ‘hopping’	  in	  the	  things	  we	  call	  ‘fields’	  and	  ‘meadows’	  (Quine	  2013,	  pp.	  23-­‐72).	  Or,	  are	  scholars	  claiming	  that	  fusion	  applies,	  and	  that	  there	  are	  some	  new,	  more	  insightful	  things	  we	  can	  say	  than	  the	  Buddhists	  say	  when	  they	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are	  not	  talking	  about	  free	  will,	  but	  are	  talking	  about	  something	  that	  reminds	  us	  in	  a	  free-­‐associative	  way	  of	  our	  problem	  of	  free	  will,	  and	  which	  if	  fused	  with	  our	  talk	  about	  free	  will	  would	  either	  improve	  their	  original	  thinking	  about	  their	  non-­‐free	  will	  problem	  and/or	  ours	  about	  our	  free	  will	  problem?	  Or	  are	  inquirers	  asking,	  also	  consistently	  with	  fusion,	  that	  some	  new	  and	  improved	  set	  of	  solutions	  to	  our	  problem	  of	  free	  will	  emerge	  from	  blending	  Buddhist	  sources	  and	  our	  sources?	  As	  for	  the	  last	  question,	  if	  this	  is	  the	  thought,	  I	  see	  no	  evidence	  from	  the	  literature	  that	  any	  Buddhist	  insight	  has	  usefully	  advanced	  our	  discussions	  of	  free	  will.	  	  Then	  there	  are	  more	  cosmopolitan	  observations	  and	  questions	  that	  are	  not	  a	  proper	  subset	  of	  fusion	  observations	  and	  questions:	  It	  is	  interesting	  that	  whereas,	  let’s	  suppose,	  we	  Catholics	  think	  a	  lot	  about	  free	  will	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  free	  will,	  my	  Thai	  Buddhist	  neighbors	  don’t	  think	  this	  way.	  It	  is	  kind	  of	  amazing	  to	  me	  that	  they	  have	  managed	  to	  think	  about	  virtue	  and	  goodness,	  reward	  and	  punishment,	  even	  about	  afterlives	  following	  a	  similar	  logic	  to	  the	  way	  I	  think	  without	  that	  conceptual	  apparatus.	  I	  wonder	  if	  it	  is	  necessary	  for	  me	  to	  think	  about,	  wonder	  and	  worry	  about,	  free	  will	  the	  way	  I	  do?	  Here	  one	  could	  be	  wondering	  about	  what	  ordinary	  folk	  thought	  about	  free	  will	  or	  something	  spiffed	  up	  like	  talk	  of	  the	  problem	  in	  Christian	  philosophical	  theology	  or	  analytic	  philosophy.	  	  The	  liberal	  comparativist,	  unlike	  the	  cosmopolitan,	  but	  maybe	  like	  some	  advocates	  of	  fusion,	  is	  a	  convert,	  and	  she	  is	  trying	  to	  find	  the	  space	  to	  move	  forward	  with	  integrity	  in	  the	  light	  of	  her	  new	  commitments.	  She	  brings	  questions	  she	  already	  knows	  about,	  cares	  about,	  has	  conceived	  her	  life	  in	  terms	  of,	  and	  asks	  them	  now	  in	  the	  light	  of	  her	  new	  core	  philosophy.	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The	  only	  constraint	  is	  not	  to	  say	  something	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  new	  set	  of	  commitments,	  which	  in	  the	  present	  case	  is	  not	  hard.	  	  I	  read	  the	  dialectical	  situation	  as	  allowing	  all	  four	  sorts	  of	  inquiries,	  observations,	  and	  questions.	  But	  I	  am	  pretty	  sure	  that	  classical	  will	  not	  discover	  in	  ancient	  Buddhism	  any	  discussions	  of	  our	  problem	  of	  free	  will	  (Gowans	  2015;	  Garfield	  2014).	  Fusion	  might	  seem	  an	  attractive	  option	  if	  one	  thinks	  that	  the	  problem	  of	  free	  will	  is	  one	  anyone	  will	  come	  upon	  and	  must	  deal	  with,	  like	  rivers	  and	  mountains	  or	  rabbits,	  however	  these	  things	  are	  metaphysically	  parsed.	  But	  I	  don’t	  think	  that.	  I	  think	  free	  will	  is	  more	  like	  the	  topic	  of	  original	  sin,	  which	  requires	  an	  entire	  philosophical	  theology	  to	  get,	  unless	  one	  goes	  free-­‐associative,	  in	  which	  case	  any	  tradition	  (everyone	  does	  this)	  that	  has	  things	  to	  say	  about	  human	  weakness	  has	  a	  view	  on	  original	  sin.	  	  	  Finally,	  I	  see	  the	  need	  for	  and	  room	  for	  the	  liberal	  response	  among	  converts	  who	  have	  their	  feet	  in	  the	  Buddhist	  tradition	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  ones,	  e.g.,	  analytic	  philosophy	  or	  Christian	  philosophical	  theology,	  that	  make	  free	  will	  a	  problem.	  Westerners	  impressed	  by	  Buddhism	  
and	  analytic	  philosophy	  and/or	  the	  Abrahamic	  theology,	  eschatology,	  will	  be	  of	  this	  sort.	  	  My	  own	  preference	  (in	  the	  particular	  case	  of	  free	  will)	  is	  the	  cosmopolitan	  response	  with	  a	  therapeutic	  goal.	  Observe	  that	  there	  are	  smart	  people	  who	  were	  not	  sucked	  into	  the	  particular	  black	  hole	  of	  philosophy	  we	  call	  the	  ‘problem	  of	  free	  will’	  and	  learn	  from	  them	  how	  to	  avoid	  it	  (Flanagan	  2002).	  It	  is	  worth	  avoiding.	  Get	  over	  it	  and	  please	  do	  not	  introduce	  Buddhists	  to	  our	  problem	  of	  free	  will.	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  I	  have	  written	  elsewhere	  (2002)	  that,	  were	  I	  charged	  with	  being	  the	  benevolent	  dictator	  of	  philosophy,	  I	  would	  forbid	  using	  the	  words	  ‘free	  will’	  in	  anything	  like	  the	  libertarian	  sense,	  which	  is	  required	  to	  get	  the	  debate	  going.	  Once	  the	  libertarian	  conception	  is	  in	  play,	  then	  compatibilism	  is	  rightly	  seen	  as	  what	  Kant	  called	  a	  ‘wretched	  subterfuge’	  (1788,	  p.	  332).	  Nothing	  good	  comes	  from	  discussing	  the	  philosophical	  problem	  of	  free	  will.	  It	  is	  the	  black	  hole	  of	  philosophy,	  a	  pseudo-­‐problem	  caused	  by	  philosophers	  taking	  “language	  …	  on	  holiday”	  (Wittgenstein	  2001,	  §	  38),	  a	  pathological	  detour	  from	  clear	  thinking	  engendered	  by	  the	  invention	  of	  a	  heavenly	  Father	  in	  the	  West	  whose	  regimen	  of	  reward	  and	  punishment	  only	  makes	  sense	  if	  we	  possess	  this	  oddity	  called	  ‘free	  will’.	  Aristotle	  never	  discusses	  free	  will,	  although	  he	  does	  discuss	  the	  differences	  between	  voluntary	  and	  involuntary	  action	  (1999).	  	  	  And	  so	  it	  is	  with	  Buddhism	  (Flanagan	  2011).	  There	  is	  action,	  wholesome	  and	  unwholesome,	  and	  how	  a	  life	  goes	  depends	  on	  the	  ratio	  of	  wholesome	  to	  unwholesome	  action.	  There	  are	  impersonal	  laws	  of	  karma;	  there	  is	  dependent	  origination;	  there	  are	  agents	  conventionally,	  but	  not	  ultimately,	  and	  so	  on.	  But	  Buddhism	  has	  no	  need	  for	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘free	  will’.	  It	  doesn’t	  need	  free	  will,	  in	  part,	  because	  it	  does	  not	  need	  agents	  who	  conform	  to	  what	  the	  God(s)	  of	  Abraham	  needs	  them	  to	  be/be	  like—with	  immutable	  souls	  and	  magical	  agentic	  powers.	  This	  is	  a	  great	  advantage.	  	  	  Some	  smart	  philosophers	  are	  trying	  to	  draw	  Buddhism	  into	  the	  Western	  conversation	  about	  free	  will.	  This	  is	  good	  (I	  guess)	  insofar	  as	  it	  engenders	  cross-­‐traditional	  verstehen.	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And	  it	  is	  good	  if	  it	  forces	  the	  Western	  problem	  to	  dissolve	  or	  evaporate.	  But	  it	  is	  unfortunate	  if	  the	  agenda	  is	  to	  introduce	  the	  concept	  of	  free	  will	  into	  Buddhism	  or	  to	  claim	  that	  it	  can	  be	  extracted	  from	  Buddhism.	  Buddhism	  doesn't	  have	  the	  concept	  of	  free	  will	  and	  it	  doesn't	  need	  it.	  It	  is	  like	  the	  old	  song	  lyric,	  ‘Got	  along	  without	  you	  before	  I	  met	  you,	  gonna	  get	  along	  without	  you	  now’.	  	  	  This	  much	  is	  evidence	  that	  the	  classical	  Buddhisms	  are	  indeterminate	  enough	  to	  allow	  multiple	  interpretations	  from	  some	  one	  or	  another	  of	  the	  four	  frameworks,	  classical,	  fusion,	  
cosmopolitan,	  or	  liberal—indeed	  every	  one	  ever	  invented	  in	  the	  West	  on	  the	  problem	  of	  free	  will.	  I	  propose	  the	  following	  two	  interpretive	  principles	  to	  help	  understand	  this	  situation.	  First,	  if	  very	  smart	  people	  can	  find	  at	  least	  six	  different	  views	  on	  any	  question,	  problem,	  or	  topic	  formulated	  in	  our	  terms	  in	  some	  other	  tradition	  that	  is	  by	  consensus	  silent	  on	  that	  question,	  problem	  or	  topic,	  then	  infer	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  tradition	  queried	  that	  is	  yielding	  the	  answers	  to	  the	  question,	  but	  us.	  So,	  take	  classical	  off	  the	  table	  as	  an	  explanation	  of	  what	  is	  happening	  in	  this	  particular	  inquiry,	  which	  leaves	  fusion	  or	  
cosmopolitan.	  Second,	  think	  hard	  about	  why	  a	  problem	  that	  we	  feel	  with	  urgency	  must	  have	  an	  answer,	  possibly	  that	  we	  think	  every	  great	  philosophy	  must	  take	  a	  clear	  position	  on,	  wasn’t	  conceived	  as	  urgent,	  possibly	  not	  worth	  theorizing	  at	  all	  by	  a	  great	  wisdom	  tradition.	  	  	  
Conclusion:	  Buddhism	  and	  Freedom	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Charles	  Goodman	  writes,	  	  	   “Buddhists	  have	  always	  been	  interested	  in	  freedom,	  but	  only	  recently	  have	  they	  begun	  to	  think	  about	  free	  will.	  Concepts	  closely	  related	  to	  freedom—spontaneity,	  independence,	  self-­‐mastery—have	  been	  central	  to	  Buddhism	  since	  its	  beginnings.	  Serious	  Buddhist	  reflection	  on	  the	  problem	  of	  free	  will	  and	  determinism,	  however,	  is	  a	  product	  of	  dialogue	  between	  Asian	  and	  Western	  cultures.	  Unfortunately,	  this	  dialogue	  has	  barely	  begun,	  and	  very	  little	  is	  known	  about	  what	  a	  Buddhist	  position	  on	  free	  will	  might	  be	  like.”	  (2009,	  p.	  145)	  	  The	  first	  point	  to	  notice,	  and	  it	  is	  important	  to	  my	  argument,	  is	  that	  the	  topic	  of	  Buddhism	  and	  free	  will	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  dialogue,	  of	  a	  meeting	  of	  traditions.	  It	  is	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  there	  is	  not,	  internal	  to	  the	  Buddhisms,	  any	  set	  of	  texts	  or	  philosophical	  strands	  that	  clearly	  announce	  themselves	  as	  about	  our	  problem	  of	  free	  will.	  There	  is	  lots	  of	  discussion	  of	  what	  we	  call	  action	  and	  freedom	  but	  not	  free	  will.	  Second,	  Goodman	  rightly	  uses	  the	  phrase	  ‘what	  a	  Buddhist	  position	  might	  be’	  to	  mark	  this	  fact	  that	  there	  isn’t	  one	  in	  the	  classical	  texts	  or	  traditions.	  Third,	  and	  it	  is	  remarkable,	  the	  Buddhist	  position	  is	  being	  articulated	  and	  offered	  almost	  exclusively	  by	  Western	  philosophers,	  not	  by	  Asian	  Buddhists.	  Fourth,	  the	  fact	  that	  Buddhism	  has	  always	  been	  interested	  in	  freedom,	  self-­‐control,	  self-­‐perfection,	  and	  so	  on,	  does	  not	  mean	  than	  Buddhists	  were	  always	  sitting	  next	  to	  the	  mine	  that	  would	  reveal	  that	  precious	  vein	  we	  call	  free	  will.	  The	  concept	  of	  free	  will	  is	  fraught,	  freighted	  and	  culturally	  peculiar	  in	  ways	  these	  other	  concepts	  are	  not.	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One	  source	  of	  my	  admiration	  for	  Buddhism	  as	  a	  tradition	  is	  that	  is	  seems	  the	  possibility	  proof	  that	  one	  can	  have	  a	  metaphysically	  and	  morally	  serious	  tradition,	  which,	  if	  naturalized,	  is	  science-­‐friendly,	  and	  that	  does	  not	  need	  our	  concept	  of	  ‘free	  will’.	  This	  much	  is	  a	  certain	  protection	  against	  philosophical	  projection	  and	  ethnocentrism,	  especially	  the	  kind	  that	  is	  already	  common,	  where	  Western	  analytic	  philosophy	  claims	  to	  see	  the	  right	  questions	  and	  sets	  the	  agenda.	  	  One	  discussion	  that	  we	  can	  have	  across	  traditions,	  that	  is	  about	  a	  topic	  on	  which	  Buddhism	  has	  always	  been	  strongly	  opinionated,	  is	  the	  topic	  of	  freedom,	  freedom	  from	  suffering.	  That	  is	  an	  important	  topic,	  worth	  talking	  about.	  Here	  I	  agree	  with	  John	  Dewey	  when	  he	  writes:	  “What	  men	  have	  esteemed	  and	  fought	  for	  in	  the	  name	  of	  liberty	  is	  varied	  and	  complex—but	  certainly	  it	  has	  never	  been	  metaphysical	  freedom	  of	  the	  will”	  (1957,	  p.	  303).	  But	  here	  in	  this	  book	  I	  find	  myself	  part	  of	  a	  conversation	  I	  wish	  we	  were	  not	  having,	  and	  that	  I	  strongly	  advise	  against	  having.	  So	  let’s	  next	  time	  talk	  about	  cross-­‐cultural	  views	  about	  freedom	  from	  suffering,	  freedom	  of	  conscience,	  freedom	  from	  oppression,	  and	  freedom	  from	  economic	  injustice.	  These	  are	  serious	  and	  real	  problems.	  But	  they	  have	  nothing,	  exactly	  zero,	  to	  do	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  free	  will.	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  6 Free Will and the Sense of Self     
 
Galen Strawson  
 
 
1 Feelings and the Causality of Reason: Doings and Happenings1   
 
Suppose one comes to believe that no one is ever ultimately morally responsible for what they do 
in such a way as to truly deserve praise or blame, punishment or reward. One realizes that 
ultimate self-determination (“USD”) is impossible; one endorses skepticism about ‘strong free 
will’ (“SFW”) of the sort that could ground USD. One accepts that many of what P.F. Strawson 
(1962) calls one’s ‘personal-reactive’ attitudes to others (gratitude, resentment, anger, 
admiration, etc.) are in some fundamental respect inappropriate or unjustified, inasmuch as they 
seem to presuppose SFW. 
 
What then? It depends on what kind of person one is. To think that certain of one’s feelings and 
attitudes presuppose SFW, and to come to believe that SFW is impossible, may possibly cause 
one to cease to have these feelings. It seems clear, however, that most people are incapable of 
giving up the personal-reactive attitudes to others, even when convinced of the impossibility of 
SFW. Our deep commitment to belief in SFW is not so much irrational as non-rational, as P. F. 
Strawson observes (Strawson 1962). On his view, the true ground of our commitment to belief in 
SFW lies in our deep susceptibility to the emotional reactions that seem to depend on SFW for 
their appropriateness. Instead of being supported, they support. 
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Still, suppose that coming to believe in the impossibility of SFW does cause a change in one’s 
personal-reactive attitudes. Suppose one comes to adopt what P. F. Strawson calls the ‘objective 
attitude’ to all human actions (Strawson 1962). If so, this will be something that simply happens 
to one, and there seems to be a further question about what one should actively do. One can 
hardly decide to take no notice of what one now believes—that people, including oneself, are 
never ultimately responsible for their actions. But if forming this belief hasn’t caused one’s 
reactive attitudes to change, isn’t one then bound to try to stop treating people as proper objects 
of gratitude and resentment, praise and blame? 
 
Say one doesn’t want to. Isn’t that a sufficient reason not to? It’s not clear that it is; or rather, it’s 
not clear that these questions really arise. Suppose one believes there are okapi in San Diego zoo, 
but hasn’t been to check. There’s no reason why one should check if one doesn’t want to. But the 
present case is different. One has formed a belief, and nothing remains to be checked. To say that 
one needn’t try to take into account the fact that people aren’t really proper objects of reactive 
attitudes if one doesn’t want to seems like saying that one needn’t believe something one 
believes if one doesn’t want to. But one doesn’t have such a choice; belief isn’t subject to the 
will in this way. 
 
True—and yet people who reach the theoretical conclusion that SFW is impossible rarely seem 
much perturbed. Their lives continue more or less as normal. Is this acceptable? Shouldn’t they 
do something about it? Can facts about our natural non-rational commitment to believe in SFW 
somehow justify, as well as explain, their imperturbability, or somehow pre-empt the need for 
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any such justification? The question is pressing because the argument against SFW seems 
watertight (see, e.g., Strawson 1994). There’s an immovable sense in which we neither are nor 
can be ultimately responsible for what we do. But we go on thinking of ourselves as if we are. 
 
The argument against SFW doesn’t depend on the view that determinism is true; it shows that 
SFW is equally impossible even if determinism is false. But for simplicity I’ll consider the case 
in which one thinks (rightly) that SFW is incompatible with determinism, and then comes to 
believe that determinism is true.  
 
What should one do? What might one do? What might happen? It’s no good saying to oneself 
‘I’m determined to go on believing in SFW, and in having these SFW presupposing feelings and 
attitudes’. To think that this dissolves the problem is to make the mistake of fatalism—the 
mistake of thinking that nothing one can do can change what will happen. One may be so 
determined that one does make this mistake, but it’s still a mistake, and people who think clearly 
won’t make it. It looks as if such people can’t avoid the problem of what now to think, what now 
to do. 
 
 
2 Determinism, Action, and the Self: A Thought Experiment  
 
At this point one faces the fact that the heart of one’s commitment to belief in the self-
determining self doesn’t lie in the interpersonal reactive attitudes but in certain self-concerned 
reactive attitudes. One’s deepest commitment is to the view of oneself as radically self-
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determining and responsible. If one tries to overcome this commitment, it seems that one risks 
thinking oneself out of existence as a mental agent-self, a mental someone—where ‘mental 
someone’ is used to characterize an absolutely central way in which we experience ourselves. 
(I’m not concerned with the question of what if anything a ‘mental someone’ could possibly be, 
only with the phenomenology of self-experience.) 
 
Why? Because what one naturally takes oneself to be, considered as a mental someone, is a truly 
self-determining agent of the impossible kind. One takes it that this is an essential aspect of what 
one is: I feel that I—what I most truly am—couldn’t continue to exist and lack this property. So 
it’s not just as if concentration on the impossibility of SFW may cause me to cease to believe I 
have a certain property—radical responsibility—whose possession means a lot to me. It’s rather 
that there may remain nothing that is recognizable as me at all, nothing recognizable as me, the 
‘agent-self’, only a bare consciousness-function.  
 
A thought experiment may help. It consists in the rigorous application of the belief in 
determinism to the present course of one’s life. One does one’s best to think rapidly of every 
smallest action one performs or movement one makes—everything that happens, so far as one is 
oneself concerned—as determined as not, ultimately, determined by oneself; contemplate this for 
a minute or two, say. 
 
*  *  * 
 
This should have the effect of erasing any sense of the presence of a freely deciding and acting 
	  	   143	  
‘I’ in one’s thoughts; for—it appears—there is simply no role for such an ‘I’ to play. It may be 
strangely, faintly depressing, or it may give rise to a curious, floating feeling of detached 
acquiescence in the passing show of one’s own psychophysical being, a feeling, not of 
impotence, but of radical uninvolvement. Or the feeling may be: I am not really a person; there 
isn’t really anyone there at all. The thought experiment may make a good exercise for certain 
schools of Buddhists. 
 
I take this to indicate the respect in which one’s natural pre-theoretical sense of self has a 
strongly libertarian cast, although it also has strong compatibilist elements (Strawson 1986, 
§§6.3–6.5). One naturally and unreflectively conceives of oneself, qua the mental planner of 
action, as capable of USD. The reason one disappears in the thought experiment is that it reveals 
that one isn’t possible, so conceived. 
 
At the same time, of course, one doesn’t—can’t—disappear just like that. One’s thought 
naturally and inevitably occurs for one in terms of ‘I’, and one’s conception of this ‘I’ remains, 
so far, a conception of a truly responsible self-determining someone. One’s attempts to grasp the 
consequences of determinism fully may succeed in bursts, but they will keep breaking up on the 
rock of one’s natural commitment to a self-conception which is simply incompatible with fully 
fledged belief in determinism. 
 
When this happens, one may try to continue to think that everything about one is determined, but 
it won’t be striking with full force. And when it isn’t striking with full force it probably won’t 
make it seem that one doesn’t really exist at all as an agent-self. It’s more likely to make it seem 
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that although one does somehow still exist as a mental someone, and does continue to act in 
various ways, still one cannot truly be said to do anything oneself, because determinism gobbles 
up everything, revealing everything one does to be not really one’s own doing. 
 
Seasoned philosophical compatibilists may have trouble with the thought experiment. They may 
find it hard to appreciate the force of these points. Perhaps they should imagine facing the 
following choice: if you agree to submit to twenty years of torture—torture of a kind that leaves 
no time for moral self-congratulation—you will save ten others from the same fate. Perhaps they 
should agree to be hypnotized into believing that they really are facing such a choice—
hypnotized in such a way that, afterwards, they remember exactly what it felt like. They may 
then rerun to the thought experiment. 
 
It seems, in any case, that there are two principal poles around which one’s thought will oscillate 
when one is trying to apply the thought that one is totally determined. At one pole, the freely 
deciding and acting ‘mental someone’ goes out of existence. At the other pole, the mental 
someone continues to exist, but can no longer see itself as a freely deciding and acting being. 
One’s thought is likely to oscillate around this second pole when the thought experiment has not 
been engaged with full force, and isn’t having its full effect of strangely dissolving the (sense of) 
self.  
 
Suppose one focuses on the fact that every moment of one’s thinking is completely determined. 
Whatever thought one then has, one will, pursuing the thought experiment, think of that thought 
too as determined. And, this being so, no thought will ever be able to emerge as the true product 
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of the I, the putative true originator of thoughts, decisions, and actions. This I will perpetually 
evanesce, however far one pursues the possible regress of thoughts about thoughts about 
thoughts. 
 
This is just one way in which the thought experiment may develop. Those who reach the 
theoretical conclusion that SFW is impossible should try it. For them, undertaking it involves 
nothing more than dwelling with special concentration on something they already believe to be 
true. Those who learn to maintain the state of mind induced by the thought experiment will be 
well on the way to a thoroughgoing, truly lived, or as I shall say genuine belief in determinism or 
non-self-determinability (they may be on the way to nirvāṇa). It is, however, important to be 
clear what this involves. One may theoretically accept that one is a product of one’s heredity and 
environment in such a way that one can never attain USD—many of us do—and yet, in everyday 
life, have nothing like the kind of self-conception that is here required of the genuine skeptic 
about SFW.  
 
  
3 What Might Happen   
 
Consider Louis and Lucy, incompatibilists who have just come to believe that determinism is 
true, and hence that there is no SFW. They’re struggling to attain a true perspective on their 
situation. How is Lucy to think of herself as she wonders whether to give money to charity—
thinking perhaps of each of her thoughts and movements that it is determined, and thinking that 
her thinking this is determined in turn, and so on? 
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We may suppose that she doesn’t make the fatalist mistake of ceasing to try to get what she 
wants because she thinks it’s already determined whether she will get it or not—in such a way 
that she can do nothing about it. She knows her own planning and action are real and effective 
parts of the continuing deterministic causal process. It’s rather that when she does something 
intentionally which she feels to be reprehensible (say), she may then think: that was determined 
to happen, and yet if I hadn’t done it that too would have been determined. This is a very 
ordinary thought in philosophy. What is it like to take it seriously in life, trying to apprehend 
every detail of one’s life as determined?  
 
Louis may find that he feels that he (i.e. as he automatically conceives of himself in his natural, 
unreconstructed thought, an agent capable of truly deserving punishment or reward, praise or 
blame) can do nothing at all. Here he is at the second of the two main poles of serious self-
applied determinism. He feels he exists, but that he can’t really act at all. This is how he puts it, 
at least. Or rather, this is how he would put it, if it weren’t for the fact that, relaxing his 
application of the thought of determinism to himself, and being a novice, he still feels completely 
responsible. He feels he simply knows that he knew at the time of action that he could have done 
otherwise. Both Louis and Lucy are unable to accept that they are at bottom radically exempt 
from responsibility or praise or blame, because what happened was determined to happen as it 
did. Yet they also now believe that the way they are, and their decisions, are things for which 
they are ultimately in no way responsible. And when, see-sawing back, they concentrate again on 
this thought, they find, again, that they can no longer make sense of the idea of performing 
actions that are truly their actions. For the sense of self they naturally have is simply 
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incompatible with any deep acceptance of the idea that all they are and do is determined. 
 
Lucy may think as follows: for her to choose to (try to) abandon her personal-reactive attitudes is 
not really possible, because only a free agent, which she does not now consider herself to be, can 
really have a reason for action which is really its own reason. There may be a train of practical 
deliberation going on in her head, but she feels that it’s not really her thought at all (although it 
feels just like it, as soon as she stops concentrating on her determinedness), but (because) a 
determined process.  
 
Louis, equally, thinks he can’t reason or deliberate in a way that culminates in a decision which 
is truly his, and which is such that the ensuing action is something for which he is truly 
responsible, or indeed something that he really did. For he knows that what he thinks of as his 
choice is determined, however much he may contrasuggestibly change his mind. And so, stuck 
with his unreconstructed sense of self, he can’t think of it as really his choice. To talk of freedom 
here, as compatibilists do, is, both think, to talk of the freedom of the turnspit (Kant 1788, p. 191, 
Ak 5.97) or the self-sealing tank (Davidson 1973/1974, p. 141). It’s the ‘wretched subterfuge’ of 
compatibilism, a ‘petty word-jugglery’ (Kant 1788, pp. 189–90, Ak 5.96), ‘so much 
gobbledygook’ (Anscombe 1971, p. 146). It’s not really to talk of freedom at all. 
 
So the picture of a thoughtful incompatibilist like Lucy coming to believe in determinism, and 
then raising the question of what to do about it, may be ill-conceived. The question may be 
completely unreal for her, so long as she concentratedly applies the thought of determinism to 
herself. For she may then feel that she can’t really choose to do, or do, anything, in the way she 
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thought. This rejection of the possibility of real choice or action is, certainly, a piece of reasoning 
on her part. But it too can’t be thought to have any practical consequences or rationalize any 
decision—such as a decision not to choose or decide anything on the grounds that it is strictly 
speaking impossible to do so. One can’t decide not to decide anything on the grounds that one 
can’t decide anything. 
 
This is a strange drama, an enactment of the deep problem of free will. In the end only the 
exigencies of everyday life will carry them forward. The continual tendency of Louis’s 
unreconstructed thought will be to reinsert him—him conceived as a truly praise-and-blame-
deserving mental someone—into his thought and deliberation. And continually he will correct 
this tendency. For nothing, he realizes, can be done by him, so conceived. Nothing can be done 
by him in the sense that matters to him; things can only happen. So too for Lucy. Whatever she 
starts to plan and do, it’s whipped away from her, only to appear as not really her own, by the 
thought that it’s entirely determined. 
 
It seems, then, that a genuine belief in the impossibility of SFW, uneasily coupled with an 
unreconstructed conception of self, may produce a total paralysis of purposive thought as 
ordinarily conceived of and experienced. There are more compatibilist ways of thinking and 
theorizing about deliberation and action that may leave us untroubled by the thought of 
determinism. It doesn’t follow that the present story isn’t accurate as a story of what might 
happen to a newly fledged believer in the impossibility of SFW. What may follow is that we’re 
deeply inconsistent in our characteristically very vague thoughts about freedom, action, 
deliberation, and ourselves. 
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4 The True Center of Commitment   
 
There are many respects in which our natural sense of self and of freedom is profoundly 
libertarian. There are also many respects in which it is entirely compatibilist—many aspects of 
our general sense of ourselves as free agents that don’t seem to be put in question in any way by 
the impossibility of USD. This natural compatibilism is a very important part of what underlies 
our general commitment to belief in SFW, and this is so even though compatibilism is 
incompatible with belief in SFW. 
 
A full description of our natural compatibilism would take a long time.2 Here I want to focus 
again on the question whether our commitment to belief in SFW is grounded primarily in our 
experience of other people as proper objects of the reactive attitudes, or in our experience of our 
own agency. I think the second view is correct: the true center of one’s commitment to the notion 
of human freedom lies in one’s experience of oneself and one’s own agency, one’s deep sense of 
oneself as a self-determining planner and performer of action, someone who can create things, 
make a sacrifice, do a misdeed. 
 
This is not to deny that one’s experience of oneself is deeply determined by one’s interaction 
with others. It’s simply (i) to consider two things that develop in us in the course of our social 
development—our sense of ourselves as truly responsible and our sense of others as truly 
responsible, (ii) to claim that the nature and causes of these two things can profitably be 
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distinguished, and (iii) to claim that the former is more important than the latter, so far as our 
general commitment to belief in SFW is concerned. 
 
A naturalistic explanation of our deep sense of self-determination must connect it tightly with 
our sense, massively and incessantly confirmed since earliest infancy, of our ability to do what 
we want to do in order to (try to) get what we want, by performing a vast variety of actions, 
walking where we want, making ourselves understood, picking up this and putting down that. 
We pass our days in more or less continual and almost entirely successful self-directing 
intentional activity, and we know it. Most of these actions are routine or trivial, more or less 
thoughtlessly performed, but this doesn’t diminish the importance of the experience of their 
performance as a source of the sense of radical self-determinability that we ordinarily have. Even 
if we don’t always achieve our aims, when we act, we almost always perform a movement of the 
kind we intended to perform, and in that vital sense (vital for the sense of self-determining self-
control) we are almost entirely successful in our action. 
 
This experience is central to our natural compatibilism. It gives rise to a sense of freedom to act, 
of complete self-control, of responsibility in self-directedness, that is compatibilistically 
unexceptionable and completely untouched by arguments against SFW based on the 
impossibility of USD. And it is precisely this compatibilistically unexceptionable sense of 
freedom and efficacy that is one of the fundamental bases of the growth in us of the 
compatibilistically impermissible sense of SFW. To observe a child of two, fully in control of its 
limbs, doing what it wants to do with them, and to this extent fully free to act in the compatibilist 
sense of the phrase, and to realize that it is precisely such unremitting experience of self-control 
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that is the deepest foundation of our naturally incompatibilist sense of true-responsibility-
entailing self-determination, is to understand one of the most important facts about the genesis 
and power of our ordinary strong sense of freedom (and of self). 
 
One reason why we advance from the permissible to the impermissible sense of freedom is 
perhaps negative. Ignorant of the causes of our desires or pro-attitudes, we don’t normally 
experience them as determined in us in any way at all, let alone in any objectionable way, as 
Spinoza remarked (Spinoza 1677). So too for our characters. We don’t think back behind 
ourselves as we now find ourselves. And even if a desire is experienced in its importunacy as 
somehow foreign, imposing itself from outside the self, this probably only serves, by providing a 
contrast, to strengthen our general sense that our desires are not determined in us. For if a pro-
attitude is experienced as imposing itself, then there must be another one in the light of which the 
first is experienced as imposing itself, and the second one will presumably not also be 
experienced as an imposition. It will presumably be a pro-attitude one ‘identifies’ with and 
apprehends as part of oneself, and acquiesces in. 
 
A great deal is locked up in this acquiescence. For although it’s unlikely to involve any explicit 
sense that one has been in any way actively self-determining as to character, it does nevertheless 
seem to involve an implicit sense that one is, generally, somehow in control of and answerable 
for how one is, even, perhaps, for those aspects of one’s character that one doesn’t particularly 
like. As for those pro-attitudes and aspects of one’s character that are welcome to one, it’s as if 
the following ghostly subjunctive conditional lurks in one’s attitude to them: if per impossibile I 
were to be (had been) able to choose my character, then these are the features I would choose 
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(would have chosen). This, I suggest, makes a deep contribution to the impermissible sense of 
true responsibility for themselves that most people have, more or less obscurely, more or less 
constantly. 
 
It’s hardly surprising that the ghostly subjunctive conditional confirms the central, acceptable 
status quo, for there’s a fundamental respect in which the ‘I’ that features in it is constituted, as 
something with pro-attitudes that imagines choosing its pro-attitudes, by the very pro-attitudes 
that it imagines choosing. 
 
But this is still not the principal reason why we have the impermissible sense of true 
responsibility. The principal reason is the nature of our experience of choice. It’s simply that we 
are, in the most ordinary situations of choice, unable not to think that we will be truly or 
absolutely responsible for our choice. Our natural thought may be expressed as follows: even if 
my character is indeed just something given (a product of heredity and environment, or 
whatever), I’m still able to choose (and hence act completely freely and truly responsibly, given 
how I now am and what I now know); this is so whatever else is the case—determinism or no 
determinism.  
 
To illustrate this, consider the following story. You arrive at a bakery on the evening of a 
national holiday. You want to buy a cake with your last ten dollars to round off the preparations 
you’ve already made. There’s only one thing left in the store—a ten-dollar cake. On the steps of 
the store, someone is shaking an Oxfam tin. You stop, and it seems quite clear to you that it’s 
entirely up to you what you do next. You are—it seems to you—truly, radically, ultimately free 
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to choose what to do, in such a way that you will be ultimately morally responsible for whatever 
you do choose. Look, you can put the money in the tin, or you can go in and buy the cake. 
You’re not only completely, radically free to choose in this situation. You’re not free not to 
choose (that’s how it feels). You’re fully and explicitly conscious of what the options are and 
you can’t escape that consciousness. You can’t somehow slip out of it. 
 
You may have heard of determinism, the theory that absolutely everything that happens is 
causally determined to happen exactly as it does by what has already gone before—right back to 
the beginning of the universe. You may also believe that determinism is true. (You may know 
that current science gives us no more reason to think that determinism is false than that 
determinism is true.) In that case, standing on the steps of the store, it may cross your mind that 
in five minutes’ time you’ll be able to look back on the situation you’re in now and say truly, of 
what you will by then have done, ‘Well, it was determined that I should do that.’ But even if you 
do fervently believe this, it doesn’t seem to be able to touch your sense that you’re absolutely 
morally responsible for what you do next. 
 
The case of the Oxfam box is relatively dramatic, but choices of this general type are common. 
They occur frequently in our everyday lives, and seem to prove to us that SFW is both possible 
and real. The argument that SFW is impossible seems powerless when faced with this 
conviction, which is reinforced by the point just considered, according to which something in 
itself negative—the absence of any general sense that our desires, pro-attitudes, character, and so 
on are not ultimately self-determined—is implicitly taken as equivalent to some sort of positive 
self-determination. We certainly don’t ordinarily suppose that we’ve gone through some sort of 
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active process of self-determination at some particular past time. Nevertheless, it seems accurate 
to say that we do unreflectively experience ourselves rather as we would experience ourselves if 
we did believe that we had engaged in some such activity of self-determination. 
 
There are many complexities here, but the main causes of the development of our sense of true 
(straight-up punishment-and-praise-justifying) responsibility out of our unremitting and 
compatibilistically speaking unexceptionable sense of complete self-control may be summarized 
as follows. (1) We tend to think that we have a will (a power of decision) distinct from all our 
particular motives. (2) In all ordinary situations of choice, we think that we’re absolutely free to 
choose whatever else is the case (even if determinism is true, for example), and are so just 
because of the fact of our full appreciation of our situation. (3) In some vague and unexamined 
fashion, we tend to think of ourselves as in some manner responsible for, answerable for, how 
we are. 
 
All these aspects of the sense of true responsibility directly concern only one’s experience of 
oneself and one’s own agency. It’s one’s commitment to belief in one’s own radical efficacy, 
control, self-determination, and total responsibility (in normally unconstrained circumstances), 
rather than one’s commitment to holding others responsible and treating them as proper objects 
of reactive attitudes, that is primarily unrenounceable. What on earth is one to think that one is, 
or is doing, if one thinks one cannot really be responsible at all for what one does? Those who 
have fully understood what the application of the thought of determinism to themselves involves 
should be bewildered by this question. And yet it’s likely to leave them undisturbed for more 
than a few minutes.  
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5 Satkāyadṛṣṭi 
 
Is it impossible to abandon commitment to belief in SFW? Perhaps partial if not total erosions 
are possible. It seems that it isn’t equally unrenounceable in all areas. One’s commitment to 
belief in one’s absolute punishment-and-praise-justifying responsibility for one’s own actions 
seems more deeply founded than one’s commitment to belief in the responsibility of others, even 
if this difference doesn’t show up in a difference of surface strength in everyday life. It seems 
correspondingly more likely that one might cease to be moved to blame others, on account of 
loss of belief in SFW, than that one might cease to feel guilty about what one felt to be one’s 
own wrongdoing. 
 
But perhaps one can raise a more general doubt about arguments for unrenounceable 
commitments to beliefs that appear to be false from some natural point of view. Consider certain 
Buddhists who argue, on a variety of metaphysical grounds, that our natural notion of the 
persisting individual self is a delusion. Having reached this conclusion, they set themselves a 
task: that of overcoming the delusion. 
 
There are several routes to the doctrine of satkāyadṛṣṭi, the ‘false view of individuality’.3 The 
Buddhists I have in mind hold that (a), the false sense or conception of self, leads to (b), 
suffering, because it is essentially bound in with, as a necessary condition of, (c), the having of 
desires and aversions, which is itself a condition of the possibility of suffering. (b) requires (c) 
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and (c) requires (a), so to eliminate (a) is to eliminate (b). To realize that there’s no such thing as 
the persisting individual self, to undermine the false view of individuality in oneself, is to cease 
to be bound by desires, cravings, and aversions, and hence to achieve liberation from suffering. It 
is, ultimately, to achieve the ‘blowing out’ of self in nirvāṇa, and thereby to cease to suffer and 
to fear old age, sickness, and death. 
 
These Buddhists not only have theoretical reasons for believing that their natural sense of self is 
delusory; they also have powerful practical reasons for trying to improve their grasp of its 
delusoriness. They recognize, however, that one can’t simply abolish one’s sense of 
individuality, by some sort of effortless, rationally motivated, self-directed intellectual fiat. 
Delusions delude, after all, and the ordinary, strong sense of self (and self-determination) is a 
particularly powerful delusion. They therefore recommend engagement in certain practices 
whose eventual effect—so they claim—is to cause the delusion to dislimn.  
 
A decision to engage in such meditative practices is presumably motivated by some pro-attitude. 
One may simply wish to live in truth—without illusion. In the Buddha’s case, the originally 
predominant motive was a desire to overcome fear of old age, sickness, and death. Plainly one’s 
own suffering, decrepitude, and death can be fearful only if one has a sense of oneself as an 
object, a continuing entity, a person, and has in addition certain desires concerning what happens 
to that object. If there’s no ‘I’, there’s nothing to fear in death and dissolution, because it’s 
precisely the dissolution of the ‘I’ that is feared. Nor is there anyone there to feel fear, because 
it’s precisely the ‘I’ that does the fearing.  
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It seems good, then, to grasp the non-existence of the ‘I’, since it is both the object and the 
necessary repository of the desires that lead to suffering. If one were to attain a state of 
desirelessness, one’s desire for truth or correctness of attitude, or one’s wish to escape fear of 
mortal ills, would lapse with all other desires, so it would no longer be there to be finally fulfilled 
by the course of action that it set in motion. In this sense, those who attain a state of 
desirelessness can never give a reason for being the way they are—if giving a reason involves 
adducing a present desire currently satisfied. Nevertheless, given their love of truth, or their fear 
of old age and death, their engagement in meditative practices was rational—even if they are 
now (practically speaking) non-rational, and are so as a result of their practice. There’s no 
paradox here, given that Buddhists standardly use the word ‘desire’ in the narrow sense of 
craving, not in the entirely general sense of ‘pro-attitude’ (Collins 1997). 
 
This enables one kind of person, at least, to answer the question of what it would be rational to 
do, given belief in the impossibility of SFW. Someone who had such a belief, and wished to lose 
any sense of self as a radically self-determining agent, simply in order to achieve a more correct 
attitude to the world, might do well to adopt the allegedly self-dissolving practice of meditation. 
A sense of self is not only a necessary condition of fear for one’s future; it is also, obviously, a 
necessary condition of possession of the allegedly illegitimate sense of oneself as a radically self-
determining planner and performer of action. 
 
A decision to adopt the ‘objective’ (SFW-denying) attitude can’t be implemented overnight, but 
one can perfectly well initiate some practice which may more gradually undermine the 
supposedly inflexible constraints of the general framework of ideas within which we ordinarily 
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live. And if we admit the possibility of partial alterations in attitudes or habits of thought to 
which we are, as things are, deeply committed, this points to the possibility of a progressive 
abandonment of these attitudes or habits of thought which, gradually achieved, amounts to a total 
abandonment relative to the original position. It is not implausible to suppose that Buddhist 
monks and other mystics have succeeded in altering quite profoundly their experience of 
themselves (and of others) as acting, thinking, and feeling beings. Nor is it implausible to say 
that they have in so doing achieved what is in certain respects a more correct view of the world, 
precisely to the extent that they have utterly ceased to regard themselves and others as radically 
self-determining sources of actions. Philosophers who believe that SFW is impossible, and are 
committed to the pursuit of truth, should perhaps undertake some practice of meditation. It may 
enable them to come to appreciate the truth of their theoretical conclusion in a way they cannot 
achieve by any other means. 
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1 Most of the ideas in this article originally appeared in chapters 5 and 6 of my Freedom and 
Belief (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), for which I thank the publisher for permission to 
reproduce (www.oup.com); they are recast here to emphasize their connection with the present 
volume.  
2 I make a beginning in Strawson (1986), §§6.3–6.5; see also Dennett (1984). 
3 Anātman, or ‘no-soul’, denotes the corresponding positive doctrine that there is no soul or self. 
The experiential or phenomenological correlate of the factual or metaphysical error involved in 
satkāyadṛṣṭi is called asmimāna, or the “‘I am’ idea’”. See, e.g., Collins (1982), pp. 94–5, 100–3.	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  7 What Am I Doing? 
 
Susan Blackmore 
 
 
I am sitting outside my hut.1 It’s summer, warm enough to put my mat and stool on the 
flagstones and sit outside, in front of the flower bed. 
 
A blackbird sings on the garage roof; another answers from behind somewhere. There are many 
birds singing, now I come to notice them, and even a seagull shrieking far above. Bristol isn’t far 
from the sea and the gulls…no, let it go. The buzzing from countless bees and flies, messing 
about in the flowers, maps out a sonic space around me. The sun feels warm on my arms. I am 
sitting still: the mind is calming down. 
 
I wonder what I’m doing here. Have I chosen to be in this spot, sitting like this, of my own free 
will? How much of this am I doing, and how much is just happening? When I’m ready I will 
look into what it means to act.2 
 
 
*    *    * 
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What am I doing? I am sitting. That is, this body has been sitting here a long time. But does that 
count as me doing it? 
 
I am breathing. Yes, but the breaths go in and out whether I will them to or not. I can watch, or 
not, I can decide to breathe faster or hold my breath. But now breaths just come and go. No one 
is doing them. 
 
I hear birdsong and bees. Yes, but I can’t not hear them, and it feels passive. The sounds arise 
and fall away. I’m not making an effort to listen to them and I don’t respond to them now that 
my mind has settled. So does that count as me doing it? 
 
This is a strange question. Asking what I am doing seems to freeze me in a moment of not doing, 
of asking and not knowing the answer. I was asking the question but now? 
 
I sit, not doing, and wonder. What am I doing? 
 
I could do something else if I chose to, couldn’t I? It seems so. This is the essence of free will, 
and without that there would be no point in doing anything at all, would there?  
 
I am sitting absolutely still, as I am supposed to in meditation. But if I wanted to I could lift one 
hand, clap loudly, ring the bell, get up and walk away, or run out into the road shouting, “I’m 
free. I can do anything I like!”  
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OK, I’ll clap.  
 
Clap. 
 
Did I do that freely—for no other reason than that I consciously decided to do it? 
 
Probably not. I thought of clapping because I was asking, “What am I doing?” and casting 
around for something to do, and there aren’t many things you can do sitting in meditation 
posture, and clapping has a lot of history in Zen, so it’s probably a likely candidate to be chosen 
by this brain at this time, and all of this goes back to why I’m sitting here, and that goes back 
to… 
 
OK. I give up. I can trace back myriad possible reasons why this happened. But even so, in 
ordinary language, I would say I did the clapping, not just that this body did it. Did I? And if so, 
did I do it of my own free will? 
 
 
*    *    * 
 
 
I’m being too intellectual about this, and perhaps that’s not surprising. Free will is said to be the 
most argued-about philosophical problem of all time, and I’ve read quite a lot of the philosophy.  
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The basic problem has been apparent for thousands of years both in Western philosophy and in 
Buddhism. The universe seems to be causally closed: everything that happens is caused by 
something else. Nothing happens by magical forces intervening from outside the web of causes 
and effects, for everything is interconnected with everything else.  
 
This means there is no sense to the idea of free will: to the idea that I can jump in and 
consciously decide to do something without any prior causes, just because I want to. If that 
happened, it would be magic, implying that conscious actions lie outside the physical web of 
interconnectedness. Yet I feel as though I can act freely. Indeed this magical view is probably 
how most people in most cultures have always thought about themselves, imagining a non-
physical mental entity that has wishes and desires, can think and plan, and can carry out those 
plans by acting on the world. But non-physical things cannot act in the physical world without 
magic, and the more we learn about how the brain works, the less room there is for magical 
interventions by conscious minds. We are back to dualism and the problem Descartes never 
solved, and no one else has since.  
 
In Zen, and in the languages in which early Buddhist texts were written, there is no equivalent of 
the Western concept of free will, but there is plenty about doing and not-doing. On his 
enlightenment, the Buddha is said to have awakened to the realization that all phenomena co-
arise in an interconnected web of cause and effect. This is called ‘dependent origination’ or 
‘dependent co-arising’.  Everything is part of everything else: nothing has its own self-nature, 
independent of the rest, including people. If so, then no one can act independently of everything 
else, hence ‘Actions exist, and also their consequences, but the person that acts does not’. In its 
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completely different way, Buddhism is saying the same as science – however it feels, there’s no 
room for magical interventions. 
 
To resolve the problem of free will philosophers have come up with many ways of recasting the 
problem; for example by treating actions and choices as free if they are not forced, and finding 
ways in which free action can be compatible with determinism, but I want to stick with the 
everyday sense of ‘free will’, the sense in which it feels as though ‘I’ have consciously caused 
things to happen. In that sense the solution seems, purely intellectually, to be obvious. There 
cannot be free will. It doesn’t make sense. 
 
So what to do? Many people come to a similar conclusion and say, “But I cannot live my life not 
believing in free will, so I will act ‘as if’ there’s free will”. That seems to satisfy them.  
 
Not me. I am not prepared to live my life pretending the world is otherwise than it is. So I have 
worked hard systematically challenging the feeling of having free will whenever it arises. Now it 
rarely catches me out and actions seem to happen on their own. Even so, there is always room for 
deeper inquiry, and so it was with some enthusiasm that I set aside the time to investigate what 
it’s like to act, and decide, and do. 
 
 
*    *    * 
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I am sitting outside my hut, and the morning air is fresh and chilly, even though it’s mid-
summer. The flowers of the feverfew in front of me are back-lit by the early morning sun: small 
and white with tiny yellow centres. I am calming the mind for half an hour before I start work on 
today’s question. One cat sits beside me, the other on a chair across the orchard. From the corner 
of my eye I see something move, cat-like though rather large. But both my cats are here. “Let 
…” 
 
What is it?  
 
I cannot, or do not, resist. I turn my eyes to look. 
 
A fox slips quietly between them.  
 
I shouldn’t have done that. I am supposed to keep looking straight down at the flowers and grass. 
Was that free will? No. The movement of the fox and my curiosity made me do it. ‘My’ 
curiosity. Was this me doing it? 
 
Not yet. I go back to sitting quietly, but thoughts start bubbling up; the foxes died out in Bristol a 
few years ago and now they’ve begun to come … “Let…”  
 
There you are, you see. I did that, didn’t I? It was me who jumped in with “Let it go…”, and the 
thoughts went away. But this isn’t true. I learnt that trick from John decades ago. That meme, 
those words, ‘Let it come, Let it be, Let it go’, is one he infected me with when I began 
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meditating, and it’s been working away in my mind since. But I choose to keep it rather than 
forget it, reject it, tell myself it’s stupid, or any number of other things I might have done. So it is 
up to me that I keep on using the trick, isn’t it? 
 
Not really. The reasons for rejection or acceptance are my personality, genetic make-up, other 
memes I’ve picked up along the way, and force of circumstance. All this has led to a person who 
sits here now, and when thoughts start rattling away whispers “Le…”, and they stop.  
 
So where do I come into this? It’s all bound up with me. For me to have free will means I do 
something of my own accord. So who am I? 
 
Ah. That’s a familiar one. I’ll sit and see who is here for a bit. Perhaps I can see if she’s doing 
anything. 
 
Here it is; the headless body topped with grass and pretty white flowers. It sits still. 
 
 
*    *    * 
 
 
Do I have free will? I hear the words. I ask. I am stumped.  
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Perhaps I need to work with something easier, with the absolute minimal requirement for free 
will, which is that I actually do things. I must go back to the simple question. 
 
What am I doing?  
 
I can sit with that. I can stay calm and clear and ask, “What am I doing?” 
 
I sit. The buzzing continues; the cats do not stir. 
 
I am sitting up straight. But it’s not exactly me who’s doing this. It’s such a long-practised habit 
that this body just gets into that position and stays there. Maybe it makes sense to say that my 
body is doing it; but am ‘I’ doing it?  
 
All right, I’m making an effort here. I’m paying attention. That really is an effort. Indeed, that is 
the whole task of meditation: that you have to stay there, minute after minute, hour after hour, 
and keep on paying attention, not sliding off, not getting side-tracked into worries, fantasies, or 
imagined conversations. You have to work at paying attention. I am paying attention now. And 
now. 
 
So that’s the key, isn’t it?  If I didn’t make the effort, then it wouldn’t happen. It’s an effort of 
will; it’s hard work. I am using my will to pay attention, and now, and keeping on paying 
attention. It’s hard work. So this is what I am doing. The hard work and the effort I feel myself 
making are proof that I’m doing something. 
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But oddly enough, I realize, hard work doesn’t prove that. As I sit here, I remember being in 
labor, many years ago. My first child had a very big head, or something else wasn’t quite right, 
and I was in labor for over 24 hours. It was hard work, terribly painful. That’s why it’s called 
‘labor’, I realized. And who was making the effort? I had this extraordinary sense that I was 
doing the hard work, but that I had no option. I couldn’t say “No. I don’t want to have this baby. 
I won’t do it.” My body was doing it by itself. I was doing the hardest physical work I had ever 
done, but was not willing it. The labor was willing itself. Doing, yet not doing. 
 
Come back now, to the garden, sit calmly, pay attention.  
 
Hard work does not prove it’s a matter of will, or that I am doing it. So what am I doing?  
 
 
*    *    * 
 
 
Sitting still again. I see the taller flowers, and the branches of an apple tree moving in the chilly 
breeze. I feel the wind.  
 
Am I doing this? Am I looking at them and seeing them? Is seeing doing? 
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Yes, but I couldn’t do it without them. They are as much doing it as I am. Which is moving: me 
or them? Is the moving in my mind or in the world? 
 
The trick of turning inwards unfolds again. There are the flowers, legs, arms, half a nose, and 
then where there should be me inside there are only moving flowers and apple branches. I am not 
doing this. The looking, seeing, moving, we’re doing it together. It’s just happening, the universe 
doing its thing. The body goes on sitting still. The branches keep on waving. 
 
Nine o’clock strikes. End of meditation. I bow. I get up.  
 
Did I do that? 
 
I feel strange. I am used to these mental manoeuvres, yet they still have a deep effect. 
 
I get up and walk attentively, without assuming I’m doing anything. The legs are walking, the 
grass and flowerbed are slipping by in the space where I should be.  
 
There are raspberries to be picked for breakfast. A hand reaches out, again, and again. It can 
choose this bush or that. It picks this one, until enough are picked. It’s time to go indoors, but 
which way will she go? 
 
I like making paths, and there are several quite bendy and pointless paths in our garden. There 
are three ways I can go, one with low branches to duck under, another narrowed by spreading 
	  	  171	  
weeds, and the last clear but longer. Which way shall I go? I try to catch myself in the act of 
making the decision. Everything slows down, I stand hovering with one foot raised, to see 
whether I can catch my mind making itself up. If I could catch this moment, or watch this 
process, I might find out what it’s like to act freely, and to know that I am really doing this. A 
hand reaches out to a just-noticed ripe raspberry, the cats suddenly scamper past, and a foot is 
already following them. They go to the place on the wall where I always stroke them before 
going indoors. The hand reaches out, the fur is soft and the cat’s head presses against the hand.  
 
So she must have decided to go that way. 
 
This seems to be all that happens; decisions are made because of countless interacting events, 
and afterwards a little voice inside says, “I did that”, “I decided to do that”.  
 
Is there any need for that little, after-the-fact, voice? 
 
I must watch some more. 
 
 
*    *    * 
 
 
Do I have free will? 
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No. I am not separate from the perceptions, thoughts and actions that make up my world. And if 
I am what seems to be the world, then we are in this together. Me and the world, world/me, are 
doing all these actions that seem to act of their own accord. 
 
But help! 
 
This means I am not responsible. This is terrible. If I’m not responsible then … 
 
My mind goes back many years to when I was first practicing mindfulness, and hit upon this 
fear. We were staying at a campsite in Austria, by a lake, and I was on the little beach with the 
children. It was a lovely day, and the place was peaceful except for a blaring radio. It was 
annoying. 
 
I knew what I would usually do in such circumstances: fret, be angry, think about the regulations 
of the campsite, about telling him to turn it off, feel bad at the thought of doing so, look at his 
tattoos and worry what he’d do if I approached him, think that if I were a real Buddhist I would 
feel compassion rather than anger, imagine that if I were a good meditator I wouldn’t mind the 
noise, try not to mind, fail. And so on.  
 
So what happened? Many such thoughts began but each was met with “Let …” and fizzled out, 
leaving the grass before my feet, the mud pies the children were making, the feel of the earth on 
my hands as I joined in, the sounds of birds, the sounds of the radio, the grass again as I walked 
up the beach and stopped, my voice (in my best German) saying “Excuse me, your radio is very 
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loud, would you please mind turning it down?”—the man’s face scowling and muttering, his 
hand reaching out to his radio, the grass and then the mud and stones rough under my feet, and 
the mud pies and children.  
 
Later I noticed he left. I wondered whether I’d done the ‘right thing’, but “Let …” and back to 
the feel of the water on my toes. A moment’s thought was enough to realize that agonising about 
what to do would not have helped. The world had summed up the options, chosen one, carried it 
out, and moved on. This action was a result of everything learned and done before. Now was, as 
ever, fine. And now. 
 
Deep breath. Watch again. The world said, “Deep breath, watch again”. This sensible response 
was not coming from a little thing inside called ‘me’; it came from somewhere, I don’t know 
where, from all the past actions of this body, and this brain, and everything it’s gone through. It 
just happened. There’s nothing wrong with that response.  
 
So is it always like this? Could I just trust the world and this body to work by itself without me 
doing anything? I realize with some horror that by relinquishing myself to the world, and 
accepting that actions just happen, I have given up all personal responsibility. I cannot believe in 
it any more. There’s no one in here making the decisions. They are making themselves. I walked 
inside, fed the cats, had breakfast, and made loads of little decisions along the way, all with alert 
attention to what’s happening, and with no sense of myself doing it.  
 
It seems so right. It seems truthful to the way things really are. 
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*    *    * 
 
 
But what about responsibility? 
 
I have played around with this question intellectually since my teens, when I first worked out 
that free will must be an illusion, but it was only after many years of meditating that I confronted 
the problem directly.  
 
I was on a Zen retreat at Maenllwyd, practising intensely. Our teacher for the week was Reb 
Anderson, a Zen master visiting from California, and he was pushing us hard. As the illusion of 
doing began to loosen its grip, I became frightened. The world was seeping into me and I was 
disintegrating into the world. I was acting and not acting. This flowing sense of action without an 
actor felt perfectly natural, but as soon as I started thinking about it I hit the problem: what about 
responsibility? There could be none in such a world.  
 
I signed up for an interview. The Zen master was an impressive, good-looking man, with shaven 
head and imposing robes, and this was a formal interview. I walked to the interview room, 
opened the door and slipped in. I bowed in the prescribed way, sat in the prescribed posture, 
looked into his shining eyes, and summoned the courage to tell him what I thought: that 
ultimately no one is responsible for anything. 
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He chuckled.  
 
“Yes”, he said with a delightfully warm and encouraging smile, “ultimately, that’s true”. He 
seemed to emphasise ‘ultimately’, and I thought of the Zen distinction between the ultimate view 
and the relative view, wondering whether there’s some other way in which it’s not true. 
 
“Then what do I do about responsibility?” I blurted out. 
 
“You take responsibility”, he said (Anderson 2009).3  
 
 
*    *    * 
 
 
Help! Who takes responsibility? Isn’t ‘taking’ responsibility ‘doing’ something? Isn’t taking 
responsibility an act of will? Doesn’t it require someone who is doing it? Isn’t it freely done? No, 
in this case he had told me to do it, so it wasn’t free. But I could refuse to do it. 
 
Then who would refuse to do it? I know there is no self, so isn’t taking responsibility just 
inventing a new false self who is going to have that responsibility? Why would one want to do 
that if one knew there really was no self?  
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I am going in circles. Help. 
 
 
*    *    * 
 
 
Over the years, as the sense of free will has slipped away, I have remembered this advice and it 
has helped.  
 
The illusion of free will does not survive the kind of scrutiny I have given it. It melts away. I no 
longer feel its pull. People sometimes ask me how I did it; how I gave up free will, but I cannot 
tell them. I know that I battled intellectually with it for years, but thinking only creates a 
mismatch between what one believes and how the world seems. I never felt comfortable with this 
mismatch, and didn’t want to go on living as though free will were true when logic and science 
told me it could not be. I didn’t want to live a lie, or a half-truth, or an ‘as if’. So this great 
intellectual doubt drove me to look directly into how decisions are made, and to examine the self 
that underlies the feeling of acting freely.  
 
I no longer get that feeling. Sometimes a shadow of it arises up—“I’ve got to decide what to 
wear for my lecture this evening” or “I don’t know whether to accept this work offer”. I welcome 
these as a chance to look again, to investigate what it feels like to make a conscious decision, but 
all the habits of paying attention and watching what happens dissipate the feeling quickly. It has 
nothing to cling to. 
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So it works something like this. An email arrives. It’s an invitation to give a lecture in an 
exciting place, at a prestigious conference. I look in my diary. That day I’ve agreed to go with 
my partner to a family event, planned for ages, he’d love me to attend. What to do? I have to 
decide. I don’t like letting anyone down. The lecture is a terrific opportunity. It won’t come 
again. But I’ve already committed myself. 
 
No, ‘I’ don’t have to decide. There is no inner me who can do so. This whole series of events is 
part of the play of the world/me as it is, and the decision is too. So the thoughts come, and the 
feelings of indecision come, and the feelings sway back and forth, and the weighing-up goes on, 
and it’s all just happening, like cars going by and the ticking clock in the background. Then the 
decision somehow is made, whether it’s today or three days later. Eventually the fingers type the 
replying email and it’s done. Then what? 
 
I take responsibility. I don’t mean that a little inner me who has free will does so, because that 
would be to fall back into the endless cycle of the illusion of doing. The little me is fictional. 
Taking responsibility only means consequences follow and I will accept them. If someone tells 
me how wonderful the conference was and I missed it I won’t be angry that ‘I’ made the wrong 
decision. It was made. That’s what happened and that’s how it is now. If someone is angry with 
me for being so selfish and mean for not joining the family event I will accept that. That’s what 
happened, these are the consequences. Things just are the way they are. Whether they could have 
been different I do not know, but I suspect that even asking this question does not make sense. 
Stuff just happens. 
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Indeed, the fingers are typing right now. No one is acting. I am not doing anything. 
 
What, then, is the point? What’s the point in doing anything? 
 
No point. 
 
 
Notes 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This is a revised, condensed version of a selection from my Zen and the Art of Consciousness 
(Oxford: Oneworld Publications: 2011), pp. 135-149. I thank Oneworld Publications for granting 
permission to reprint this material here in revised form. 
2 The ellipses set off immediately below in the text are meant to encourage the reader to pause 
reflectively; in the original text, there are little drawings. 
3 Years later, I met Reb again and we talked about doing and not doing. Now, he says, he would 
probably say, ‘Accept responsibility - without limit’.	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8 Freedom from Responsibility: Agent-Neutral Consequentialism and the Bodhisattva Ideal 
 
Christian Coseru 
 
 
§ 1 Introduction 
 
Is there such a thing as free will in Buddhism? Do moral and mental forms of cultivation at the 
heart of Buddhist practice imply some notion of agency and responsibility? And if they do, how 
are we to think of those individuals that embark on the path to liberation or enlightenment, 
considering that all Buddhists give universal scope to the no-self doctrine? Of course, Buddhism 
is not alone among the world’s great philosophical traditions in providing ample testimony for 
the possibility of cultivating to a high degree such cardinal virtues as nonviolence, wisdom, 
compassion, and a general spirit of tolerance. But it is unique among them in articulating a 
theory of action that, it seems, dispenses altogether with the notion of agent causation. Buddhists 
pursue what are unmistakably moral ends, but there is no stable self or agent who bears the 
accumulated responsibility for initiating those pursuits, and seemingly no normative framework 
against which some dispositions, thoughts, and actions are deemed felicitous, and thus worthy of 
cultivation, while others are not so deemed. It is not surprising, therefore, to find a near universal 
lack of agreement among contemporary interpreters about how best to capture the scope of 
Buddhist ethics using the vocabulary and theoretical frameworks of Western ethical discourse. 
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In seeking an answer to the questions above, the plan, then, is first to show that despite some 
straightforward metaphysical tenets, the conception of agency in Buddhism is less alien than it 
may seem at first blush—indeed, it is not unlike conceptions of moral agency that we find in 
Stoic thought, and more recently in Nietzsche (2006) and several strands of contemporary moral 
phenomenology; next, to argue for a solution to what is widely regarded as a clear conflict 
between traditional conceptions of moral agency and the agent-neutral metaphysical picture of 
causality that we glean from Abhidharma literature. Recent accounts (Flanagan 2002; Meyers, 
2014; Siderits 1987, 2008) seek to resolve this conflict by arguing that the two pictures are 
compatible because the discourse of ‘persons’ and the discourse of ‘causes’ belong in two 
distinct and incommensurable domains. Specifically, my claim is that compatibilist solutions 
compromise the traditional notion of moral responsibility and render ethical conduct 
indistinguishable from merely pragmatic acts. The main thrust of the compatibilist move is 
against the notion of agent causation itself, which social and cognitive psychology has 
presumably rendered incoherent.1 It is only to the extent that we dispense with such incoherent 
concepts—as compatibilist interpreters of Buddhist action theory argue—that some notion of 
moral agency and responsibility can be salvaged. 
 
Despite the dominant and paradoxical image of the selfless Mahāyāna (later Buddhist) 
bodhisattva (one who has taken the altruistic vow) tirelessly, yet effortlessly, working to put an 
end to ultimately nonexistent human suffering (on account of the nonexistence of sentient beings 
as conventionally established), support for a robust notion of phenomenal agency can be found in 
nearly all major schools of Buddhist thought.2 Indeed, the Eightfold Path program, much like the 
promulgation of monastic rules of conduct (the Vinaya), comes in recognition of the complex 
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range of personal and subpersonal factors that are constitutive of human agency. Because mental 
states such as greed, hatred and delusion or, alternatively, loving kindness, compassion, and 
sympathetic joy, can only be made sense of with reference to the person whose states they are, 
they are irreducibly phenomenal: they only exist first-personally. The impersonal description 
thesis at the heart of Abhidharma Reductionism (cf. Abelson, this volume) may allow for the 
analysis of mental states in terms of their constitutive factors, but for these states to be 
analyzable at all, and for the attribution of moral responsibility and freedom to be intelligible, 
there needs to be a conception of first-personal agency in place. On the view I defend here, 
mental states are irreducibly first-personal: the idea of generic pain apart from individually 
realized sensations of burning, itching, or stinging is thus deeply incoherent.  
 
In what follows, I argue that influential Mahāyāna ethicists such as Śāntideva, who allow for 
moral rules to be proscribed under the expediency of a compassionate aim, seriously compromise 
the very notion of responsibility. Moral responsibility is intelligible only in relation to 
conceptions of freedom and human dignity that reflect a participation in, and sharing of, inter-
personal relationships. As critics of hard determinism (the view that universal causal 
necessitation is incompatible with free will and moral agency) have argued, there is no threat to 
human agency so long as we understand that agency is essentially grounded in a range of 
participant reactive attitudes and feelings (e.g., resentment, gratitude, anger, etc.) that are 
impossible without the ascription of agency and moral responsibility (see Strawson 1973, p. 11, 
and discussion in Goodman 2009, pp. 147ff). But bodhisattvas cannot be seen to harbor such 
participant reactive attitudes, at least not once they are sufficiently advanced on the path to 
understand that no beings exist whatsoever as ordinarily conceived. For compatibilists, thus, the 
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extraordinarily demanding bodhisattva ideal—informed, as it is, by a steadfast commitment to 
forego the body, its enjoyments, and all virtue for the sake of accomplishing the welfare of all 
sentient beings—makes a compelling case for allowing special dispensation. On an agent-neutral 
consequentialist interpretation of the Mahāyāna ethical project, we must grant the Buddhist saint 
dispensation for the unfathomable and mysterious ways in which utterly impersonal 
psychophysical aggregates accomplish their aim, while the unenlightened must be content with 
merely following rules.  
 
I do not dispute this claim. Nor do I disregard the importance of revising our traditional notions 
of agency and moral responsibility to accommodate new findings about the sociobiological roots 
of morality. Rather, I simply caution that such revisionary strategies, insofar as they seek to 
explain agency in event-causal terms, may well (if they have not done so already) set the stage 
for moral epiphenomenalism.3 Indeed, on the view I defend here, an effective compatibilist 
solution to the problem of reconciling freedom of the will and determinism depends on 
expanding, rather than eliminating, the complex register of factors that underpin the experiential 
aspects of our moral life. In short, although social and cognitive psychology has significantly 
augmented our knowledge of agency, there is a widespread sense that mapping out human action 
in impersonal terms—a project of significant affinity to Abhidharma—has advanced only 
marginally our understanding of agency, of what it is like to show responsiveness to norms, 
reasons, and principles. 
 
 
§2 Freedom, Destiny, and the Will 
	  	   184	  
 
As with classical Western conceptions of causality and agency, the Indian philosophical context 
at the time of the Buddha presents us with a wide array of philosophical views: for (arguably) 
strict determinists like the Ājīvikas, who embrace a fatalist conception of human existence, all 
actions are predetermined by an external force of destiny (niyati) from which there is no escape; 
at the other end of the spectrum we find the Cārvākas, the Indian physicalists, for whom the most 
probable explanation for the existence of the universe is a series of random events. The Cārvākas 
reject both the law of karma and the concept of destiny because implicit in these notions is a 
view of existence as inherently purposeful (Bhattacharya 2011). The latter view is not unlike that 
of some contemporary libertarians who, drawing on the findings of quantum mechanics, argue 
that the statistical probabilities that characterize events at the subatomic level extend to the 
everyday realm of human experience: actions, though biologically and psychologically 
conditioned, and constrained by the norms of social conduct, are not strictly causally determined 
(Kane 1996, 1999; Wallace 2011).  
 
It is worth noting from the outset that causal determinism was far less an issue of concern for the 
historical Buddha than the fatalism of the Ājīvikas. In a discourse on “The Fruits of the Ascetic 
Life” (Sāmaññaphala Sutta), the Buddha is particularly concerned to reject the view of Makkhali 
Gosāla, who, by removing all trace of effort from human action, renders the ethical life 
meaningless: neither defilement nor purification have any cause or condition, no action is 
voluntarily undertaken either by oneself or by another, and, generally speaking, humans lack 
power, energy, and steadfastness; it is simply their lot in life to experience pain and pleasure in a 
manner beyond their control (Dīgha Nikāya 2.19–20, in Walshe 1987, pp. 94ff; Meyers 2014, pp. 
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62ff). In condemning this view, the Buddha not only emphasizes the reality of karmic action but 
also the efficacy of individual effort. To those who claim that nothing is done either by oneself or 
another, the Buddha responds by pointing out the inconsistency of such statements: taking a first 
step in articulating any view whatsoever shows that there is an element of initiative, that one 
either strives to overcome some resistance or to reach the sort of reflective equilibrium that 
comes with understanding and insight (Aṅguttara Nikāya (“AN”) 6.38, in Bodhi 2012, p. 901).  
 
Should this rejection of fatalism be taken to mean that the Buddha is championing freedom of the 
will? More importantly, is there a notion of personal autonomy at work in the Buddha’s clear 
admonition to his followers to jettison the extremes of both determinism and indeterminism, and 
devote themselves instead to an ethical life in the pursuit of liberation? It would appear that the 
picture of the ordinary human condition, mired in ignorance and moved by short-term pragmatic 
goals, precludes such a notion of personal freedom. The evaluative attitude implicit in this 
complex analysis of cognitive and affective states, however, seems to suggest otherwise. Clearly, 
an expression of self-concern and concern about the consequences of one’s actions is a 
ubiquitous feature of Buddhist teachings. Indeed, while the value placed on shame and 
apprehension suggests that the Buddha favors a conception of responsibility and moral self-
regard for those pursuing the Eightfold Path, such a perspective is not ultimate (see Meyers’ 
2014 deft analysis of this view). Specifically, morally reactive attitudes, whether unwholesome 
(e.g., anger and hatred) or wholesome (shame and apprehension), are still impersonal mental 
factors. But, like the complex notion of disposition (cetanā), they are also self-referential mental 
states: “they presuppose the notion of oneself as a morally responsible agent” (Meyers 2014, p. 
63). Is this conception of moral agency self-referentiality constitutive or is it merely an emergent 
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feature of these mental states? Are our choices and the sense of control and ownership of action 
illusory or is agency built into the very fabric of lived experience? 
 
Agency, choice, and self-referentiality are complex notions with a rich and contested history of 
interpretation. Some attention to Western theories of intentionality, the will, and motivation for 
action, then, is necessary if we are to make any progress in clarifying whether, and in what way, 
we can make sense of the Buddhist conception of selfless agency. This contrasting analysis must 
recognize that while Western and Buddhist ethical discourses are embedded in their own 
intellectual histories, there is no neutral stand from which to assess their merits and possible 
limitations. While contemporary philosophers do address metaethical questions, historically the 
paucity of inquiries into the nature of ethics in Buddhist philosophy makes the matter all the 
more complicated. By noting this absence (first pointed out in Siderits 1987), I do not mean to 
suggest that Buddhists either deny or doubt the possibility of moral knowledge. Nor do I mean to 
endorse the sort of moral skepticism championed by Mackie (1977), which says that judging a 
particular action morally permissible is simply a statement about one’s participation in a specific 
way of life, Buddhist or non-Buddhist. I do, however, share the generally Kantian line of 
argumentation which says that there are better and worse ends, and thus better and worse ways of 
achieving those ends depending on the criteria that we adopt (Kant, 1993).  
 
As I already noted, efforts to capture the scope of Buddhist ethics are mired in disagreements, 
mainly between those who favor a virtue ethical model, on account of the presence of a rich 
catalogue of virtues and of practices conducive to their mastery (Keown 2001), and those who 
advance consequentialist interpretations, owing mainly to the identification of happiness and the 
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elimination of suffering as key elements in a comprehensive list of factors that define well-being 
(Goodman 2009). Efforts to map out the theoretical structure of Buddhist ethics in sui generis 
terms—and thus to steer clear of both consequentialist and virtue ethical models—have so far 
gestured in the direction of moral phenomenology as the basis for the tradition’s normative 
claims: only the experience of enlightened beings can serve as a criterion for moral blame or 
praiseworthiness (see Garfield 2010, 2014). I have no intention to weigh in on this debate, 
relevant as it may be to the broader question of whether a specific conception of agency 
underwrites the Buddhist path all the way to awakening or only up to a point (viz. the moment 
immediately preceding it). Of course, this question assumes that we know what kind of agency, 
if any, enlightened beings exhibit, an assumption that lies at the heart of yet another controversy, 
about the very nature and possibility of enlightened agency (see Garfield 2006; Finnigan 2011).  
 
Let us, then, briefly consider the concept of the will. An integral part of the Western vocabulary, 
captured by such ubiquitous statements as “Did you do that of your own free will?”—the idea of 
will occurs in the classical worlds of neither India nor Greece. For Aristotle, who provides much 
of the technical philosophical vocabulary for virtue ethics, voluntary action is conveyed by the 
less ambiguous concept of deliberative desire (bouleutikê orexis), which captures what it means 
for an action to be within our power. For an action to be deliberately and effectively undertaken, 
desire and reason must converge: it is only when reason is desiderative (orekticos nous) and 
desire is thoughtful or deliberative (orexis dianoetike) that we are in a position to make informed 
decisions (NE VI.2, 1139b4, in Aristotle 1999, p. 87; Murphy 2001). When these two work in 
concert they give rise to the more capacious idea of moral purpose (prohairesis). In classical 
India, there are different avenues of volitional pursuit, typically classed alongside material 
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(artha), affective (kāma), social (dharma), and ultimately emancipatory (mokṣa) ends. These 
ends are not necessarily continuous. The ethical life, centered on the first three aims, is almost 
entirely dispensed with in the generally spiritual and otherworldly quest of Upaniṣadic lore. If 
Aristotle heeds the Socratic dictum ‘knowledge is virtue’, the Upaniṣadic sage Yājñavalkya is 
proleptically Humean in regarding morality as the play of emotions over reason. The early 
Buddhist conception of the ethical life, likewise, shares in this Upaniṣadic impulse to transcend 
all inclination, desire, and emotion in the pursuit of the higher, if still self-referentially 
constituted, goal of liberation (see Bilimoria, Prabhu, and Sharma 2007, pp. 40ff).   
 
The idea of ‘will’ as a distinct faculty occurs for the first time in the writings of St. Augustine. In 
On Free Will (De libero arbitrio), Augustine sets out to address the problem of theodicy by the 
introduction of a new faculty, free will (liberum arbitrium), which alone is responsible for moral 
acts being deemed praiseworthy or blameworthy.4 An omniscient and omnibenevolent God, as 
creator of the world, cannot be the cause for the primal fall from grace that marks the human 
condition (according to the old Hebrew myth of the Fall from Eden). Hence, the invention of a 
new faculty, the will, capable of producing uncaused free action—that is, action that is not 
accountable in terms of natural events and processes (see Stump 2001). But Augustine also uses 
the term voluntas (‘the will’), which he adopts from Cicero and especially Seneca, who use it to 
refer to the Stoic manner of assenting to a given proposition. For the Stoics, this assent to 
propositions of the sort “No man can compel you to receive what is false”5 has moral valence. 
Thus, to the extent that Augustine’s use of ‘voluntas’ captures the notion that we morally assent 
to various propositions, his understanding of agency is ultimately continuous with the Greek 
conception of moral purpose (prohairesis), especially as it finds articulation in Epictetus. With 
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one caveat: the Stoic and Christian conceptions of human nature are radically different. For the 
Stoics, who take human nature to be ultimately pure, pursuing the moral life is basically living in 
accordance with right reason (not to be confused with the (Kantian) idea of a morality grounded 
in rationality). As Seneca so eloquently puts it in Epistulae morales, the pursuit of such moral 
ends is predicated on the notion that “conduct cannot be right unless the will to act is right” 
(1917-25, XCV, pp. 56ff). For Augustine, the ‘right will to act’ becomes ‘free will’, not as a 
condition for the possibility of right attitudes of the mind (habitus animi), but as a necessary 
condition of the justice of divine retribution (see Rist 2001, pp. 34ff, for a detailed discussion). 
 
Clearly, nothing resembling the Augustinian conception of a free will tied to divine justice is to 
be found in Indian philosophy. Karma, or the reward and punishment for action, is the closest we 
come to a conception of justice. But this is cosmic, rather than divine, justice: karmic 
consequences depend on the universality of the causal principle of dependent arising, not on 
uncaused divine judgment.  
 
The more pressing question, however, is whether the idea of free will is compatible with 
determinism, given a conception of the world as causally ordered. Here, I want to draw on Stoic 
thought again as providing a better basis to conceptualize the Buddhist conception of moral 
agency. The Stoic emphasis on the causal antecedents of mental states does not mean that they 
are externally necessitated (Long 2002, p. 28). The occurrence of mental states may be causally 
governed, but their intelligibility is not: the latter requires assent, the only criterion of 
individuation that marks a mental state as mine, as occurring in my mental stream. It is the 
volition manifest in assenting, thus, that serves as the basis for Stoic conceptions of personal 
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identity and moral agency. But assenting is not the same as judging. Evaluative judgments may 
intrude, but the entire scope of the Stoic life is to bracket them, to realize (with Epictetus) that 
“death is nothing terrible, else it would have seemed so even to Socrates; rather it is the idea that 
death is terrible that is terrible” (Encheiridion, 5, in Hard 2014, p. 288).  
 
This Stoic conception of the moral purpose (prohairesis), indeed, is not unlike the role assigned 
to cetanā (‘disposition’ or ‘volition’)6 in the canonical Buddhist literature. Variously rendered as 
‘will’, ‘volition’, ‘intention’, ‘motivation’, ‘conation’, ‘drive’, ‘stimulus’, ‘determination’, 
‘effort’, ‘choice’, and ‘resolve’, ‘cetanā’ is typically the sort of bodily, verbal, and mental 
activity one performs either on one’s own or conditioned by others (AN II 158, in Bodhi 2012, 
pp. 563ff). I can either voluntarily raise my arm or have it raised by another, as a referee would 
upon declaring the winner of a boxing match. Likewise, I can either think through an issue and 
volunteer an opinion or ponder a question and offer a response. Thus, I can say with certainty 
that my response to a question is causally determined by external factors. But this determinist 
picture of agency is too simplistic to capture the complexity of intersubjective relations (the sort 
of relations that, as already noted, Strawson has in mind when he suggests that participant 
reactive attitudes are indispensable to an account of moral agency and responsibility). My 
response might be solicited by a question, but that a string of sounds registers as a question 
requires a complex set of interpretive, evaluative, and analytic skills that can only be constituted 
as reasons. It is our responsiveness to reasons prompted by valuing judgments—of the sort that 
extol the cultivation of certain mental states as wholesome and the rejection of others as 
unwholesome—that serves as conduit for verbal and mental activity, even when caused by other 
things. 
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The question of freedom and determinism, thus, must consider not whether factors relevant to 
moral assessment can be causally assessed, but whether the agent-neutral framework of Buddhist 
Reductionism is compatible with a conception of responsibility-entailing moral agency.7 
 
 
§3 Agency, Causation, and the Moral Domain 
 
Does the Buddhist conception of agency demand a radical reassessment of our understanding of 
voluntary action and of the causal and motivational factors that inform, condition, and sanction 
our valuing judgments? To answer this question we must consider the defining experience that 
transforms Siddhartha Gautama from a human being caught in the causal web into the Buddha, 
an enlightened being. This transformative experience becomes at once the source of the Buddhist 
metaphysical picture of reality and the culmination of all human aspiration for genuine freedom. 
The centerpiece of this metaphysical picture is the causal principle of dependent arising 
(pratītya-samutpāda) and a thoroughly reductionist account of persons, which takes volition to 
be but one of several contributing factors that shape human identity and agency. 
 
Firmly situated within this causal web, yet unattached to its emerging phenomena, the Buddha 
can thus declare that we ought to regard any form of sensation, attention, and consciousness, 
whether “past, future, or present; internal or external; manifest or subtle…as it actually is… [as]: 
‘This is not mine. This is not my self. This is not what I am’” (Saṃyutta Nikāya 22, 48, in Bodhi, 
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2000, p. 887). Rather, we are told, the arising of each element in the person series is only as 
conditioned by the presence of immediately preceding, causally efficacious elements:  
 
“[D]ependent on the eye and forms, visual-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three 
is contact. With contact as condition there is feeling. What one feels, that one perceives. 
What one perceives, that one thinks about.” (Majjhima Nikāya (“MN”) I, 111-112, in 
Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001, p. 203)  
 
This picture of causality, however, does not entail strict determinism. The enlightened being’s 
actions are not so much causally grounded as conditioned by an ongoing series of enabling 
factors. Unlike the typical ‘if, then’ formula of Western forms of sentential logic, the Pāli 
canonical literature uses the locative absolute to capture the conditional nature of phenomena: 
‘when that, then this’. Hence, the central thesis (dependent arising) that all Buddhists endorse is:  
 
“When this is present, that comes to be; from the arising of this, that arises. When this is 
absent, that does not come to be. On the cessation of this, that ceases.” (See, e.g., MN II, 
32, in Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi, 2001, p. 655) 
 
It would appear thus that the conception of agency in Buddhism is not that of an autonomous, 
free willing agent or self, but of an embodied and self-referential bundle of aggregates. We can 
thus get on with the business of charting out the experiential domain using the ‘when that, then 
this’ formula: when there is touch, then there is feeling, when there is awareness, then there is 
grasping for objects. Can we go as far as to say ‘when there is agency, there is moral 
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responsibility’? The early Buddhist literature, as we have already noted, is unambiguous that 
initiative is essential to moral progress. But the philosophical innovations of later Mahāyāna 
Buddhism, specifically the doctrine of ‘emptiness’ (universal metaphysical insubstantiality) 
proposed by Nāgārjuna, complicate the ethical project. By making the agent-neutral 
metaphysical picture of selflessness indispensable to Mahāyāna Buddhist ethics, Śāntideva 
describes a way of living with the practical consequences of actions that effectively lack agency, 
and thus also lack the sort of intersubjective relation that entails moral responsibility.    
 
This complication is especially problematic when, in the Bodhicaryāvatāra (“BCA”), Śāntideva 
(1995), drawing on the principles of dependent arising and momentariness, claims that there is 
no continuity between agency and the experience of its consequences “in terms of a unity of the 
continuum of consciousness” (pp. 9, 72). Pressed with the objection that divorcing agency from 
the experience of moral responsibility makes the pursuit of virtues such as compassion for all 
sentient beings irrelevant, Śāntideva appeals to the ‘two truths’ (ultimate versus conventional) 
framework of Madhyamaka (‘Middle Way’) dialectic to make an even more radical claim: from 
the perspective of ultimate truth, the embodiment of such perfections as wisdom and compassion 
lacks the intentionality, aboutness or directness of ordinary (conventionally understood) mental 
states. In response to the crucially critical question: “for whom is there compassion if no being 
exists?” (BCA pp. 9, 75), Śāntideva contends that so long as the delusion—that there is a task to 
be done (e.g., bringing sentient beings to the realization of the truth of emptiness)—persists, the 
illusion of effort persists too (BCA pp. 9, 76). 
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Thus, when ethicists like Śāntideva reject even this minimal conception of agency as the ground 
for moral and mental cultivation, the Buddhist ethical project reaches an impasse. If there is no 
agent, and if actions are merely transient events arising within a continuum of causally 
interconnected states, what explains the phenomenal character of experience? Touch, after all, is 
not generic contact, but an active and firm grip. Awareness is not bare wakefulness, but the sense 
of being present here and now. And compassion is no mere feeling for others, but empathetic 
self-disclosure in the presence of others. Furthermore, the capacity for self-regulation that 
grounds our moral sense presupposes that we are not merely self-aware but aware in a way that 
makes us implicitly responsive to action and their consequences. Even if we assume, as the 
evidence from cognitive neuroscience seems to suggest, that we are psychologically hardwired to 
attribute agency and hold others responsible for their actions, the question why such agency-
attributing capacities should be accompanied by a moral sense remains to be explained (see 
Gray, Gray, and Wegner 2007; Arico, Fiala, Goldberg, and Nichols 2011).  
 
Whether the Buddhist no-self view is simply a theoretical construct, derived from metaphysical 
considerations about agency and causality, or a descriptive account grounded in the 
phenomenology of lived experience, matters to our conception of agency and moral 
responsibility. Compatibilists argue that reductionism about persons is not incompatible with the 
pursuit of an ethical life. Of course, the compatibilist must acknowledge that the conventional 
practice of morality (to which the Buddha offers precepts, inspiring tales, and rules of conduct) 
and Buddhist metaphysical doctrine are in conflict (this is precisely Siderits’ (2008) view).  
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Can appealing to the two truths framework of Buddhist philosophy solve this conflict? How is 
the moral life to be justified in terms that ultimately make no reference to anything experiential 
and intentional? If enlightened agency is no agency at all, what makes it desirable? The 
Buddha’s concern to reject any conception of determinism that strips our efforts of causal 
efficacy becomes all the more pertinent. Indeed, if the Buddhist analysis of experience allows for 
persons to have the kinds of freedom necessary for the pursuit of moral ends, then the principle 
of dependent arising cannot function as a basis for strict causal determinism. 
 
That agency and moral responsibility are deeply intertwined is obvious when we consider the 
relation between practical deliberation and theorizing about the nature of things: the latter looks 
for causal explanations of events, and ultimately finds them in impersonal elements and factors 
that are constitutive of the natural world. This naturalistic picture has no place for concepts like 
‘freedom’ and ‘responsibility’. But most, if not all, of our most pressing deliberations rest on 
practical reasoning of the sort that asks, “What should I do?”—and then looks for the most 
justifiable course of action. If such is the case, then holding myself responsible for actions that I 
undertake is integral for their success. That is, regardless of whether theoretical reason is able to 
demonstrate freedom or not, practical reason must assume that freedom is possible for the 
purpose of effective action. This Kantian perspective on human agency is motivated by the 
assumption that the kind of freedom we are supposed to consider (and criticize) is as described 
by libertarians or agent causal theorists. This conception of freedom gives agency its spontaneity 
within the logical space of reasons.  
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Do ‘freedom’ and ‘responsibility’ belong in a discourse about causation in the natural world? If 
such discourse does not eliminate consciousness from its ultimate picture of what there is, then 
freedom and responsibility are no mere artifacts of practical reason, but epistemically objective 
features of lived experience. If, on the other hand, we find no room for practical concerns about 
how best to live in our ultimate ontology, then freedom and responsibility are confined 
exclusively to the domain of social convention. The Buddhist metaphysical picture of reality, as 
a product of theoretical reason, is devoid of any reference to selves and their concerns, or indeed 
to anything substantive. At least in principle, the no-self view would preclude any robust account 
of free will and responsibility.  
 
Yet, Buddhist practice requires the observance of certain norms and the valuation of certain 
types of thought, speech, and action that are considered beneficial. Chief among these is the 
restraint of unmitigated willful thought, speech, and action. However, this valuation, and the 
psychological terms in which it is expressed, is at odds with an impersonal account of 
phenomena in causal terms. Proposals for some kind of Buddhist compatibilism to solve this 
conflict, as I have argued elsewhere (Coseru 2016), indirectly render agency in general, and 
moral agency in particular, epiphenomenal. The largely consequentialist framework of 
compatibilism, on my view, cannot give an adequate account of our moral institutions, and is 
generally indifferent to the concerns of practical reason. 
 
 
§4 Conclusion: Which Action, Whose Responsibility? 
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Now that we have a clearer grasp of why understanding the nature of agency matters to morality, 
we can return to the metaphysical question of what personal agency entails. What does it mean to 
take ourselves as capable of choosing or directing our actions in a deliberate way? As it should 
be obvious, entertaining such a question and reflecting on what it means for the alternatives it 
presents (voluntary or intentional behavior versus behavior that is simply caused by a totality of 
causes and conditions) opens up the possibility that reason could serve as a causal motive for 
action. For someone like Kant, this deliberative process does not simply inform, but also enacts, 
the idea of spontaneity (1998, A533/B561, p. 533). In short, when we act, as opposed to merely 
being acted upon by causal factors beyond our control, we do so for reasons.  
 
We may dispute the libertarian conception of an unconditioned spontaneity. But reflection 
compels us to acknowledge its epistemic and phenomenological salience in differentiating 
between voluntary and involuntary actions. It is, after all, a demonstrable truth that how we 
choose to act (by deliberating about possible alternatives) makes a difference in how we actually 
act. Of course, choice means that the alternatives so entertained are equally attainable, and that 
deliberation is effective in charting the range of available possibilities. 
 
The choice to act one way or another is also grounded in all sorts of practical considerations. Do 
we need a conception of free will or even an idea of freedom in a transcendental sense to ground 
our practical deliberations? Those who find the Kantian argument—about the independence of 
reason from the necessitation of impulses—compelling, take the view that we can only be free if 
we conceive of ourselves as such. But this way of framing the problem confronts us with yet 
another metaphysical conundrum, in this case about whether conceivability entails possibility. It 
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seem intuitively plausible that we can and indeed do conceive of ourselves as free agents, and 
thus that we do assume freedom for the possibility of action. And it is equally plausible that we 
can conceive of ourselves as lacking agency by externalizing the causes of our actions (Dennett 
2004, p. 292 entertains this very possibility). This is precisely the strategy that informs 
Śāntideva’s Madhyamaka ethics: pain, anger, and desire simply arise due to causes and 
conditions without there being someone for whom the pain is sharp or stingy, the anger righteous 
or impulsive, and the desire wholesome or unwholesome, respectively.  
 
If conceiving of ourselves as free agents challenges the dominant picture of the universe as a 
causally closed physical system, conceiving of ourselves as lacking agency comes, it seems, at a 
significantly lesser cost: with human behavior explainable in terms of either external causes or 
internal, but subpersonal, cognitive processes, we can dispense with the notion of responsibility 
altogether. The utility calculus at the heart of agent-neutral consequentialism compels us to make 
the less expensive choice: sacrificing freedom also means the end of moral responsibility. It is no 
longer the individual but her brain or hormones that precipitate action. However counterintuitive 
it may seem at first, the no-self picture is perfectly suited to accommodate this account of 
personal identity.  
 
Also conceivable is that Buddhist ethical thinkers like Śāntideva are less concerned with the 
possibility of freedom in a causally ordered universe (such possibility is nonetheless taken to be 
the modus operandi of all enlightened beings), and more with minimizing suffering and/or 
maximizing happiness for all sentient beings. As there is no overarching normative framework 
and no need to demonstrate freedom, ethical conduct is simply a matter of pursuing certain 
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pragmatic ends. Most importantly, the rules that regulate the pursuit of such ends vary depending 
on whether one is a novice bodhisattva or a realized Buddhist saint. And since Buddhist saints, 
unlike novice practitioners, are permitted to break moral rules in the service of carrying out 
compassionate actions, they are also free from the responsibility such actions entail for the 
unenlightened. In the end, it is precisely this freedom from responsibility, perhaps ironically, that 
makes the bodhisattva ideal the more costly alternative. No responsibility does not just mean no 
justification for action: it also means no agency, not even for the Buddha, who obviously could 
not have taught, let alone inspired, myriad generations to follow in his path.   
 
 
Notes 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Caruso (2012), Smart (2006), and Wegner (2002) for various attempts to prove the illusory 
nature of experiences of mental causation. While not conclusive, Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, 
and Turner (2004) review experimental data that seems to favor compatibilist over 
incompatibilist accounts of free will.  
2 Despite the taboo on speaking about ‘the self’, psychological and moral attitudes form an 
integral part of the Buddhist tradition (see Collins 1982, ch. 6). Also, despite the dominance of 
the ultraminimalist account of agency developed in the Abhidharma, there are good and 
compelling reasons to give ‘Buddhist personalists’ (pudgalavādins) credit for insisting that 
important features of personhood are ineliminable (see Carpenter 2015; Priestly 1999).  
3 The problem with event-causal theories of action is their failure to capture agency altogether, 
instead reducing it merely to things that happen to us. On this model, there are pushes and pulls 
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but no one does anything ever. This is the so-called problem of the ‘disappearing agent’ (see 
Mele 2003, ch. 10; Lowe 2008, pp. 159ff; Steward 2013). 
4 As Garfield (2014, p. 166, n.1) notes, both compatibilists and libertarians claim Augustine as 
their source, and both readings are possible.  
5 As Epictetus (Hard 2014) notes in Discourses 1.17, moral agency is grounded in our capacity to 
assent: “Can any man hinder you from assenting to the truth? No man can. Can any man compel 
you to receive what is false? No man can. You see that in this matter you have the faculty of the 
will free from hindrance, free from compulsion, unimpeded.” 
6 Among the most common translations are ‘will’ (Davis 1898), ‘volition or conation’ (Aung and 
Davis 1979), ‘choice’ (Keown 2001), ‘volition’ (Gunther 1976), and ‘intention’ (Gombrich 
1988; Heim 2014). Garfield (2014) thinks all arguments in favor of a conception of ‘the will’ in 
Buddhism are bad arguments because they rely on tendentious translations of cetanā as ‘choice’ 
rather than ‘intent’ or ‘volition’. See also Repetti (2010) for an analytic review of Western 
discussions of free will in Buddhism that focuses on interpretations of the principle of dependent 
arising, and its possible interpretation as endorsing either a soft or hard determinism. 
7 As Siderits (2008, p. 30) notes, since classical Indian philosophers did not directly address this 
problem, we cannot go to the historical record in search of an answer. Instead, the question 
should be framed in terms of what Buddhists ‘should say, given their other commitments’. 
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  9 Free Will, Liberation and Buddhist Philosophy 
 
Marie Friquegnon 
 
 
Three different attitudes toward what we consider free will may be found in Buddhist 
philosophy: first, the idea that our behavior is not determined by the gods or completely 
constrained by karma; second, the idea that our behavior is ultimately impersonally determined, 
the way fire causes smoke; and third, the idea that selfless actions spontaneously arise from 
enlightened nature, in a way that differs from deterministic behavior. Philosophically, the 
grounds for these views are as follows:  
 
1. There is no proof that gods or caste cause behavior.  
 
2. In samsara (cyclical reincarnational wandering) causal processes govern all things. 
Therefore, one’s actions will be determined by circumstances and our reactions to them. 
These reactions are themselves governed by our inherited and developed emotional and 
intellectual characteristics.  
 
3. Nirvana is not subject to causality.  
 
In response to the problem of how one can achieve nirvana or enlightenment, later (Mahayana 
and Vajrayana) Buddhists argue that nirvana and samsara are two perspectives on the same 
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reality. Unenlightened beings can only perceive samsara because they cannot take the 
perspective of nirvana. This is because their vision is obscured. One can, through Buddhist 
practices, such as meditation, remove these impediments, and one will be able to experience 
nirvana. Then one’s actions will be positive, spontaneous, selfless and free. One can only be free 
if one has freed oneself from the limitations of the self. 
 
 
Free Will and Buddhist Philosophy 
 
With the exception of free will, almost every philosophical problem in metaphysics and 
epistemology that has absorbed Western philosophers has been examined in a similar way by 
Indian philosophers. In the West the problem is seen roughly as follows. ‘Hard’ determinists and 
‘libertarian’ indeterminists agree on the meaning of free will. Actions to be free must be 
intentional and avoidable. By ‘avoidable’ they mean that if one chose to do X at time T1, if one 
then ‘rolled back the clock’ one could, all things being the same, choose to do Y at T1 instead, X 
and Y being two different courses of action. Hard determinists deny that this is possible. Every 
event must have a cause. When all the causal factors are present the event must necessarily 
occur. Actions are events; therefore, they necessarily occur.  
 
Even if events were not caused, they would be random. What is random is not free. (This is the 
‘hard’ indeterminist position. The ‘hard’ incompatibilist thinks free will is incompatible with 
both determinism and indeterminism.) For example, if while I was teaching a class, and 
something randomly happened to me, that would not be something I did. Therefore, it would not 
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be a free action. Following Broad (1934) and van Inwagen (1983), Goodman put this point very 
well: “After all, if what you do is caused by some random-quantum-mechanical event in your 
brain, how can you be responsible for it?” (2002, p. 360) However, if an event were intended, a 
hard determinist would insist that the intention was just another cause in a long chain of causes. 
 
Some indeterminists argue that randomness cannot secure free will because it cannot be authored 
or controlled. Libertarian indeterminists argue that free actions are not causally necessitated. 
There are many forms of indeterminism, but a modern variety would limit the use of the word 
‘cause’ to what is statistically predictable. Causal laws are in fact just those generalizations about 
the past that reflect ‘invariant concomitance’, one type of event always having been found to 
follow another. But human action is often unpredictable. So we have no evidence that it is 
always necessitated by causes. So hard determinists and libertarian indeterminists define a free 
act in the same way. They agree that free will requires indeterminism. But the hard determinist 
therefore denies the existence of free will, while the libertarian affirms its existence.  
 
Soft determinists, however, provide us with a new definition. Giving up the criterion of strict 
avoidability, they assert that the definition of a free act is an action that is caused by a rational 
intention. So, for example, if I chose to stay home and study rather than to go to the movies, that 
would be a free action. But if a kleptomaniac steals hats although she hates hats and doesn’t want 
hats, that behavior would not be free. Both behaviors are caused deterministically. 
 
Libertarians such as Campbell are an interesting variety of indeterminist. Campbell believes that 
although behavior in general is caused, that which is brought about by the self is both free and 
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avoidable in the strict sense. The evidence for this, he argues, is that the self is able to resist 
temptation so as to do what is right. In these cases one is acting against one’s desires, so one’s 
desires cannot be the causes of those actions. (1957) 
 
Goodman, correctly, I think, argues that soft determinism fails because it implies that no events, 
strictly speaking, could have turned out differently (Goodman 2002). As Hobbes famously 
objected, we are free to do what we want, but we are not free to want other than what we in fact 
want. Libertarianism also fails because, as Santarakshita implies in the Tattvasamgraha VII.197 
(Santarasksita 1937) and Kamalashila says in his commentary to the root text,  
 
“If the cognitions of BLUE and the rest were the effect of a single such cause as the 
‘soul’, which is eternal (continues for all time, past and future), then any order of 
sequence among such cognitions would be incongruous; as the efficient cause being 
present, all the effects should appear simultaneously” (Santarakshita 1937, p. 148). 
 
Turning to the Buddhist models of action, we find the field divided in quite a different way, both 
in relation to levels of understanding and to the different schools. The early teachings of the 
Buddha concentrate on self-liberation. All one has to do is follow the Eightfold Path, which of 
course includes right understanding and meditation. From the very beginning in Buddhism, right 
wisdom was what enables the practitioner to become aware of the human condition. That is, one 
comes to realize that all is impermanent, and that our cravings and dissatisfactions make us 
suffer. The key is letting go, since there is nothing permanent to which one can cling. The 
simplest form is to be found in the Dhammapada, where with his dying breath the Buddha 
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advises his disciples to achieve liberation relying on no one. There is no god, for example, on 
which one can depend. Nor is one determined by caste or social position. A barber and a king 
may be equally qualified to follow the path. 
 
But isn’t one constrained by karma? Even if one becomes aware of karmic conditions, does one 
have the power to alter them? Isn’t one’s will to do so itself constrained by karma? Isn’t trying to 
overcome karma like trying to lift yourself up by your own bootstraps? 
 
The first complication can be illustrated by passages in chapter 6 of the Mahayana text, The Way 
of the Bodhisattva, by Shantideva, an Indian philosopher of the eighth century. Shantideva 
advises one to dissolve the emotion of anger because one should no more blame or become angry 
at a person who has harmed one than (i) at bile for causing suffering or (ii) at fire for causing 
smoke (1997, pp. 78-97). The justification for this is that: (a) all evil actions occur because of 
ignorance and attachment, and (b) all events occur successively due to a set of causal conditions 
operating at T1 that are necessary and sufficient to bring about the state of the world at T2. 
 
At first sight this seems to do away with the possibility of self-liberation promised by the 
Buddha. One will reach liberation only if the causal conditions operating in the world bring us 
there. Having the right causal conditions or not is just the luck of the draw. 
 
This is an important and difficult issue in Buddhism. Earlier Theravada Buddhist thinkers tended 
to think of nirvana as beyond conception, as completely transcending the phenomenal world. 
Thus, we have the problem of having to lift ourselves out of samsara by our own bootstraps. 
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Later Mahayana Buddhist thinkers thought of this transcendence as epistemological but not 
ontological. That is, the thought of the enlightened state of awareness is transcendent, but 
ontologically, nirvana and samsara are not distinct states of being, rather different perspectives: 
nirvana is samsara. Like a dance and its dancer, nirvana and samsara are distinguishable, but 
not separable. 
 
It is easier to think of escaping samsara by shifting one’s perspective rather than somehow 
catapulting oneself out of it. Nevertheless, there are still problems. How is one within the 
samsaric point of view able to assemble the causal conditions that will produce enlightenment? 
 
Buddhist thinkers agree that nirvana or enlightenment cannot be produced at will. Mahayanists 
argue that this is not really a problem because we are already enlightened. But our own 
enlightenment is concealed from us as clouds block the sun. So, the Dharma consists in 
assembling the correct causal conditions that will dissipate the emotional and intellectual 
obscurities that prevent us from the realization of ultimate reality.  
 
This view of samsara and nirvana is both similar and dissimilar to Wittgenstein’s duck/rabbit 
example. In Wittgenstein’s example, one can see a figure as either a duck or a rabbit (1980, p. 
75). Some people, however, may only be able to recognize it as a duck or as a rabbit. In any case, 
the duck and the rabbit perspectives are equally correct. But in the case of samsara and nirvana, 
samsara is the way we see things when we are blinded by obscurations. We see now ‘through a 
glass darkly’. Of course, the duck/rabbit analogy does not hold perfectly, because the perspective 
of samsara is transformed when one is able to take the perspective of nirvana. This is because 
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one’s vision is no longer obscured by negativities such as anger and hatred, jealousy and 
attachment, ignorance and fear. In addition, the duck/rabbit example concerns a perspective on 
something outside of the subject, whereas the enlightenment perspective is non-dual, 
transcending subject and object.  
 
But what is there in samsara powerful enough to initiate a perspectival shift? Since nirvana is 
samsara, there already exists in samsara what is called the tathagatagarbha or seed of 
enlightenment. In the Mahayana and Vajrayana traditions, this is what propels all sentient beings 
towards enlightenment. All the karmic ups and downs are ultimately affected and transformed by 
this seed. 
 
There are other manifestations of this seed of enlightenment into the phenomenal world. These 
are the appearances of the buddhas into the phenomenal world, appearances that are illusory in 
the way we perceive them, but which are rooted in reality at the absolute level, beyond duality, 
beyond conception. 
 
Illusory as they are on the phenomenal level, they are seen as the way out of the ‘bootstraps’ 
problem. In Wittgensteinian terms, they are the ladder that one uses until one achieves 
enlightenment. After that one throws the ladder away. For the enlightened being, there is no 
Dharma or Buddha. 
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Now, let’s return to the problem of free action. On the most basic level, free action is conceived 
of as the absence of external constraint. God or membership in a caste do not determine what one 
can or cannot do.  
 
To repeat, on the psychological level, Shantideva tells us we have no more justification for 
blaming someone who harms us than for blaming a fire for causing heat or, in another example, 
for blaming the sky for having clouds (1997, p. 83). This line of thought reflects the view that all 
wrongdoing is due to ignorance. Should one then draw the conclusion that good as well as bad 
actions are causally determined? This is sometimes the case. Actions that are morally correct 
may be caused by selfish desires. Kant’s example of the shopkeeper who is honest in order to 
attract customers is an example of this. Such a shopkeeper, from the Buddhist point of view, 
would still be chained to his or her desires. 
  
To return to Campbell, what should we think about selfless and heroic actions that demand real 
moral effort? Are these free? Campbell claims that such actions are self-caused, rather than 
determined by desires, etc. (1957, p. 5). But Buddhists believe a separate substantial self is an 
illusion. Who then is the bodhisattva (highly evolved Buddhist) that acts unselfishly for the 
good? 
 
The answer in Mahayana Buddhism lies in the concept of bodhicitta, the thought of 
enlightenment. ‘Bodhicitta’, literally the ‘awakened mind’, is a blend of wisdom, compassion 
and bliss. 
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There are both relative and absolute bodhicitta. Relative bodhicitta is a matter of degree. As 
Khentrul Tsewang Dongyal Rinpoche, a well-known Tibetan Buddhist lama, once said, “Some 
days you will wake up, and your bodhicitta will be low” (2012). The higher the bodhisattva, the 
greater the bodhicitta. Buddhas are claimed to have absolute bodhicitta, which is the same as 
enlightenment. 
 
The bodhicitta of a buddha is viewed as beyond duality, beyond subject and object. The 
bodhicitta of a buddha is uncaused and spontaneous. Yet it is not random. It is a kind of holy 
will. It is similar to the way God is imagined as having compassion even before there are any 
beings toward which he could show compassion. 
 
So it seems that we have the following anomaly. A bodhisattva acts freely insofar as he or she is 
not motivated by selfish desire, but only by the pure intention of helping sentient beings. The 
greater the selflessness, the greater the bodhicitta and the freer the action. So, a perfectly free 
action is not caused by the self at all. Of course, on the absolute level, it is not correct to say 
there is either self or other. The absolute level is beyond duality. But even on the relative level 
the bodhisattva, as he or she gains bodhicitta, becomes less and less involved with the illusory 
self. 
 
What does this mean in practice? It is not simple spontaneity, which can be harmful or crazy. It 
is not just wisdom, because without compassion wisdom can be only shrewdness. It is not just 
mindless compassion. One should not, for example, out of sympathy, let a mass murderer out of 
prison. A bodhisattva possessed of great bodhicitta is recognizably wise, compassionate and 
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blissful all at once. Is such a being free or determined? It looks like the truest kind of freedom, 
yet an advanced bodhisattva is said to have irreversible bodhicitta, which means he or she is 
incapable of committing an evil act. It is hard to say if this should be considered a limitation on 
his or her freedom. Theists say God is always good, yet is free. 
 
To return to the problem of free will, it seems as if one who is not a bodhisattva is not free at all. 
This would be a very good reason to treat wrongdoers with compassionate understanding. As 
Blackburn states very eloquently: 
 
“As we come to learn about causal regularities lying behind actions and other mental 
states, we are apt to switch into less moralistic modes. We might blame someone for 
being depressed all the time, until we learned a chemical story explaining it. We might be 
angry with someone for being unable to stir himself, until we learn that he has 
mononucleosis. But according to the determinist, there are always things like this to 
learn. Quite apart from increasing neurological evidence, we may think of cases where 
we learn of ‘brainwashing’ or ‘conditioning’. Parents may be inclined to blame their 
teenage daughter for spending time, energy, and income on valueless cosmetics, but a 
better reaction would be to understand the social and commercial pressures that paralyze 
her better judgement and bring this state of affairs about.” (1999, p. 98) 
 
Blame and, likewise, guilt have no place in Buddhism, except as skillful means for the altering of 
behavior. But regret does, for this signals a realization that one’s actions are not of the best, and 
that one wants to improve them in the future.  
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Vajrayana philosophers, mindful of the pervasiveness of primordial wisdom, see even the karmic 
forces and the three poisons (anger, attachment, ignorance) as part of the process of 
enlightenment, rather than as external forces that oppress us. This view is similar to Smullyan’s, 
who argues that, since we are not separate entities from the rest of the universe, but rather part of 
the totality, the so-called ‘external’ forces acting on us are really our own activity. We have no 
reason to feel that we are their slaves (1981). 
 
Some, including some Buddhists, are concerned that viewing immoral actions as causally 
determined may lead to moral laxity, because one can always excuse one’s bad behavior. But if 
one has sincerely entered the Buddhist path, one can be motivated to act from bodhicitta by 
‘tuning in’ to the enlightenment qualities that are always with us, because they are part and 
parcel of our true nature. And when we do fall into bad behavior, the compassionate view we 
have of others who err morally should also be applied to ourselves. 
 
To summarize, Buddhists resemble soft determinists when they proclaim that we are not coerced 
by gods or by caste. They resemble hard determinists when it comes to wrongdoing, which is 
determined by the three poisons. They resemble indeterminists with respect to selfless actions 
done from bodhicitta. So, particularly from the Mahayana point of view, the actions done from 
bodhicitta, strictly speaking, neither are our actions nor do they fail to be our actions. To assert 
that they must be one or the other, I suspect, is a metaphysical mistake of believing in the reality 
of the self, part of the more general dualistic division of self and other. 
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The denial of free will on the relative level should not, I believe, be construed as asserting that 
there is no freedom. Goodman says the goal should be to “see our true non-existence, abandon 
the illusion of free will, and abide in real freedom” (Goodman 2009, p. 212). 
 
Further, as the eleventh century teacher Rongzom pointed out, reality is beyond duality. It cannot 
therefore be claimed that the ultimate is free and appearances are not. So, if there is freedom 
ultimately, then in reality, all are free (2008, pp. 104-107). This is not, of course, to assert the 
free will of a non-existent self. 
 
 
	  	  	   220	  
References 
 
Blackburn, S., 1999. Think: a compelling introduction to philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
 
Broad, C.D., 1934. Determinism, indeterminism and libertarianism. London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul.  
 
Campbell, C.A., 1957. On selfhood and godhood. London: George Allen and Unwin.  
 
Goodman, C., 2002. Resentment and morality: Buddhism on moral responsibility. American 
Philosophical Quarterly, 39(4), pp. 359-372. 
 
Goodman, C., 2009. Consequences of compassion: an interpretation and defense of Buddhist 
ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Rinpoche, K.T.D., 2012. Teaching on bodhicitta. [Conversation] (Personal communication, 6 
June). 
 
Rongzom, 2008. Establishing appearances as divine. Translated by H. Kopl. Ithaca, NY: Snow 
Lion. 
 
	  	  	   221	  
Santaraksita, 1937. Tattvasamgraha with commentary by Kamalashila. Translated by G. Jha. 
Delhi: Motilal. 
 
Shantideva, 1997. The way of the bodhisattva. Translated by the Padmasambhava Translation 
Group. Boston, MA: Shambhala. 
 
Smullyan, R., 1981. Is God a Taoist? In: D.R. Hofstadter and D.C. Dennett, eds. The mind’s I. 
New York: Basic Books. p. 333. 
 
Wittgenstein, L., 1980. Remarks on the philosophy of psychology, vol. I. Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press. 
 
Van Inwagen, P., 1983. An essay on free will. New York: Oxford University Press. 
	  10	  Buddhism	  and	  Free	  Will:	  Beyond	  the	  ‘Free	  Will	  Problem’	  	  B.	  Alan	  Wallace	  	  	  
Determinism	  and	  Indeterminism,	  Ancient	  and	  Modern1	  	  The	  diversity	  of	  Indian	  views	  concerning	  causality	  in	  the	  Buddha’s	  lifetime	  represented	  the	  broader,	  then-­‐prevalent	  philosophical	  pluralism,	  not	  unlike	  our	  world	  today,	  and	  the	  Buddha’s	  novel	  responses	  to	  those	  views	  remain	  as	  provocative	  as	  ever.	  Then	  as	  now,	  philosophers	  fell	  roughly	  into	  two	  camps,	  akin	  to	  determinism	  and	  indeterminism.	  	  	  Among	  the	  former,	  some	  asserted	  that	  all	  pleasant,	  unpleasant,	  or	  neutral	  experiences	  are	  due	  to	  past	  karma	  (pubbe	  kata-­‐hetu)	  or	  the	  will	  of	  God	  (Issara-­‐nimmāna-­‐hetu).	  (For	  the	  Western	  version	  of	  the	  latter	  type,	  see	  Aquinas	  (1947),	  pp.	  1,	  5,	  23.)	  The	  Ājīvikas	  maintained	  the	  fatalistic	  doctrine	  that	  all	  actions	  are	  predetermined	  by	  destiny	  (niyati),	  over	  which	  people	  lack	  control	  (Dīgha	  Nikāya	  (“DN”)	  I.53).	  This	  resembles	  the	  deterministic	  view	  that	  there	  is	  at	  any	  instant	  exactly	  one	  physically	  possible	  future	  (Laplace	  1951;	  van	  Inwagen	  1983,	  p.	  3;	  Pereboom	  2001).	  This	  implies	  that	  the	  precise	  condition	  of	  the	  universe,	  say,	  one	  second	  after	  the	  Big	  Bang,	  causally	  sufficed	  to	  produce	  the	  assassination	  of	  John	  F.	  Kennedy	  in	  1963	  (Dennett	  2004,	  p.	  84).	  The	  Buddha	  rejected	  such	  fatalistic	  views.	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Other	  ancient	  Indian	  philosophical	  schools	  favored	  the	  view	  that	  all	  experiences	  arise	  from	  pure	  chance,	  without	  prior	  causes	  or	  conditions	  (ahetu-­‐appaccayā)	  (Raju	  1985,	  ch.	  3).	  In	  some	  respects,	  this	  view	  parallels	  that	  of	  some	  libertarians	  who	  argue	  that	  the	  indeterminism	  in	  quantum	  mechanics	  applies	  to	  human	  experience.	  For	  us	  to	  be	  the	  ultimate	  source	  of	  our	  decisions	  so	  that	  we	  are	  truly	  morally	  responsible,	  they	  insist,	  there	  can	  be	  no	  earlier	  influences	  sufficient	  to	  determine	  subsequent	  actions	  (Kane	  1996,	  1999).	  	  In	  response	  to	  such	  views,	  the	  Buddha	  rejected	  any	  theory	  that	  undermined	  moral	  responsibility.	  He	  rejected	  deterministic	  ideas	  as	  supporting	  ‘inaction’	  (akiriya)—if	  one	  believes	  one	  is	  not	  responsible	  for	  one’s	  actions,	  the	  will	  to	  act	  wholesomely	  is	  stifled.	  	  	  Likewise,	  he	  rejected	  the	  indeterministic	  idea	  that	  everything	  arises	  from	  chance,	  without	  reliance	  on	  causes	  or	  conditions	  (ahetu-­‐appaccayā)	  (Aṅguttara	  Nikāya	  (“AN”)	  I.173–75	  (cf.	  
Majjhima	  Nikāya	  (“MN”)	  II.214);	  DN	  I.28;	  Saṃyutta	  Nikāya	  (“SN”)	  II.22).	  And	  he	  concluded	  on	  empirical	  and	  rational	  grounds	  that	  there	  is	  no	  autonomous	  self	  that	  exists	  apart	  from	  and	  controls	  the	  body	  and	  mind	  or	  that	  exists	  among	  the	  psychophysical	  aggregates	  (MN	  I.230–35;	  SN	  III.66).	  	  	  Thus,	  the	  Buddha	  refuted	  all	  notions	  of	  the	  self	  as	  an	  unmoved	  mover,	  an	  agent	  that	  causes	  events	  with	  nothing	  causing	  its	  decisions	  (cf.	  Chisholm	  1982,	  p.	  32;	  Foster	  1991).	  Thus,	  the	  sense	  that	  each	  of	  us	  is	  an	  autonomous,	  nonphysical	  subject	  who	  exercises	  ultimate	  control	  over	  body	  and	  mind	  without	  influence	  from	  prior	  psychophysical	  conditions	  is	  an	  illusion.	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Volition	  and	  Action	  in	  Early	  Buddhism	  	  At	  first	  glance,	  this	  position	  may	  seem	  identical	  to	  that	  of	  certain	  contemporary	  cognitive	  scientists	  and	  philosophers	  of	  mind.	  For	  instance,	  Daniel	  Wegner	  writes:	  	  	   “It	  seems	  to	  each	  of	  us	  that	  we	  have	  conscious	  will.	  It	  seems	  we	  have	  selves.	  It	  seems	  we	  have	  minds.	  It	  seems	  we	  are	  agents.	  It	  seems	  we	  cause	  what	  we	  do....	  	  [I]t	  is	  sobering	  and	  ultimately	  accurate	  to	  call	  all	  this	  an	  illusion.”	  (Wegner	  2003a,	  pp.	  341–2;	  see	  also	  Wegner	  2003b)	  	  Nowhere	  in	  the	  brain	  do	  neuroscientists	  find	  any	  control	  center	  that	  might	  serve	  as	  the	  neural	  correlate	  of	  an	  autonomous	  self,	  nor	  do	  they	  find	  any	  evidence	  of	  an	  independent	  self	  that	  causally	  influences	  brain	  functions.	  Rather,	  the	  brain	  appears	  to	  function	  according	  to	  its	  own	  mechanisms,	  with	  no	  independent	  self	  presiding	  over	  its	  activities.	  According	  to	  this	  materialistic	  view,	  all	  causal	  influences	  on	  mental	  processes	  occur	  in	  the	  brain,	  inaccessible	  to	  introspection.	  (Ainslie	  2001,	  p.	  40;	  Dennett	  2004,	  pp.	  244,	  254)	  	  But	  these	  apparent	  similarities	  conceal	  incompatibilities	  between	  Buddhism	  and	  materialism.	  Whereas	  many	  materialists	  believe	  that	  brain	  activities	  causally	  generate	  all	  mental	  processes,	  the	  Buddha	  declared	  the	  opposite:	  “All	  phenomena	  are	  preceded	  by	  the	  mind,	  issue	  forth	  from	  the	  mind,	  and	  consist	  of	  the	  mind”	  (Dhammapada	  I.1).	  Central	  to	  this	  Buddhist	  emphasis	  on	  the	  primacy	  of	  the	  mind	  is	  the	  role	  of	  the	  mental	  factor	  of	  volition	  or	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will	  (cetanā),	  which	  determines	  which	  actions	  have	  moral	  consequences.	  Indeed,	  the	  Buddha	  equated	  volition	  with	  karma:	  “It	  is	  will,	  O	  monks,	  that	  I	  call	  karma;	  having	  willed,	  one	  acts	  through	  body,	  speech,	  or	  mind”	  (AN	  III.415).	  	  Only	  voluntary	  actions	  produce	  karmic	  results,	  and	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  moral	  consequences	  of	  one’s	  actions	  corresponds	  directly	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  one’s	  mental	  balance,	  intelligence,	  and	  understanding.	  Thus,	  the	  moral	  consequences	  of	  the	  actions	  of	  a	  person	  who	  is	  mentally	  ill	  or	  brain-­‐damaged	  are	  relatively	  light,	  while	  those	  of	  a	  person	  of	  sound	  mind	  and	  clear	  understanding	  are	  relatively	  heavy	  (AN	  I.249–53).	  This	  corresponds	  to	  modern	  principles	  of	  jurisprudence.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  incorrect	  to	  think	  that	  previous	  karma	  determines	  all	  experiences.	  	  	  Although	  feelings	  that	  arise	  together	  with	  one’s	  initial	  awareness	  of	  sensory	  stimuli	  are	  the	  result	  of	  past	  karma,	  feelings	  that	  arise	  following	  such	  stimuli	  are	  not	  predetermined	  by	  past	  karma	  but	  are	  rather	  the	  result	  of	  fresh	  karma	  associated	  with	  the	  way	  one	  responds	  to	  those	  stimuli.	  So,	  volitional	  acts	  are	  conditioned	  by	  prior	  influences	  and	  other	  factors,	  such	  as	  the	  quality	  of	  one’s	  awareness,	  simultaneous	  with	  it	  (Milindapañha	  (“Miln.”)	  134-­‐38;	  
Visuddhimagga	  532,	  535;	  Paṭṭhāna	  I.1).	  Here	  Buddhism	  asserts	  some	  measure	  of	  free	  will	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  one	  can	  reflect	  on	  options	  and	  choose	  the	  best	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  moral	  suitability	  (MN	  I.415-­‐16).	  	  	  
Determinism	  and	  Moral	  Responsibility	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  Some	  contemporary	  scientists	  and	  philosophers	  think	  determinism—the	  view	  that	  there	  is	  at	  any	  instant	  exactly	  one	  possible	  future—is	  compatible	  with	  moral	  responsibility.	  Wegner,	  for	  instance,	  argues	  that	  actions	  are	  determined	  by	  brain	  activity	  prior	  to	  the	  conscious	  experience	  of	  making	  decisions,	  so	  consciousness	  does	  nothing.	  If	  so,	  conscious	  will	  is	  an	  illusion,	  but	  it	  is	  nevertheless	  the	  person’s	  guide	  to	  his	  or	  her	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  action,	  and	  moral	  action	  is	  quite	  real	  (Wegner	  2003a,	  pp.	  59,	  224,	  241).	  But	  he	  fails	  to	  provide	  any	  cogent	  explanation	  for	  how	  something	  that	  is	  an	  illusion	  and	  doesn’t	  do	  anything	  can	  be	  responsible	  for	  moral	  action.	  And	  his	  fundamental	  premise—that	  conscious	  will	  is	  an	  epiphenomenal,	  causally	  ineffective	  illusion—has	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  inconclusive	  (Lau,	  Rogers	  and	  Passingham	  2007,	  pp.	  81–90;	  Dennett	  2004,	  pp.	  228–42).	  	  	  Daniel	  Dennett	  takes	  a	  virtually	  identical	  position,	  and	  his	  arguments	  face	  the	  same	  dilemma.	  He	  declares	  that	  a	  person	  is	  nothing	  more	  than	  an	  assemblage	  of	  roughly	  a	  hundred	  trillion	  cells,	  each	  of	  them	  a	  mindless	  mechanism	  functioning	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  laws	  of	  physics	  and	  biology.	  But	  he	  writes,	  “Human	  freedom	  is	  not	  an	  illusion;	  it	  is	  an	  objective	  phenomenon,	  distinct	  from	  all	  other	  biological	  conditions	  and	  found	  in	  only	  one	  species,	  us”	  (Dennett	  2004,	  pp.	  2-­‐3;	  see	  also	  p.	  305).	  In	  an	  elaborate	  but	  specious	  series	  of	  arguments,	  he	  tries	  to	  assert	  the	  existence	  of	  ‘autonomous	  human	  agents’	  who	  exercise	  free	  will	  as	  their	  ability	  to	  control	  action	  whenever	  there	  are	  no	  constraints,	  coercions,	  or	  compulsions	  that	  limit	  their	  behavior.	  Yet	  nowhere	  does	  he	  provide	  any	  compelling	  argument	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  human	  agent	  among	  or	  apart	  from	  the	  mindless	  mechanisms	  that	  make	  up	  a	  person.	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  Those	  who	  argue	  for	  ‘compatibilism’	  between	  determinism	  and	  moral	  responsibility	  seem	  to	  be	  moved	  by	  independent	  motives.	  They	  consider	  reality	  explicable	  in	  deterministic	  terms	  (physics,	  biology),	  but	  feel	  a	  psychological	  imperative	  to	  affirm	  moral	  responsibility,	  without	  which	  civilization	  is	  inconceivable.	  On	  the	  horns	  of	  this	  dilemma,	  they	  are	  forced	  to	  introduce	  morality	  and	  purpose	  into	  the	  mindless,	  deterministic	  activities	  of	  atoms	  and	  cells,	  which	  is	  unwarranted	  by	  all	  we	  know	  about	  physics	  and	  biology.	  This	  makes	  for	  bad	  science	  and	  bad	  philosophy.	  	  As	  noted,	  according	  to	  determinism,	  based	  on	  classical	  physics,	  the	  precise	  condition	  of	  the	  universe	  at	  the	  Big	  Bang	  sufficed	  to	  cause	  Kennedy’s	  assassination	  in	  1963,	  rendering	  Lee	  Harvey	  Oswald	  a	  passive	  cog	  in	  the	  world’s	  deterministic	  machinery.	  Since	  his	  actions	  were	  predestined	  billions	  of	  years	  beforehand,	  it	  is	  absurd	  to	  speak	  of	  his	  having	  free	  will,	  and	  irrational	  to	  assert	  he	  was	  responsible	  for	  them.	  	  	  Some	  contemporary	  Buddhist	  scholars,	  while	  shunning	  materialism,	  argue	  for	  compatibility	  between	  determinism	  and	  moral	  responsibility,	  citing	  the	  Buddhist	  principle,	  “When	  this	  exists,	  that	  comes	  to	  be,	  with	  the	  arising	  of	  this,	  that	  arises”	  (SN	  II.28;	  see	  Federman	  2010;	  Harvey	  2007).	  Whether	  the	  universe	  is	  deterministic	  in	  accordance	  with	  physical	  causality	  (materialism)	  or	  with	  mind-­‐matter	  causality	  (Buddhism,	  on	  a	  certain	  reading),	  it	  is	  deterministic,	  implying	  that	  the	  present	  is	  thoroughly	  determined	  by	  the	  past.	  If	  so,	  Oswald	  had	  no	  more	  of	  a	  choice	  to	  not	  kill	  Kennedy	  according	  to	  Buddhism	  than	  according	  to	  materialism.	  If	  at	  any	  instant	  there	  is	  exactly	  one	  physically	  possible	  future,	  as	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determinism	  maintains,	  then	  the	  present	  is	  fixed	  by	  the	  past.	  This	  offers	  no	  wiggle	  room	  for	  freedom	  or	  responsibility.	  	  	  As	  noted,	  the	  Buddha	  rejected	  belief	  in	  any	  theory	  that	  undermines	  our	  responsibility	  or	  inspiration	  for	  cultivating	  virtue.	  The	  causal	  relations	  between	  actions	  and	  consequences	  are	  so	  complex	  that	  they	  cannot	  be	  fully	  comprehended	  conceptually	  (AN	  II.80).	  So	  it	  is	  vital	  not	  to	  become	  immobilized	  by	  our	  lack	  of	  understanding	  of	  the	  rationale	  for	  moral	  responsibility.	  The	  important	  thing	  is	  to	  recognize	  the	  myriad	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  are	  not	  free	  to	  make	  wise	  choices,	  to	  follow	  courses	  of	  action	  that	  are	  beneficial	  to	  our	  and	  others’	  well-­‐being,	  and	  to	  devote	  ourselves	  to	  the	  cultivation	  of	  such	  freedom.	  	  	  
The	  Buddhist	  Ideal	  of	  Freedom	  	  A	  modern	  definition	  of	  freedom	  is	  the	  capacity	  to	  achieve	  what	  is	  of	  value	  in	  a	  range	  of	  circumstances	  (Maxwell	  1984).	  The	  Buddhist	  tradition	  emphasizes	  that	  ordinary	  sentient	  beings	  are	  not	  entirely	  free,	  but	  constrained	  by	  mental	  afflictions	  such	  as	  craving,	  hostility,	  and	  delusion;	  as	  long	  as	  we	  live	  under	  these	  afflictions,	  we	  remain	  in	  bondage	  to	  their	  resultant	  suffering.	  But	  the	  Buddha	  taught	  that	  suffering	  and	  its	  causes	  are	  not	  intrinsic	  to	  the	  mind,	  for	  in	  every	  being	  there	  exists	  a	  ‘brightly	  shining’	  (pabhāssaram)	  dimension	  of	  awareness	  that,	  though	  veiled	  by	  adventitious	  defilements,	  may	  be	  revealed	  through	  spiritual	  practice.	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Theravāda	  Buddhist	  commentaries	  identify	  this	  radiant	  mind	  as	  the	  naturally	  pure	  ‘ground	  of	  becoming’	  (bhavaṅga),	  the	  resting	  state	  of	  the	  mind	  that	  is	  not	  included	  among	  the	  six	  modes	  of	  consciousness,	  namely	  the	  five	  physical	  senses	  plus	  ordinary	  mental	  consciousness.	  This	  dimension	  of	  consciousness	  manifests	  in	  dreamless	  sleep	  and	  at	  death,	  and	  when	  the	  (waking)	  mind	  momentarily	  reverts	  to	  it	  between	  periods	  of	  engaging	  with	  cognitive	  objects	  (AN	  I.61;	  Harvey	  1995,	  pp.	  145–6,	  155–79).	  Ordinarily,	  one	  has	  no	  recognition	  of	  this	  state	  of	  awareness,	  but	  it	  can	  be	  vividly	  apprehended	  in	  highly	  focused,	  stable,	  meditative	  attention	  (samādhi),	  withdrawn	  from	  all	  objects,	  sensory	  and	  mental.	  This	  ground	  of	  becoming	  described	  in	  early,	  Theravāda	  Buddhism	  resembles	  accounts	  of	  the	  substrate	  consciousness	  (ālaya-­‐vijñāna)	  in	  the	  later,	  Great	  Perfection	  (rdzogs	  chen,	  Dzogchen)	  tradition	  of	  Tibetan	  Buddhism	  (Wallace	  2006a,	  pp.	  14–8,	  95–6;	  2007,	  pp.	  45–8).	  	  This	  brightly	  shining	  mind	  may	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  unconditioned	  state	  of	  awareness	  present	  after	  an	  arhat,	  one	  who	  has	  achieved	  nirvāṇa,	  passes	  away.	  Such	  consciousness,	  transcending	  the	  five	  psychophysical	  aggregates,	  is	  said	  to	  be	  non-­‐manifest	  (anidassanaṃ),	  timeless,	  and	  unconditioned	  (DN	  I.223;	  MN	  I.162).	  Unborn—not	  created	  by	  prior	  causes—and	  not	  the	  consciousness	  of	  anything	  other	  than	  oneself,	  it	  must	  be	  present	  in	  each	  sentient	  being	  before	  achieving	  nirvāṇa.	  It	  is	  beyond	  the	  conceptual	  mind,	  so	  its	  possible	  influence	  on	  the	  minds	  of	  ordinary	  sentient	  beings	  is	  unimaginable.	  	  	  Such	  transcendent,	  pristine	  awareness	  appears	  similar	  to	  the	  Buddha	  nature	  (buddha-­‐
dhātu)	  presented	  in	  Mahāyāna	  Buddhism	  and	  to	  the	  pristine	  awareness	  (vidyā,	  rig	  pa)	  taught	  in	  the	  Great	  Perfection	  tradition.	  This	  primordial	  consciousness	  is	  considered	  the	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source	  of	  our	  yearning	  for	  liberation,	  and	  may	  be	  the	  ultimate	  ground	  of	  freedom	  for	  all	  beings	  (Paul	  1980,	  XIII).	  Because	  its	  nature	  transcends	  the	  conceptual,	  it	  does	  not	  lend	  itself	  to	  rational	  analysis,	  and	  its	  way	  of	  impacting	  the	  mind	  and	  the	  natural	  world	  lies	  outside	  philosophy.	  It	  may	  be	  known	  directly	  through	  non-­‐dual	  awareness,	  but	  cannot	  be	  an	  intellectual	  object.	  	  Spiritual	  practice	  resembles	  the	  process	  of	  refining	  gold	  contaminated	  by	  impurities.	  The	  first	  step	  is	  to	  cultivate	  a	  wholesome	  lifestyle,	  avoiding	  injury.	  On	  this	  ethical	  basis,	  one	  gradually	  balances	  the	  mind	  by	  cultivating	  focused	  attention,	  for,	  as	  Śāntideva	  cautioned,	  “a	  person	  whose	  mind	  is	  distracted	  lives	  between	  the	  fangs	  of	  mental	  afflictions”	  (Bodhicaryāvatāra	  VIII.1).	  When	  the	  mind	  is	  subject	  to	  attentional	  imbalances	  such	  as	  laxity	  and	  excitation,	  it	  is	  as	  if	  one’s	  psychological	  immune	  system	  is	  impaired:	  all	  kinds	  of	  mental	  problems	  can	  easily	  overwhelm	  it.	  	  	  Cultivating	  focused	  attention	  bears	  on	  morality	  and	  free	  will.	  William	  James	  declared,	  	  	   “‘In	  what	  does	  a	  moral	  act	  consist	  when	  reduced	  to	  its	  simplest	  and	  most	  elementary	  form?’	  .	  .	  .	  [I]t	  consists	  in	  the	  effort	  of	  attention	  by	  which	  we	  hold	  fast	  to	  an	  idea	  which	  but	  for	  that	  effort	  of	  attention	  would	  be	  driven	  out	  of	  the	  mind	  by	  the	  other	  psychological	  tendencies	  that	  are	  there.”	  (James	  1958,	  p.	  126,	  my	  italics.)	  	  	  And	  Renouvier	  (1912),	  admired	  by	  James,	  understood	  free	  will	  as	  the	  sustaining	  of	  a	  thought	  because	  one	  chooses	  to	  when	  one	  might	  have	  other	  thoughts.	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  With	  the	  development	  of	  sustained,	  vivid	  attention,	  one’s	  awareness	  may	  be	  focused	  on	  one’s	  feelings,	  desires,	  thoughts,	  and	  intentions	  as	  they	  arise.	  As	  the	  arhat	  Nāgasena	  taught	  King	  Milinda,	  the	  practice	  of	  mindfulness	  entails	  directing	  attention	  to	  wholesome	  and	  unwholesome	  tendencies	  and	  recognizing	  them	  as	  such	  so	  one	  may	  cultivate	  the	  former	  and	  reject	  the	  latter	  (Miln.	  37-­‐8).	  Such	  discerning,	  metacognitive	  awareness	  allows	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  freely	  choosing	  whether	  to	  allow	  a	  desire	  to	  lead	  to	  an	  intention	  or	  let	  an	  intention	  result	  in	  verbal	  or	  physical	  action.	  Free	  will	  depends	  on	  the	  ability	  to	  recognize	  impulses	  arising	  involuntarily	  and	  to	  choose	  which	  to	  accept	  or	  reject	  (Wallace	  2006b,	  pp.	  77-­‐127).	  	  Without	  monitoring	  our	  mental	  states,	  we	  are	  bound	  to	  succumb	  to	  detrimental,	  habitual	  conditioning,	  with	  attention	  compulsively	  focusing	  on	  attractive	  appearances	  (subha-­‐
nimitta),	  reinforcing	  craving,	  and	  disagreeable	  appearances	  (paṭigha-­‐nimitta),	  reinforcing	  hostility	  (AN	  I.3,	  I.200-­‐1;	  SN	  v.	  64-­‐5).	  Such	  misguided	  attention	  is	  prone	  to	  lead	  one	  to	  view	  as	  permanent	  what	  is	  impermanent,	  as	  satisfying	  what	  is	  unsatisfying,	  and	  as	  a	  self	  what	  is	  not-­‐self	  (Vibhaṅga	  373).	  To	  overcome	  such	  delusional	  ways	  of	  viewing	  reality,	  one	  must	  add	  to	  the	  cultivation	  of	  meditative	  quiescence	  (samatha)	  the	  development	  of	  insight	  (vipassanā)	  through	  the	  close	  application	  of	  mindfulness	  (satipaṭṭhāna)	  to	  the	  body,	  feelings,	  mind,	  and	  phenomena	  (SN	  v.	  156).	  Only	  through	  the	  unification	  of	  meditative	  quiescence	  and	  insight	  can	  one	  gain	  complete	  freedom	  from	  mental	  afflictions	  and	  resultant	  suffering,	  revealing	  the	  innate	  purity	  of	  the	  brightly	  shining	  mind.	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The	  Middle	  Way	  beyond	  Determinism	  and	  Indeterminism	  	  One	  may	  devote	  oneself	  to	  the	  path	  to	  freedom	  from	  suffering	  and	  its	  causes	  without	  knowing	  whether	  one	  can	  exercise	  free	  will	  in	  a	  manner	  not	  determined	  by	  prior	  circumstances.	  However,	  it	  may	  be	  helpful	  to	  have	  a	  working	  hypothesis	  for	  free	  will	  to	  be	  actualized.	  	  One	  sticking	  point	  for	  any	  Buddhist	  affirmation	  of	  free	  will	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  self,	  or	  agent.	  Buddhism	  denies	  any	  autonomous,	  controlling	  self	  among	  or	  apart	  from	  the	  psychophysical	  constituents.	  The	  same	  analysis	  applies	  to	  all	  phenomena.	  For	  instance,	  a	  chariot	  is	  not	  any	  of	  its	  parts,	  does	  not	  exist	  independent	  of	  them,	  nor	  does	  their	  collection	  constitute	  it	  (SN	  I.135;	  Miln.	  25).	  The	  chariot	  comes	  into	  existence	  only	  when	  the	  label	  ‘chariot’	  is	  pragmatically	  designated	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  those	  parts.	  Likewise,	  the	  term	  ‘I’	  is	  imputed	  on	  the	  body	  and	  mind,	  which	  are	  not,	  themselves,	  a	  real	  self.	  ‘I’	  come	  into	  existence	  only	  when	  conceptually	  designated	  as	  such.	  When	  most	  of	  us	  use	  these	  concepts	  and	  conventions,	  including	  the	  words	  ‘I’	  and	  ‘mine’,	  we	  grasp	  onto	  the	  referents	  of	  those	  labels	  as	  being	  real,	  independent	  of	  our	  conceptual	  projections;	  this	  is	  the	  delusional	  basis	  for	  all	  mental	  afflictions,	  such	  as	  craving	  and	  hostility.	  Those	  who	  are	  free	  of	  delusion	  still	  use	  those	  concepts	  and	  words,	  but	  are	  not	  fooled	  by	  them.	  (SN	  I.14;	  Itivuttaka	  53)	  	  This	  analysis	  applies	  to	  the	  body,	  mind,	  and	  all	  their	  constituents.	  Thus,	  absent	  delusion,	  the	  self	  is	  no	  more	  and	  no	  less	  real	  than	  any	  phenomenon	  (Sutta	  Nipāta	  937;	  MN	  III.31;	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Mūlamadhyamakakārikā	  (“MMK”)	  V,	  VIII;	  Lamrimpa	  2002;	  Jinpa	  2002).	  Therefore,	  just	  as	  we	  meaningfully	  speak	  of	  a	  chariot	  performing	  certain	  functions,	  we	  refer	  to	  the	  self	  as	  an	  agent	  who	  makes	  decisions	  and	  engages	  in	  voluntary	  activity.	  But	  the	  challenge	  of	  determinism	  remains:	  If	  all	  decisions	  and	  actions	  are	  determined	  by	  prior	  causes	  and	  conditions—physical	  or	  mental—how	  can	  there	  be	  free	  will?	  	  The	  definition	  of	  determinism	  noted	  earlier	  allows	  no	  such	  freedom.	  Fatalism	  is	  its	  unavoidable	  implication,	  as	  later	  events	  are	  set	  in	  stone	  by	  prior	  conditions.	  Although	  some	  look	  to	  quantum	  indeterminacy	  to	  escape	  fatalism,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  chance	  allows	  for	  a	  coherent	  picture	  of	  a	  human	  agent	  exercising	  free	  will.	  Most	  interpretations	  of	  determinism	  and	  indeterminism	  assume	  a	  metaphysical	  realism	  whereby	  mind-­‐independent	  objects	  exist	  and	  admit	  of	  a	  complete	  description	  that	  is	  true	  if	  it	  corresponds	  to	  them	  (Putnam	  1990,	  p.	  30).	  	  	  The	  Middle	  Way	  (Madhyamaka)	  propounded	  by	  Nāgārjuna	  rejects	  the	  reification	  of	  time	  and	  causality	  that	  underlies	  most	  versions	  of	  metaphysical	  realism	  (MMK	  I,	  V,	  XVII).	  All	  causally	  conditioned	  phenomena	  arise	  through	  dependent	  origination	  (pratītya-­‐
samutpāda),	  in	  dependence	  on	  (1)	  prior	  causes,	  (2)	  their	  own	  parts	  and	  attributes,	  and	  (3)	  conceptual	  designation.	  A	  chariot	  arises	  in	  dependence	  on	  (1)	  the	  materials	  used	  to	  make	  it	  and	  the	  carpenter’s	  assembling	  it,	  (2)	  its	  components,	  and	  (3)	  the	  conceptual	  designation	  ‘chariot’	  imputed	  to	  this	  assembly.	  The	  first	  mode	  of	  dependence	  entails	  prior	  causes	  and	  conditions	  resulting	  in	  a	  subsequent	  product.	  The	  dependence	  of	  the	  chariot	  on	  its	  parts	  is	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simultaneous:	  the	  whole	  and	  the	  parts	  exist	  simultaneously.	  And	  the	  chariot	  as	  the	  designated	  entity	  comes	  into	  existence	  with	  its	  conceptual	  designation.	  	  	  For	  all	  phenomena	  the	  basis	  of	  designation	  is	  never	  identical	  to	  the	  object	  imputed	  on	  that	  basis.	  Thus,	  a	  chariot	  is	  imputed	  on	  its	  chassis,	  wheels,	  etc.,	  but	  none	  of	  those	  parts—individually	  or	  collectively—constitute	  it.	  The	  chariot	  comes	  into	  existence	  with	  the	  imputation	  of	  that	  label,	  but	  other	  designations	  are	  possible,	  such	  as	  ‘fire	  wood’.	  Thus,	  the	  entities	  in	  our	  world	  arise	  in	  dependence	  on	  conceptual	  designations,	  and	  exist	  relative	  to	  the	  conceptual	  framework	  they	  are	  embedded	  in,	  not	  intrinsically	  or	  independent	  of	  conceptual	  frameworks.	  There	  is	  freedom	  in	  the	  present	  to	  view	  the	  world	  through	  different	  conceptual	  frameworks,	  and	  here	  free	  will	  may	  enter	  our	  experience.	  By	  shifting	  our	  way	  of	  framing	  appearances	  and	  making	  sense	  of	  them	  within	  our	  cognitive	  framework,	  we	  alter	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  the	  world	  as	  it	  arises	  from	  moment	  to	  moment	  relative	  to	  our	  way	  of	  viewing	  it.	  	  	  The	  relativity	  of	  all	  phenomena	  with	  respect	  to	  our	  cognitive	  reference	  frame	  is	  put	  to	  use	  in	  many	  Buddhist	  practices	  to	  overcome	  mental	  afflictions	  and	  cultivate	  wholesome	  mental	  states	  and	  behavior.	  The	  Tibetan	  Buddhist	  genre	  of	  ‘mind	  training’	  (blo	  sbyong)	  is	  explicitly	  designed	  to	  transform	  all	  circumstances,	  felicitous	  and	  adverse,	  so	  they	  arise	  as	  aids	  to	  spiritual	  maturation.	  By	  conceptually	  designating	  events	  in	  ways	  that	  support	  virtue	  rather	  than	  afflictions,	  one	  alters	  the	  world	  one	  inhabits:	  this	  constitutes	  a	  fundamental	  freedom	  of	  choice	  (ed.	  Jinpa	  2006).	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According	  to	  the	  Middle	  Way,	  time	  itself	  has	  no	  inherent	  nature	  independent	  of	  conceptual	  designation.	  While	  past	  events	  influence	  the	  present,	  the	  way	  we	  designate	  the	  past	  determines	  how	  it	  arises	  relative	  to	  our	  present	  reference	  frame.	  There	  is	  an	  asymmetry	  between	  past	  and	  present,	  according	  to	  Buddhism	  and	  physics.	  We	  can	  think	  whatever	  we	  like	  about	  a	  piece	  of	  rotten	  fruit,	  but	  it	  won’t	  reverse	  the	  decomposition	  process.	  Likewise,	  we	  cannot	  change	  the	  past,	  but	  we	  can	  shift	  it	  relative	  to	  our	  reference	  frames,	  as	  there	  is	  no	  past,	  present,	  or	  future	  independent	  of	  reference	  frames.	  Thus,	  the	  past	  may	  impact	  us	  variably,	  depending	  on	  how	  we	  conceptually	  designate	  it	  now.	  By	  designating	  the	  past	  differently,	  the	  nature	  of	  past	  events	  shifts	  relative	  to	  those	  designations.	  	  Drawing	  an	  analogy	  in	  modern	  physics,	  Eugene	  Wigner	  commented,	  “We	  do	  not	  know	  of	  any	  phenomenon	  in	  which	  one	  subject	  is	  influenced	  by	  another	  without	  exerting	  an	  influence	  thereupon”	  (1983,	  p.	  178).	  By	  reifying	  time,	  we	  assume	  the	  past	  influences	  the	  present	  but	  is	  uninfluenced	  by	  the	  present,	  and	  that	  the	  present	  influences	  the	  future	  but	  is	  uninfluenced	  by	  it.	  Such	  unidirectional	  influence	  runs	  against	  the	  grain	  of	  current	  scientific	  understanding.	  Likewise,	  the	  Madhyamaka	  view	  denies	  the	  inherent	  existence	  of	  all	  three	  times,	  supporting	  the	  view	  that	  they	  can	  all	  influence	  each	  other,	  relative	  to	  the	  reference	  frame	  from	  which	  they	  are	  designated.	  	  John	  Archibald	  Wheeler	  explained	  this	  in	  terms	  of	  quantum	  physics:	  	  	   “It	  is	  wrong	  to	  think	  of	  that	  past	  as	  ‘already	  existing’	  in	  all	  detail.	  The	  ‘past’	  is	  theory.	  The	  past	  has	  no	  existence	  except	  as	  it	  is	  recorded	  in	  the	  present.	  By	  deciding	  what	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questions	  our	  quantum	  registering	  equipment	  shall	  put	  in	  the	  present	  we	  have	  an	  undeniable	  choice	  in	  what	  we	  have	  the	  right	  to	  say	  about	  the	  past.”	  (1983,	  p.	  194;	  see	  Wallace	  2007,	  pp.	  76-­‐80)	  	  	  For	  example,	  the	  systems	  of	  measurement	  used	  by	  cosmologists	  serve	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  bringing	  about	  what	  appears	  to	  have	  happened	  early	  in	  the	  universe.	  Wheeler	  concludes:	  	  	   “Useful	  as	  it	  is	  under	  everyday	  circumstances	  to	  say	  that	  the	  world	  exists	  ‘out	  there’	  independent	  of	  us,	  that	  view	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  upheld.	  There	  is	  a	  strange	  sense	  in	  which	  this	  is	  a	  ‘participatory	  universe.’”	  (1983,	  p.	  194)	  	  More	  recently,	  Stephen	  Hawking	  and	  Thomas	  Hertog	  proposed	  that	  there	  is	  no	  objective	  history	  of	  the	  universe	  independent	  of	  systems	  of	  measurement	  and	  conceptual	  inquiry	  (2006;	  Bojowald	  2006).	  Instead,	  there	  are	  many	  possible	  histories	  from	  which	  scientists	  select	  based	  on	  their	  methods	  of	  inquiry.	  According	  to	  Hawking,	  every	  possible	  version	  of	  the	  universe	  exists	  in	  a	  state	  of	  quantum	  superposition—as	  a	  set	  of	  possibilities	  rather	  than	  concrete	  realities.	  When	  we	  make	  a	  measurement,	  we	  select	  from	  this	  range	  of	  possibilities	  a	  subset	  of	  histories	  that	  share	  the	  specific	  features	  measured.	  To	  relate	  this	  to	  the	  Middle	  Way,	  this	  is	  freedom	  to	  choose	  the	  bases	  of	  designation	  on	  which	  to	  designate	  a	  history	  of	  the	  universe	  as	  we	  conceive	  it,	  based	  on	  that	  subset	  of	  possible	  histories.	  Thus,	  we	  may	  exercise	  free	  will	  not	  only	  to	  establish	  our	  past,	  but	  to	  frame	  our	  present	  and	  sow	  the	  seeds	  of	  our	  future.	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The	  ‘empty’	  or	  non-­‐inherent	  nature	  of	  time	  is	  incorporated	  in	  Tibetan	  Buddhist	  Vajrayāna	  practice,	  when	  one	  ‘takes	  the	  fruition	  as	  the	  path’	  (‘bras	  bu	  lam	  ‘khyer).	  This	  means	  that,	  while	  unenlightened,	  one	  cultivates	  ‘divine	  pride’	  (lha’i	  nga	  rgyal),	  regarding	  oneself	  as	  a	  buddha,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  buddha	  one	  will	  become.	  Likewise,	  one	  develops	  ‘pure	  perception’	  (dag	  snang),	  viewing	  the	  environment	  and	  its	  inhabitants	  as	  manifestations	  of	  enlightened	  awareness	  (dharmakāya)—in	  emulation	  of	  the	  pure	  perception	  of	  a	  buddha.	  Here,	  one	  draws	  the	  transformative	  power	  of	  one’s	  future	  enlightenment	  into	  the	  present,	  understanding	  that	  the	  future	  is	  not	  inherently	  real	  and	  separate	  from	  the	  present.	  Based	  on	  a	  realization	  of	  emptiness	  and	  the	  Buddha	  nature	  of	  all	  beings,	  one	  may	  enable	  the	  future	  to	  influence	  the	  present.	  	  	  Another	  way	  of	  interpreting	  divine	  pride	  is	  to	  identify	  one’s	  Buddha	  nature,	  pristine	  awareness,	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  designation	  for	  one’s	  identity	  now.	  The	  bases	  of	  designation	  of	  one’s	  sense	  of	  personhood	  are	  ordinarily	  one’s	  body	  and	  mind.	  When	  one	  refers	  to	  oneself	  as	  having	  past	  and	  future	  lives,	  the	  basis	  of	  designation	  for	  one’s	  identity	  is	  one’s	  substrate	  consciousness,	  which,	  according	  to	  the	  Great	  Perfection	  teaching,	  provides	  reincarnational	  continuity.	  When	  one	  assumes	  the	  identity	  of	  a	  buddha,	  in	  divine	  pride,	  the	  basis	  of	  designation	  of	  self	  is	  one’s	  timeless	  Buddha	  nature.	  In	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  Great	  Perfection,	  one	  nonconceptually	  rests	  in	  this	  timeless,	  pristine	  awareness,	  allowing	  actions	  to	  arise	  spontaneously	  and	  effortlessly,	  aroused	  by	  the	  interplay	  of	  one’s	  intuitive	  wisdom	  and	  the	  moment-­‐to-­‐moment	  needs	  of	  sentient	  beings.	  In	  this	  way,	  one	  realizes	  a	  trans-­‐temporal	  kind	  of	  freedom.	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Again,	  the	  Buddha	  rejected	  the	  philosophical	  extremes	  of	  fatalism	  and	  chance	  and	  discouraged	  followers	  from	  embracing	  any	  view	  that	  might	  undermine	  their	  inspiration	  to	  devote	  themselves	  to	  an	  ethical	  life	  in	  pursuit	  of	  liberation.	  In	  pragmatic	  terms,	  as	  ordinary	  sentient	  beings	  we	  do	  not	  have	  free	  will	  to	  achieve	  what	  is	  of	  value	  within	  our	  range	  of	  circumstances	  inasmuch	  as	  our	  minds	  are	  dominated	  by	  mental	  afflictions.	  But	  the	  Buddha	  declared	  that	  these	  sources	  of	  bondage	  are	  not	  inherent	  to	  our	  existence,	  but	  may	  be	  dispelled	  through	  sustained,	  skillful	  practice.	  The	  Middle	  Way	  shows	  how	  free	  will	  may	  operate	  within	  the	  nexus	  of	  causal	  relations	  through	  time.	  Teachings	  on	  the	  Buddha	  nature	  reveal	  the	  ultimate	  source	  of	  our	  freedom.	  And	  the	  Vajrayāna	  tradition,	  including	  the	  Great	  Perfection	  teaching,	  demonstrates	  how	  the	  freedom	  implicit	  in	  the	  teachings	  of	  the	  Middle	  Way	  and	  the	  Buddha	  nature	  may	  be	  put	  to	  use	  in	  the	  swift	  realization	  of	  liberation,	  enlightenment.	  	  	  
Note	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  This	  paper	  has	  been	  revised	  for	  this	  volume	  from	  my	  “A	  Buddhist	  View	  of	  Free	  Will:	  Beyond	  Determinism	  and	  Indeterminism”,	  Journal	  of	  Consciousness	  Studies,	  vol.	  18,	  no.	  3-­‐4	  (2011),	  pp.	  217–33;	  I	  thank	  JCS	  for	  permission	  to	  reproduce	  it	  here.	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  11 Degrees of Freedom: The Buddha’s Implied Views on the (Im)possibility of Free Will  
 
Martin T. Adam 
 
 
1 Some Basic Distinctions1 
 
Much of the psychological impetus driving philosophical discussions of free will derives from 
ordinary, commonly entertained intuitions concerning actions we perform in circumstances of 
duress or coercion. In most instances our practice is that we don’t hold the agent fully 
responsible for such acts. This corresponds to our personal experience and is intuitive. Do unto 
others, we say—and who has not felt dismay or anger at being held morally responsible for 
doing something that was forced upon one? And yet, even in such cases, a subjective sense 
persists that one’s actions remain one’s own; there lingers a feeling of personal responsibility. 
And so the question arises: Just how free need one be for personal responsibility to obtain? And 
in what sense free? Such questions form the very substance of the ancient and apparently 
unending thread of Western philosophical discourse referred to as ‘the free will problem’. I seek 
to expand the boundaries of this conversation by opening it up to a perspective on freedom 
originating beyond Western intellectual horizons—namely, that of early Buddhism, as 
represented in the Pāli Canon of the Theravāda tradition. To that end, I examine some of the 
implications of the Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta (Discourse on the Characteristic of Non-self), 
comparing these with Harry Frankfurt’s account of free will. I argue that the Buddha’s position 
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on human freedom is unique, implying the denial of a metaphysically free will while asserting 
moral responsibility and the possibility of spiritual freedom.   
 
One basic distinction Western philosophers draw is between empirical and metaphysical 
freedom. Empirical freedom refers to the ability to act as one wants. Formulated negatively, it 
can be understood in terms of the absence of constraints obstructing an individual’s ability to do 
as they like. The notion of ‘constraint’ can be understood as either external or internal to the 
agent. Philosophers have distinguished different sets of constraints in spelling out different 
understandings of freedom. Political philosophers, for example, have focused on external 
restrictions such as those imposed by governments, political classes, and material conditions. 
Psychologically minded thinkers have emphasized internal constraints such as compulsions, 
obsessive thoughts, depression, confusion and so on.  
 
For philosophers working in the area of metaethics, however, it is the idea of metaphysical 
freedom that has seemed most germane. Metaphysical freedom, like empirical freedom, can be 
understood negatively as an absence of constraints. In this case, however, the constraint is 
understood in abstracto—as causality itself. Moral responsibility is thought to require some kind 
of freedom from, or exception to, the necessity and universality that characterize the normal 
cause and effect operations of nature (van Inwagen 1975). Attaching a clear meaning to such a 
notion has, however, proven problematic. Two basic approaches have been attempted. The first 
asserts that a metaphysically free will would entail that some of one’s actions or decisions are 
uncaused. This approach has been thoroughly criticized as implying randomness rather than 
freedom (Dennett 1984), and will not be dealt with here. The present discussion will, however, 
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involve another kind of account, one that has proven much more resilient. In this view, to assert 
metaphysical freedom is to assert that at least some of one’s actions or decisions are self-caused.  
 
One final distinction must be observed here. We can enumerate three principal subjects to which 
‘freedom’ has been predicated, viz., persons, wills, and actions. Conceptually, freedom of the will 
seems to stand between freedom of the person and freedom of action. Authors often slide 
between these three things, assuming that the predication of freedom to one eo ipso implies a 
statement of the same truth-value for the others. However, this is not the case within the basic 
Buddhist soteriological framework.  
 
 
2 The Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta  
 
The Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta is the Buddha’s second sermon, delivered to his first five disciples. 
Here the Buddha systematically argues against the possibility of identifying the self with any of 
the five psychophysical aggregates that constitute a person: form, feeling, perception, volitional 
formations, and consciousness. While this sutta (discourse) is not normally considered as 
addressing free will, its teachings have implications for free will. For the Buddha suggests that 
none of the aggregates can be identified with the self because none is subject to control. 
Beginning with the body or form (rūpa) the Buddha states: 
 
“Bhikkhus, form is non-self. For if, bhikkhus, form were self, this form would not lead to 
affliction, and it would be possible to have it of form: ‘Let my form be thus; let my form 
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not be thus.’ But because form is non-self, form leads to affliction, and it is not possible to 
have it of form: ‘Let my form be thus; let my form not be thus.’”2 (SN III 66)3 
 
An identical line of reasoning is offered for each of the aggregates. To appreciate the 
implications for free will we need to see that the Buddha is relying on a conceptual connection 
between the notions of self and of control. If there were a self, he asserts, it would be that aspect 
of the person over which one would have control. We do not have control over any of the 
aggregates. The five aggregates are all that constitute a person. Therefore, there is no self (Pāli: 
anattā; Sanskrit: anātman). 
o 
Bhikkhu Bodhi makes some observations about the basis of this argument. The selflessness of 
the aggregates is demonstrated: 
 
“…on the ground that they are insusceptible to the exercise of mastery (avassavattitā). If 
anything is to count as our ‘self’ it must be subject to our volitional control; since, 
however, we cannot bend the five aggregates to our will, they are all subject to affliction 
and therefore cannot be our self.” (Bodhi, 2000, pp. 1066-67)4 
 
Thus, if there were a self, we would be able to control its states. In the above passage concerning 
rūpa, we would choose not to suffer and to be well in our bodies if we could; this is our natural 
wish and predisposition. Nevertheless, we remain afflicted and disposed to affliction. Suffering 
is inherent to rūpa. We cannot will it away. If rūpa were the self, we would be able to. 
Importantly, the sense in which we are said to lack control over rūpa is one of direct control over 
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its states, in particular its state of being subject to affliction. In the above passage there is no 
denial that we can do as we wish with respect to the actions we perform with our bodies; what is 
denied is that we can be as we want with respect to the presence or absence of affliction. The 
wish that the Buddha describes as impossible to fulfill is ‘Let my form be thus, let my form not 
be thus’, not ‘Let my form do thus, let my form not do thus’. If free will is simply understood as 
the empirical ability of persons to act voluntarily, to do as they want, the Buddha’s position here 
does not imply any denial of this. All it suggests is that we cannot directly will away the 
suffering associated with the first aggregate. In fact, the Buddha’s teachings are premised on the 
idea that it is possible to do something about suffering; indeed we can eliminate it. But we 
cannot simply do away with it directly.  
 
Are we then to conclude that Buddhist doctrine implies a qualified free will, one in which we can 
do as we will if not actually be as we will immediately, according to our wishes? Is this the end 
of the story? Actually, the Buddha’s implied position turns out to be considerably more complex 
than this.  
 
To understand how this is so, we need to revisit the concept of ‘the will’. Let us follow others in 
tentatively identifying the English language concept will with the Pāli concept cetanā (Harvey, 
2007, p. 47). However inexact this match may be, the concept of ‘the will’ must correspond to 
some aspect(s) of the five aggregates—and this is actually all we need to proceed with our 
argument. Cetanā is considered part of the fourth aggregate, saṅkhāra. The latter term is 
commonly translated as ‘volitional formations’, a heading meant to capture those mental events 
that direct one’s actions—physical, mental and vocal. It would appear, then, that volitional 
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formations constitute the aggregate in virtue of which action is voluntary. Keeping this in mind 
allows us to raise a deeper question regarding the will’s freedom. For, as mentioned, an analysis 
identical to that carried out on rūpa is applied to each aggregate in turn—including saṅkhāra. 
 
“Volitional formations are non-self. For if, bhikkhus, volitional formations were self, they 
would not lead to affliction, and it would be possible to have it of volitional formations: 
‘Let my volitional formations be thus; let my volitional formations not be thus.’ But 
because volitional formations are non-self, volitional formations lead to affliction, and it is 
not possible to have it of volitional formations: ‘Let my volitional formations be thus; let 
my volitional formations not be thus.’” (SN III 67) 
 
Thus, it would appear that the aggregate that includes the will is itself not subject to control. 
Following our analysis with respect to rūpa, the lack of freedom here consists in our inability to 
make saṅkhāra unafflicted directly by wishing it to be so.5 This seems a critical consideration; it 
suggests that the mental factors determining the morality of actions are themselves not subject to 
control. The mental states that direct our actions—desires, attitudes, and values we identify 
with—are themselves not under control. Thus, it appears that we are unfree with respect to what 
we will, rather than with regard to what we do. 
 
If this is indeed the implication, then it seems that the Buddha would likely not have disagreed 
with the assertion famously attributed to Schopenhauer (1985): “A man can do what he wants, 
but not want what he wants” (quoted in Einstein 1982, p. 8). The Buddhist analysis suggests that 
the issue of free will is not simply a first-order problem as to whether we can do what we want. 
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There is a much deeper concern—one that turns on second-order considerations as to whether 
we can be what we want to be, or, put another way, whether we can have the wills we want to 
have. The issue of the will’s freedom is a question regarding whether we have freedom with 
respect to our own constitutions. The Buddha’s answer appears to be negative. While it may be 
that we can be judged empirically free to the extent that we can do as we want, we are not 
metaphysically free in the sense of being able to directly determine the constellation of factors 
that the mind identifies with, and out of which our actions emerge. The reason for this assertion 
is clear: the will is not subject to control because, quite simply, there is no one over and above 
the shifting configuration of mental factors to do the controlling. There is no controller. There is 
no one (i.e., no final independent unity) holding the reigns. There is no self. 
 
 
3 Harry Frankfurt Meets the Buddha 
 
Second-order considerations are critically important in the well-known analysis of free will 
provided by Frankfurt: 
 
“Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to 
have (or not to have) certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be 
different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to 
have the capacity for... ‘desires of the first order’, which are simply desires to do or not to 
do one thing or another. No animal other than man, however, appears to have the capacity 
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for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires.” 
(1971, p. 7) 
 
Frankfurt’s observations concerning the self-reflective powers of human beings seem directly 
pertinent to the Buddhist analysis, where they find an obvious resonance in the human ability to 
reflect upon and have desires concerning the aggregates. Frankfurt aims to provide a coherent 
account of free will in terms of the capacity to form second-order volitions about one’s first-
order desires. He identifies the will with the first-order desire that actually moves, or would 
move, an individual to act. This Frankfurt terms the agent’s ‘effective desire’:6 
 
“[The notion of the will] is the notion of an effective desire—one that moves (or will or 
would move) a person all the way to action. Thus the notion of the will is not coextensive 
with what an agent intends to do. For even though an agent may have a settled intention to 
do X, he may none the less do something else instead of doing X because, despite his 
intention, his desire to do X proves to be weaker or less effective than some conflicting 
desire.” (1971, p. 8) 
 
Frankfurt’s account turns on the notion that one acts freely only if one wants to be moved by the 
desire that moves one to act. If one does not want to be moved to act by that desire, but is moved 
by it, then the will is unfree. Frankfurt employs the example of an unwilling drug addict. In 
analyzing the addict’s condition one must understand that the agent is the subject of conflicting 
first-order desires: he both wants and does not want to take the drug. In indulging his habit, 
however, he is being moved to act in a way that he wishes not to. His desire to take the drug on 
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these occasions, because it is effective in moving him to act, is to be identified with his will. And 
in this case it is unfree. It is unfree precisely because the agent has a negative second-order 
volition against it, i.e., a desire that this desire not move him to act.7  In cases where this is not so, 
which is to say, in cases where one wants to be moved by the desire that is effective in moving 
one to act, the will is free. (pp. 9-11) 
 
Frankfurt’s version of free will makes sense of some common intuitions regarding our everyday 
actions. Most of us, most of the time, are moved to act by desires we want to move us. Hence, on 
Frankfurt’s analysis, most of our actions are free. This way of thinking about things makes sense 
of those instances in which we ‘feel free’ in acting and are therefore willing to take responsibility 
for what we do. Our actions reflect our choices and the values we identify with. In brief, they 
reflect ‘who we are’ (or at least who we take ourselves to be). We do think of such actions as 
freely willed. 
 
On the other hand, Frankfurt’s account is not without its counterintuitive aspects. As we have 
seen, the identification of the will with one’s effective desire entails a denial of free will to 
Frankfurt’s addict. This runs against our intuition that persons are always in possession of a free 
will—even when their actions are compelled. In such cases we usually say that one is acting 
against one’s own will, which is thought of as remaining free even when one is forced to act 
against it.  
 
There is, in fact, another well-attested understanding of the will that would support this latter 
intuition. According to this understanding, in saying that one wills something, there is no 
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implication of effort. If, contra Frankfurt, we conceive of the will as the desire (or set of desires) 
that one most identifies with—as opposed to one’s effective desire—we can maintain that while 
the unwilling addict’s action is not free, his will, which he is unable to act upon, remains so. The 
notion of will is here connected to one’s deepest wishes and values—even one’s self-concept. 
The manner in which Bodhi speaks of the will above seems to reflect this usage: the will is 
identified with a very deep desire indeed, the desire to be free from affliction—ineffective 
though this is. In this way of speaking, persons can lack free will only in cases where they lack a 
desire (or set of desires and preferences) that they identify with—a circumstance that would 
seem applicable only to the unconscious (or, just possibly, the enlightened).  
  
Philosophical discussions of free will appear to be divisible into these two different ways of 
conceiving the will. Obviously, these two conceptions of the will imply different ways of talking 
about free will. It is, therefore, essential to be clear which concept is being assumed. It would 
seem that we are faced with a choice of locutions. In one, freedom of the will is conceptually 
bound to freedom of action: one’s will is free if and only if one’s action is free. In the other, 
freedom of the will is tied to freedom of the person, and indeed to the very concept of identity 
and personhood. In the latter manner of speaking, it is possible for one to act unfreely even while 
retaining one’s free will.  
 
Two further difficulties with Frankfurt’s account seem relevant to our concerns. The first is that 
an individual’s second-order desires and volitions are not consistent through time. In some cases 
they are in direct conflict from one time to the next. Desires change depending on a great variety 
of internal and external conditions. We are inconsistent as to what we want our will to be. Which 
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of one’s various ‘selves’ is to be identified as one’s true self? On what basis? This issue is clearly 
relevant in the Buddhist context. 
 
A moment’s reflection reveals a second problem: an infinite regress threatens to develop when 
freedom is made to turn on the presence of higher order volitions. If the will’s freedom depends 
on a second-order volition, do we not then require a third-order volition to ensure the freedom of 
the second? We seem to be faced with the prospect of an infinite regress to higher-order 
volitions, each needed to guarantee the freedom of the ones below. 
 
One could, of course, respond to this by saying that as a point of empirical fact all we ever really 
do have are desires of the first and second order or, at most, the third. If we choose to speak of 
further higher-order desires, it is not clear we would be referring to anything. At some point there 
is no further ‘I want’; we simply find ourselves with certain basic desires, values and preferences 
that are not chosen or even consciously entertained. Incompatibilist determinists argue that the 
causes that give rise to these mental states are not subject to control; if one traces them back far 
enough, they are impersonal in nature (e.g. historical, genetic, cultural, etc.). Even if our present 
awareness can reflect on and evaluate our choices, the thoughts, values and desires entering into 
such evaluations are ultimately beyond our control. The Buddhist position would appear to 
accord with this perspective. Whether one identifies the will with one’s effective desires or the 
desires that one most identifies with, in the end there is no final, independent person where the 
chain of causes and conditions find their origin. In the last analysis it is not possible to have it of 
the will, ‘Let my will be thus, let my will not be thus’. 
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4 The Foundation of Morality 
 
If this is so, should we conclude that the Buddhist position, like that of the incompatibilist 
determinist, undermines the foundations of moral responsibility? If there is no self to which 
responsibility may ultimately be attributed, is there no moral responsibility? Interestingly, from 
the Buddhist perspective the answer to this question is negative. In fact, the Buddha’s teachings 
imply a very unusual view (from a Western perspective): while the will is not metaphysically 
free, morally responsibility is just a fact about the way things are.  
 
Although ultimately there is no self, persons’ actions do have results that accord with the moral 
character of those actions. Just as moral causality is one kind of causality operating in the 
universe, so too moral responsibility is simply one kind of causal responsibility. Like it or not, 
results flow from actions; happiness and suffering are the results of moral (kusala) and immoral 
(akusala) actions. Such action (Pāli: kamma; Sanskrit: karma) is distinguishable as mental, 
physical, and vocal behavior willingly done (i.e. accompanied by cetanā); cetanā is the key 
factor in determining moral responsibility. Freedom of the will is not. The point is that the action 
is voluntary, not that the will is metaphysically free in some way. Universal causality is not 
considered a constraint or obstacle to moral responsibility from the Buddhist perspective; it is, 
rather, a requirement.8 
 
 
5 Degrees of Freedom 
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Freedom in Buddhism is not understood as a quality of the will.  If there is no independent 
source of volitions over and above our mental, physical and vocal actions, then there cannot be 
free will in any ultimate sense. It is precisely from the higher perspective that the will can be 
seen to be unfree. Our lack of free will logically follows from the Buddhist position on the 
ontology of the self. There is no independent self. Just as the self is known to be a delusion, so 
too must free will be seen. No self, no free will. 
 
This is a difficult point. It is not, perhaps, irrelevant that the Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta was not 
addressed to an audience of ordinary people (puthujjanas), but to a small group of ‘learners’ or 
disciples in higher training (sekha)—individuals who had already attained the higher perspective 
that sees things as they really are. There is an important sense in which such individuals, 
beginning with the ‘stream-enterer’ (sotapanna), are free already. They are free from the 
delusion of self.  
 
The notion of the sekha is defined in terms of having undergone a transformative insight into the 
truth of no-self. The five disciples are said to have experienced this insight some days earlier, 
upon hearing the Buddha’s first sermon, the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta.9 Upon hearing the 
second, it is said that they became fully liberated beings or arahats (Bodhi, 2000, p. 1066). 
These considerations provide a clue as to how freedom in Buddhism might be best understood. 
 
‘Freedom’ is a predicate of persons and consists in an absence of suffering and its causes. It is 
dependent on the state of knowledge of the agent. The ultimate aim of Buddhism is freedom 
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from suffering and rebirth—realities that, first and foremost, are to be understood. Thus, freedom 
implies knowing, and then abandoning, the causes and conditions that give rise to suffering and 
rebirth (paticcasamuppāda (Pāli): dependent origination; pratītyasamutpāda (Sanskrit)). The 
delusion that there is a self lies at the basis of this chain of causes. The insight that there is no 
self allows the mind to become free.  
 
Different degrees of knowledge and mental purity are attributable to the various kinds of agent 
within the Buddhist soteriological framework; corresponding levels of freedom may be attributed 
to them accordingly.10 The puthujjana cannot be called a ‘free’ person, operating within the 
deluded perspective of being an independent actor in control of her life in saṃsāra (cyclical 
delusional wandering). Although such an agent may be reflexively aware of her actions, and 
although such actions may be voluntary, they occur in the context of the basic delusion of ‘self’, 
whence they are regarded as originating independently. Thus, the ordinary person’s mind is 
inevitably trapped in delusion, conflicting desires, and suffering.  
 
The sekha is free in one important respect, having elminated the delusion of self, and with it, it 
should be noticed, any notion of possessing an independent will. Being irreversibly oriented 
away from suffering and its causes, the sekha can be described as consistently having the desires 
she wants to have. An internal order has been established; such a person cannot do otherwise 
than act in a way that leads to nibbāna (Pāli; Sanskrit: nirvāṇa).  Freedom here is clearly a 
function of knowledge, rather than of a capacity to do or choose otherwise. Although the mind of 
the sekha remains obscured to some degree, constrained by residual mental fetters (saṃyojana), 
the complete freedom of nibbāna is assured.11  
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If we apply Frankfurt’s analysis of the will, an empirically ‘free’ will can be attributed to the 
sekha insofar as she has the effective desires she wants to have. Thus, one could say her actions 
are free, and this dovetails the Buddhist view that they are informed by the realization of anattā 
and the prospect of nibbāna. 
 
The arahat has realized nibbāna. She is free from all fetters and any trace of self-centered desire; 
indeed, because she no longer reaps the results of her acts and will not be reborn, there is an 
important sense in which she is seen as free from action itself.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Freedom in Buddhism can best be characterized negatively in terms of freedom from constraints 
upon a person—either internal or external, depending on one’s focus. That is, to the extent 
different categories of agent are free from the internal constraints of delusion and other fetters, so 
too are they free externally in relation to saṃsāra. The puthujjana is not free from the delusion 
of self or from saṃsāra. The sekha is free from the delusion of self but not yet free from all 
fetters and from samsāra. The arahat is free from all internal constraints and thus also from 
saṃsāra. Such a person is describable as being free from action. Indeed, being free from all self-
centered desire, the arahat can be described as being free from the will—as opposed to 
possessing freedom of the will. To see this is to recognize that Buddhist perspectives on freedom 
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emerge from a very different set of paradigms than those that inform most Western philosophical 
discussions of the free will problem. 
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1 This paper significantly revises some of the arguments of my 2011 paper on the same topic, 
“No Self, No Free Will, No Problem: Implications of the Anattalakkhana Sutta for a Perennial 
Philosophical Issue”, Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, special 
volume, pp. 239-265; I thank JIAB for kindly granting permission to reprint elements of that 
paper here. 
2 Translations are those of Bodhi (2000). 
3 “SN” abbreviates the Saṃyutta Nikāya. 
4 He also writes “...the aggregates are suffering because they tend to affliction and cannot be 
made to conform to our desires” (Bodhi, 2000, p. 842).  
5 Sayadaw (1996, p. 49) indicates how we would change our volitional formations if we could: 
we would make them all wholesome (kusala) and not unwholesome (akusala). 
6 The concept of will as effective desire is traceable as far back as Locke (1959), pp. 313-315. 
7 Frankfurt defines second-order volitions as a type of second-order desire. Second-order desires 
are simply desires concerning one’s first-order desires. Second-order volitions are second-order 
desires that have as their object the efficacy of one’s first-order desires. This is an important 
qualification, as one can have a second-order desire for a first-order desire without wanting the 
latter to be effective. We can imagine, for example, that the drug addict wants to have the desire 
to give up drugs while simultaneously wanting this desire not to be effective. “If I didn’t want to 
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give up drugs at least a little bit”, he might reason, “then friends wouldn’t sympathize and lend 
me money”. (1971, p. 9-11)  
8 One might well ask how it is that if the aggregates are ultimately beyond our control we could 
ever begin to strive for the ending of suffering. The Buddha’s response is found in the Mahali 
Sutta (SN III 70). See Adam (2011). 
9 Hence, the unstated assumption in the Buddha’s second sermon—that the five aggregates are 
all that a person is. 
10 See Adam (2005, 2008) for discussion of different classes of agent in relation to key moral 
vocabulary, principally kusala-akusala, puñña-apuñña, and sukka-kaṇha. 
11 Ten fetters are progressively eliminated along the supramundane path; corresponding degrees 
of freedom are attributable to the subcategories of sekha, i.e., the stream-enterer, once-returner 
(sakadāgāmin), and non-returner (anāgāmin). 
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  12	  Buddhist	  Paleocompatibilism	  	  Mark	  Siderits	  	  	  
1	  	  My	  topic	  is	  a	  view	  that	  I	  call	  ‘Buddhist	  Paleocompatibilism’.1	  	  This	  is	  something	  that	  I’ve	  talked	  and	  written	  about	  before	  (1987,	  2008),	  and	  I	  should	  apologize	  in	  advance	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  shall	  not	  have	  much	  to	  say	  about	  it	  that	  I	  have	  not	  said,	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another,	  before.	  What	  I	  hope	  to	  do	  is	  explain	  the	  view	  more	  clearly	  than	  I	  have	  in	  the	  past.	  It	  is	  a	  view	  that	  I	  find	  interesting	  and	  perhaps	  plausible,	  and	  I	  think	  it	  serves	  as	  a	  good	  illustration	  of	  the	  sort	  of	  thing	  that	  can	  happen	  when	  we	  bring	  two	  distinct	  philosophical	  traditions	  into	  conversation	  with	  one	  another.	  	  While	  I	  call	  the	  view	  ‘Buddhist	  Paleocompatibilism’,	  I	  should	  say	  right	  at	  the	  beginning	  that	  this	  is	  not	  a	  view	  that	  (as	  far	  as	  I	  know)	  any	  Indian	  Buddhist	  philosopher	  actually	  held.	  Since	  we	  now	  know	  of	  no	  classical	  Indian	  philosopher	  who	  claimed	  that	  determinism	  and	  moral	  responsibility	  are	  incompatible,	  no	  Buddhist	  philosopher	  would	  have	  felt	  compelled	  to	  defend	  the	  opposing	  compatibilist	  view.2	  Buddhists	  were	  forced	  to	  deal	  with	  a	  problem	  that	  is	  in	  some	  ways	  related	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  determinism	  and	  responsibility—the	  problem	  of	  reconciling	  karmic	  justice	  with	  the	  Buddhist	  doctrine	  of	  non-­‐self.	  And	  it	  is	  their	  response	  to	  this	  problem	  that	  first	  led	  me	  to	  think	  that	  if	  they	  were	  faced	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  determinism	  and	  responsibility,	  paleocompatibilism	  might	  be	  their	  answer.3	  So,	  while	  the	  view	  has	  a	  Buddhist	  heritage,	  it	  is	  not	  strictly	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speaking	  a	  classical	  Indian	  Buddhist	  view.	  But	  neither	  is	  it	  a	  Western	  view.	  While	  the	  problem	  it	  addresses	  is	  modern	  and	  Western,	  some	  of	  the	  tools	  it	  employs	  are	  distinctively	  Buddhist.	  And	  therein,	  I	  think,	  lies	  much	  of	  its	  interest.	  	  Paleocompatibilists	  make	  two	  key	  claims:	  	   1. There	  is	  no	  sound	  argument	  for	  the	  incompatibility	  of	  determinism	  and	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  2. In	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  compelling	  incompatibilist	  argument,	  we	  should	  accept	  the	  common-­‐sense	  view	  that	  persons	  are	  generally	  morally	  responsible	  for	  their	  actions.	  	  While	  (2)	  might	  seem	  uncontroversial,	  there	  are	  difficulties	  involved	  in	  spelling	  out	  what	  moral	  responsibility	  would	  look	  like	  given	  various	  possible	  ways	  of	  establishing	  the	  antecedent	  of	  (2).	  But	  I	  shall	  skip	  over	  those	  now	  and	  focus	  on	  the	  defense	  of	  (1).	  The	  strategy	  here	  uses	  the	  doctrine	  of	  two	  truths.4	  That	  doctrine	  has	  it	  that	  there	  are	  two	  ways	  a	  statement	  may	  be	  said	  to	  be	  true,	  ultimately	  and	  conventionally.	  	  	  The	  defense	  of	  (1)	  will	  be	  that	  the	  form	  of	  determinism	  said	  by	  incompatibilists	  to	  be	  incompatible	  with	  moral	  responsibility	  could	  only	  be	  true	  ultimately,	  while	  the	  claim	  that	  persons	  are	  morally	  responsible	  is	  true	  conventionally,	  and	  there	  can	  be	  no	  entailment	  relations	  across	  the	  barrier	  between	  ultimate	  and	  conventional	  truth,	  so	  nothing	  about	  responsibility	  could	  follow	  from	  the	  thesis	  of	  determinism.	  Any	  argument	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meant	  to	  show	  that	  the	  truth	  of	  determinism	  would	  undermine	  moral	  responsibility	  has	  to	  fail.	  	  	  
2	  	  Let	  me	  begin	  to	  explain	  all	  this	  by	  saying	  more	  about	  the	  two	  truths.	  Ultimate	  truth	  is	  easy	  to	  explain.	  It	  is	  just	  what	  most	  people	  think	  of	  as	  truth:	  the	  property	  a	  statement	  has	  when	  it	  represents	  reality	  as	  being	  a	  certain	  way	  and	  reality	  mind-­‐independently	  is	  that	  way.	  But	  the	  stipulation	  that	  correspondence	  be	  to	  how	  things	  mind-­‐independently	  are	  means	  that	  many	  statements	  we	  take	  to	  be	  true	  are	  not	  ultimately	  true.	  Take	  the	  statement,	  “I	  am	  in	  Sinyang	  Hall”.	  Since	  buildings	  and	  other	  such	  composite	  entities	  are	  not	  mind-­‐independently	  real,	  no	  statement	  about	  them	  could	  be	  ultimately	  true.	  That	  composite	  entities	  are	  not	  ultimately	  real	  is	  established	  by	  the	  ‘neither-­‐identical-­‐nor-­‐distinct’	  argument:	  the	  building	  cannot	  be	  identical	  with	  the	  atoms,	  since	  it	  is	  one	  and	  they	  are	  many;	  but	  neither	  can	  it	  be	  distinct	  from	  them,	  since	  it	  cannot	  be	  wholly	  located	  where	  each	  atom	  is	  (it	  being	  too	  large),	  and	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  it	  is	  only	  partly	  located	  where	  each	  atom	  is	  leads	  to	  an	  infinite	  regress	  (since	  the	  building	  can	  only	  be	  partly	  located	  where	  each	  of	  its	  atom-­‐sized	  spatial	  regions	  is,	  thus	  necessitating	  that	  it	  have	  parts,	  etc.).5	  It	  is	  important	  to	  add	  that	  while	  “I	  am	  in	  Sinyang	  Hall”	  is	  not	  ultimately	  true,	  it	  is	  not	  ultimately	  false	  either.	  For	  there	  being	  ultimately	  no	  Sinyang	  Hall,	  the	  statement	  “I	  am	  not	  located	  in	  Sinyang	  Hall”	  could	  not	  be	  ultimately	  true.	  	  While	  the	  statement	  lacks	  ultimate	  truth-­‐value,	  the	  statement	  is	  conventionally	  true.	  Explaining	  what	  this	  means	  is	  rather	  more	  difficult.	  How,	  one	  wants	  to	  know,	  could	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there	  be	  any	  other	  way	  for	  a	  statement	  to	  be	  true	  than	  by	  corresponding	  to	  mind-­‐independent	  reality?	  Well,	  “Hamlet	  is	  a	  Danish	  prince”	  is	  true,	  we	  say,	  yet	  there	  is	  no	  one	  in	  the	  world	  to	  whom	  the	  name	  ‘Hamlet’	  refers.	  The	  statement	  cannot	  be	  really,	  literally	  true,	  yet	  we	  still	  think	  there	  is	  some	  sense	  in	  which	  it	  is	  true.	  That	  Hamlet	  was	  a	  Danish	  prince	  is,	  we	  say,	  ‘true	  in	  the	  story’.	  By	  this	  we	  mean	  that	  if	  the	  statements	  that	  make	  up	  the	  story	  were	  fact	  and	  not	  fiction,	  then	  this	  statement	  would	  be	  true	  in	  the	  literal	  sense.	  Conventional	  truth	  is	  a	  little	  like	  that.	  There	  really	  are	  no	  buildings,	  just	  atoms	  arranged	  in	  various	  ways.	  But	  given	  the	  way	  that	  the	  atoms	  around	  me	  are	  arranged,	  if	  in	  addition	  to	  atoms	  there	  were	  also	  such	  things	  as	  buildings,	  then	  “I	  am	  in	  Sinyang	  Hall”	  would	  be	  ultimately	  true.	  There	  aren’t	  such	  things	  as	  buildings.	  We	  only	  think	  there	  are	  because	  it’s	  useful	  for	  us	  to	  think	  of	  atoms	  arranged	  a	  certain	  way	  not	  simply	  as	  the	  many	  things	  they	  actually	  are,	  but	  as	  composing	  one	  big	  thing	  such	  as	  a	  building.	  If	  this	  pretense	  of	  ours	  reflected	  mind-­‐independent	  reality,	  the	  statement	  would	  be	  ultimately	  true.	  Our	  pretense	  does	  not	  reflect	  reality—indeed,	  given	  the	  neither-­‐identical-­‐nor-­‐distinct	  argument,	  it	  cannot.	  But	  just	  as	  the	  statement	  about	  Hamlet	  does	  bear	  a	  certain	  complex	  relation	  to	  marks	  on	  a	  page,	  so	  the	  statement	  about	  Sinyang	  Hall	  bears	  a	  complex	  relation	  to	  the	  atoms	  around	  us.	  That	  is	  why	  it	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  useful,	  and	  why	  we	  say	  it	  is	  true	  when,	  strictly	  speaking,	  it	  is	  not.	  	  Now	  take	  the	  statement	  that	  Hamlet	  lives	  in	  Denmark.	  We	  know	  it	  is	  not	  literally	  true,	  but	  could	  it	  be	  ‘true	  in	  the	  story’	  or	  ‘fictively	  true’?	  Opinions	  about	  this	  vary.	  The	  difficulty	  is	  that	  we	  think	  Denmark	  is	  a	  real	  place	  while	  Hamlet	  is	  not	  a	  real	  person,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  a	  real	  place	  could	  be	  related	  to	  an	  unreal	  person	  in	  the	  right	  way	  to	  make	  the	  story	  true.	  If	  you	  think	  that	  a	  real	  place	  can	  figure	  in	  the	  truth-­‐maker	  for	  a	  statement	  that	  is	  only	  fictively	  true,	  then	  you	  will	  think	  the	  statement	  can	  be	  fictively	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true	  in	  a	  perfectly	  straightforward	  way.	  But	  if	  not,	  then	  you	  will	  need	  to	  hold	  that	  the	  true-­‐in-­‐the-­‐story	  “Hamlet	  lives	  in	  Denmark”	  is	  not	  about	  the	  real	  Denmark	  but	  some	  other	  sort	  of	  place	  entirely.	  	  Something	  similar	  happens	  with	  conventional	  truth.	  	  	  We	  agree	  that	  “I	  am	  in	  Sinyang	  Hall”	  is	  conventionally	  true,	  and	  we	  can	  also	  say	  that	  a	  statement	  like	  “There	  are	  such-­‐and-­‐such	  atoms	  arranged	  in	  such-­‐and-­‐such	  a	  way”	  is	  ultimately	  true.	  But	  what	  about	  “Sinyang	  Hall	  is	  made	  of	  such-­‐and-­‐such	  atoms”?	  Since	  it	  says	  something	  about	  Sinyang	  Hall,	  we	  know	  it	  is	  not	  ultimately	  true	  (or	  false	  either),	  but	  could	  it	  be	  conventionally	  true?	  Here	  too,	  opinions	  will	  vary.	  The	  difficulty	  in	  this	  case	  is	  that	  if	  we	  can	  talk	  of	  Sinyang	  Hall	  and	  those	  atoms	  in	  the	  same	  breath,	  this	  will	  lead	  to	  contradictions.	  Perhaps	  the	  easiest	  way	  to	  see	  why	  is	  to	  think	  of	  the	  sorites	  puzzles	  that	  will	  emerge	  when	  we	  begin	  to	  look	  into	  how	  many	  randomly	  chosen	  atoms	  we	  can	  remove	  before	  Sinyang	  Hall	  ceases	  to	  exist.6	  And	  there	  are	  other	  ways	  to	  show	  why	  permitting	  such	  talk	  leads	  to	  dire	  logical	  consequences.7	  Still,	  there	  are	  those	  who	  would	  say	  that	  there	  can	  be	  a	  conventionally	  true	  statement	  referring	  to	  both	  Sinyang	  Hall	  and	  the	  atoms.	  	  	  Although	  Buddhist	  accounts	  of	  the	  two	  truths	  do	  not	  typically	  discuss	  this	  question,	  if	  they	  were	  asked,	  then,	  no	  doubt,	  many	  Buddhists	  would	  say	  just	  this.	  But	  this	  is	  because	  these	  Buddhists	  believe	  conventional	  truth	  harbors	  contradictions	  within	  itself,	  and	  so	  must	  be	  transcended.	  These	  Buddhists	  would	  not	  see	  a	  reason	  to	  try	  to	  insulate	  conventional	  truth	  from	  the	  contradictions	  that	  arise	  when	  you	  let	  in	  the	  referring	  expressions	  of	  ultimate	  truth.	  Other	  Buddhists,	  such	  as	  Dharmakīrti,	  would	  disagree.	  They	  would	  say	  that	  we	  cannot	  account	  for	  the	  usefulness	  of	  conventionally	  true	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statements	  if	  they	  inevitably	  give	  rise	  to	  contradictions.	  So	  the	  insulation	  between	  the	  two	  discourses	  must	  be	  two-­‐way.	  	  To	  summarize,	  there	  are	  two	  things	  we	  might	  say	  about	  the	  conventional	  truth-­‐value	  of	  “Sinyang	  Hall	  is	  made	  of	  such-­‐and-­‐such	  atoms”.	  We	  might	  say	  that	  it	  is	  conventionally	  true.	  That	  policy	  will	  lead	  to	  there	  being	  good	  reason	  to	  accept	  various	  contradictions.	  We	  might	  welcome	  this	  result	  as	  showing	  the	  inherent	  instability	  of	  our	  ordinary	  ways	  of	  talking	  and	  thinking.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  might	  take	  the	  resulting	  contradictions	  to	  show	  that	  conventional	  truth	  must	  be	  reformed.	  The	  proposed	  revision	  is	  that	  we	  not	  allow	  referring	  expressions	  from	  ultimate	  discourse	  to	  be	  employed	  in	  conventional	  discourse.	  Buddhist	  Reductionists	  might	  take	  either	  of	  these	  two	  stances.	  What	  I	  want	  to	  explore	  is	  what	  happens	  if	  we	  take	  the	  second,	  according	  to	  which	  that	  sentence	  has	  no	  truth-­‐value,	  since	  it	  is	  simply	  meaningless.	  	  Now	  if	  that	  is	  the	  view	  we	  take	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  two	  truths,	  then	  it	  follows	  quite	  straightforwardly	  that	  no	  argument	  the	  conclusion	  of	  which	  belongs	  to	  conventional	  discourse	  can	  have	  a	  premise	  that	  belongs	  to	  ultimate	  discourse.	  No	  statement	  about	  Sinyang	  Hall	  follows	  from	  any	  statement	  about	  atoms.	  That	  will	  sound	  counter-­‐intuitive	  to	  many,	  but	  Buddhists	  will	  not	  be	  put	  off	  by	  this.	  All	  Buddhists	  agree	  that	  common	  sense	  is	  profoundly	  mistaken	  about	  any	  number	  of	  important	  facts	  about	  the	  world,	  so	  the	  intuitions	  shaped	  by	  common	  sense	  cannot	  always	  be	  trusted.	  What	  Buddhists	  disagree	  about	  is	  whether	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  revise	  common	  sense	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  rid	  it	  of	  its	  liability	  to	  lead	  to	  contradictions.	  The	  Buddhist	  revisionists	  I	  am	  discussing	  now	  think	  it	  is.	  That	  is	  the	  point	  of	  their	  two-­‐way	  semantic	  insulation.	  If	  they	  can	  then	  show	  that	  the	  relevant	  formulation	  of	  determinism	  could	  only	  be	  ultimately	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true,	  while	  the	  claim	  that	  persons	  are	  morally	  responsible	  for	  some	  of	  their	  actions	  is	  conventionally	  true,	  then	  they	  will	  have	  a	  way	  of	  establishing	  (1).	  	  	  
3	  	  This	  brings	  me	  to	  why	  I	  call	  the	  view	  ‘paleocompatibilism’.	  The	  strategy	  will	  be	  to	  show	  that	  moral	  responsibility	  is	  a	  property	  only	  persons	  could	  have,	  while	  the	  relevant	  form	  of	  determinism	  concerns	  the	  parts	  of	  persons,	  such	  as	  volitions.	  Now	  the	  first	  modern	  Western	  compatibilists,	  Locke	  and	  Rousseau,	  both	  answered	  the	  incompatibilists	  by	  saying	  that	  one	  should	  ask	  not	  whether	  the	  will	  is	  free,	  but	  whether	  the	  person	  is	  free	  to	  do	  their	  will.	  Since	  by	  ‘freedom’	  they	  meant	  something	  that	  is	  necessary	  for	  moral	  responsibility,	  they	  thus	  held	  that	  moral	  responsibility	  pertains	  to	  the	  person	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  not	  to	  one	  of	  its	  parts.	  And	  this	  much	  seems	  right.	  It	  is	  persons	  we	  hold	  accountable	  for	  actions,	  that	  are	  the	  objects	  of	  our	  praise	  and	  blame,	  gratitude	  and	  resentment—not	  hands,	  feet,	  hearts,	  lungs,	  brains.	  	  	  Of	  course,	  the	  incompatibilists	  to	  whom	  Locke	  and	  Rousseau	  were	  responding	  were	  dualists	  who	  thought	  of	  the	  will	  as	  a	  faculty	  of	  the	  mind.	  And	  faculties,	  it	  can	  be	  said,	  are	  not	  parts	  of	  the	  substances	  in	  which	  they	  inhere;	  they	  are	  powers	  or	  abilities	  of	  those	  substances.	  So,	  if	  it	  is	  a	  mistake	  to	  ask	  if	  the	  will	  is	  free,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  mistake	  involved	  in	  confusing	  a	  whole	  and	  one	  of	  its	  parts.	  While	  a	  present-­‐day	  incompatibilist	  might	  not	  want	  to	  affirm	  that	  the	  mind	  is	  a	  substance	  distinct	  from	  the	  body,	  they	  might	  still	  claim	  that	  the	  will	  is	  not	  a	  part	  of	  the	  person,	  but	  a	  faculty	  of	  the	  person.	  But	  now	  we	  must	  ask	  what	  it	  is	  about	  the	  exercise	  of	  this	  faculty	  of	  willing	  that	  leads	  to	  the	  thought	  that	  the	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person,	  whose	  willing	  this	  is,	  is	  not	  responsible.	  Answering	  this	  question	  will	  take	  us	  back	  to	  wholes	  and	  parts.	  	  The	  thought	  that	  if	  determinism	  holds	  universally,	  then	  the	  will	  is	  not	  free,	  stems,	  I	  submit,	  from	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  event	  of	  willing	  to	  do	  A	  is	  caused	  not	  by	  the	  person	  but	  by	  some	  prior	  event	  (which	  is	  in	  turn	  caused	  by	  some	  prior	  event,	  etc.,	  back	  to	  a	  time	  before	  the	  person	  was	  on	  the	  scene).	  The	  kind	  of	  causation	  at	  work	  here	  is	  event	  causation:	  one	  event	  causing	  another.	  We	  also	  think	  of	  persons	  as	  causes.	  But	  persons	  are	  not	  events;	  they	  are	  substances.	  When	  we	  say	  that	  a	  person	  caused	  some	  happening—say	  that	  Kim	  caused	  the	  death	  of	  Lee—we	  think	  of	  the	  effect	  as	  an	  event	  (the	  demise	  of	  poor	  Lee),	  but	  the	  cause	  not	  as	  another	  event	  (the	  act	  of	  pulling	  the	  trigger,	  or	  the	  act	  of	  intending	  to	  pull	  the	  trigger),	  but	  as	  the	  thing	  behind	  that	  act,	  the	  agent	  Kim.	  Agency	  is	  a	  variety	  of	  substance	  causation.	  And	  substance	  causation	  is	  not	  a	  kind	  of	  causation	  that	  operates	  alongside	  or	  in	  competition	  with	  event	  causation.	  It	  represents	  an	  altogether	  different	  model	  of	  how	  the	  world	  behaves.	  Incompatibilist	  arguments	  exploit	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  two	  models	  do	  not	  work	  in	  tandem.	  The	  paleocompatibilist	  explains	  this	  disharmony	  by	  claiming	  that	  substance	  causation	  concerns	  wholes	  while	  event	  causation	  involves	  parts.	  	  The	  mereological	  nihilism	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  Buddhist	  Reductionism	  has	  no	  substances	  in	  its	  final	  ontology.	  The	  atoms	  that	  are	  all	  there	  really	  is	  to	  what	  we	  think	  of	  as	  Sinyang	  Hall	  are	  not	  indivisible	  material	  particles.	  A	  particle	  is	  a	  substance,	  an	  enduring	  thing	  that	  bears	  various	  qualities	  (such	  as	  having	  a	  certain	  mass	  and	  charge).	  And	  the	  same	  argument	  that	  shows	  Sinyang	  Hall	  not	  to	  be	  ultimately	  real	  shows	  that	  no	  substance,	  no	  matter	  how	  small	  and	  simple	  in	  structure,	  could	  be	  ultimately	  real.	  The	  ultimately	  real	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atoms	  are	  tropes,	  particular	  momentary	  occurrences	  of	  qualities	  such	  as	  resistance	  and	  heat.8	  A	  material	  particle	  is	  a	  bundle	  of	  tropes.	  And	  of	  course	  it	  is	  we	  who	  do	  the	  bundling,	  for	  our	  own	  convenience;	  that	  is	  why	  material	  particles	  are	  not	  ultimately	  real.	  	  	  As	  for	  the	  substance	  known	  as	  mind,	  Buddhist	  Reductionists	  analyze	  that	  into	  mental	  tropes:	  occurrences	  of	  such	  mental	  events	  as	  feelings	  of	  pleasure	  and	  pain,	  desirings,	  willings	  and	  cognizings.	  The	  belief	  that	  such	  events	  must	  have	  an	  owner	  arises	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  have	  conceptually	  constructed	  a	  substance,	  the	  mind,	  as	  what	  holds	  a	  bundle	  of	  such	  tropes	  together.	  Descartes	  was	  wrong:	  from	  the	  occurrence	  of	  this	  cognizing	  event	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  there	  is	  any	  ‘I’	  that	  is	  cognizing.	  That	  this	  cognizing	  event	  occurs	  is	  ultimately	  true.	  That	  I	  exist	  is	  conventionally	  true.	  There	  are	  no	  entailment	  relations	  between	  the	  two	  discourses.	  	  There	  is	  more	  that	  could	  be	  said	  about	  the	  cogito,	  but	  our	  present	  topic	  is	  such	  mental	  events	  as	  desirings	  and	  intendings.	  Incompatibilist	  arguments	  typically	  invite	  us	  to	  think	  that	  if	  determinism	  is	  true,	  then	  it	  must	  hold	  for	  events	  like	  these.	  And	  then	  a	  sort	  of	  vertigo	  sets	  in.	  We	  know	  how	  to	  answer	  questions	  about	  the	  cause	  of	  an	  action,	  such	  as	  the	  question	  of	  who	  caused	  Lee’s	  death.	  Suppose	  we	  agree	  it	  was	  Kim.	  Presumably	  this	  means	  Kim	  wanted	  Lee	  to	  die	  and	  formed	  the	  intention	  to	  bring	  about	  Lee’s	  death.	  But	  when	  we	  go	  on	  to	  ask	  about	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  intention,	  the	  question	  becomes	  somewhat	  puzzling.	  Are	  intendings	  things	  that	  I	  ‘do’	  in	  the	  same	  sense	  in	  which	  I	  might	  do	  the	  killing	  of	  Lee?	  I	  know	  what	  it	  is	  to	  want	  someone	  dead,	  and	  to	  form	  an	  intention	  to	  bring	  this	  about.	  But	  how	  do	  I	  cause	  it	  to	  be	  the	  case	  that	  I	  intend	  Lee	  to	  die?	  By	  intending	  that	  I	  intend	  for	  Lee	  to	  die?	  How	  do	  I	  bring	  it	  about	  that	  this	  occurs?	  It	  begins	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to	  look	  as	  if	  when	  we	  ask	  about	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  volition	  or	  the	  intention,	  only	  another	  event	  will	  serve,	  and	  not	  the	  substance	  that	  is	  the	  person.	  Buddhist	  Reductionism	  explains	  why	  this	  should	  be.	  	  	  Mental	  events	  like	  desires	  and	  intentions	  are	  among	  the	  parts	  that	  make	  up	  the	  whole	  known	  as	  a	  person.	  This	  means	  that	  such	  events	  cannot	  be	  said	  to	  have	  persons	  as	  their	  causes.	  A	  mere	  conceptual	  fiction	  cannot	  be	  the	  cause	  of	  something	  ultimately	  real.	  The	  causes	  of	  such	  events	  must	  instead	  be	  impersonal	  events.	  So	  the	  incompatibilist	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  right	  after	  all	  in	  saying	  that	  if	  the	  psychological	  factors	  involved	  in	  performing	  an	  action	  are	  causally	  determined	  by	  prior	  events,	  then	  the	  springs	  of	  action	  can	  always	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  thoroughly	  impersonal	  forces.	  What	  the	  incompatibilist	  neglects	  to	  mention	  is	  that	  this	  is	  because	  when	  we	  speak	  of	  these	  mental	  events	  and	  their	  causes,	  we	  can	  only	  be	  speaking	  about	  ultimate	  truth,	  which	  is	  by	  nature	  necessarily	  impersonal.	  Nothing	  whatsoever	  follows	  about	  persons.	  	  	  
4	  	  In	  defending	  his	  agent-­‐causal	  version	  of	  incompatibilism	  against	  a	  Davidson-­‐style	  objection,	  O’Connor	  (2003)	  confronts	  the	  difficulty	  that	  arises	  when	  we	  try	  to	  combine	  our	  talk	  of	  agents	  with	  what	  we	  say	  about	  events	  internal	  to	  the	  agent.	  It	  might	  prove	  useful	  to	  consider	  how	  he	  handles	  it,	  for	  this	  may	  throw	  some	  light	  on	  how	  paleocompatibilism	  both	  accommodates	  certain	  strands	  of	  the	  agent-­‐causation	  approach	  and	  rejects	  its	  incompatibilism.	  Agent	  causation	  theories	  typically	  claim	  that	  while	  actions,	  as	  events,	  have	  causes,	  the	  cause	  of	  a	  basic	  action	  is	  not	  another	  event	  but	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rather	  an	  agent,	  an	  enduring	  substance.	  On	  O’Connor’s	  account,	  causation	  is	  an	  irreducibly	  primitive	  production	  relation.	  Causal	  powers	  are	  the	  properties	  of	  particulars,	  and	  causation	  is	  the	  manifestation	  of	  these	  powers.	  There	  are	  then	  two	  kinds	  of	  causation,	  event	  causation	  and	  agent	  causation.	  	  	  Event	  causation	  may	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  the	  manifestation	  of	  the	  particular’s	  having	  its	  nature	  in	  certain	  specific	  circumstances	  (one	  event)	  through	  the	  production	  of	  the	  effect	  (another	  event).	  Agent	  causation	  is	  the	  manifestation	  of	  the	  agent’s	  agent-­‐causal	  power	  in	  conferring	  on	  the	  agent	  the	  ability	  to	  produce	  at	  will	  some	  effect	  or	  other	  from	  a	  range	  of	  options.	  Only	  particulars	  that	  are	  in	  certain	  respects	  self-­‐determining	  have	  agent-­‐causal	  powers.	  Thus,	  a	  physicalist	  version	  of	  the	  theory	  will	  require	  that	  such	  powers	  be	  emergent	  properties	  of	  complex	  systems	  with	  the	  capacities	  of	  representing	  possible	  courses	  of	  action	  to	  themselves	  and	  of	  having	  beliefs	  and	  desires	  concerning	  those	  courses	  of	  action.	  (O’Connor	  2003,	  p.	  262)	  	  On	  O’Connor’s	  account,	  the	  basic	  actions	  produced	  by	  agents	  are	  initiations	  of	  actions	  through	  the	  formation	  of	  intentions.	  This	  means	  that	  I	  am	  the	  agent	  of	  the	  action	  of	  killing	  Lee	  by	  virtue	  of	  my	  producing	  the	  requisite	  intention,	  which	  is	  the	  event	  through	  which	  my	  agency	  flows	  to	  the	  successive	  events	  in	  the	  series.	  Intendings	  are	  indeed	  things	  that	  I	  do	  on	  this	  view.	  The	  Davidson-­‐style	  objection,	  tailored	  to	  this	  formulation	  of	  the	  agent-­‐causal	  theory,	  concerns	  the	  question	  what	  is	  the	  relation	  between	  agent	  and	  action,	  the	  action	  here	  understood	  as	  the	  primitive	  action	  of	  forming	  the	  determinate	  intention	  that	  will	  in	  turn	  initiate	  the	  freely-­‐willed	  action	  (e.g.,	  the	  arising	  of	  the	  executive	  intention	  to	  kill	  Lee,	  from	  which	  the	  grasping	  and	  firing	  of	  the	  gun	  flow).	  Specifically,	  is	  this	  relation	  itself	  an	  event	  or	  not?	  If	  so,	  then	  either	  this	  event	  is	  an	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action	  or	  it	  is	  not.	  If	  it	  is	  an	  action,	  then	  the	  supposedly	  primitive	  action	  that	  is	  its	  result	  is	  not	  primitive,	  and	  we	  have	  the	  start	  of	  an	  infinite	  regress.	  If	  this	  event	  is	  not	  an	  action,	  then	  there	  is	  a	  causing	  by	  the	  agent	  that	  is	  not	  a	  doing	  by	  the	  agent.	  If,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  this	  relation	  is	  not	  an	  event,	  then	  since	  a	  causing	  is	  an	  event,	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  clear	  what	  it	  means	  to	  say	  that	  the	  agent	  caused	  the	  action.	  	  O’Connor	  responds	  by	  grasping	  the	  second	  horn	  of	  Davidson’s	  dilemma:	  the	  relation	  of	  the	  agent	  to	  the	  action	  is	  not	  a	  distinct	  event,	  but	  is	  instead	  identical	  with	  the	  action,	  understood	  as	  the	  agent’s	  production	  of	  the	  intention.	  The	  relation—the	  agent’s	  causing	  the	  action—is	  a	  complex	  state	  of	  affairs,	  consisting	  of	  the	  agent’s	  being	  the	  agent-­‐cause	  of	  the	  action.	  And	  this	  is	  not	  the	  sort	  of	  thing,	  O’Connor	  claims,	  that	  could	  itself	  be	  caused	  (2003,	  pp.	  271-­‐2).	  The	  threatened	  infinite	  regress	  is	  avoided	  by	  in	  effect	  making	  the	  producing	  relation	  identical	  with	  one	  of	  its	  relata.	  	  	  The	  Nyāya	  school	  of	  classical	  Indian	  philosophy	  developed	  a	  similar	  strategy	  as	  a	  way	  to	  avoid	  various	  Bradley-­‐style	  regresses.	  Included	  in	  their	  ontology	  are	  such	  things	  as	  universals,	  substances,	  and	  a	  relation	  of	  inherence	  that	  connects	  potness	  to	  particular	  pots.	  Asked	  how	  inherence	  is	  in	  turn	  related	  to	  particular	  pots,	  they	  answer	  that	  there	  is	  no	  distinct	  relation	  between	  inherence	  and	  a	  particular,	  that	  inherence	  is	  a	  self-­‐linking	  connector,	  so	  that	  the	  relation	  between	  inherence	  and	  a	  pot	  is	  just	  the	  inherence	  itself.	  (This	  seems	  to	  be	  what	  Russell	  had	  in	  mind	  (1927,	  p.	  263)	  when	  he	  sought	  to	  stop	  the	  original	  Bradley	  regress	  by	  claiming	  that	  relations	  are	  not	  at	  all	  like	  the	  substances	  that	  they	  relate.)	  Nyāya	  likewise	  holds	  that	  there	  are	  such	  things	  as	  absences,	  for	  instance,	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  particular	  pot	  from	  this	  table.	  But	  absences,	  they	  claim,	  only	  exist	  when	  there	  is	  an	  existing	  counter-­‐positive:	  there	  can	  be	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  pot	  from	  this	  table	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only	  because	  that	  pot	  exists	  elsewhere	  (or	  elsewhen).	  Asked	  about	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  absence	  and	  its	  counter-­‐positive,	  their	  reply	  is	  that	  this	  relation	  just	  is	  the	  absence	  itself,	  which	  is	  a	  self-­‐linking	  connector.	  O’Connor’s	  reply	  to	  the	  question	  about	  the	  causal	  relation	  between	  the	  agent	  and	  the	  action	  is	  similar:	  by	  in	  effect	  making	  the	  action	  a	  self-­‐linking	  connector,	  he	  hopes	  to	  thereby	  avoid	  a	  Bradley	  regress.	  	  O’Connor’s	  strategy	  has	  a	  distinguished	  pedigree,	  but	  can	  it	  succeed?	  The	  notion	  of	  a	  self-­‐linking	  connector	  has	  gotten	  mixed	  reviews.	  The	  reception	  is	  somewhat	  warmer	  where	  we	  are	  antecedently	  inclined	  to	  say	  that	  the	  connection	  in	  question	  is	  across	  different	  ontological	  categories.	  To	  suppose,	  for	  instance,	  that	  some	  extra	  tie	  is	  needed	  to	  connect	  inherence	  with	  substances	  is	  to	  think	  of	  inherence	  as	  substance-­‐like	  in	  being	  just	  another	  particular	  without	  intrinsic	  relations	  to	  other	  particulars.	  If	  we	  instead	  think	  of	  inherence	  as	  belonging	  to	  a	  category	  distinct	  from	  that	  of	  substance	  (as	  does	  Nyāya),	  then	  we	  may	  be	  more	  inclined	  to	  accept	  the	  claim	  that	  it	  is	  a	  self-­‐linking	  connector.	  Those	  who	  wish	  for	  a	  more	  austere	  ontology	  containing	  fewer	  categories	  will	  resist	  such	  claims.	  Buddhist	  Reductionism	  represents	  an	  extreme	  form	  of	  such	  austerity,	  maintaining	  that	  we	  can	  make	  do	  with	  just	  the	  category	  of	  momentary	  trope-­‐occurrences,	  all	  else	  being	  conceptually	  constructed	  on	  the	  base	  of	  these	  elementary	  events.	  If	  so,	  then	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  self-­‐linking	  connector	  will	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  both	  incoherent	  and	  superfluous.	  But	  assessing	  the	  plausibility	  of	  so	  Spartan	  an	  ontology	  as	  that	  of	  Buddhist	  Reductionism	  is	  no	  easy	  task.	  	  It	  might,	  however,	  be	  worth	  looking	  into	  the	  motivation	  behind	  this	  resort	  to	  self-­‐linking	  connectors.	  For	  if	  it	  should	  turn	  out	  that	  the	  problem	  it	  is	  meant	  to	  address	  can	  be	  resolved	  in	  a	  simpler	  way,	  that	  will	  be	  one	  consideration	  against	  it.	  We	  started	  with	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the	  difficulty	  that	  arises	  when	  we	  ‘pop	  the	  hood’	  on	  my	  killing	  Lee	  in	  order	  to	  ascertain	  whether	  I	  am	  responsible	  for	  this	  regrettable	  event.	  Presumably,	  what	  we	  find	  when	  we	  look	  under	  the	  hood	  will	  tell	  us	  whether	  this	  is	  genuinely	  my	  act	  or	  not.	  The	  stock	  answer	  is	  that	  it	  is	  my	  act	  provided	  we	  find	  that	  it	  flowed	  from	  an	  intention	  wholly	  my	  own.	  How	  does	  an	  intention	  come	  to	  be	  wholly	  my	  own?	  If	  we	  say	  that	  it	  must	  reflect	  my	  character,	  then	  we	  may	  ask	  why	  we	  should	  take	  the	  relevant	  elements	  of	  my	  current	  character	  as	  truly	  my	  own.	  If	  they	  arose	  as	  the	  result	  of	  earlier	  elements	  identified	  as	  expressive	  of	  my	  nature,	  we	  may	  ask	  the	  same	  question	  of	  those	  earlier	  elements.	  Eventually,	  this	  quest	  will	  lead	  us	  back	  to	  a	  time	  before	  I	  was	  born.	  It	  is	  this	  prospect	  that	  leads	  the	  agent	  causation	  theorist	  to	  claim	  I	  can	  be	  responsible	  for	  the	  action	  only	  if	  the	  event	  of	  the	  intention’s	  occurrence	  is	  the	  effect	  not	  of	  a	  prior	  event	  but	  of	  an	  agent,	  me.	  	  That	  this	  line	  of	  thought	  is	  on	  the	  right	  track	  might	  be	  confirmed	  by	  considering	  the	  case	  of	  the	  ‘Swampman	  double’	  who,	  when	  the	  lightning	  strikes	  the	  muck,	  arises	  as	  a	  fortuitous	  molecule-­‐for-­‐molecule	  duplicate	  of	  me	  as	  I	  am	  just	  before	  forming	  the	  requisite	  intention.9	  	  Should	  Swampman	  last	  long	  enough	  to	  then	  form	  the	  intention	  and	  shoot	  Lee	  (who	  happens	  to	  be	  in	  the	  swamp	  that	  day)	  before	  dissolving	  back	  into	  the	  primordial	  ooze,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  judgment	  of	  responsibility.	  Such	  judgments	  require	  an	  enduring	  agent,	  and	  Swampman	  does	  not	  endure	  long	  enough	  to	  count.	  This	  is	  why,	  says	  the	  agent-­‐causal	  theorist,	  responsibility	  drains	  away	  when	  we	  pop	  the	  hood	  and	  look	  for	  some	  inner	  event	  that	  might	  explain	  the	  causal	  chain	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  action.	  As	  long	  as	  our	  explanations	  are	  couched	  exclusively	  in	  terms	  of	  event	  causation,	  we	  will	  never	  find	  an	  enduring	  agent.	  This	  is	  why	  we	  must	  turn	  to	  causation	  of	  an	  altogether	  different	  sort.	  
	  	   276	  
	  The	  paleo-­‐compatibilist	  will	  agree	  with	  this	  last	  point,	  but	  draw	  a	  different	  conclusion:	  that	  agent	  causation	  and	  event	  causation	  belong	  to	  the	  distinct	  discourses	  whereby	  we	  speak	  of	  wholes	  and	  of	  their	  parts,	  respectively.	  Given	  the	  semantic	  restrictions	  on	  these	  discourses,	  there	  can	  be	  no	  problem	  of	  explaining	  how	  an	  enduring	  substance	  can	  serve	  as	  cause	  of	  an	  event’s	  occurrence	  at	  one	  time	  rather	  than	  another.	  And	  it	  is	  this	  dating	  problem	  that	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  present	  difficulty.	  The	  agent-­‐causal	  theorist’s	  explanation	  fails	  to	  satisfy	  because	  it	  tries	  to	  account	  for	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  intention	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  agent’s	  being	  in	  certain	  circumstances	  just	  before	  the	  intention	  was	  produced.	  In	  this	  case,	  it	  looks	  like	  we	  should	  say	  it	  is	  those	  circumstances	  that	  are	  the	  cause,	  with	  the	  result	  that	  the	  agent	  once	  again	  drops	  out	  of	  the	  picture.	  As	  long	  as	  agent	  causation	  and	  event	  causation	  are	  thought	  of	  as	  competing	  ways	  of	  explaining	  the	  occurrence	  of	  an	  event,	  event	  causation	  will	  always	  win	  out,	  given	  its	  ability	  to	  solve	  the	  dating	  problem.	  	  The	  alternative	  picture	  offered	  by	  the	  Buddhist	  Reductionist	  places	  event	  causation	  at	  the	  ultimate	  level	  and	  substance	  causation	  at	  the	  conventional	  level.	  There	  being	  no	  substances	  at	  the	  ultimate	  level,	  event	  causation	  consists	  in	  the	  relation	  of	  universal	  concomitance	  and	  ordered	  succession	  between	  elementary	  event-­‐types.	  Substance	  causation,	  the	  sort	  of	  causal	  relation	  asserted	  at	  the	  conventional	  level,	  involves	  the	  manifestation	  of	  a	  substance’s	  powers	  in	  the	  production	  of	  events	  (understood	  as	  the	  arising	  of	  new	  properties	  in	  this	  or	  another	  substance).	  When	  the	  substance	  in	  question	  is	  an	  agent,	  we	  say	  this	  manifestation	  can	  occur	  ‘at	  will’.	  This	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  to	  mean	  that	  the	  agent	  produces	  a	  willing	  that	  in	  turn	  brings	  about	  the	  initiation	  of	  the	  action.	  It	  means	  instead	  that	  it	  is	  up	  to	  the	  agent	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  action,	  that	  the	  agent	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produces	  the	  action	  when	  they	  choose	  to,	  they	  ‘just	  do	  it’	  when	  they	  see	  fit.	  To	  seek	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  timing	  here	  is	  to	  pop	  the	  hood,	  to	  treat	  the	  agent	  as	  a	  system	  analyzable	  into	  components	  whose	  properties	  do	  the	  real	  explanatory	  work.	  	  	  To	  those	  accustomed	  to	  the	  sorts	  of	  causal	  explanations	  found	  in	  science,	  it	  may	  sound	  odd	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  causation	  at	  use	  in	  conventional	  discourse	  is	  that	  of	  substance	  causation.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  really	  all	  that	  untoward	  a	  view.	  If	  we	  follow	  the	  lead	  of	  Locke	  (1693,	  I.xxi.4),	  we	  should	  say	  that	  the	  child’s	  concept	  of	  causation	  begins	  with	  its	  learning	  to	  exercise	  control	  over	  its	  limbs.	  Seen	  in	  this	  light,	  it	  is	  hardly	  surprising	  that	  the	  child	  should	  attribute	  agency	  to	  inanimate	  objects.	  And	  even	  when	  we	  come	  to	  realize	  that	  such	  objects	  lack	  the	  representational	  and	  deliberative	  capacities	  necessary	  for	  agency,	  we	  continue	  to	  speak	  of	  them	  as	  the	  causes	  of	  various	  changes	  in	  the	  world.	  Just	  as	  Kim	  may	  be	  said	  to	  be	  the	  cause	  of	  Lee’s	  death,	  so	  cars,	  or	  power	  plants,	  or	  even	  trees	  (on	  Ronald	  Reagan’s	  view)	  may	  be	  said	  to	  be	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  polluted	  state	  of	  today’s	  air.	  While	  current	  common	  sense	  also	  allows	  talk	  of	  event	  causation	  (understood	  as	  strictly	  a	  relation	  between	  events),	  we	  may	  speculate	  that	  this	  has	  come	  about	  under	  pressure	  from	  the	  ascendancy	  of	  scientific	  explanation.	  We	  might	  even	  claim	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  substance	  causation	  is	  the	  more	  primitive	  concept	  not	  just	  ontogenetically,	  but	  phylogenetically	  as	  well—that	  it	  is	  what	  Perry	  (2010,	  p.	  94)	  calls	  a	  ‘natural’	  concept.	  	  	  
5	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If	  determinism	  is	  true,	  then	  all	  mental	  events	  are	  causally	  determined	  by	  other	  events.	  We	  have	  seen	  why	  when	  this	  thesis	  is	  properly	  understood	  it	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  ultimately	  true.	  We	  can	  also	  see	  why	  the	  claim	  that	  persons	  are	  sometimes	  morally	  responsible	  for	  their	  actions	  could	  only	  be	  conventionally	  true.	  Given	  the	  semantics	  of	  the	  revisionist	  form	  of	  Buddhist	  Reductionism	  I	  am	  discussing,	  no	  conventionally	  true	  statement	  is	  entailed	  by	  any	  ultimately	  true	  statement.	  This	  completes	  the	  defense	  of	  (1):	  nothing	  about	  moral	  responsibility	  can	  follow	  from	  the	  thesis	  that	  all	  mental	  events	  are	  causally	  determined	  by	  other	  events.	  But	  it	  might	  be	  useful	  to	  illustrate	  (1)	  in	  action	  by	  looking	  at	  what	  it	  tells	  us	  about	  Benjamin	  Libet’s	  experimental	  results.	  	  	  In	  a	  series	  of	  experiments	  Libet	  purportedly	  showed	  that	  when	  subjects	  are	  instructed	  to	  spontaneously	  initiate	  hand	  movement	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  sudden	  urge	  (i.e.,	  an	  intention	  formed	  at	  the	  very	  last	  moment),	  the	  neural	  events	  that	  begin	  the	  process	  of	  movement	  occur	  before	  the	  subject	  becomes	  aware	  of	  intending	  to	  move	  their	  hand	  (1985).10	  This	  is	  sometimes	  taken	  to	  show	  that	  the	  event	  of	  consciously	  deciding	  (the	  formation	  of	  a	  conscious	  intention)	  cannot	  have	  caused	  the	  initiation	  of	  movement.	  Critics	  contend	  that	  the	  experimental	  design	  is	  flawed,	  and	  that	  the	  data	  do	  not	  support	  this	  conclusion.	  But	  let	  us	  waive	  such	  questions.	  Suppose	  we	  agree	  that	  the	  subjects	  reliably	  report	  the	  time	  when	  they	  become	  aware	  of	  intending	  to	  move	  their	  hand,	  and	  that	  in	  this	  case	  the	  intention	  must	  be	  a	  conscious	  event.	  Since	  the	  initiation	  of	  movement	  precedes	  the	  conscious	  intention,	  the	  latter	  cannot	  have	  caused	  the	  former.	  (Of	  course,	  if	  we	  follow	  Dennett	  in	  thinking	  of	  consciousness	  as	  a	  property	  that	  mental	  events	  only	  acquire	  retroactively	  (2005),	  pp.	  131-­‐57),	  this	  conclusion	  does	  not	  follow;	  but	  on	  his	  view	  nothing	  is	  intrinsically	  a	  conscious	  mental	  event,	  so	  nothing	  can	  be	  a	  real	  cause	  by	  virtue	  of	  being	  a	  conscious	  state.)	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  The	  real	  question,	  though,	  is	  why	  this	  should	  be	  thought	  to	  matter.	  People	  often	  find	  these	  results	  spooky.	  And	  the	  spookiness	  is	  sometimes	  said	  to	  consist	  in	  this	  being	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  there	  is	  no	  free	  will.	  What	  people	  probably	  mean	  by	  this	  is	  that	  in	  the	  experiment	  the	  subjects	  were	  not	  responsible	  for	  moving	  their	  hands—that	  the	  movement	  was	  not	  really	  something	  the	  subjects	  did.	  The	  question	  is	  why	  anyone	  would	  interpret	  the	  results	  of	  the	  experiment	  in	  this	  way.	  The	  subjects	  did,	  after	  all,	  do	  what	  they	  were	  asked	  to.	  They	  produced	  a	  series	  of	  hand	  movements	  in	  a	  relatively	  spontaneous	  way:	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  an	  observer	  would	  not	  have	  been	  able	  to	  reliably	  predict	  just	  when	  the	  next	  movement	  was	  likely	  to	  occur	  from	  anything	  coming	  before.	  Of	  course,	  the	  subject	  is	  not	  aware	  of	  having	  decided	  to	  initiate	  movement	  until	  after	  the	  initiation	  process	  has	  begun.	  But	  this	  does	  not	  show	  that	  the	  subject	  did	  not	  initiate	  the	  movement.	  That	  would	  follow	  only	  if	  being	  the	  agent	  of	  the	  movement	  requires	  that	  one	  be	  the	  agent	  of	  the	  intending.	  And	  it	  might	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  think	  of	  intending	  this	  way,	  as	  an	  action	  performed	  by	  an	  agent.	  	  	  It	  is	  this	  conception	  of	  intending	  that	  seems	  to	  stand	  behind	  the	  thought	  that	  intentions	  must	  be	  formed	  consciously.	  The	  idea	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  persons	  come	  to	  have	  intentions	  by	  engaging	  in	  a	  process	  of	  deliberation	  about	  their	  situation	  and	  their	  standing	  desires	  and	  then	  choosing	  from	  among	  the	  range	  of	  available	  intentions	  the	  one	  that	  best	  matches	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  deliberation	  process:	  springs	  of	  action	  not	  formed	  in	  this	  way	  are	  not	  truly	  chosen	  by	  the	  agent,	  and	  so	  are	  not	  genuine	  intentions	  of	  the	  agent.	  What	  else	  could	  explain	  the	  requirement	  that	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  intention	  be	  a	  conscious	  process,	  if	  not	  the	  idea	  that	  this	  must	  be	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  agent,	  and	  that	  control	  requires	  consciousness?	  Surely	  not	  the	  evidence	  of	  introspection.	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  We	  are	  often	  hard	  pressed	  to	  say,	  even	  with	  our	  most	  weighty	  actions,	  just	  when	  we	  decided	  to	  do	  this	  rather	  than	  that.	  The	  descriptions	  we	  give	  of	  the	  moment	  of	  choice	  are	  often	  no	  more	  than	  retrospective	  reconstructions.	  That	  this	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  intending	  might	  be	  mistaken	  is	  also	  suggested	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  introduces	  yet	  another	  action	  of	  the	  agent	  into	  the	  account,	  the	  choosing	  that	  yields	  the	  intention.	  As	  we	  saw	  earlier,	  an	  infinite	  regress	  threatens.	  We	  avoid	  this	  regress	  by	  keeping	  separate	  our	  talk	  of	  the	  agent’s	  responsibility	  and	  our	  talk	  of	  the	  occurrence	  of	  the	  intention.	  The	  first	  concerns	  a	  big	  thing;	  the	  second	  concerns	  a	  small	  thing.	  Talk	  of	  big	  things	  and	  talk	  of	  small	  things	  do	  not	  mix.	  	  Gallagher	  (2006)	  has	  a	  somewhat	  similar	  view	  of	  the	  controversy	  about	  Libet’s	  results.	  He	  also	  thinks	  we	  are	  looking	  in	  the	  wrong	  place	  for	  ‘free	  will’	  when	  we	  look	  at	  the	  neurological	  precursors	  to	  the	  initiation	  of	  hand	  movement.	  The	  notion,	  he	  says,	  “applies	  to	  intentional	  actions	  themselves,	  described	  at	  the	  highest	  pragmatic	  level	  of	  description”	  (p.	  117).	  Neurological	  accounts	  of	  motor	  control	  are	  simply	  at	  a	  level	  of	  description	  (the	  ‘subpersonal’	  level)	  too	  low	  to	  be	  relevant	  to	  the	  question	  of	  responsibility,	  just	  as	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  parts	  making	  up	  your	  car	  is	  not	  relevant	  to	  the	  question	  whether	  I	  should	  ride	  in	  it	  (p.	  115).	  Instead,	  the	  question	  of	  ‘free	  will’	  or	  responsibility	  only	  arises	  at	  the	  level	  at	  which	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  speak	  of	  persons	  and	  the	  things	  they	  think	  of	  themselves	  as	  achieving	  through	  their	  intentional	  acts:	  doing	  the	  laundry,	  killing	  Lee,	  complying	  with	  the	  instructions	  in	  the	  psychology	  experiment.	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Gallagher	  also	  holds	  that	  responsibility	  requires	  that	  intentions	  be	  formed	  through	  a	  conscious	  process.	  Although	  this	  may	  hold	  for	  the	  sorts	  of	  actions	  that	  we	  take	  as	  paradigms	  of	  ‘free	  will’,	  I	  am	  not	  sure	  it	  holds	  across	  the	  board.	  But	  what	  he	  says	  in	  defense	  of	  his	  claim	  is	  important.	  This	  is	  that	  the	  timeframe	  required	  to	  see	  the	  sorts	  of	  intendings	  involved	  in	  responsible	  agency	  is	  different	  from	  the	  one	  used	  in	  examining	  processes	  of	  motor	  control.	  The	  time	  between	  the	  neural	  events	  that	  initiate	  hand	  movement	  and	  the	  occurrence	  of	  the	  movement	  is	  measured	  in	  hundreds	  of	  milliseconds.	  With	  the	  action	  of	  killing	  Lee	  the	  intending	  can	  count	  as	  such	  only	  by	  being	  placed	  within	  a	  context	  of	  awareness	  of	  desired	  outcome	  (that	  Lee	  be	  dead)	  and	  opportunity	  (there	  is	  a	  gun	  before	  me)	  through	  initiation	  of	  movement	  (grasping	  the	  gun	  and	  pulling	  the	  trigger)	  through	  monitoring	  the	  movements	  (ascertaining	  that	  the	  gun	  is	  grasped	  by	  the	  handle	  and	  not	  by	  the	  barrel),	  to	  awareness	  of	  the	  goal’s	  having	  been	  achieved	  (seeing	  the	  falling	  of	  Lee’s	  body	  as	  Lee’s	  death).	  The	  intending	  involved	  here	  is	  what	  it	  is	  only	  by	  being	  situated	  within	  a	  temporally	  extended	  process;	  it	  is	  not	  the	  sort	  of	  simple	  neural	  event	  that	  might	  count	  as	  what	  initiates	  the	  process	  of	  muscle	  contraction.	  	  The	  Buddhist	  Reductionist	  will	  agree,	  and	  go	  on	  to	  claim	  that	  as	  a	  temporally	  extended	  event,	  the	  intending	  involved	  in	  the	  killing	  of	  Lee	  requires	  an	  enduring	  person	  as	  its	  subject.11	  The	  simple,	  short-­‐lived	  mental	  event	  that	  initiates	  the	  process	  of	  muscle	  contraction	  requires	  no	  subject.	  By	  the	  mereological	  nihilism	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  Buddhist	  Reductionism,	  simple	  momentary	  events	  are	  themselves	  ultimately	  real.	  Temporally	  extended	  processes,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  can	  only	  be	  construed	  as	  properties	  of	  conventionally	  real	  substances.	  The	  intention	  that	  Libet	  studied	  is	  the	  wrong	  sort	  of	  thing	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  determinations	  of	  responsibility.	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6	  	  So	  much,	  then,	  for	  the	  defense	  of	  (1).	  I	  said	  earlier	  that	  there	  might	  be	  difficulties	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  second	  paleocompatibilist	  thesis:	  	  2. In	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  compelling	  incompatibilist	  argument,	  we	  should	  accept	  the	  common-­‐sense	  view	  that	  persons	  are	  generally	  morally	  responsible	  for	  their	  actions.	  	  The	  difficulties	  I	  had	  in	  mind	  stem	  from	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  paleocompatibilist	  argues	  for	  (1)	  and	  thus	  tries	  to	  establish	  that	  there	  is	  no	  compelling	  argument	  for	  incompatibilism.	  The	  belief	  that	  persons	  are	  generally	  morally	  responsible	  for	  their	  actions	  is	  surely	  a	  part	  of	  common	  sense,	  something	  most	  people	  believe	  unreflectively.	  The	  Buddhist	  Reductionist	  view	  that	  underlies	  the	  defense	  of	  (1)	  is,	  however,	  profoundly	  revisionist.	  The	  common	  sense	  view	  has	  it,	  for	  instance,	  that	  persons	  really	  exist,	  whereas	  Buddhist	  Reductionism	  denies	  this.	  This	  raises	  the	  question	  whether	  the	  paleocompatibilist	  is	  actually	  affirming	  the	  common-­‐sense	  view	  that	  persons	  are	  sometimes	  deserving	  of	  moral	  praise	  and	  blame.	  	  	  One	  way	  of	  bringing	  out	  the	  difficulty	  here	  is	  to	  ask	  the	  Buddhist	  Reductionist	  why	  it	  is	  that	  if	  strictly	  speaking	  there	  are	  no	  persons,	  it	  should	  be	  useful	  to	  hold	  that	  there	  are,	  and	  attribute	  moral	  responsibility	  to	  them.	  The	  response	  will	  be	  consequentialist	  in	  nature:	  our	  institutions	  of	  moral	  praise	  and	  blame	  help	  maximize	  overall	  utility,	  and	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these	  institutions	  require	  that	  we	  think	  of	  ourselves	  as	  persons.	  The	  common-­‐sense	  view	  of	  desert	  is	  not,	  however,	  consequentialist.	  This	  can	  be	  seen,	  for	  instance,	  in	  the	  strongly	  retributivist	  intuitions	  most	  people	  have	  about	  punishment.	  So,	  the	  responsibility	  and	  desert	  delivered	  by	  paleocompatibilism	  are	  importantly	  different	  from	  those	  of	  common	  sense.	  	  This	  is	  the	  familiar	  complaint	  about	  compatibilisms	  of	  every	  sort—that	  they	  deliver	  something	  other	  than	  what	  was	  promised.	  (Hence	  Kant’s	  complaint	  that	  compatibilism	  is	  ‘a	  wretched	  subterfuge’.)	  Neocompatibilists	  are	  often	  quite	  open	  about	  this.	  They	  claim	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  desert	  behind	  our	  common-­‐sense	  view	  of	  responsibility	  is	  simply	  incoherent,	  and	  must	  be	  replaced	  by	  something	  saner.	  Here	  we	  have	  a	  situation	  that	  is	  common	  in	  philosophy:	  we	  find	  ourselves	  with	  conflicting	  intuitions	  and	  must,	  somehow	  or	  other,	  make	  the	  best	  of	  a	  bad	  lot.	  	  	  Perhaps	  the	  paleocompatibilist	  can	  do	  slightly	  better	  than	  the	  neocompatibilist.	  Many	  people	  have	  the	  intuition	  that	  the	  person	  who	  does	  an	  evil	  deed	  thereby	  acquires	  the	  very	  real	  property	  of	  deserving	  blame	  and	  (other	  forms	  of)	  punishment.	  The	  neocompatibilist	  must	  say	  that	  this	  is	  simply	  a	  mistake.	  The	  paleocompatibilist	  has	  a	  different	  response:	  what	  common	  sense	  says	  is	  true.	  Of	  course	  it	  is,	  in	  their	  eyes,	  only	  conventionally	  true.	  Still,	  if	  we	  are	  to	  speak	  of	  persons	  at	  all,	  then	  this	  is	  what	  we	  must	  say.	  Moreover,	  this	  real	  desert	  could	  not	  be	  said	  to	  exist	  if	  we	  were	  to	  say	  that	  the	  psychological	  events	  involved	  in	  the	  production	  of	  an	  action	  are	  causally	  determined	  by	  prior	  events.	  The	  incompatibilist	  is	  right	  about	  this	  as	  well.	  The	  mistake	  lies	  not	  in	  our	  intuitions	  but	  in	  what	  the	  incompatibilist	  makes	  of	  them.	  The	  intuitions	  behind	  our	  views	  about	  responsibility	  uphold	  judgments	  that	  are	  true	  conventionally,	  while	  the	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intuitions	  behind	  our	  views	  about	  determinism	  support	  claims	  that	  are	  true	  ultimately,	  so	  there	  can	  be	  no	  conflict	  here.	  The	  responsibility	  on	  offer	  is	  that	  of	  common	  sense.	  The	  conflict	  lies	  not	  in	  our	  intuitions	  but	  in	  what	  philosophers	  make	  of	  them.	  	  So	  where	  does	  this	  leave	  us?	  There	  is	  some	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  (1)	  and	  (2)	  are	  true.	  If	  they	  are,	  then	  it	  can	  be	  the	  case	  both	  that	  persons	  are	  sometimes	  morally	  responsible	  for	  their	  actions	  and	  that	  determinism	  is	  true.	  We	  have	  seen	  how	  that	  could	  be.	  I	  shall	  end	  by	  repeating	  what	  I	  said	  at	  the	  beginning,	  that	  I	  think	  this	  view	  is	  interesting	  and	  might	  even	  be	  true.	  Much	  more	  work	  is	  needed	  to	  figure	  out	  if	  it	  is	  true.	  And	  that	  work	  requires	  the	  active	  participation	  of	  scholars	  of	  Asian	  philosophy.	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  1	  This	  paper	  is	  a	  version	  of	  my	  2013	  paper	  by	  the	  same	  title,	  “Buddhist	  Paleocompatibilism”,	  Philosophy	  East	  &	  West,	  63(1),	  pp.	  73–87,	  which	  has	  been	  partly	  revised	  for	  this	  volume.	  I	  thank	  PEW	  for	  granting	  permission	  to	  reprint	  the	  paper	  here.	  
2	  The	  question	  whether	  determinism	  and	  moral	  responsibility	  are	  compatible	  has	  of	  course	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  much	  recent	  debate.	  The	  question	  is	  this:	  supposing	  that	  all	  events,	  including	  those	  psychological	  events	  involved	  in	  human	  deliberation,	  decision	  and	  action,	  are	  caused	  by	  earlier	  events	  in	  accordance	  with	  strict	  (non-­‐stochastic)	  causal	  laws,	  would	  it	  then	  follow	  that	  no	  one	  is	  ever	  justifiably	  subject	  to	  moral	  praise	  or	  blame	  for	  their	  actions?	  It	  is	  widely	  called	  the	  issue	  of	  ‘free	  will’,	  but	  because	  many	  neo-­‐
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  compatibilists	  find	  this	  term	  problematic,	  I	  shall	  employ	  the	  longer	  and	  perhaps	  more	  accurate	  label.	  
3	  This	  was	  the	  train	  of	  thought	  behind	  Siderits	  (1987),	  though	  I	  did	  not	  then	  call	  the	  view	  ‘paleocompatibilism’.	  There	  is,	  however,	  one	  passage	  in	  the	  Nikāyas	  that	  I	  believe	  can	  be	  read	  as	  at	  least	  hinting	  at	  something	  like	  this	  view.	  At	  Aṅguttara	  i.173	  ff.	  (Mahāvagga,	  Titthāyatana	  Sutta),	  the	  Buddha	  discusses	  three	  views	  that	  he	  claims	  lead	  away	  from	  the	  practice	  leading	  to	  liberation:	  that	  everything	  a	  person	  experiences	  is	  the	  result	  of	  their	  past	  actions,	  is	  the	  result	  of	  God,	  is	  uncaused.	  These	  views	  are	  said	  to	  all	  lead	  to	  a	  state	  of	  soteriological	  paralysis.	  On	  the	  first	  two	  views,	  the	  present	  ‘I’	  is	  a	  mere	  conduit	  of	  causation,	  channeling	  decisions	  made	  earlier	  over	  which	  I	  have	  no	  present	  control.	  On	  the	  third	  view,	  nothing	  I	  presently	  decide	  can	  be	  counted	  on	  to	  have	  any	  effect	  on	  the	  world.	  In	  all	  three	  cases	  I	  am	  left	  an	  impotent	  observer	  of	  the	  events	  making	  up	  my	  life,	  unresponsive	  to	  thoughts	  concerning	  what	  should	  and	  should	  not	  be	  done.	  Both	  determinism	  and	  the	  view	  that	  nothing	  is	  caused	  are	  equally	  corrosive	  of	  prudential	  responsibility.	  One	  might	  then	  expect	  the	  Buddha	  to	  seek	  wiggle	  room	  in	  an	  indeterminism	  lying	  between	  determinism	  and	  utter	  causelessness,	  one	  holding	  that	  certain	  human	  choosings	  are	  not	  determined	  by	  prior	  causes.	  But	  the	  ‘middle	  path’	  he	  teaches	  on	  this	  occasion	  does	  no	  such	  thing.	  Instead,	  he	  explicates	  the	  formula	  of	  ‘dependent	  origination’,	  according	  to	  which	  suffering	  arises	  in	  dependence	  on	  a	  series	  of	  psychophysical	  events	  beginning	  with	  ignorance.	  In	  other	  contexts	  in	  which	  the	  Buddha	  invokes	  dependent	  origination	  as	  a	  ‘middle	  path’	  in	  order	  to	  dissolve	  an	  apparent	  dilemma,	  Abhidharma	  exegetes	  took	  him	  to	  be	  utilizing	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  two	  truths.	  If	  we	  were	  to	  read	  the	  Titthāyatana	  Sutta	  in	  that	  way,	  the	  Buddha	  would	  be	  a	  paleocompatibilist.	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  4	  The	  distinction	  between	  two	  kinds	  of	  truth,	  conventional	  and	  ultimate,	  was	  first	  developed	  by	  Abhidharma	  philosophers.	  It	  is	  central	  to	  the	  view	  of	  persons	  I	  call	  ‘Buddhist	  Reductionism’.	  Not	  all	  Buddhists	  accept	  Buddhist	  Reductionism.	  And	  not	  all	  Buddhist	  Reductionists	  accept	  the	  formulation	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  two	  truths	  that	  paleocompatibilism	  relies	  on.	  Many	  Buddhist	  philosophers	  do,	  however,	  draw	  the	  distinction	  in	  the	  way	  I	  am	  about	  to	  describe,	  e.g.,	  Vasubandhu,	  Buddhaghosa,	  Saṃghabhadra,	  Dignāga,	  Dharmakīrti,	  and	  perhaps	  even	  some	  Pudgalavādins.	  
5	  The	  argument	  is	  more	  fully	  described	  at	  Siderits	  (2007),	  pp.	  104-­‐111.	  
6	  See	  Unger	  (1979)	  for	  the	  classic	  formulation	  of	  these	  difficulties.	  
7	  For	  evidence	  that	  Buddhist	  Reductionists	  were	  aware	  of	  the	  sorts	  of	  semantic	  difficulties	  that	  arise	  when	  the	  contentious	  relatives—the	  referring	  expressions	  of	  the	  two	  discourses—are	  not	  kept	  apart,	  see	  Mikogami	  (1979),	  pp.	  83-­‐6.	  	  For	  discussion	  of	  some	  further	  considerations	  behind	  making	  the	  semantic	  insulation	  between	  the	  two	  truths	  two-­‐way,	  see	  Siderits	  (2009).	  
8	  Support	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  dharmas,	  the	  ultimate	  reals	  of	  Buddhist	  Reductionism,	  are	  tropes	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Ganeri	  (2001),	  pp.	  101-­‐02;	  also	  see	  Goodman	  (2004).	  
9	  For	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  Swampman-­‐style	  thought	  experiment,	  see	  Davidson	  (1987).	  
10	  A	  useful	  discussion	  is	  Pockett	  (2009),	  pp.	  15-­‐19.	  
11	  See	  Metzinger	  (2003),	  pp.	  422-­‐26	  for	  a	  useful	  account	  of	  the	  cognitive	  architecture	  at	  work	  in	  the	  self-­‐ownership	  of	  actions—what	  is	  required	  for	  the	  agent	  to	  view	  the	  action	  as	  their	  own	  and	  thus	  as	  something	  for	  which	  they	  can	  be	  held	  accountable.	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  13 ‘Shifting Coalitions’ and the Responsibility of Persons      
 
Ben Abelson 
 
                      
1 Buddhist Reductionism and the Extreme Claim 
 
One of the philosophical doctrines commonly thought most central to Buddhism (in opposition 
to the Hindu ātman, the soul or self), is anātman, the ‘no-self’ view, the idea that there is no 
persisting essence of any individual, no substantial ‘I’ standing beneath or behind an individual’s 
constantly arising and perishing parts and properties. The Buddha’s teachings, as recorded in 
texts known as Nikāyas (baskets or collections) that comprise the Pāli Canon, analyze human 
experiences, along with the beings ordinarily thought to have those experiences, into skandhas 
(Sanskrit; Pāli: khandhas) or ‘aggregates’, of which there are five kinds: four that are mental in 
nature, usually translated from Pāli as ‘feeling’, ‘perception’, ‘volitional formations’, and 
‘consciousness’, and one physical, ‘form’ (as derived from material elements). (Bodhi 2005, p. 
307) Coming to understand that no skandha, nor anything else, is one’s self, is essential to 
realizing the soteriological aim of Buddhism—the attainment of enlightenment and cessation of 
the cycle of suffering and rebirth. Given the apparent conceptual connection between having a 
self that stands behind one’s thoughts and actions and the exercise of free agency typically 
thought to be necessary for moral responsibility, philosophers are hard pressed to reconcile such 
responsibility with the no-self doctrine. 
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Mark Siderits is one philosopher who has made a concerted effort at such reconciliation, with 
some success. In Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy (2003, ch. 3), Siderits develops and 
defends a view about the nature of persons that he calls ‘Buddhist Reductionism’. According to 
this position, persons are not ultimately real, because what is conventionally referred to as a 
‘person’ is only a series of distinct, momentary collections of psychophysical constituents or 
skandhas. Nevertheless, persons have conventional existence because grouping some such 
momentary psychophysical elements into collections and those collections together into 
temporally extended series has a certain utility. This utility is grounded synchronically in the 
spatiotemporal contiguity between the (physical) elements and diachronically in the causal 
connections that obtain between the momentary collections of elements.  
 
Buddhist Reductionists are, according to Siderits, committed to an ‘Impersonal Description’ 
(“ID”) thesis. This is the claim that “we can give a complete description of reality without either 
asserting or presupposing that persons exist” (2003, p. 35). Siderits defends Buddhist 
Reductionism against the charge that the ID thesis implies the intuitively unpalatable ‘extreme 
claim’, which is: 
 
“…that four central features of our present person-regarding practices cannot be 
rationally justified: interest in one’s own survival, egoistic concern for one’s future states, 
holding persons responsible for their past deeds, and compensation for one’s past 
burdens” (p. 37).  
 
Endorsing the extreme claim would make one an eliminativist, not a reductionist, about persons. 
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The eliminativist agrees with the reductionist that there is no ‘self’ separate from a body and 
brain and no similarly independent further fact about persons beyond facts about the person’s 
psychophysical constituents and their relations. However, unlike the reductionist, the 
eliminativist insists that the denial of such a self or further fact entails that many of our common-
sense attitudes about persons, those targeted by the extreme claim, are irrational. Another way to 
say that reductionism implies the extreme claim is to say that a reductionism that is not also 
eliminativist is internally inconsistent—that reductionism necessarily slides into eliminativism, 
because one cannot consistently deny the existence of a separate self while adhering to the 
rationality of our normal attitudes concerning persons. 
 
My aim here is to evaluate the objection that the ID thesis implies the extreme claim regarding 
the third of the four features listed above, concerning responsibility. I consider Siderits’ account 
of Galen Strawson’s (1986) version of the objection and Siderits’ proposed answer to it on the 
part of the Buddhist Reductionist, which appeals to the concept of ‘shifting coalitions’ of self-
revision in an individual. I argue that the shifting coalitions idea successfully disarms part of 
Strawson’s version of the objection, and so can account for a modest kind of responsibility 
(though not quite the robust sort Siderits has in mind) that is compatible with both Buddhist 
Reductionism and causal determinism (and so does not require a separate self or libertarian—
indeterminism-requiring—free will).  
 
Nevertheless, while Siderits succeeds in reconciling a compatibilist notion of responsibility with 
the metaphysics of Buddhist Reductionism, it (and any account of responsibility whatsoever) 
will still be in tension with the soteriological aspect of the Buddha’s teachings because it requires 
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the appropriation and identification of one’s mental states as one’s own, which is for the Buddha 
a source of suffering and an impediment to the only sort of freedom he explicitly recognizes: 
liberation from attachment. 
 
 
2 Reductionism and Responsibility 
 
The distinction between reductionism, non-reductionism (or inflationism) and eliminativism is 
illustrated in the Buddhist literature through the famous example of the chariot. As Siderits 
explains it: 
 
“... ‘chariot’ is a convenient designator for a set of parts assembled in a certain way. Thus 
while there are ultimately no chariots, there are those wholly ‘im-chariotal’ facts into 
which all chariot-talk may be reductively analyzed; it is these facts that explain the utility 
of our talk of the fiction… Given this utility we may say that while the chariot is 
ultimately unreal, it is conventionally real. This will be the reductionist view of chariots. 
The non-reductionist will claim that chariots are both conventionally and ultimately 
real—that in addition to the parts of which chariots are composed, ultimate reality also 
contains some sort of separately existing chariot-essence. And the eliminativist will claim 
that chariots are both ultimately and conventionally unreal—that our talk of chariots is 
misleading and should be replaced by some entirely new way of conceptualizing 
collections of chariot parts.” (2003, p. 7) 
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Like the chariot, persons are seen by the Buddhist Reductionist as conceptual constructions that 
are only conventionally, not ultimately, real. This is the Buddha’s self-described ‘middle path’, 
developed by the Abhidharma schools, between the eternalism of the non-reductionist Nyāya and 
Sāṃkhya (orthodox Indian) schools that believed in a transcendent self called, respectively, 
‘ātman’ and ‘puruṣa’, and the annihilationism of the eliminativists, for whom the denial of an 
eternally and separately existing self entails that the duration of any individual person’s life is 
instantaneous. 
 
Furthermore, reductionism about persons is one interpretation of the seemingly paradoxical 
claims made by the monk Nagasena in his famous dialogue with King Milinda. The king asks, 
given that there is no separate self, whether or not infant Milinda is the same person as adult 
Milinda. Nagasena replies saying that “the adult is neither the same person as the infant, nor is he 
a distinct person” (Siderits 2003, p. 35). According to the Abhidharma commentators, what he 
means is that the adult and infant ultimately are distinct entities (so long as it makes sense to 
think of them ultimately as entities at all), but are conventionally one and the same. 
 
With respect to responsibility, the argument that reductionism implies the extreme claim goes as 
follows. Being responsible requires that we are capable of ‘purposeful action’, which in turn 
necessarily involves what Siderits calls a “thick sense of agency, one that involves seeing 
ourselves as standing over and above our desires and other psychological states” (2003, p. 62). 
So if one accepts the reductionist view, then one could not rationally retain that ‘thick sense of 
agency’ and therefore could not act purposively in the way required for being morally 
responsible. Siderits states the argument, which he attributes to Strawson (1986), as follows:  
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“[I]n order to see ourselves as purposeful agents, we must be prepared to acknowledge 
responsible ownership of our actions; this in turn requires that we see them as stemming 
from a character that we have actively shaped. But this we cannot do unless we view 
ourselves as possessing a self that transcends any of our particular values, projects, and 
life-plans, a self that is so positioned as to be able to endorse any or all of our pro-
attitudes. Hence, the argument concludes, our sense of purposeful agency requires belief 
in just the sort of conception of ourselves that reductionism denies.” (Siderits 2003, p. 62) 
 
According to Siderits, Strawson’s argument depends on the claim that in order to be free in a 
way where we are truly responsible for our actions we must think of ourselves as free in that 
way, which requires that we acknowledge full authorship of the intentional causes of the actions 
in question. To do so I must be “truly responsible for those of my beliefs, desires, dispositions, 
policies, decision-making procedures and the like that resulted in my choosing to perform the 
action” (Siderits 2003, p. 63). However, if determinism is true, then these beliefs, desires, etc. 
that make up my present nature were “determined by factors (of either heredity or environment) 
that were set before I was born and over which I therefore have no control” (p. 63), and so the 
fact that my actions flow from my present nature cannot by itself account for my being 
responsible for them.  
 
What I need, in order to think of myself as free/responsible, is to think of myself as something 
that transcends any of the particular mental states that are the antecedent causes of my actions. 
This self must actually transcend the contents of any individual mental state, particularly “any 
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value or pro-attitude that happens to be contained within” it (p. 63), for it must be the sort of 
thing that can potentially be aware of all my mental states, past or present, that causally 
contribute to my actions.  
 
However, for the reductionist, no individual mental state or series of discrete states can play this 
role because of their transitoriness. A present momentary mental state cannot have been the 
subject of previous states, particularly those that contributed to causing it. Furthermore, 
responsible agency requires normatively assessing the mental states that lead to one’s actions, 
but this assessment can only come from the self, not from any particular, contingent mental 
states with their deterministic causal history.  
 
If one wholeheartedly accepts reductionism, Strawson argues, and therefore ceases to think of 
oneself as possessing the kind of transcendent self explicated above, then one’s sense of oneself 
“as a truly self-determining planner and performer of action” (Siderits 2003, p. 64) is 
undermined. This conclusion reflects the worry that accepting reductionism leads to 
Micawberism, a conception of oneself as a mere passive observer in one’s life-narrative which 
leads to one waiting to see what happens rather than taking an active role in shaping one’s 
character and actions.  
 
Before offering his own response to Strawson’s argument, Siderits first considers and rejects one 
sort of possible move the reductionist could make. As Siderits puts it:  
 
“The Reductionist might be tempted to retreat to a weaker conception of freedom [and 
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responsibility], according to which it is enough that the action ‘come from within’ the 
agent, regardless of how the agent came to have the particular beliefs, desires, 
dispositions etc. from which the action flowed. But this temptation should be resisted, 
since we do expect agents to take responsibility not just for their actions but also for their 
own character… Being responsible for my actions means being responsible for being the 
sort of person who would perform those actions. Any account of freedom that omits this 
is justly criticized as too weak.” (2003, pp. 64-65)        
 
An acceptable account of responsibility cannot be so broad that it makes one responsible for 
actions that are not self-consciously chosen, but only for the sort of actions that can be performed 
by a being that can reflect on its own character and evaluate its own desires. Assuming that only 
persons can be responsible for their actions, such an account should distinguish, in a principled 
way, on the one hand, the kinds of actions a mere animal is capable of, and, on the other, the 
kind only persons can perform (Frankfurt 1971). So the challenge, as Siderits sees it, is to 
explain how a reductionist might rationally believe herself to be responsible not only for her 
actions but for the character that results in those actions: How could a person be responsible for 
their character, understood as the total aggregation of their effective mental life at a time, if they 
just are that aggregation (however conceived as their character, etc.)? How is the self-
determination necessary for responsibility possible without a transcendent self that does the 
determination? Why isn’t “an agent-self that is transcendent yet contentful” necessary for the 
“responsibility-entailing freedom that requires self-determination”? (2003, p. 65) 
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3 The Shifting Coalitions Model of Self-revision 
 
To answer the challenge posed by these questions, Siderits invokes the shifting coalitions 
conception of self-revision that he develops earlier in the book. There, Siderits is concerned to 
show how persons could be capable of self-scrutiny, self-control and self-revision without 
violating what he calls the ‘anti-reflexivity’ principle that ‘an entity cannot operate on itself’ 
(2003, p. 27). The aforementioned capacities seem to require a separate self as subject and chief 
executive, with its particular mental states comprising its object, because if the mental states that 
play the role of the subject that scrutinizes and revises are ever themselves objects of revision, 
which any state seems potentially capable of being, then some mental states would have to serve 
as both subject and object, but that would violate the anti-reflexivity principle:  
 
“For if each of them is a potential object of the executive function, and an entity cannot 
operate on itself, then it seems that none of them could be the one enduring subject that 
performs this function” (p. 26). 
 
However, Siderits rightly points out that the principle is only violated if the same mental states 
are subject and object simultaneously. A reductionist can offer an account of self-revision that 
appeals to shifting coalitions of mental states playing the role of chief executive at different 
times, such that each coalition could be the object of revision at the times when it is not the 
subject. According to the reductionist, the temptation that leads to positing a transcendent self—a 
temptation to be resisted—is to take a particular set of mental states that play the subject role 
relatively frequently and hypostatize them into an enduring subject: “Thus arises the notion that a 
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person has an essence—that some constituents are more central to the existence of the person 
than others” (p. 27).  
 
Holding this view seemingly requires one to deny that the set of mental states taken to be the 
subject is itself subject to revision. But if one has no way of revising the chief executive, then 
one cannot be responsible for the way that executive scrutinizes, controls, and revises one’s other 
mental states and behavior. “For instance, when I decide to curb my bedtime snacking I may be 
employing a particular standard of acceptable body shape, which I may subsequently decide is 
politically problematic and morally questionable” (p. 26). This isn’t such a problem for the non-
reductionist, who can claim that the self, being independent from the psychophysical elements 
that are subject to deterministic laws of physics, is the sole source of independent valuation in a 
person (and may be propped up by a conception, usually religious, of an infallible conscience)—
a view which is endorsed by libertarians about free will.  
 
However, if one denies, for good reason—namely, that we have no evidence for such a thing and 
the concept of it may be internally incoherent in various respects—that such a self exists, and 
says that the executive function is played by some subset of psychophysical states which are, like 
any others, causally determined, then those states must also sometimes be subject to revision by 
other elements of the person/brain. Siderits offers the shifting coalitions view as a solution to this 
problem. 
 
“If I am to be capable of revising my own character, then I require a stock of beliefs and 
desires on the basis of which I may critically evaluate and seek to reform various of my 
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dispositions and tendencies I am called upon to monitor. It may now seem as if, were 
they to constitute a part of the ‘I’ that performs self-revision, then the anti-reflexivity 
principle would be violated. But what this picture omits is the possibility that a given 
stock of beliefs and desires might serve as a basis for a particular bout of self-criticism, 
yet some among these stand under subsequent scrutiny on the basis of a distinct (though 
perhaps overlapping) stock of beliefs and desires... On one occasion my anal-compulsive 
disposition might lead to extirpation of the desire to smoke. Yet, subsequently a wish to 
be more accommodating to others might lead to an effort to curb my anality. At one time 
the anal disposition belongs to the coalition making up the ‘executive’, later it falls out of 
this shifting coalition.” (p. 65)  
 
The shifting coalitions approach posits a kind of feedback loop between psychophysical states 
that allows one to have a sense of self-determination that depends on nothing that is undermined 
by reductionism. Each coalition that at one time plays the role of executive can be at another 
time the object of a different coalition’s scrutiny as well as control and revision. Even if the 
activity of each coalition is causally determined, the fact that there are internal checks and 
balances, and that one cannot be aware of all the facets of one’s psychology at once, yields a 
rationally tenable sense of self-determination. If a person is a system of such shifting coalitions, 
and each one of those is shaped by the activity of others that were themselves once objects of 
scrutiny by some other coalition of elements in the system (though any set may have dropped out 
of the system at any point), so that each coalition has been available for assessment and revision, 
then the system as it is at any point may act in a way for which it can reasonably be held 
responsible in the future. 
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However, the above account would not satisfy Strawson or others who think that reductionism 
undermines self-determination. Recall that Strawson thinks that to see oneself as self-
determining, one must think of oneself as ultimately responsible for one’s character as well as 
one’s actions. Even if one’s character is formed internally by the feedback mechanism of shifting 
coalitions, Strawson would argue that the way in which this system functions is determined by 
factors before one’s birth. For instance, consider Siderits’ example of the kind of self-revision an 
agent must see him or herself as responsible for:  
 
“So my miserable childhood resulted in a predisposition to behavior that causes trouble 
for myself and others? Others tell me to stop kvetching. I agree, and set about trying to 
reform and improve my character.” (2003, p. 64)  
 
Strawson would object that in such a case whether I am or am not the ‘sort of person’ who would 
respond that way to the criticism of others, or who can find the strength within myself to push 
back against the forces of my upbringing, is not really up to me. In other words, it is still a matter 
of deterministic luck whether or not I have the right coalitions with the necessary strength to 
bring about a particular act of self-revision.   
 
Siderits claims that the idea that Micawberism follows from reductionism is due to the 
assumption that without believing in a transcendent self, one can only see oneself as a ‘mere 
conduit of causation’, which entails the denial “that free, responsible agents could believe 
themselves to be constituted by shifting coalitions of volitions” (2003, p. 65). For Siderits, the 
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type of argument Strawson is pushing underestimates our ability to “carry out the sort of self-
monitoring and self-revision required for full responsibility” and our capacity for ‘ironic 
engagement’ (Siderits 2003, p. 66). ‘Ironic engagement’ is characterized as the ability to “induce 
and maintain a belief in a useful fiction while knowing it for what it is” (p. 109). 
 
So, even while recognizing that we are merely bundles of causally determined psychophysical 
elements, we can adopt and genuinely believe in the useful fiction of self-determination. What 
makes the fiction useful is that it accurately distinguishes two types of phenomena, i.e., cases 
where one’s actions are compulsive or automatic, and ones where one’s actions are caused by 
inner states that have been subjected to self-revision under the shifting coalitions model. This 
genuine phenomenal distinction justifies our belief in responsibility. 
 
Nonetheless, that is not the kind of full, ultimate responsibility that Strawson is interested in. 
Nothing short of a genuinely transcendent agent acting outside of the deterministic causal matrix 
could fit that bill. However, it is also not the weak sort of responsibility that Siderits rightly 
rejects, where one’s actions simply ‘come from within’ the agent. The sort of responsibility made 
possible by the shifting coalitions strategy and ironic engagement is distinguished by the 
recognition that actions ‘come from within’ in different ways. The ones that result from a process 
of dynamic self-revision are the ones for which we are responsible.  
 
Siderits’ account of self-revision therefore helps to ground a kind of determinism-compatible 
conception of responsibility that is consistent with reductionism, though it may not be quite the 
robust sort he is aiming for. Still, he has succeeded in demonstrating how resources from the 
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Buddhist tradition can be employed to further explicate positions taken in the Western discussion 
of personal identity, free will and responsibility by explaining how a reductionist can give a 
coherent account of the best, roughly Frankfurtian, compatibilist conception of self-
determination. I mean ‘compatibilist’ not in the sense that acceptance of determinism is 
compatible with all of our pre-reflective attitudes about praise, blame, revenge, and punishment, 
but only that accepting determinism need not undermine our sense of ourselves as purposive 
agents who, at least sometimes, act because of reasons that we are able to reflect on and modify, 
and therefore perform actions for which we can be reasonably held responsible. 
 
 
4 Identification and Attachment 
 
Siderits succeeds in reconciling the metaphysical aspect of the ‘no-self’ doctrine with a 
compatibilist conception of responsibility. However, there remains a further conflict between a 
different aspect of the Buddha’s teachings and any notion of responsibility whatsoever. This 
conflict concerns not the metaphysics of anātman, but its soteriological implications. In putting 
forth the no-self view, the Buddha is not primarily concerned with the mereological relations 
between the skandhas and the experiences of persons that they constitute, but rather with the 
attitudes that persons take toward their experiences and psychophysical characteristics. Any 
conception of responsibility requires, if not the actual identity of the individual with her thoughts 
and actions, then at least the appropriating or identifying with those actions and thoughts as her 
own. For the Buddha, such appropriation and identification constitutes the clinging to what is 
ephemeral that is the essence of suffering and the primary obstacle to enlightenment. 
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To understand this point it is necessary to take a closer look at the skandhas and the role they 
play in the Buddha’s soteriological teaching. In the Saṃyutta Nikāya (“SN”), he states the First 
Noble Truth, the reality of suffering, by reference to the five aggregates: 
 
“Now this, monks, is the noble truth of suffering: birth is suffering, aging is suffering, 
illness is suffering, death is suffering; union with what is displeasing is suffering; 
separation from what is pleasing is suffering; not to get what one wants is suffering; in 
brief, the five aggregates subject to clinging are suffering” (Dhammacakkappavattana 
Sutta V 420-24, SN 56:11; Bodhi 2005, p. 78). 
  
Clinging to the five aggregates is suffering itself, for the Buddha. According to Bodhi’s analysis, 
clinging occurs in two different modes, appropriation and identification. One clings to the 
aggregates first by taking possession of them, ‘this is mine’, and then by using them as a basis 
for self-definition, ‘this is what I am, this is myself’. One who is not on the path toward 
enlightenment, according to the Buddha,  
 
“…regards form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in form. 
He regards feeling as self… perception as self… volitional formations as self… 
consciousness as self, or self as possessing consciousness, or consciousness as in self, or 
self as in consciousness. That is how identity view comes to be.” (SN 22:82, 100-103; 
Majjhima Nikāya 109, III 15-19; Bodhi 2005, p. 340)   
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This passage is a diagnosis of how the mistaken conception of an enduring self comes to be. 
Individual thoughts, sensations and other psychophysical states are appropriated by the person 
who experiences them and are then taken to be part of the identity of that person. The supposed 
person doing the appropriating and identifying, at least according to the shifting coalitions 
model, is just another set of states. So we have one coalition clinging to others as its possessions 
and then taking those others to be part of its own essence. For Siderits, so long as one realizes 
that this is all that’s going on, that no state really is essential to a person’s identity, that at every 
moment of self-scrutiny it may be a different state doing the scrutinizing, and that any state may 
be (at a time that it is not scrutinizing) the object of scrutiny, then one can still rationally assert 
the conventional existence of persons and hold them, oneself included, responsible for their 
actions.  
 
However, such a view does not do justice to the soteriological import of the above diagnosis. The 
problem is not just that we mistakenly take the subject of our self-scrutiny to be independent of 
our fleeting psychophysical states when it is at each moment just another set of those states, nor 
that we also take some fleeting psychophysical states to be essential to our identities. The more 
fundamental problem is that we think of any of those states as belonging to ourselves, either 
essentially or merely contingently, for any duration whatsoever. The shifting coalitions model 
requires that we think of our skandhas as in some way part of us. Each set of elements that make 
up the skandhas may be sometimes in the subject role and sometimes in the object, but they and 
their activities are taken to have some bearing on who we are and what we do, such that we can 
be responsible for the effects of those activities. Such appropriation of the skandhas is just the 
sort of clinging that is, for the Buddha, the basis of suffering and the barrier to enlightenment.  
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Siderits has made a valiant effort at making Buddhism safe for our conception of persons as 
responsible agents. However, no conception of responsibility can be reconciled with the 
soteriological aims of Buddhism because all such conceptions require that thoughts and actions 
be appropriated by and identified with a self, even if that self is regarded as temporary and 
fleeting. To hold myself responsible for some actions and the intentions behind those actions I 
must regard them as my actions, and to do so, rationally or not, is already to become attached and 
to suffer in that attachment. To hold someone else responsible for some actions is to believe that 
they should suffer in the same way and is, therefore, to lack compassion for them.  
 
The upshot is that even if we can consistently think of ourselves—and others—as responsible 
agents, while maintaining reductionist commitments, the view of the Buddha is that we should 
not. Both the soteriological aim of non-attachment and the ethical ideal of universal compassion 
are served by abandoning all conceptions of personal identity, responsibility, and the retributive 
model of reward and punishment that is often founded upon them.    
 
 
	   307	  
References 
 
Bodhi, B., ed., 2005. In the Buddha’s words: an anthology of discourses from the Pāli canon. 
Boston: Wisdom Publications. 
 
Frankfurt, H., 1971. Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. Journal of Philosophy, 
68(1), pp. 5-20. 
 
Siderits, M., 2003. Personal identity and Buddhist philosophy: empty persons. Hampshire: 
Ashgate. 
 
Strawson, G., 1986. Freedom and belief. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
	  14 Psychological versus Metaphysical Agents: A Theravāda Buddhist View of Free Will 
and Moral Responsibility 
 
Peter Harvey 
 
 
A Permanent Self Could Not Be a Free Agent of Actions 
 
A strand of the current discussion of ‘free will’ and Buddhism concerns the fact that most 
forms of Buddhism do not accept a self in the sense of a permanent essence of a person. This 
is then generally seen as equivalent to the non-acceptance of a self as the agent of actions, an 
agent-self, which could be either free or unfree. The connection seems a natural one to make, 
but it is worth pausing to reflect on its appropriateness. 
 
In teaching that ‘everything (all dhammas) [is/are] non-self (anattā)’1 (AN.I.286),2 the 
Buddha meant that they were ‘empty of self and what belongs to self’ (SN.IV.54). Here ‘self’ 
(Pāli: atta; Sanskrit: ātman) is used in a specific kind of sense, to refer to a permanent and 
happy essence of a person. This can be seen in the repeated teaching that it is “not fit to 
consider that which is impermanent, painful, of a nature to change, as: ‘This is mine (etam 
mama), this I am (eso ham asmi), this is my self (eso me attā)”’ (e.g., SN.III.66). Hence, the 
kind of ‘self’ in the term ‘non-self’ is best rendered with an initial capital—‘Self’—to signal 
that it is a specific kind of self. Anything conditioned is seen as impermanent, painful and 
non-Self, but nirvāṇa, the unconditioned, is not seen as impermanent and painful, but still as 
non-Self, because it is beyond any grounds for the arising of the thought ‘I am’ (Harvey 
1995a, pp. 23, 51-3). 
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Now if there were a Self in the above sense, could it be a free agent of action? To answer this, 
one needs to ask if it could be any kind of agent of action. I would argue that the answer is 
‘no’. Why? Because the occurrence of a decision or any other action-initiating event in such a 
putative Self would be a change within it. But if anything has change within it, there is surely 
no way that further changes can reliably be prevented from happening within it, which would 
in time bring about its end; so, it could not actually be permanent, in a strong sense. So, a 
truly permanent Self could not be an agent of action. This seems to be recognized in the 
Sāṃkhya school of Hinduism, in which the puruṣa or inner ‘person’ is not the agent of 
actions, but is simply the observer of an aspect of conditioned and impermanent (material) 
‘nature’ (prakṛti) that is the agent of actions (Flood 1996, pp. 234-35). 
 
Admittedly, in the pre-Buddhist Upaniṣads, the inner immortal ātman or Self is seen as the 
autonomous ‘inner controller’ (antaryamin) of a person’s actions, inner elements and 
faculties (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, 3.7.3). It would also need to be in full control of itself. 
But the Buddha argues in the Anatta-lakkhaṇa Sutta that no aspect of a person is capable of 
being perfectly controlled and shaped at will: 
 
“Material form, monks, is non-Self. Now were this material form Self, it would not 
lead to affliction, and one would be able to effectively say, ‘Let my material form be 
like this, or not like this.’ But inasmuch as material form is non-Self, therefore it leads 
to affliction, and one cannot effectively say, ‘Let my material form be like this, or not 
like this.’” (SN.III.66-8) 
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(The same formulaic line of reasoning is then applied to feeling, perception, volitional 
activities, and consciousness.) This must allude to such facts as that the body gets tired, ill 
and old; we do not feel pleasure all the time, as we might wish; we can act erratically and 
against our better judgement; and our awareness often wanders, being pulled this way and 
that by external events or inner emotions. All aspects of body and mind are conditioned in a 
variety of ways, and cannot be dominated by any controlling factor. Hence, the idea that there 
is a Self that acts as the ‘inner controller’ of them is negated.  
 
Indeed, in response to various quarrelling brahmins and renunciants who hold that ‘pleasure 
and pain, Self and the world’ are self-made (sayaṃ-kato), made by another (paraṃ-kato)—
presumably meaning made by a Self-essence, or made by a separate God, respectively—both, 
or neither, the Buddha says that these teachers are bound by problematic and conceited ideas 
of ‘“I’-as-maker/doer’ (ahaṃ-kāra-pasutā) … ‘another-as-maker/doer’ (paraṃ-
kārûpasañhitā)” (Ud.69-70). That is, the concepts of ultimate makers of the world or ultimate 
agents of action are unsupportable. The Theravāda view is thus that there is karma (action), 
but no “doer of karma (kamma-kārako)” (Katthāvatthu, pp. 53-4). That is, there is 
cetanā/volition, which AN.III.415 defines ‘action’ in terms of, but no specific process that is 
the agent of action, much less a permanent essence that is the agent. 
 
 
Yet Agency Is Accepted 
 
At MN.III.179-80, it is said that Yama, king of the dead, reprimands an evildoer arriving in 
hell, saying that a certain deed was done by him, and not by any friend or relative, so that he 
must experience its karmic result. This passage need not imply that such a past action was 
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done by a substantial, still-existent Self, but only that it was done by an earlier portion of the 
stream-of-states that the person now is, rather than by any other stream-of-states. ‘He’, no 
one else, is responsible. This shows that agency of, and responsibility for, actions is accepted 
in Theravāda Buddhism. 
 
Hence, the Buddha criticized the fatalist view of Makkhali Gosāla (AN.I.173-75), who held 
that there was no cause or condition for the defilement or purification of beings, i.e., no cause 
or condition that they could effect themselves. This is because Gosāla held: 
 
“there is no self-doing or other-doing (atta-kāre … para-kāre), there is no personal 
doing (purisa-kāre), no power, no energy, no personal strength, or personal exertion. 
All beings … are without control (avasā), without power, without energy, they 
experience the pleasure and pain of the six kinds of rebirth, changed according to the 
fixed course (niyata-) of circumstances and individual natures (-saṅgati-bhāva-) … 
[over a fixed series of rebirths] … Just as a ball of string, when thrown, runs till it is 
all unravelled, so fools and wise run and wander on till they make an end of 
suffering.” (DN.I.53-4)  
 
That is, the Buddha rejected a view that saw humans as being passively shaped by an external 
fixed destiny, with no agency of their own with which to influence their own future. 
 
In a very common sense way, the Buddha also pointed out that, within certain limits, we can 
control our actions. When a brahmin came to him and said that he had the view “there is no 
self-doing (atta-kāro), there is no other-doing (para-kāro)”, the Buddha asks him how one 
who “himself (sayaṃ) comes and himself returns” can say this? He then gets the brahmin to 
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see that self-doing and other-doing can be seen inasmuch as there is the ‘element of 
instigation’ (ārabbha-dhātu) and beings who instigate (actions), likewise with the elements of 
persistence, exertion, strength, continuation and application (AN.III.337-38). 
 
 
The Nature of Agency 
 
As a permanent, unconditioned agent of actions is impossible, an agent of actions must be 
something that is subject to change and have limited influence. It would be enmeshed in the 
network of conditions that is a person, and like all conditioned things, be non-Self. If it were 
a permanent Self, it could not do anything.  
 
One might like to think that the agent of one’s actions is an essential, permanent Self/I-agent, 
but this in fact makes no sense if taken literally. Yes, actions are done by the kind-of-person-
one-has-been-so far, but this is ‘permanent’ only in an approximate sense, as a cluster of 
mental and physical process-events with a reasonably consistent, but still changeable, pattern 
to it. This is the only kind of ‘thing’ that can be an agent of action, and Buddhism does not, 
and has no reason to, deny its reality. That said, ‘it’ is a misleading term here, for what is 
being talked about is not a single thing, but an interacting cluster of processes. Yes, a crucial 
process is cetanā—will, intentional volitional impulse—but this is just the most immediate 
condition for the arising of an action of body, speech or mind. And of course it arises 
according to conditions, most immediately, sensory contact (SN.III.60, IV.68). Hence, 
AN.V.113-116 holds that the most immediate condition for misconduct is non-guarding of 
the sense-faculties (regarding what one focuses on, and how). 
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So, while the Theravāda suttas3 do not accept a permanent Self that is the agent of action, that 
stands above all conditions, unaffected by them, a will that is unconditioned, totally free, or 
‘strong free will’, it does accept that a person, as a cluster of conditioned processes including 
will, can have agency and responsibility. 
 
 
The Issue of Freedom and Unfreedom 
 
To what extent and in what way can ‘will’ and its associated mental processes be ‘free’? The 
crucial thing seems to be a capacity for self-direction. When there are no external threats or 
inner insanity, can the stream of related processes that is a particular ‘person’ be such as to be 
able to reflect on possible alternative actions and decide between them, and to make plans 
and be able to carry them out, at least some of the time? The answer, both in common sense 
and Buddhism is ‘yes’; hence right ‘resolve’ (saṅkappa) is a factor of the Noble Eight-
factored Path. 
 
Buddhism would add, though, that: we are not as in charge of ourselves as we would like to 
think, as we get captured by, e.g., greed or aversion; we often act in inconsistent ways; we are 
often deluded and mistaken about what is truly in our best interests; and we delude ourselves 
in after-the-act self-justifications. That is, our ability for self-direction is often used in a 
sloppy, ineffective and problematic way. We have a degree of freedom, but are not as free to 
act in our best interests, or the best interests of others, as we might like to think. But we can 
overcome these limitations, as seen by the Buddha’s saying that he has the qualities of one 
with great wisdom, including that: 
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“He thinks whatever thought (vittakkaṃ) he wants (ākaṅkhati) to think and does not 
think a thought he does not want to think; he resolves in whatever way he wants to 
resolve, and does not have a resolve (saṅkappaṃ) he does not want; thus he has 
attained mental mastery (cetovasippatto) over the ways of thought” (AN.II.36-7). 
 
The Vitakka-saṇṭhāna Sutta gives five methods for attaining such mastery of thought 
(MN.I118-22). 
 
The Buddha clearly taught that we could learn to be freer. But to do that, we need to 
recognize the ways in which we are currently conditioned in unhelpful ways, and be aware of 
alternatives and how to access and establish them. That the Buddha criticized all views that 
saw one’s actions as beyond one’s control—so that bad actions such as killing might be 
determined by one’s past karma, the creative activity of ‘God’, or no cause or condition other 
than the fixed course of destiny (AN.I.173-75)—shows that he felt that we could break free 
of past patterns of conditioning. But doing so was not a matter of going beyond conditions 
(except at the level of final nirvāṇa), but of cultivating a more wholesome, skillful, wise set 
of conditions. It was a matter of assiduous training, involving, among others, four points:  
 
(a) Resolving to keep certain ethical precepts would help cultivate ethical restraint and 
weaken bad habits of behavior. 
 
(b) ‘Guarding the sense-faculties’ would help reduce the extent to which contact with 
certain sense-objects and thought-objects automatically trigger habitual reactions that 
are often unhelpful. 
 
	  	  	   315 
(c) Developing inner calm would help build more inner resilience and mental clarity, 
bringing about a clearer and freer inner space. Hence it is said that when there is 
suspension of the ‘five hindrances’ to wisdom—desire for sense-pleasures, aversion, 
dullness and lethargy, restlessness and worry, and vacillation—one is, respectively, 
like a person free from debt, illness, prison, slavery, and the dangers of a journey 
(DN.I.71-3). 
 
(d) Cultivating insight would help one see that the objects of one’s greed and aversion 
are not truly worthy of these. 
 
A person advanced on the path, strong in these qualities, has an empirical self, i.e., a cluster 
of mental processes, that is more centered, calm and coherent than most people’s—they are 
said to have a ‘great self’ or ‘developed self’ (mahatta, bhāvitatta, It.28-9, 78-9; Harvey 
1995a, pp. 55-8), one that has more effective agency than ordinary people. 
 
In this, mindfulness is a crucial quality, both in enabling a clearer and unbiased view of one’s 
current and past states, learning from this, and connecting to past wholesome states and thus 
helping them re-arise in the present. To the extent that we can choose what we bring to mind 
in memory, we can choose which past experiences and events influence our current actions. 
Mindfulness helps one be more wise and skillful in how one accesses past memories and 
hence brings their influence to play on the present. Similar considerations apply in thoughts 
about the future, in terms of how mindful and skillful one is in bringing to mind future 
possibilities, and what one resolves to put energies into in terms of planning and promises. 
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Is a Conditioned Agency Still Agency? 
 
In what one focuses the mind on, for how long, and in what manner—all of which are key 
conditions for what one does next—there can be an element of choice. This choice, though, 
will be conditioned by all manner of things: past behavior, how one is feeling at the time, 
one’s energy level, what one’s ideals are, where one is and with whom, etc. The crucial 
question here is: do such conditions entail the hard determinist view that determinism negates 
any idea of genuine choice or agency, and hence responsibility? 
 
None of the factors conditioning a choice will be a single determining cause. As explained by 
Buddhaghosa in his explanation of the sequence of conditions in the Buddhist causal 
doctrine, ‘dependent origination’: 
 
“Here there is no single or multiple fruit of any kind from a single cause (kāraṇato); 
nor a single fruit from multiple causes, but only a multiple fruit from multiple 
causes… But one representative cause and fruit are given in this way, ‘with spiritual 
ignorance as condition are the volitional activities…’” (Vism. 542) 
 
A condition for something is only ever one among many, such that what we identify as ‘the 
cause’ is generally only the last condition to fall into place, or a condition of particular 
interest. A choice will have various factors conditioning it, along with how one currently 
construes and relates to such factors. And at different times, the items within the same 
collections of conditions may individually have different strengths.  
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One can, of course, have done things in the past that would strengthen or weaken certain 
conditions, with a view to beneficially influencing one’s future choices. But that just puts the 
focus of the question of ability-to-choose further back in time: At age 20, I did this, rather 
than that, and met a certain range of people, and chose to cultivate particular friends and 
contacts among these, such that I put energy into X rather than Y, which helped lead me to 
being the kind of person I generally am now, who is more likely to choose A rather than not-
A, and so on.  
 
Hence, when one winds things back, one does not just come to past events and circumstances, 
but also to more choices. Current choices are always made by the kind of person that one’s 
own past choices as well as circumstances have shaped one into being. And the more that 
capacity for choice is actively utilized—rather than one passively accepting circumstances, 
and how one is—the more it grows stronger. Thus, agency and responsibility can increase, 
when the right conditions are nurtured. It is not undermined by the mere fact of 
conditionality, if self-determination exists. There is hence a form of compatibilist freedom of 
action, i.e., a freedom of action that is compatible with all actions being conditioned. The 
relevant freedom may be described as of a variable degree. 
 
Any choice/volition would be the product of the totality of its previous and simultaneous 
conditions; these would be its determining condition set, which necessitates its 
arising/existence. In effect, the Abhidhamma4 seeks to spell out as many possible conditions 
as it can for a variety of mental processes, although the Theravāda Abhidhamma at least 
recognizes that its list of ingredient processes of a particular momentary state of mind may be 
incomplete (Dhammasaṅgaṇi, para. 1). 
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Hard Determinism and Predictability in Principle? 
 
Given the totality of conditions in the universe at a particular time, are all future events, 
including a being’s choices, stretching over many lives, already determined, as hard 
determinism holds, so as to be in principle predictable, if all the relevant facts about the 
present could be known? 
 
In Buddhism, there is no higher kind of being than a Buddha; but could even a Buddha have 
the knowledge that could enable such a prediction? As Charles Goodman kindly commented 
on my (Harvey 2007) article: 
 
“great complexity does not conflict with predictability in principle, but only with 
predictability in practice…. In fact, if we accept that the Buddha knew or even could 
have known in 500 BCE how you were going to make all your life decisions, we have 
already and automatically ruled out the view that the future is genuinely open (a view 
you assert on p. 69).” (Goodman 2009a) 
 
On this topic, though, he elsewhere accepts that the Tevijja-vacchagotta Sutta (MN.I.482-83) 
“does not seem to ascribe to the Buddha any special knowledge about the future” (Goodman 
2009b, p. 151). In this sutta, the Buddha denies he has continuous omniscience, but only, 
when he applies his mind to it, unlimited memory of his past lives and ‘divine eye’ 
knowledge of how other beings are reborn according to their karma, and his own liberating 
insight.  
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Goodman continues by saying “But in the Cūḷasakuludāyi Sutta [MN.II.31-2], the Buddha 
claims that he, or anyone else with the divine eye, can answer any question about the future” 
(Goodman 2009b, p. 151). Yet the ‘divine eye’ is not seen as the ability to know all the future 
rebirths of a particular being, but simply to know what their next rebirth will be, based on 
knowledge of the current karma. At DN.III.134, when the issue of whether the Buddha’s 
great knowledge extends to the future is raised, he claims that it does; but the example of 
such knowledge that is given is that he knows that he will have no further rebirths. 
Admittedly, the post-canonical Milindapañha says: 
 
“the Blessed One was omniscient (sabbaññū), but knowledge-and-vision was not 
constantly and continuously (satataṃ samitaṃ) present to the Blessed One. His 
omniscient knowledge was dependent on the adverting (of his mind); when he 
adverted to it he knew whatever it pleased (him to know).” (Miln.102) 
 
Yet in the early texts, while the Buddha talks about various past lives of people, he only ever 
says how someone will next be reborn, or has recently been reborn, or says that someone will 
have a limited number of future lives due to their spiritual realization: for example, a ‘stream-
enterer’ (one having attained a level beyond taking anything as Self or related to a Self) will 
have seven future lives at most (AN.V.120). 
 
To be able to predict everyone’s future in detail, the Buddha would need to be able to know 
every conceivable detail of the world at the present moment, so as to be able to work out how 
this hyper-complex mix of conditions would evolve in the future. But the Buddha’s 
omniscience is not seen as of the kind that can know everything simultaneously, in one 
moment (sakideva)—he denies the possibility of such omniscience at MN.II.127. It would 
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thus take some time to scan and know the totality of the universe; hence the total state of the 
universe at one moment could not be known even by him. And without this knowledge of a 
complete past condition set, precise predictability in practice would be impossible even for a 
Buddha. This must be particularly true of events in the minds of living beings. These are far 
more complex systems than the weather, for example, but chaos theory explains that complex 
dynamic systems such as this, though predictable in principle, have limited predictability in 
practice; for precise starting conditions cannot be exactly known, and small differences can 
have large effects over time. 
 
What of predictability in principle? Relevant here is the fact that the Buddha did not accept 
the view that saw the world as finite, nor its opposite, that it was infinite (Harvey 1995a, pp. 
83-7). He left this as an undetermined issue, holding both that worrying over it was a time-
wasting side-track to the path to liberation (MN.I.429), and also that those with at least the 
insight of a stream-enterer would not go for either view (SN.IV.395). But only if the world 
were finite would it contain a finite set of conditions that could be known, on which a precise 
prediction of the future of the world could be made.  
 
This may be one of the reasons that the Buddha also left as undetermined whether the world 
is eternal or not. As he saw the world is kept going by the karma of the beings in it 
(DN.III.84-92), and only unenlightened beings make karma, if one cannot predict if all beings 
will attain enlightenment, one cannot say if the world will some day end or not. Indeed, when 
he was asked if all beings will attain enlightenment, he was silent (AN.V.194), leaving it an 
undetermined question. 
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So, even the Buddha cannot precisely know everyone’s future, and perhaps this is impossible 
in principle. Nevertheless, all our futures will arise from the immeasurably complex set of 
conditions that is the universe. There is plenty we do not know, and perhaps things we cannot 
know about this. So we need to focus on significant patterns of conditions that we can now 
observe and manipulate. For Buddhism, the most important ones concern the mind, thought 
and action. These are things that can be directly known, and worked on. We can develop 
greater self-directed freedom within this stream of conditions, so any view that suggests 
otherwise, and so encourages passivity, is problematic. 
 
 
Responsibility for Actions, and Blame 
 
In moral discourse, and in a court of law, issues of responsibility and praise and blame are 
central. The more a person is held to have been free of constraints when doing a 
reprehensible action, the more they are held personally responsible so as to be subject to 
stronger blame or punishment. 
 
Hard determinism would seem to undermine all rationales for such blame or punishment 
other than as a useful fiction that may be used to condition people to act in different ways. 
Accordingly, Goodman says:  
 
“An enlightened spiritual teacher might sometimes praise or criticize others, in order 
to cause them to feel emotions that would be helpful to them at their stage on the path. 
But he would never feel any resentment about their mistakes, or regard them as 
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genuinely responsible for their successes; all praise and blame, for such a teacher, 
would be merely an expression of skillful means (upāya).” (Goodman 2009b, p. 159) 
 
Yet in Buddhist texts, Arahats (enlightened beings) are not beyond giving and being the 
object of criticism, implicitly blame. It is said that at the council convened after the Buddha’s 
death, consisting of 500 Arahats, the Arahat Ānanda was taken to task for various failings, 
such as not having asked the Buddha which were the ‘lesser and minor’ monastic rules that 
might be abolished after his death (DN.II.154). He was declared to have committed ‘an 
offence of wrongdoing’ for this (Vin.II.288-29). 
 
Certainly, an enlightened teacher would not have resentment when blaming, and would want 
to be helpful to the blamed person, but then blame is only likely to have beneficial effects if 
the person it is directed at accepts that they were responsible for the blamed act. And this can 
be true, not just a useful delusion on their part. 
 
As I see it, in moral discourse, courts of law, and also in Buddhist monastic discipline, 
holding a person responsible for an action makes perfect sense, so long as they were not 
insane, knew what they were doing, and knew what the immediate effects of their action 
would be. What Buddhism does do, though, is to council greater consideration for mitigating 
circumstances in assessing what degree of punishment or blame is appropriate, and also a 
lack of ill-will or vindictiveness towards a wrong-doer. Blame or punishment should be for 
the potential benefit of the recipient of these, as much as for the protection of others.  
 
This is not a question of using a ‘skillful means’ falsehood.5 It is simply that the only good 
reason to use blame is due to its beneficial potential. In any case, the concept of blame does 
	  	  	   323 
not depend on the idea of a 100% free agent, or agent-essence. It can be sensibly directed at a 
person seen as a dynamic cluster of events/processes, so long as this cluster includes the 
capacity to understand the rebuke, and to reflect on behavior in the light of it. That is, blame 
has a proper place in Buddhist practice so long as it is not given, or taken, as if directed at a 
permanent Self with an unchangeable fault. Indeed, if this were so, blaming would have no 
chance of initiating change in the blamed person! So blame and responsibility are not 
concepts to be transcended as one’s insight grows.  
 
In the Lakkhaṇa Sutta, it is said that the Bodhisatta (the aspiring Buddha-to-be, in the 
Buddha’s immediately previous lives) had great wisdom in that he used to enquire of 
renunciants and brahmins: 
  
“What is it that is wholesome (kusalaṃ), what is it that is unwholesome? What is with 
fault (sāvajjaṃ), what is not? What course is to be followed (sevitabbaṃ), what is 
not?” (DN.III.157) 
 
This sees being ‘with fault’ as closely linked to unwholesomeness, and clearly sees both as 
not to be pursued. Lance Cousins comments that: 
 
“In the great majority of cases … whatever other terms are associated with kusala, the 
term which is always present, usually immediately next to kusala, is blameless 
(anavajja)” (1996, p. 148). 
 
There is a small uncertainty in how best to translate ‘sāvajja’ and ‘anavajja’. Cousins sees 
‘anavajja’, as “(originally) not reprehensible, blameless; (later) faultless” (p. 139). Margaret 
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Cone, in A Dictionary of Pāli, says that ‘avajja’ means, as an adjective, ‘blameable; low, 
inferior’, as a noun, ‘what is blameable; imperfection, fault’, and ‘sāvajja’ as an adjective 
meaning ‘blameable; faulty’ (2001, p. 245). Perhaps a word that captures both aspects of the 
adjectival meaning is ‘wrong’, with ‘right’ for ‘anavajja’. While ‘micchā’ and ‘sammā’ are 
also translated this way, at AN.V.242, the ‘micchā’ and ‘sammā’ path factors are respectively 
called, among other things, ‘sāvajja’ and ‘anavajja’. 
 
It is not surprising, then, that an unwholesome action is also criticized by the discerning or 
wise (viññugarahitā).6 Of course, blame from those who are not wise may not be appropriate: 
the eight worldly phenomena that one needs equanimity in the face of are gain and loss, fame 
and shame, blame and praise (nidā, pasaṃsā), and pleasure and pain (e.g. DN.III.260). As 
King Pasenadi says in the Bāhitika Sutta:  
 
“…we do not recognize anything of value in the praise and blame (vaṇṇaṃ vā 
avaṇṇaṃ) of others spoken by foolish and ignorant people who speak without having 
investigated and evaluated; but we recognize as valuable the praise and blame of 
others spoken by wise, intelligent and sagacious persons who speak after having 
investigated and evaluated” (MN.II.114). 
 
So wisdom does not entail going beyond the use of the idea of blame, and hence 
responsibility and agency. 
 
 
The Benefit of Associating with the Wise 
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Indeed, criticism from the wise is much valued in Buddhism: 
 
“It is easy to see the faults (vajjaṃ) of others, but hard to see one’s own faults. Like 
chaff, one winnows another’s faults, but hides one’s own, like a crafty gambler hiding 
a bad throw.  
 
If you see a wise person who points out faults (vajja-) and is an admonisher, you 
should associate with such an intelligent one as with a revealer of treasure; this will 
always be for the better, not worse.” (Dhammapada vv. 252, 76) 
 
The utterance of another person, which may highlight one’s faults, and one’s own wise, 
probing attention (yoniso manasikāra), are said to be two key conditions for the arising of 
right view (MN.I.294), and consequently for the seven subsequent factors of the Noble Eight-
factored Path. Indeed, if the Buddha had not taught, there would currently be a lot less wise 
attention and mindfulness in the world; and it is said he was inspired to become a buddha by 
many lives previously meeting and being inspired by a past buddha (Buddhavaṃsa, ch. 2A). 
So, other people are a great influence for good, as well as for ill, on our views and actions. It 
is in the context of interaction with other people that most questions of responsibility lay. 
While self-direction shows our agency, direction from others can help us improve this. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Overall, I do not think that either the non-Self teaching, or the teachings that everything other 
than nirvāṇa is conditioned, mean that we do not have a degree of freedom of action, and that 
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concepts of responsibility and blame become unfounded when a person has deep insight into 
these teachings. Rather, such insight, and related aspects of the Buddhist path, make us 
stronger agents of action, with greater responsibility and freedom, but also with greater 
compassion for the way we all bring suffering on ourselves and others by inept actions rooted 
in an ignorance of our conditioned nature. Hence, I infer that I am a ‘semi-compatibilist’ who 
believes in weak free will, and see this as the implication of the teachings of the suttas 
preserved by Theravāda Buddhism. 
 
 
Notes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The term ‘dhamma’ is Pāli for (conditioned) ‘phenomena’; ‘dharma’ in Sanskrit. Cf. 
‘Dhamma’ and ‘Dharma’, respectively, for the ‘Buddhist teaching’, among various 
interpretations (the Law, etc.). 
2 Translations used are the author’s own, with references to page numbers in the Pali Text 
Society edition of the Pāli texts, preceded by volume number where appropriate. See list of 
in-text abbreviations following the Notes section, with references to Pali Text Society 
editions and translators.  
3	  A	  ‘sutta’	  (Pāli;	  Sanskrit:	  ‘sutra’)	  is,	  in	  early	  Buddhism,	  a	  ‘saying	  of	  the	  Buddha’,	  and	  a	  ‘discourse’	  in	  later	  Buddhism	  as	  well	  as	  broadly	  within	  Indian	  philosophy.	  
4	  The	  ‘Higher	  Dhamma’	  (Pāli;	  Sanskrit:	  Abhidharma).	  
5	  In	  any	  case,	  in	  the	  Pāli	  suttas,	  the	  Buddha	  says	  that	  he	  only	  teaches,	  from	  what	  he	  knows	  to	  be	  true,	  what	  is	  spiritually	  helpful	  to	  a	  particular	  person,	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  is	  pleasant	  to	  hear	  (MN.I.395).	  He	  makes	  no	  mention	  of	  false-­‐but-­‐useful	  teachings	  (Harvey	  1995b).	  
6 There is also reference to “virtues dear to the noble ones (ariya-kantehi sīlehi)” (SN.V.343). 
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Abbreviations 
 
AN. Aṅguttara Nikāya (Bodhi 2012) 
DN. Dīgha Nikāya (Walshe 1996) 
It. Itivuttaka (Masefield 2001) 
Miln. Milindapañha (Horner 1963/1964) 
MN. Majjhima Nikāya (Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 1995) 
SN. Saṃyutta Nikāya (Bodhi 2005) 
Ud. Udāna (Masefield 1994) 
Vin. Vinaya Piṭaka (Horner 1938-66) 
Vism. Visuddhimagga (Ñāṇamoli 1999) 
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  15 Emotions and Choice: Lessons from Tsongkhapa 
 
Emily McRae 
 
 
Introduction1 
 
B. Alan Wallace has called the Buddhist traditions’ view of free will a ‘pragmatic position’ that 
builds on an obvious fact of human experience: “there are circumstances under which we are 
more or less free to make wise decisions that contribute to our and others’ genuine happiness” 
(2011, p. 218). In Buddhist traditions, then, the pressing questions of freedom of will—and the 
related concepts of autonomy and choice—are more experiential than intellectual: how do we 
experience freedom in our everyday lives? They are also more normative than descriptive: why 
is exercising choice a good thing?  
 
I flesh out this ‘pragmatic’ position on free will in the Buddhist philosophical traditions by 
focusing on one aspect of human experience that is often assumed to be largely unfree: 
emotional life. Buddhist moral philosophy, especially Tibetan Buddhist philosophy—which I 
draw and focus on here—stands out for the attention it pays to the subtlety of emotional 
experience and the seriousness with which it considers our ability to exercise freedom in our 
emotional lives. In fact, the intentional intervention in—and cultivation of—our emotional 
experiences is a foundational part of Tibetan Buddhist ethics. Many of the Tibetan Buddhist 
mind training (blo sbyong) exercises are aimed at reducing the negative emotional experiences of 
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anger, envy, and hatred and cultivating positive emotions, including love, compassion, and 
equanimity (e.g., Patrul 1994, pp. 223-237; Tsongkhapa 2000, pp. 50-60; Gyalchok and Gyaltsen 
2006, pp. 247-257).  
 
I turn to the 14th century Tibetan Buddhist yogin and philosopher Tsongkhapa, whose account of 
anger and compassion offers a compelling explanation of the causes and conditions of our 
emotional experiences and the extent to which they are under our control. Drawing on 
Tsongkhapa, I argue that our ability to choose emotions is best understood as a capacity for 
intentional intervention, which depends not only on the strength of the emotion, but our 
background knowledge of the nature of emotional experiences and our capacity to observe our 
emotional states as they occur.  
 
First, two qualifications regarding terminology are in order. As has been demonstrated by others 
(Dreyfus 2001; Heim 2008), there is no concept of ‘emotion’ in Buddhism and hence none of the 
accompanying concepts, such as the reason/emotion dichotomy, which are so prevalent in 
Western philosophy. In Tibetan, as in all traditional languages of Buddhism, there is no word for 
‘emotion’, although there are words for particular emotions, such as love, anger, compassion, 
and envy, which are analyzed at length.2  
 
Although there are no theories of emotion in Buddhist philosophy, philosophical reflection about 
the nature of certain emotions tends to emphasize the cognitive and affective elements of 
emotional experience, as well as long-term causes and conditions of emotional experience, such 
as underlying predispositions and habits, one’s environment, and the company one keeps. In 
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what follows, I draw on these reflections on the nature of particular emotional experiences to 
investigate the degree of control we have in these experiences and the dispositions that form 
from them.  
 
Second, one of the aims in this paper is to uncover what ‘choice’ means in the context of 
emotional life. I use the word ‘choice’ mainly because it is used in the Western philosophical 
scholarship of the emotions with which I am in dialogue (Solomon 1976a; Rorty 1980; 
Nussbaum 1990). I take ‘choice’ to refer to a general sense of having control of and facility with 
our emotional experiences as well as the capacity to directly, intentionally, and through our own 
power influence our emotional dispositions. In this way, I use a more conventional rather than 
philosophically technical definition of ‘choice’, for instance, one that already assumes certain 
metaphysical notions of free will.  
 
Part of what I am attempting to do in this paper is to try to uncover what a Buddhist pragmatic 
position on free will would look like. In Tibetan there are no words that directly correspond to 
the Western philosophical concepts of ‘choice’ or ‘free will’.3 But, there is overlap between the 
more conventional notion of choice, as outlined above, and traditional concepts in Tibetan 
Buddhism. For instance, the Tibetan word ‘rang dbang’—which Tsongkhapa uses in his 
discussion of managing our negative emotions—connotes self-control, autonomy, and 
independence. In what follows I hope to show that we can learn a great deal about exercising 
choice in our emotional lives—in the general rather than philosophically technical sense—by 
examining Tsongkhapa’s analysis of the possibility of having self-control (rang dbang) in the 
midst of a strong emotional experience.  
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Causes and Conditions for Afflictive Emotions: Tsongkhapa’s Account 
 
In his discussion of the afflictive emotions in the Great Treatise of the Stages of the Path to 
Enlightenment (lam rim chen mo), Tsongkhapa (2000) draws on three main causes of these 
emotions: object, subject and basis. The first cause, the ‘object’, is who or what the emotion is 
about. Under this heading, Tsongkhapa also includes the judgments we make about the objects of 
our emotions. If I am envious of you, both you and the judgment I made about you (that you 
have more than you deserve) are included as part of the object of the envy (pp. 161-163). The 
object and the judgments made about it are conditions for afflictive emotional responses that are 
often emphasized in Western scholarship on emotions. Along with the object, emotional 
experience also requires a subject, that is, the being who is experiencing the emotion. The third 
cause of an afflictive emotion is what he calls ‘the basis’, or the basic predispositions towards 
certain emotional responses and against others. These predispositions are formed by (often 
complex) previous causes and conditions.4 
 
Suppose I am angry with you for (what I perceive to be) a harsh criticism of a paper of which I 
am (or was, until your criticism) particularly proud.5 The object of the emotion, anger, is you and 
your harsh criticism. I am the subject of the emotion and the basis of the emotion is my own 
predisposition to be sensitive to criticism and my over-identification with my philosophical 
ideas. These predispositions, which set me up to be angry in situations where my work is under 
review, are formed by my experiences in this and previous lives. For example, I may have been 
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taught or picked up the view that a direct challenge to one’s most cherished beliefs is a sign of 
deep disrespect and I may have seen friends or family members respond with anger in these 
situations. If I have developed the habit of becoming angry in this kind of situation in the past, 
then it is likely—if I do not intervene in some way—that I will become angry again in the 
present circumstance. Other people who do not share my predispositions would not be similarly 
set up to feel anger in this situation.6 
 
Tsongkhapa’s inclusion of the basis of emotion gives his account particular explanatory power, 
since by examining the basis we can better account for emotional experiences that would be 
difficult to explain by just looking to the object of the emotion and the judgments we make about 
it. Consider Tsongkhapa’s analysis of someone who intentionally (without remorse) harms 
another. He writes, 
 
“... when the conditions and causes—seeds left by afflictions to which they were 
previously habituated, a nearby object, and erroneous conceptions—come together, 
[those who do harm] give rise to the thought to harm, even though the harmdoers do not 
think, ‘I will feel malice’; whereas if those causes and conditions are not complete, they 
will never produce the thought to harm, even if the harmdoers think, ‘I will feel malice’” 
(2000, p. 161). 
 
This analysis recognizes that, for hatred or malice to occur, one needs to have the perception of 
the right kind of object (‘the nearby object’) as well as a certain judgment (which Tsongkhapa 
sees as ‘erroneous conception’). But the basic predisposition toward hatred or malice is what 
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allows certain thoughts and perceptions to ‘stick’ and develop into the intention to harm. As 
Tsongkhapa points out, the thought ‘I will feel malice’ is neither necessary nor sufficient to give 
rise to feeling malice and the desire to harm others, since such feelings and desires can arise 
without the thought ‘I will feel malice’ and one can have this thought without it giving rise to 
malice. The thought must resonate with the person’s basic predispositions in order for it to give 
rise to intentions.  
 
Contemporary Western philosophical scholarship (Solomon 1976a; Nussbaum 1990) often 
focuses nearly exclusively on the judgments or thoughts behind an emotional experience. In the 
case of malice, these thoughts may include: ‘you are inferior to me’, ‘you do not deserve what 
you have’, or ‘you have wronged me’. The thought ‘you are inferior to me’ may give rise to 
feelings of contempt, hatred or malice in some people. But in other persons it may give rise to 
shame, guilt or pity, which may motivate a desire to help another as a form of compensation. 
Alternatively, such a thought could give rise to feelings of pride or arrogance without any desire 
to harm or help another. The same thought and the same perceived object could produce different 
emotional and conative states in different people. This is difficult to explain if we only focus on 
the intentionality of an emotion and its accompanying thoughts, beliefs or judgments. 
Tsongkhapa, however, would explain these differences by pointing to differences in underlying 
predispositions.7 
 
 
A Puzzle for Tsongkhapa 
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Tsongkhapa (and most Tibetan Buddhist philosophers) generally sees emotions as fundamentally 
malleable and subject to intentional cultivation, despite the fact that they issue from a wide range 
of causes and conditions, some of which are more consciously accessible than others. Yet, 
despite his commitment to the project of intentionally transforming emotions, he often 
emphasizes the lack of self-control one has over one’s emotional states. In fact, one of 
Tsongkhapa’s tactics for cultivating patience is to see anger as unjustified. The main strategy for 
doing that is to see the person who has wronged you as lacking self-control. Immediately 
following the passage on malice quoted above, Tsongkhapa writes, 
 
“These causes and conditions produce the desire to harm; this in turn produces the work 
of harming; and this produces suffering for someone else, so those harmdoers do not have 
even the slightest self-control (rang dbang cung zad kyang med). Moreover, they have 
become like servants of their afflictions, because they are under the control of others, i.e., 
their afflictions.” (2000, p. 161, my italics) 
 
This claim seems surprising, especially since it is stated in the middle of a larger discussion 
about how to manage our emotions, particularly anger and the desire to harm. How, on the one 
hand, can Tsongkhapa argue that those who feel malice toward us have no self-control and yet 
our malice towards others must be controlled, managed and eventually eradicated? Do we not 
also lack even the ‘slightest self-control’ with regard to our anger? Are we not also ‘servants of 
our afflictions’? 
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I argue that, with regard to the emotions, choice is best understood as the capacity for intentional 
intervention in our emotional experiences. Successful intervention in our emotions depends on 
certain factors, including the knowledge of methods of intervention, some understanding of the 
nature of the emotion and the depth and breadth of one’s awareness of one’s emotional state. In 
the following section, I examine some Western philosophical conceptions of choice or control 
over the emotions and argue that choice is best understood as intentional intervention. I argue 
that this understanding of emotional experience can explain the puzzle that I posed for 
Tsongkhapa. 
 
 
Emotions and Choice 
 
Historically in Western philosophical ethics, emotions have often been seen as fickle, unreliable 
and ultimately out of our control. Since the pervasiveness of this view in Western philosophy has 
been well documented, I will only briefly recount it (Sherman 1997; Solomon 1976a, 2007). 
Many of the most influential thinkers in the history of Western ethics, despite deep theoretical 
differences, shared skepticism about the possibility and desirability of intervening in one’s 
emotional responses. Kant, for example, was skeptical of the project of basing morality on 
emotions at least in part due to the unreliability of emotional responses.8 Neither David Hume 
(1975) nor Adam Smith (1948)—despite their view that emotions, in particular sympathy, are the 
foundation of morality—present or even imply a program by which we can intentionally 
cultivate, control or choose sympathy.9 Even Aristotle, in his Rhetoric, who recognizes the 
power of orators to trigger certain emotional states, says surprisingly little about the intentional 
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cultivation of emotions in the Nichomachean Ethics, claims that emotions do not issue from 
choice (2002, 1106a2), and expresses a general skepticism regarding our ability to change our 
emotional dispositions as adults (Bk. X).10 
 
However, in contemporary Western philosophical scholarship on the emotions there has been 
increasing criticism of the traditional view that emotions are out of our control (Solomon 1976a, 
1976b, 2003, 2004, 2007; Sherman 1997; Nussbaum 2001). Solomon, for example, even claimed 
that we can choose our emotions (1976b). But what does ‘choosing’ one’s emotions mean?  
 
Even a skeptic would agree with one basic sense in which we can choose our emotions: we can 
choose, at least to some degree, the external circumstances that are likely to give rise to emotions 
that we value and not to emotions that we do not value. This very limited sense of choice is 
analogous to ‘choosing’ not to get sick; we can only choose to do things that will make it less 
likely that we will get sick.  
 
This idea of choice, which basically amounts to the avoidance of triggers, is philosophically thin 
and not always easy to accomplish. Philosophically, this basic sense of choice is not about 
emotions. Rather, it is about exercising choice over one’s actions and control over one’s 
circumstances. However, although learning to avoid situations that we have reason to think 
trigger uncontrollable negative emotions is important, it is not possible (and probably not 
desirable) to avoid all triggers of negative emotions. Simply by having relationships with others 
we will be exposed to situations that trigger negative emotions, such as jealousy or clinging 
infatuation. If, as Tsongkhapa suggests, there is a sense in which emotional dispositions set us up 
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for similar emotional experiences—consider the case of the angry person looking for someone to 
knock the chip off his shoulder—avoiding triggers may be difficult. Even hermits meditating in 
caves cannot escape the triggers of negative emotions.11  
 
Solomon offers a more robust sense in which we may choose emotions. He argues that emotions 
are essentially judgments. For example, anger is the judgment that one has been wronged and 
compassion is the judgment that another is unfairly suffering. According to this view, choosing 
emotions amounts to choosing how we judge situations. He writes,  
 
“By forcing myself to be scrupulous in the search for evidence and knowledge of 
circumstance, and by training myself in self-understanding regarding my prejudices and 
influences, and by placing myself in appropriate circumstances, I can determine the kinds 
of judgments I will tend to make. I can do the same for my emotions.” (1976b, p. 32) 
 
The idea here is not that we choose our emotions simply by avoiding the external situations that 
trigger them, but rather that we choose them by recognizing the emotion, including the object 
and cause(s) of the emotion, and challenging the judgments (or, we might add, thoughts, beliefs 
or images) that are triggering and sustaining the emotional experience. This kind of choice, while 
not nearly as direct as choosing to lift one’s arm, is still a robust sense of choice that can capture 
the ways in which we generally think we should take responsibility for our emotional lives.  
 
This approach to choosing our emotions allows for more direct engagement in the formation, 
maintenance, and longevity of an emotional experience than does the avoidance-of-triggers 
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approach. On this view, if we are angry with someone, we can choose to reduce or eradicate that 
anger by analyzing the judgments we have made about the object of our anger and, by critically 
examining these judgments, we can reduce the duration and intensity of the emotional 
experience.  
 
One problem with this approach, however, is that it focuses only on engagement with the object 
of the emotion. As noted, the object of the emotion is not always the cause of the emotion. We 
may feel anger at someone due to the complex causes and conditions that shaped our personal 
history (Tsongkhapa’s ‘basis’), such as our physical and psychological health, childhood 
experiences, emotional stress or fatigue, or substance abuse. In other words, although an emotion 
almost always has an object, sometimes the main cause of the emotion is the basis, not the 
object. When this is the case, analyzing the judgments that we make about the objects of our 
emotion seems ineffective, except perhaps to show us that the object is not the cause of the 
emotional experience.  
 
Tsongkhapa’s analysis of the three main causes of afflictive emotional experience, however, can 
give an account of choosing our emotions that is not limited to analyzing the object of the 
emotion. On his account, our emotional experiences are the result of many causes and 
conditions—and not only the object (which is most apparent to us). When we believe, as we 
usually do, that the judgments behind our emotions are true, it seems that the only way to explain 
and hence transform that emotion is to do something about the object. For instance, if I believe 
that my anger has that singular cause (the object of my anger), then my attempts to address my 
anger will focus on the person who I perceive as having wronged me. I may, depending on my 
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social power and personality, abuse or attack the person or I may turn the anger inward and 
cultivate resentment and hostility. But, if I open up the causal story of my anger to include, for 
instance, my sleep-deprivation, my childhood and other formative experiences and the habits I 
have formed because of them, the company I keep, and the environment in which I spend my 
days, then I have more avenues for addressing my anger. I could take a nap, seek therapeutic or 
spiritual practices that address childhood trauma, or befriend more positive people. Because 
emotions have more causes than simply their objects, methods that address such causes (in 
addition to the object) will be efficacious.  
 
The intentional intervention in this wide range of causal conditions of emotional experience is, I 
submit, the best way to think about exercising choice or control over our emotions. As 
Tsongkhapa’s account makes clear, emotions form from a variety of causes and conditions, 
including our judgments about the objects of our emotions, our environments, health and 
personal history. The problem with the first two conceptions of choice—as avoidance of triggers 
and as engagement with judgments—is that they are too narrow in scope. The first restricts focus 
to one’s environment and the second to one’s judgments. But if Tsongkhapa is right about the 
range of causal conditions of emotional experience, then successful intervention in one’s 
emotions will engage all these causal and conditions.  
 
There are certain core features of successful intentional intervention in one’s emotional life. 
These features are highlighted in what I take to resolve Tsongkhapa’s puzzle, to which I now 
turn.  
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Solving Tsongkhapa’s Puzzle 
 
Tsongkhapa’s account of afflictive emotional experience allows for many avenues for 
intervention. This explains his assumption that emotions can be transformed, trained and 
cultivated. But how do we explain his comments that others who act on their afflictive emotions 
lack self-control? One possibility is that his claim, that others lack control over afflictive 
emotions, is a useful fiction designed to facilitate our moral and spiritual development. If the 
goal is simply to decrease and eventually eliminate our afflictive emotions, then imagining those 
who harm us as having no control over their actions seems prudent (as long as it is believable 
enough to be motivating).  
  
But given Tsongkhapa’s general commitment to understanding reality and not simply producing 
desired mental states, it seems unlikely he intended these reflections on a harmdoer’s lack of 
control as useful fictions. I see no reason not to take Tsongkhapa at his word that there is some 
important sense in which people who harm us have no control over their afflictive emotions, yet 
we (readers of Tsongkhapa) have some degree of control over ours.  
 
Tsongkhapa’s discussion introduces two levels of control over the emotions: the relative self-
control of the reader of Tsongkhapa, who has a commitment to practice the meditations 
Tsongkhapa presents (the ‘meditator’), and the relative lack of self-control of the person who has 
harmed another (the ‘harmdoer’). There are two main differences between the meditator and the 
harmdoer that can explain why it may make sense to say the former has control over afflictive 
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emotions while the latter does not. The first is that the harmdoer has already harmed someone (in 
this case, the meditator). The meditator, on the other hand, feels anger or resentment, but has not 
yet harmed the other person (as the example goes). The second main difference is that the 
meditator, in virtue of being a meditator and a reader of Tsongkhapa, has exposure to a variety of 
practical methods that are designed to intervene in our afflictive emotions. This is not to say, of 
course, that a person who is a meditator could not also be a harmdoer or vice versa. Rather, the 
differences are between a person who, out of hatred or malice, has already intentionally harmed 
someone else and a person (maybe the same one at a later time) who feels hatred or anger toward 
another but has not acted on it, and has access to relevant methods of intervention in emotional 
experience. 
 
Tsongkhapa seems to take the fact that the harmdoer has already harmed another out of hatred or 
malice as evidence that the harmdoer lacks control over her afflictive emotions. The idea is that, 
since people who have strong afflictive emotions and harm others are, in the Buddhist view, 
perpetuating their own suffering, we can be sure that they lack self-control since, presumably, 
they do not want to suffer and would not, if they could help it.12 The fact that they are 
participating in the misery-producing lifestyle in which people intentionally hurt each other 
means that they lack control over their afflictive emotions.  
 
That the harmdoer did not intervene in her afflictive emotions (and subsequently harmed 
someone) means either she did not attempt to intervene in the emotional experiences that 
preceded her harmful action or she did and was unsuccessful. If she did not consider intervening, 
either she does not know how (ignorance) or she does but did not on that occasion think to 
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attempt an intervention (thoughtlessness). In either case, the harmdoer does not have many live 
choices because either she does not know what her options are or she is not mindful enough to 
realize she is in a situation in which interventions in her afflictive emotions may be helpful. 
Alternatively, a harmdoer may have considered an intervention but did not follow through, or 
attempted an intervention and failed because, for example, she was attracted to the afflictive 
emotion or identified with it. So, if someone has done harm, then that indicates lack of sufficient 
self-control.13 
 
The meditator, on the other hand, is experimenting with interventions at an earlier stage, when 
the anger or hatred is still forming. Because the meditator presumably has knowledge of possible 
interventions (because she is reading Tsongkhapa), ignorance of appropriate tactics is not an 
obstacle to intervention. Similarly, since the meditator is engaging in these meditations, 
thoughtlessness is not an obstacle to intervention. Furthermore, because the meditator has not yet 
harmed another, it seems that her afflictive emotions have not reached the pitch of those of the 
harmdoer. She has three advantages to successful intervention—knowledge, mindfulness, and 
decreased emotional intensity—that the harmdoer lacked. When we consider these advantages, it 
seems less asymmetrical to claim that the harmdoer lacks control of her emotions but the 
meditator does not.  
 
Tsongkhapa’s example of the lack of control of the harmdoer and the relative self-control of the 
meditator reveals some important features of successful intervention in emotional life. First, 
successful intervention depends not only on the intensity of the emotional experience, but also on 
our knowledge and ability to pay attention to our experiences. Second, within the same 
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emotional event, say, anger, there may be points at which we can intervene and points at which 
we cannot. Anger, like many emotions, is not a monolithic experience. If it is prolonged, there 
are points when anger increases and decreases. Although we may lack control when anger has 
surged, we may not when anger begins to diminish (or before it surges). It is helpful, therefore, 
to understand the nature of emotional experience as changing and amorphous. To say that the 
degree of control we have in our emotional lives varies does not, therefore, translate into the 
claim that there are some emotions that we have control over and others we do not. Rather, 
within any emotional experience there are opportunities for intervention.  
 
 
Concluding Remarks: Emotions, Choice, and Free Will 
 
I have argued, with Tsongkhapa, that successful intervention in a negative emotional experience 
depends not only on the intensity of the emotional experience, but also on one’s ability to pay 
attention to the workings of one’s mind and body, knowledge of intervention practices, and 
insight into the nature of emotional experiences. I maintain that this explains Tsongkhapa’s 
seemingly contradictory claims that the meditator can and should control (and eventually 
abandon) her anger and desire to harm others while the harmdoer is a ‘servant to her afflictions’.  
 
But what are the implications of Tsongkhapa’s account for understanding free will in the 
Western philosophical context? Unlike typical deterministic arguments in Western philosophy 
that make explicit the vast web of causes that preceded any particular action to underscore how 
unfree the action was, Tsongkhapa uses the understanding of the complex preconditions of our 
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actions in order to explain how we can be more free in our actions, thoughts and feelings. 
Understanding the ways our emotional lives are causally conditioned increases our freedom. 
Moreover, Tsongkhapa’s account suggests that freedom of will is not something that we either 
have or do not, but can come in degrees: we can gain and lose our freedom. We can gain more 
freedom, at least in part, by coming to understand the ways in which we are not free (see also 
Harvey 2007, p. 84). As Peter Harvey has argued with respect to Theravāda accounts of 
psychological freedom, “Mindfulness of how-I-am-conditioned-so-far seems a crucial ingredient 
in increasing freedom by reducing one’s conditioning, replacing limiting unskillful conditioning 
by more open-ended skillful conditioning” (p. 85). 
 
Second, Tsongkhapa’s approach to exercising choice in one’s emotional life highlights the 
forward-looking moral implications of the free will debate. Backward-looking models of 
responsibility—placing moral blame or praise for past actions—is not the focus of Tsongkhapa’s 
analysis, although it typically is the focus of Western philosophical approaches here. Rather than 
asking if we can be held morally responsible for the actions we have performed, the more 
pressing question for Tsongkhapa (and Buddhist ethicists generally) is whether we will be 
motivated to strive for virtue and eliminate vice.14 Buddhist ethics refocuses the question from 
“Could he have done otherwise and, if not, should we blame (or praise) him?” to “Can I be freer 
in the ways I think, feel, and act, to help myself and others?” This does not imply backward-
looking questions of responsibility are unimportant, but that discussions of free will are relevant 
to forward-looking considerations of self-cultivation that have been relatively unexplored in 
Western moral philosophy.  
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1 Parts of this paper first appeared in “Emotions, Ethics, and Choice: Lessons from Tsongkhapa”, 
Journal of Buddhist Ethics, 19 (2012), pp. 344-369; I thank JBE for permission to reproduce 
them here. 
2 According to Dreyfus, in some circles the neologism ‘tshor myong’ is used in order to facilitate 
communication between Tibetan teachers and Western students, for whom ‘emotion’ is too 
important a concept to do without (2001, p. 31).  
3 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer at the Journal of Buddhist Ethics for helpful 
comments and questions on the meaning of ‘choice’ in Tsongkhapa’s texts. 
4 For a more detailed account of the causes and conditions of emotional experience as explained 
by Tsongkhapa, see Tenzin (1999).  
5 This example is based on an example given by Solomon (1976a). 
6 I focus on the emotion of anger because, for Tsongkhapa and other Mahāyāna Buddhist 
philosophers, anger is a particularly destructive emotion and great attention is given to methods 
of reducing, eradicating or transforming it. See Cozort (1995).  
7 Rorty has argued for the explanatory power of the basis of an emotion, which she called the 
‘magnetizing disposition’ that orients an emotional experience. She defines it as a “disposition to 
gravitate toward and to create conditions that spring other dispositions” (1980, pp. 106-107). 
8 In the Groundwork, Kant notoriously overstated his skepticism when he claimed that 
‘inclinations’, such as love or sympathy, are “so far from having an absolute worth” that it must 
be the “universal wish of every rational being to be altogether free of them” (1786, p. 79).  
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9 According to Smith, although the ability to feel love and sympathy is inherent in human nature 
(even the ‘greatest ruffian’ is not altogether without them), there are natural limits to the degree 
to which we feel these emotions (1948, p. 73). Yet, no program of cultivating sympathy or 
intervening in emotional obstacles to sympathy is offered or implied. 
10 There are some exceptions to this general skepticism. In his discussion of friendship, Aristotle 
considers the possibility that one’s friends, once good, can become bad (2002, 1165b1-b23). He 
also implies that it is possible that one’s friend may, as an adult, be made good again (1165b19-
b20). Since becoming good means habituating one’s action and feelings, becoming good would 
presumably involve the changing of one’s emotional habits as an adult. However, Aristotle does 
not state whether these changes are achieved through intentional invention or because of a 
change in one’s circumstances.  
11 In a recent article on meditation retreats for lay people, one participant revealed that in a one-
month silent retreat, he suffered from (a completely unfounded) worry that his dog had died in 
the interim (Stout 2011).  
12 Tsongkhapa writes, “If these beings had self-control, they would not have any suffering, 
because they could control it” (2000, p. 162).  
13 This is an interesting point of similarity between Tsongkhapa’s view and Socrates’s position, 
in the Apology 25e-26b and the Meno 77b-78b (Plato 2002), that no one knowingly does wrong. 
14 In his discussion of free will in the Theravāda, Harvey claims that “Buddhism accepts 
‘freedom of will’ in the sense that before one acts one can and should stop and reflect on things 
to assess [their] moral suitability” (2007, p. 84); see also Wallace 2011, p. 219). 
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  16 Grasping Snakes: Reflections on Free Will, Samādhi, and Dharmas 
 
Karin Meyers 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Before one can entertain the question of whether or how there is free will in Buddhism, one must 
define ‘free will’ and decide which Buddhism(s) one has in mind. There are conceptions of free 
will that are antithetical to common Buddhist ideas about the mind or person—such as the 
conception of free will as a specific faculty of the soul or as a power enjoyed by an autonomous 
agent. The fact that Buddhists cannot accept these forms of free will is of historical interest, but 
does not tell us much about Buddhist perspectives on freedom and action.  
 
The problem is that these are specific theoretical postulates invoked to explain a much more 
basic fact of the human condition—the fact that human beings appear to have some degree of 
choice and control with respect to their external actions and even their internal mental states. We 
might call these ‘empirical freedom of action’ and ‘empirical free will’, respectively. These are 
conceptually distinct, but for economy’s sake I use ‘empirical free will’ to encompass both. The 
crucial point is that the term signals a set of pre-theoretical assumptions about human freedom. 
 
Regardless of the metaphysical truth underlying empirical free will (or the conceptual models 
invoked to explain it), it appears to be at the heart of the free will problem in the West, and is 
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presupposed by virtually all conceptions of the Buddhist path. However, until recently Buddhists 
didn’t regard its existence a problem. This should give us pause to consider from whence our 
free will problem arose, and caution us against seeking in Buddhist texts analogues to the 
categories and assumptions that have made free will a problem for us.1  
 
Elsewhere, I have argued if there is something like a problem of free will for Buddhists, it lays in 
the tension between personal and impersonal levels of discourse and experience, and should be 
examined in the context of Buddhist soteriology, rather than through the lens of concerns about 
determinism or moral responsibility (Meyers 2014). I have also argued at length against the 
thesis that all South Asian Buddhists (or perhaps any) were causal determinists and that the 
Buddhist commitment to empirical free will or to intention (cetanā) as a necessary ingredient of 
action (karman) implies some form of libertarianism; I have also illustrated the distortions that 
arise from imposing our (largely Judeo-Christian) concerns about moral responsibility onto the 
doctrine of karma (Meyers 2010). However, pressed to arrive at a conclusion about ‘free will’ in 
Buddhism, and with Abhidharma (‘Higher Dharma’ teaching) in mind, I have also suggested 
that while the freedoms attributed to persons can be explained in terms of impersonal 
psychophysical events (dharmas)—a view generally consistent with either compatibilism or 
event causal libertarianism—belief in these freedoms involves a kind of delusion about oneself 
as an agent critical for progress on the path.2 
 
Here, I modify and expand upon this line of argument by tracing a greater plurality of Buddhist 
views on the relationship between personal and impersonal discourse and experience. I drop any 
attempt to attach to these familiar labels such as ‘compatibilism’ and instead focus on the ways 
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in which they challenge our assumptions. In the first part of the essay, I draw upon the Pāli 
Nikāyas3 to demonstrate that while empirical free will is assumed, it exists alongside varieties of 
freedom that we might consider impossible. Next, I draw upon the path outlined in the Nikāyas 
and Abhidharma4 to explain the role samādhi (meditative concentration)5 plays in the cultivation 
of these freedoms. I then take a more constructive turn, comparing how empirical free will can 
be explained in light of various Buddhist views on persons and dharmas (phenomena).  
 
Although I cannot examine these views in detail, I attempt to demonstrate how they reveal a 
greater range of conceptual options for a Buddhist response to the free will problem than has 
sometimes been appreciated. The comparison also underscores a methodological point: in order 
to have meaningful philosophical dialogue with Buddhist traditions, we must recognize their 
diversity and historicity (as well as our own).  
 
 
Empirical Free Will in the Nikāyas 
 
While later Buddhist schools developed sophisticated explanations for the relationship between 
appearances and reality, the Nikāyas tend to be more pragmatically orientated. They agree with 
the broader Indian and Buddhist view that ordinary beings do not see things exactly as they are, 
but do not offer an ontological theory regarding the relation between what ordinary beings see 
and what a Buddha or arhat (liberated being) sees. In this context, it is assumed that persons are 
able to choose between one course of action and another and even gain optimal control over their 
mental states. In other words, the Nikāyas treat empirical free will as a real phenomenon and 
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basic axiom of the path. There is no palpable worry that this might be inconsistent with the 
Buddha’s other prescriptions to end suffering, such as to regard the psychophysical aggregates as 
dependently arisen and not-self (Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta (SN iii.66-68); Bodhi 2000, pp. 901-
903).6  
 
Thus, the Buddha exhorts his disciples to reflect on their actions so that they might choose a 
better course (Ambalaṭṭhikārāhulovāda (M i.415); Bodhi and Ñāṇamoli 1995, p. 524), or 
commends the ideal monk for his ability to control his mind and not be controlled by it (p. 310), 
for having mastery over his mind (AN iv.34; Bodhi 2012, p. 1024)—even to the degree that he 
does not think any thought that he does not wish to think (AN ii.36; Bodhi 2012, p. 423). As if 
that were not already considerably beyond what we typically have in mind as empirical free will, 
the Buddha explains that an adept at samādhi can wield manifold supernormal powers thereby 
creating and controlling matter in the human and divine realms and seeing into others’ minds 
(Sāmaññaphala Sutta (DN i.76-80); Walshe 1994, pp. 104-106).7 Such powers are not strictly 
required for individual liberation,8 but this does not mean they were unreal or unimportant, even 
for otherwise ‘rational’ Buddhist philosophers.  
 
No matter how much we try to domesticate it, Buddhism does not and could not take place in a 
materialist universe. The significance of this with regard to free will is not always appreciated. 
The fact that consciousness is at least as basic and in many cases more basic than matter, and 
always more important, results in a consistent prioritization of subjective data (data discerned 
subjectively and data regarding subjective experience) that is not particularly conducive to the 
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notion of reality as mechanical or quantifiable—ideas that have contributed to modern 
conceptions of causal determinism and the free will debate since the 17th century. 
 
As the Sāmaññaphala Sutta makes clear, such supernormal powers are worthy of praise, but less 
valuable than the ultimate fruit of the ascetic life: freedom from the defilements9—the emotional, 
conative, and cognitive distortions that prevent one from seeing the way things really are and 
bind one to suffering and rebirth. The fact that one can choose to take up this path, gain control 
over one’s own mind, and thereby bring about an end to suffering is, in fact, so central to the 
Buddha’s message that he reserves his deepest censure for those teachers who deny the power of 
individual effort or initiative (AN i.33, i.287-288; Bodhi 2012, pp. 119, 364-365),10 and ridicules 
persons who imagine his teaching to imply that they are unable to act of their own initiative (AN 
iii.337-338; Bodhi 2012, pp. 900-902).11   
 
None of this implies any particular metaphysical thesis regarding free will, such as 
compatibilism, libertarianism, or any other ‘–ism’ (except perhaps anti-fatalism), but it does 
begin to explain why Buddhists did not regard freedom to choose or control our actions and 
mental states as a metaphysical problem worth worrying about. In a context where the possibility 
of attaining profound mastery over mind and matter and ultimately transcending the human 
condition are foundational, a far more pressing concern would have been the fact that people 
typically do not capitalize on their basic freedom by cultivating the path.  
 
 
Empirical Free Will, Samādhi, and the Path 
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Although modern Buddhists tend to de-emphasize it, the cultivation of samādhi and specifically 
the jhānas (four graduated states of single-pointed absorption) play a central role in the 
conception of the path in the Nikāyas and the Abhidharma. There is, admittedly, some 
ambivalence as to whether jhāna is necessary for insight (paññā). For example, the Nikāyas 
define right samādhi as jhāna (e.g., Saccavibhaṅga Sutta (MN iii.252), Bodhi and Ñāṇamoli 
1995, p. 1101), but the Abhidharma traditions suggest a less intense form of samādhi close to the 
first jhāna may suffice.12 Nevertheless, the cultivation of the jhānas defines normative practice 
of the path in both the Nikāyas and the Abhidharma. Thus, if we want to know how empirical 
free will relates to the Buddhist path, we ought to consider how it relates to jhāna.13 
 
Functionally, jhāna is a mental state in which a set of defilements called ‘the five hindrances’ 
(sense desire, ill will, sloth and torpor, restlessness and remorse, and doubt) is in complete 
abeyance and certain wholesome mental factors are operational. Chief among the latter are the 
‘jhāna factors’ (applied attention, sustained attention, joy, ease, and single-pointedness). While 
all five jhāna factors are present in the first jhāna, grosser factors subside in successive jhānas 
leaving only single-pointedness as the defining factor of the fourth jhāna. To enter into and abide 
in each successive jhāna requires a further letting go or dis-identification with the aggregates, 
beginning with letting go of the gross material senses to enter into the first jhāna.14  
 
The cultivation of the jhānas has several interrelated benefits. As a progressive letting go it paves 
the way for the complete letting go that is nibbāna.15 This helps weaken or eliminate the 
defilements and thereby enables clear seeing (vipassanā) of the way things really are. It is also 
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the basis for the cultivation of more attenuated states of absorption, mastery of which results in 
the supernormal powers mentioned above.16 Although the logic of this path is relatively 
straightforward, its relation to empirical free will is not.17 
 
In the typical formula found in the Nikāyas, one exercises empirical free will by taking oneself to 
the foot of a tree or some such out-of-the-way place to begin cultivating mindfulness (sati) 
leading to jhāna.18 But this freedom is not optimal because it is constrained by the five 
hindrances. That this is the case becomes painfully obvious the first time one sits down to attend 
to a meditation object. One might even develop the distinct impression that one is not and 
perhaps has never been in control of one’s own mind. But as time passes and one makes repeated 
efforts to attend to the object, the hindrances begin to subside and the jhāna factors start to kick 
in. As this happens there may be various bouts of distraction, loss of control, and even loss of 
awareness, but on the whole it becomes easier, more pleasant, and more interesting to focus on 
the object. It may even feel like one has gained greater control over one’s mind, but every now 
and then one might also observe that even when one places it elsewhere, the mind tends to 
wander back to the object—seemingly of its own accord. Eventually, the mind may become so 
absorbed in the object that it is drawn into the first jhāna. Here there is no sense of separation 
from the object, and no sense of doing or willing. This absorption may occur spontaneously, but 
one can train to enter jhāna at will,19 abide in it for a predetermined length of time, exit, and 
observe with the ‘wisdom-eye’ and a supernormal degree of precision, clarity, and stability the 
mental factors from the previous moment of mind or any other phenomenon.20  
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All of these oscillations between identification and dis-identification, and between effort and 
surrender, are critical and inescapable aspects of the cultivation of jhāna and the gradual path as 
a whole. In other words, the path is a form of intentional habituation that has a complex 
relationship to empirical free will. Although one capitalizes on empirical free will in choosing to 
take up the practice, at various points in the practice precisely who or what is in control can be 
difficult to discern (as is who or what is doing the discerning), and upon absorption into jhāna 
any sense of a doer or willer fades completely.21 Paradoxically, this temporary loss of a sense of 
self results in a greater degree of choice and control in everyday action—what we might call an 
enhanced empirical free will. Indeed, all the references to self-mastery mentioned in the previous 
section are associated with the cultivation of the jhānas. 
 
 
Dharma Theory and the Two Truths 
 
All this shifting back and forth between the personal and impersonal (as well as active and 
passive) registers might seem imprecise or unsatisfying for the philosopher who seeks a 
definitive ontology, but it is unavoidable and the Nikāyas make little attempt to defend this way 
of speaking.22 However, later generations of Buddhists did. They felt compelled to explain how 
these registers relate to each other in terms consistent with their own evolving epistemological 
and ontological theories. For the Ābhidharmikas (followers of Abhidharma), these theories 
concerned dharmas, mental and material micro-phenomena conceived as the salient elements of 
experience, basic building blocks of existence, or both.  
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Contemporary scholars typically understand dharma theory as a thoroughgoing ontological and 
mereological reductionism based on relatively late works (such as Vasubandhu’s 
Abhidharmakośa). Sometimes they also speak as if such reductionism is the implicit intention of 
the Nikāya teachings on the aggregates and not-self. This reading of the earlier in terms of the 
later can produce valuable insights, but must be balanced against an attempt to trace the 
evolution of these ideas and the diversity of their trajectories. With respect to our present inquiry 
concerning empirical free will, this may reveal a greater range of conceptual options for 
Buddhist responses. I will sketch some of these here, beginning with a relatively late iteration of 
dharma theory. 
 
In the mature Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda theories, dharmas came to be understood in an 
explicitly ontological sense as the irreducible elements of existence. There are important 
differences between these theories, but on the whole both can be described as a form of critical 
realism that:  
 
“recognizes the distinctness of the world from the experiencing subject yet also distinguishes 
between those types of entities that truly exist independently of the cognitive act and those that 
owe their being to the act of cognition itself” (Karunadasa 1996, p. 20). 
 
On this view, dharmas are objectively existent and ultimately real while persons are subjectively 
constructed and only conventionally real. This view can also be described as conceptually 
realist, in the sense that concepts of dharmas correspond to real states of affairs while concepts 
of persons do not (Karunadasa 1996, pp. 20ff; Gethin 2005, p. 180). From this perspective, it can 
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be explained that persons enjoy empirical free will owing to the presence or absence of freedom 
promoting or inhibiting dharmas (primarily mental factors), respectively.23 Because persons are 
not part of the final ontology, belief in oneself as an agent is a delusion, but a useful and even 
necessary delusion insofar as it generates freedom-promoting mental factors and actions. 
(‘Freedom’ here includes empirical free will as well as freedom from suffering.) This belief need 
not take the form of a philosophical view regarding the existence of a self (and cannot after 
‘stream-entry’, the first stage of deep attainment), but remains somewhat operational up to the 
point of arhathood (attainment of enlightenment).24  
 
On this view, it is conventionally true that persons enjoy empirical free will. Moreover, this free 
will is real in the sense that it can be explained in terms of the activities of dharmas. However, 
dharmas themselves do not enjoy free will,25 and ultimately there are no persons to enjoy it 
either. The concepts of empirical free will and the person are thus useful and even necessary, but 
potentially misleading with respect to the true nature of things. I take this to be more or less 
consistent with Vasubandhu’s dharma theory and the Sarvāstivādins’, as he presents them.26 (I 
will discuss the Theravāda view below.) 
 
Not all Buddhists were happy with this reductive view of persons. It is a bit odd, after all, to treat 
the concept of a person as useful or necessary but not give persons a place in one’s ontology—
especially in light of the fact that the Buddha constantly spoke as if persons were real. Here I 
should note that Vasubandhu never says that the concept of a person is necessary. In fact, he 
does a lot of work to show that persons serve no real explanatory function and so are, 
ontologically speaking, un-necessary, mainly in the ninth chapter of his Abhidharmakośa 
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(Duerlinger 2003). But I mentioned it above for good reason: belief in one’s agency seems 
psychologically necessary and beneficial for practice; additionally, elements of the path 
Vasubandhu elaborates—that partake of his final ontology—do not make sense without the 
concept of a person, such as the all-important mental factors of shame (hrī) and apprehension 
(apatrāpya).27 While psychological and conceptual necessity may not entail ontological 
necessity, this does help explain why certain Buddhists, namely the Pudgalavādins (Personalists), 
resisted the reductionist project (long before Vasubandhu arrived).  
 
The Pudgalavādins refused the idea that persons were merely conceptual constructions and felt 
compelled to defend the idea that they were in some sense real,28 and as such, neither the same as 
nor different from the aggregates.29 This does not make for a very neat or even coherent ontology 
(as Vasubandhu ably demonstrates), but may do greater justice to the soteriological necessity of 
the idea of a person as well as to the mysterious, ever-fluctuating experience of the individual on 
the path. In other words, the Pudgalavādin alternative exposes the limitations of a reductive 
ontology when it comes to giving an account of human experience (much as the humanities are 
supposed to expose the limitations of the natural sciences in giving such an account). On this 
view, persons enjoy empirical free will but precisely what persons are is inexpressible and how 
they relate to the conditioned flow of aggregates cannot be determined.  
 
The Theravādins were not prepared to go quite that far, but they also made an effort to defend 
the value of the person-talk found in the Nikāyas against the encroaching reductionism of their 
own dharma theory. They stressed that personal and impersonal discourses are merely two 
modes of expressing the same truth and equally effective in liberating beings (Karunadasa 1996, 
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p. 24f).30 They also held that persons are potentially misleading conceptual constructions. It has 
been suggested that the tension between these perspectives can be resolved by adding the further 
provision that statements regarding persons are true “so long as one does not imagine by ‘person’ 
a substance enduring in time” (Jayatilleke 1963, p. 365; see also Karunadasa 1996, p. 27). This 
might reflect an implicit logic at work in the Nikāyas, but the tension is also evidence of a shift 
from the more practical and empirical orientation of the Nikāyas to the more theoretical and 
ontological concerns of the Abhidharma (Karundasa 1996; Cox 2004; Gethin 2004a; Ronkin 
2005). 
 
While the Sarvāstivādins and Vasubandhu appear to have been centrally preoccupied with 
populating and de-populating a reductive ontology, respectively, Theravāda dharma theory 
tended to preserve more of the empirical and epistemological orientation of the Nikāyas. They 
placed more emphasis on how dharmas are experienced and known (i.e., through direct 
perception based on samādhi) than on their explanatory necessity or physical or analytical 
irreducibility (Karunadasa 1996; Ronkin 2005).31 This orientation is illustrated in the way that 
the modern meditation master Pa Auk Sayadaw explains why only material dharmas and not 
aggregations of material dharmas (rūpa-kālapas), which are merely conceptually constructed, 
can serve as the basis for insight: with strong samādhi the illusion of the latters’ contiguity 
dissipates too quickly; they simply fade away under observation (2010, pp. 10-11, 124; Catherine 
2011, pp. 7219-7224). 
 
This empirical and pragmatic orientation is evident when dharmas are introduced in the Nikāyas. 
There they are conceived as dynamic qualities of experience, particularly those that play a 
	  	   365 
critical role in the path, such as the five hindrances (Gethin 2004a; see also Cox 2004). This use 
of the term ‘dharma’ amounts to a rejection of a substance metaphysics wherein qualities 
(dharmas) are possessed by an underlying substance (dharmin) (Gethin 2004a), but as with the 
aggregates and the other impersonal analytical rubrics found in the Nikāyas, the emphasis is 
more on how the world is known or can come to be known through introspective experience than 
on defining an objective ontology (Gethin 1986). These impersonal rubrics provide a conceptual 
map and vocabulary for navigating and making sense of experience in which an overt sense of 
self has receded. At the same time, attending to the individual dharmas or aggregates featured on 
these maps conduces to this dis-identification. If this is right, and we take seriously the outline of 
the path sketched above as well as the idea that the Buddha conveyed its truth through both the 
personal and impersonal registers, we arrive at a slightly different perspective on free will: 
empirical free will is part of ordinary subjective experience and exercising it is critical at various 
points on the path, but it is not observable or relevant when analyzing the dharmas.32 
 
On this view, worrying about whether we have free will, how we might have it, how we might 
talk about it, whether we are morally responsible for our actions, and so on, are just so many 
wrongly grasped snakes (Alagaddūpama Sutta (MN i.134); Bodhi and Ñāṇamoli 1995, p. 227). 
 
  
Conclusion 
 
Buddhist texts admit a variety of powers and freedoms that far exceed what we tend to think of 
as ‘free will’, or even regard as possible. Serious consideration of these as basic axioms of the 
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path, together with the fact that the Buddhist orientation towards subjective data makes 
determinism an unlikely conclusion, helps explain why historically Buddhists were not 
compelled by something like the free will problem. This should caution us against searching for 
analogues to our free will problem in Buddhist texts. Nevertheless, Buddhists did think deeply 
about a variety of human freedoms, agency, action, and reality, and canvasing their views on 
these topics might help fuel our reflections on free will.  
 
As illustrated above, the cultivation of the path involves a complex play of identification and dis-
identification and ever-shifting oscillation between personal and impersonal experience. This is 
reflected throughout Buddhist discourse in the interplay between the personal and impersonal 
registers. But Buddhists did not agree on what to make of this. Amongst their attempts to 
reconcile these registers, we find some theories that resonate with our modern tendency towards 
ontological reductionism and suspicion that free will is at best a useful delusion belying an 
impersonal (albeit material) reality. But if dialogue is an opportunity to expand our perspective 
rather than confirm current convictions, we might also pay attention to those Buddhist voices 
that resist or precede such reductionism, those that suggest that there is an irresolvable ambiguity 
between our reality as persons and agents and the impersonal reality of the aggregates, or those 
that take personal and impersonal experience to constitute distinct but equally relevant 
perspectives on the truth of conditioned reality.  
 
 
Notes
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1 In this essay I use the first person plural to refer to persons who, like me, have received their 
training in the Western academy. I hope other readers will forgive my parochialism. 
2 This thesis is similar to ‘paleo-compatibilism’ (Siderits 1987, 2005, 2008, 2013), but not 
identical. Aside from reservations about framing the Buddhist view in terms of causal 
determinism and moral responsibility, I object to paleo-compatibilism’s ‘semantic dualism’ and 
‘semantic insulation’ on exegetical grounds. 
3 The Nikāyas are the original Pāli collections (‘baskets’) of the Buddha’s teachings. However, it 
is safe to assume broad agreement with the Chinese Āgamas on the doctrines discussed here. 
4 I will use the Sanskrit spellings ‘dharma’ (Pāli: dhamma) and ‘Abhidharma’ (Pāli: 
Abhidhamma) rather than switching back and forth between Pāli and Sanskrit.  
5 ‘Concentration’ is the common translation of ‘samādhi’, but connotes a forceful effort absent in 
samādhi. The focus in samādhi is the result of the gathering together, strengthening, and 
balancing of the mental factors, not of gritting one’s teeth. 
6 References to the Pāli are to the Pali Text Society editions, using standard abbreviations 
followed by English translations; see “Abbreviations” below. I agree with Adam (2010, p. 248) 
that this sutta (a saying of the Buddha or, more generally, a discourse) implies we cannot directly 
control the suffering associated with the aggregates, but take its central message to concern the 
foolhardiness of identifying with the aggregates, rather than establishing the non-existence of a 
self. As for his conclusion that we cannot will our will, see below. 
7 ‘Matter’ and ‘form’ are the common translations for ‘rūpa’, but it should be noted that rūpa is 
first and foremost the human body as experienced by a subject, which is extended to the 
subjective experience of other human bodies, and then to other external bodies and phenomena 
(Gethin 1986). The fact that objective reality is understood to correspond to this subjective 
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experience—and not the other way round—means we must be careful not to impose our idea of 
matter as inert stuff confirmed through objective measurement onto the Buddhist idea.  
8 However, all bodhisattvas (advanced, avowed aspirants) must cultivate such powers at some 
point. 
9 The term here is ‘taint’ (āsava), but has a similar scope to ‘defilement’ (kilesa). 
10 Namely, the Ājīvika teacher Makkhali Gosāla. 
11 The term here is ‘attakāra’ (‘doing by oneself’).  
12 In Pāli the term is ‘upācāra’ (‘access’) samādhi. In the Abhidharmakośa (Treasury of 
Abhidharma), it is ‘anāgamya’ (‘not yet arrived’). 
13 This description is based on the Nikāyas and Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga (Path of 
Purification) (Ñāṇamoli 1991), but at this level of generality does not differ significantly from 
Vasubandhu’s presentation in the Abhidharmakośa. 
14 There is, however, some debate on this point (Meyers 2012). 
15 The term ‘nibbāna’ is Pāli (Sanskrit: nirvāṇa). 
16 These are the formless absorptions of infinite space, infinite consciousness, no-thing-ness, and 
neither perception nor non-perception. 
17 The narrative description that follows is based on my limited experience with the practice and 
substantial instruction according to the Pa Auk method, which defines ‘jhāna’ as a more 
absorptive state than some Theravāda traditions. 
18 A number of scholars have seen two distinct paths of meditation in the Nikāyas, but I follow 
Gethin (2004b) in taking the suttas to describe a single, relatively coherent path that is further 
elaborated in the Abhidharma.  
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19 For the beginner, the main lever of control (aside from faith) is applied attention (vitakka)—
which involves effort, but, as practice deepens, subtle intention or resolve (adhimokkha) for a 
factor to strengthen or jhāna to arise becomes the main lever of control. 
20 The attainment of jhāna and discerning the nature of things with the wisdom-eye are 
supernormal psychic powers, but not iddi (supernatural) per se. 
21 The effort associated with applied and sustained thought only becomes clear after some 
familiarity with the state and/or entry into the second jhāna.  
22 Aside from the distinction between interpretable (neyyattha) and definitive (nītattha) 
statements (AN i.60; Bodhi 2012, p. 151). 
23 See Meyers (2010, 2014) for a detailed explanation and defense of this approach. 
24 According to the Nikāyas, there is no more personality view (sakkāyadiṭṭhi) after stream-entry, 
but an instinctual sense of self (conceit or māna) persists until arhathood.  
25 To say that dharmas enjoy free will would constitute what the Theravādin commentators call a 
breach in convention (vohārabheda) resulting in nonsense (Karunadasa 1996, p. 27). 
26 Where they differ is with respect to what kinds of entities count as dharmas.  
27 These are considered foundational for ethical discipline and thus for the entire path. 
28 They are credited with saying that persons are concepts (prajñapti) and that they are real 
(saccikattha) and ultimate (paramattha). For most Buddhists these would be contradictory 
positions.  
29 For more on this, see the “Pudgalavada Buddhist Philosophy” entry in the Internet 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy; see Lusthaus (2009) for more on the idea of the person as a 
necessary concept (prajñapti). 
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30 This view may be facilitated by the fact that the Pāli word for convention (sammuti) merely 
means ‘consensus’ and lacks the sense of concealing found in the Sanskrit word (saṃvṛti), but it 
does not seem much different from a view expressed in the Mahāvibhāṣa-śāstra (Dhammajoti 
2007, pp. 78-79). By contrast, Vasubandhu emphasizes truth as relative to the kind of entity in 
question (ABK vi.4; ed. Pradhan 1970, p. 334; Pruden 1991, pp. 910-911). 
31 The ancient yoga masters cited by Vasubandhu and Yaśomitra appear to have a similar view 
(Dhammajoti 2007, p. 80). 
32 It should be noted, however, that mature Theravāda dharma theory, while preserving more of 
an empirical orientation, does promote an ontological reductionism and conceptual realism not 
dissimilar from that outlined in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa. 
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Abbreviations 
 
ABK Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam (Autocommentary on Abhidharmakośa) 
AN Aṅguttara Nikāya (Numerical Discourses) 
DN Dīgha Nikāya (Long Discourses) 
M Milindapañha (Questions to King Milinda) 
MN Majjhima Nikāya (Middle Length Discourses) 
SN Saṃyutta Nikāya (Connected Discourses) 
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  17 Agentless Agency: The Soft Compatibilist Argument from Buddhist Meditation, Mind- 
Mastery, Evitabilism, and Mental Freedom  
 
Rick Repetti 
 
 
As Maria Heim has argued somewhat convincingly (2014), the basic orientation of Buddhist 
philosophy is significantly orthogonal to the sort of thinking associated with Western 
philosophical theorizing about free will. In this paper, however, I argue for the view that, despite 
a lack of explicit theorizing about free will, the Buddha himself was implicitly committed to 
elements of a free will theory, and his teachings contain a rich set of resources that may be 
employed in the construction of such a theory. This is not to say that Buddhism has a theory of 
free will, but that it can have one—one powerful enough to at least hold its own against the most 
powerful form of free will skepticism in analytic Western philosophy. 
 
According to (most) Buddhist philosophy, nothing that constitutes us forms a whole, maintains 
its identity throughout the changes it undergoes, or lasts long enough to constitute a self (MN 
I.230–235; SN I.135, III.66; M 25).1 Buddhism denies the ultimate reality of the self, but 
acknowledges the validity of conventional person-involving discourse (SN I.14; Itivuttaka 53; 
Sutta Nipata 937; MN III.31; Aronson 2004; Adam 2010; Siderits 2003 and this volume; see also 
Federman 2010; Harvey 2007 and this volume; Meyers 2010, 2014, and this volume). If there is 
no self, as Goodman insists, there cannot be an autonomous self (2002; cf. Repetti 2012b; 
Meyers, this volume; and Harvey, this volume). Buddhism has remained mostly silent on free 
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will, with the exception of the Buddha. For these and related reasons (Heim 2014; Gowans, this 
volume), some think Buddhist discussion of free will is misguided (Garfield and Flanagan, both 
this volume).  
 
I have reviewed several extant Buddhist theories of free will (Repetti 2010c, 2012a, 2012b, 2014, 
and the Introduction, this volume), and argued that there ought to be a Buddhist theory of free 
will (Repetti 2010b, 2015, and in Part I of this volume). In this article, I focus on articulating 
arguments for the theory of free will I find most consistent with Buddhism and contemporary 
Western discussions: soft compatibilism, the view that evitabilism, self-regulative ability, and 
mental freedom (sufficient for moral responsibility) are possible independently of whether the 
world is deterministic or indeterministic, and, in the case of Buddhism, independently of whether 
the self is ultimately illusory (the latter of which constitutes a Buddhist variant of ‘semi-
compatibilism’). The question whether Buddhist causation is deterministic or not, both, or neither 
technically does not matter to my view. I leave it to others to dispute such ultimately empirical 
(Balaguer 2009) matters (e.g., Story 1974; Rāhula 1974; Gómez 1975; Kalupahana 1992, 1995; 
Garfield 2001; Goodman 2002, 2009; Siderits 2003; Gier and Kjellberg 2004; Harvey 2007 and 
this volume; Federman 2010; and Wallace, this volume). 
 
 
The Argument from the Buddha’s Rejection of Inevitabilism 
 
Although the Buddha rejected the notion of an autonomous self and did not have the term ‘free 
will’, he rejected ideas that negate free will—the notions of inevitable causation by matter 
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(Wallace 2011), karma (AN I 173-5; M 134–138; Visuddhimagga 532, 535; Patthana I.1), gods 
(AN I 173-5; DN I.18;2 Federman 2010, p. 14; Wallace, this volume), chance (DN I.28, I.52; AN 
I.173-175; SN II.22; Gómez 1975; Federman 2010), and fate (DN I.53-54, AN III.338, Raju 
1985). These ideas share inevitabilism: the idea that matter or karma causes events 
mechanistically suggests they are beyond agents’ control; likewise, causation by fate, gods, and 
chance are considered beyond agents’ control. We may infer from the Buddha’s rejection of these 
inevitabilist doctrines that the Buddha implicitly accepted evitabilism.  
 
If causation is deterministic (exceptionlessly lawful), even hard determinists—those who think 
determinism implies there is no free will—concede that it need not imply one kind of 
inevitabilism, for determinism does not rule out the possibility that certain attempts to avoid 
certain outcomes are causally effective in avoiding them. To my lights, however, this concession 
significantly collapses the distinction between soft and hard determinism, since the former think 
this sort of evitabilism, and other abilities of agents akin to it, suffice for a determinism-friendly 
free will in the moral-responsibility-entailing sense.  
 
What hard determinists insist on, instead, is a different kind of inevitabilism that focuses on the 
fact that agents cannot alter whatever it is that is determined to be the outcome: if determinism is 
true, there is a single outcome/event uniquely determined by all prior/simultaneous causal 
conditions, in every moment, and no outcome in this singular causal chain is evitable (van 
Inwagen 1983). Call this ‘outcome inevitabilism’. I have critiqued deterministic outcome 
inevitabilism as self-contradictory elsewhere (Repetti 2010a, Repetti 2012b). Nevertheless, the 
Buddha would likely have rejected any form of inevitabilism, including outcome inevitabilism. 
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For, in rejecting the Ājīvika inevitabilism of Makkhali Gosāla, on the grounds that it implied 
self-refuting volitional impotence (AN I.173–175, III.338; MN II.214; DN I.28, I.53, II.19-20; 
SN II.22; Federman 2010), the Buddha implicitly accepts evitabilism. Similarly, in rejecting the 
(then-prevalent Sāṃkhya3) idea of inevitable causation by prakṛti (matter) (Wallace 2011), the 
Buddha implicitly rejected a strict determinism, contra Goodman. Goodman (2012) has objected 
that in rejecting Ājīvika fatalism the Buddha did not reject determinism, because the two 
doctrines diverge over causality. But, fatalism and determinism share outcome inevitabilism, and 
in rejecting Sāṃkhya material causation, the Buddha rejected causal inevitabilism, thus 
determinism.  
 
Similarly, in describing Buddhism as a middle path between the annihilationism of Cārvāka 
materialism and the eternalism of belief in ātman (soul/self) (Gómez 1975; Kalupahana 1976, 
1992, 1995; Harvey 2007 and this volume), the Buddha rejected purely materialist and purely 
spiritual accounts. In rejecting ātman, the Buddha rejected one libertarian conception that sees 
the agent as immaterial, outside the causal nexus (Harvey 2007 and this volume; Federman 
2010). In rejecting causation by gods (AN I.173ff; Wallace 2011; Harvey, this volume), the 
Buddha rejected divine inevitabilism, along with the more specific Vedic idea that enlightenment 
is a function of divine will. Rather, the Buddha taught one can attain liberation/enlightenment, as 
he did, the most important evitabilist outcome in Buddhism. (For extensive analysis of whether 
evitabilism is compatible with determinism, see Dennett 1984; Repetti 2010a, 2012b.) 
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Some scholars have argued that a principal reason Buddhist talk of free will would involve 
category error is that Western free will talk emerges only within the Abrahamic requirement for 
theodicy, but no such need arises in Buddhism (Garfield and Flanagan, both this volume), an 
argument that courts the genetic fallacy, but also seems factually incorrect. In asserting that 
humanity can attain enlightenment without—against—divine will (his hagiography depicts gods 
trying to thwart his enlightenment), the Buddha’s account is Promethean regarding the human 
will contra divine will, a kind of reverse theodicy: humans can attain the greatest liberation, 
enlightenment, and happiness through their own self-regulating efforts in the absence of a fairly 
libertarian ātman or the mercy/will of gods (Federman 2010). The point is that enough reasons 
for thinking about human agency arise in connection with the Buddha’s rejection of the 
ātman/Brahman (soul/God) metaphysics of some, and his rejection of the inevitabilism of other, 
of his contemporaries. In rejecting the doctrine of the fruitlessness of action (Gómez 1975, p. 
81), the Buddha implicitly endorsed evitabilism.  
 
Unlike the other forms of inevitabilism, karmic inevitabilism may be an exception to the claim 
that Buddhism has not discussed free will throughout its history subsequent to the Buddha’s 
rejection of inevitabilism. The Buddha’s rejection of these forms of inevitabilism arguably 
eliminated need for further clarification in all of the above cases except that of karma, since 
karma is an opaque, complex concept that plays a central role on the Buddhist path. There are 
many clarifications about the nature of karma throughout the history of Buddhism that attempt to 
eliminate the idea that it functions in an inevitabilist manner (Kalupahana 1976, 1992, 1995; 
Harvey 2007; Federman 2010; Meyers 2010, 2014). 
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In rejecting causation by pure chance (DN I.28; SN II.22), the Buddha again rejected 
inevitabilism, for one cannot control or alter what is purely random. Arguably, in rejecting 
uncontrollable/inevitable chance, the Buddha presaged an argument against a form of 
libertarianism characterized by indeterminism. Some libertarians argue that because determinism 
seems to undermine free will by eliminating the possibility of doing otherwise, indeterminism 
avoids that problem, since the ability to do otherwise is possible in an indeterministic world 
(Kane 2002). True, but indeterminism brings its own inevitabilism: if the causes of 
choices/actions are purely random, their occurrence is beyond the agent’s control, rendering them 
inevitable (Pereboom 2001). The Buddha did not have the terms ‘determinism’, ‘indeterminism’, ‘evitabilism’, or ‘inevitabilism’. However, he rejected all forms of inevitabilism, implicitly 
accepting evitabilism.  
 
 
The Argument from Buddhist-path Abilities  
 
An evitabilist argument may be predicated on the self-regulative abilities required by the 
Buddhist path. These arguments are spelled out in elaborate detail elsewhere (Repetti 2010b, 
2015; see also Meyers 2010, 2014, and this volume; and Hyland 2014). Given these abilities, 
Buddhism may formulate a theory of agency that stands up against the most powerful arguments 
for free will skepticism in contemporary philosophy (Repetti 2015), which I’ll only summarize, 
then offer my reply. These arguments include:  
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• van Inwagen’s consequence argument: if choices are necessary consequences of prior 
events, they are unfree (1975) 
• Pereboom’s manipulation argument: manipulated choices are unfree, determinism is 
functionally equivalent to manipulation, and thus determined choices are unfree (2001) 
• Pereboom’s randomness argument: we cannot claim authorship over random events 
(2001) 
• Strawson’s impossibility argument: choices are always conditioned by mental states, so 
free will is impossible (1994). 
 
A possible Buddhist reply to these arguments is as follows. Buddhist practice cultivates such a 
heightened form of self-regulative ability that it doesn’t matter to the ārya (advanced meditation 
practitioner) whether the causal factors influencing her mental states at the choice-moment were 
produced deterministically, randomly, manipulatively, or otherwise. The reason is that a central 
skill cultivated along the meditative path is the ability to detect, discern, and disengage from the 
volitional impetus of any mental state component—the ability to sense and inspect its 
phenomenological features carefully and mindfully, discern its characteristics and whether or not 
they are dharmic (productive of mental freedom) (MN I.415), and choose whether or not to act 
on it (MN I.415–416). (Repetti (2010b) makes the case for these abilities and their relevance to 
free will skepticism; Repetti (2015) elaborates the argument that these abilities ground a rebuttal 
to the four leading arguments for free will skepticism.) This sort of control the ārya has over her 
own mind far exceeds the minimal choice-making/alternatives-accessing abilities presupposed in 
free will literature (Harvey 2007 and this volume; Wallace 2011; Meyers 2014 and this volume).  
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A distinction from the Western literature may elucidate the claim that Buddhist agency is more 
powerful than ordinary agency. Frankfurt (1971) distinguished between freedom of action, the 
ability to satisfy one’s ‘first-order’ desires (for objects or experiences), possessed by animals, 
young children, healthy adults, and even adults with certain disabilities, and freedom of the will, 
the ability to bring one’s effective first-order desires into harmony with one’s ‘second-order’ 
desires (metavolitions, of approval and/or disapproval of one’s first-order desires), an ability not 
possessed by animals, young children, or some of the mentally ill. Rather than endorse 
Frankfurt’s theory of free will, or claim that Buddhism does, contra Flanagan (this volume) and 
Tuske (2013), I only employ Frankfurt’s distinctions to illustrate the superior agential (free-will-
theoretic) abilities the ārya develops. 
 
Thus, in meditation the ārya observes the comings, goings, and patterns among her thoughts, 
emotions, bodily sensations, desires, and the like (MN I.56-60)—without acting on them—
cultivating (among other things) the ability to go off-line, relatively speaking, from the typical 
stimulus/response pairings that dominate the behavior of most sentient beings and engage them 
immediately with the environmental causal nexus. (See Repetti (2010a) for an elaborate 
argument in support of the off-line analysis of this aspect of effective agency.) Of course, off-
line status is relative, particularly in accordance with the Buddhist doctrine of interdependent 
origination (global phenomenal/causal interdependence), but there is a significant 
causal/functional difference between being physically engaged in relatively unmediated 
sensorimotor, affective, volitional interactions with one’s environment, and sitting in meditative 
absorption, withdrawn from sensorimotor activity, observing/detaching from the contents and 
activities of one’s mind, not being pulled or pushed to action by them (SN v. 156). Recent brain 
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research provides support for such causal/functional differences (e.g., Christoff, Cosmelli, 
Legrand, and Thompson 2011). As Garfield notes (2001), causal powers play a key 
justificatory/explanatory role in even the most minimalistic forms of Buddhist metaphysics. 
 
In the process, the ārya cultivates a hierarchical will characterized by metavolitions that govern 
which of her lower-order volitions issue in action and which do not. Individuals whose lower-
order volitions issue in action despite higher-order disapproval exhibit volitional incontinence 
(weakness of will or, if chronic, breakdowns of will, e.g., addiction). The ārya exhibits the 
opposite, strength of will. For in cultivating dharmically-approved volitions, such as compassion, 
generosity, and altruism, she strengthens lower-order volitions that increase self-regulative 
ability and mental freedom thereby, and weeds out lower-order volitions that decrease self-
regulative ability and mental freedom, such as greed, envy, and hedonistic self-gratification (AN 
I.3, I.200–201; SN v.64–65; DN I.75; MN I.275; Wallace 2011, p. 227). This is not to suggest 
that the ārya is ‘strong-willed’ the way an egoistic Marine might be, but rather that the features of 
will that might normally overwhelm the average person increasingly diminish relatively 
simultaneously with the increase in ability to restrain them. 
 
The ārya does employ volition- and mind-training at a level of discipline akin to that of a marital 
artist or other highly disciplined mind-body expert, and thus is a virtuoso of mental/volitional 
control,4 but as this control increases it is increasingly spontaneous/effortless, on the one hand, 
and the sense of self as an independently-existing autonomous entity decreases, on the other, and 
vice versa. When self-regulative control increases, so does the extent to which evitabilism holds 
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for that individual. Thus, Buddhist-path practices increase the extent to which practitioners 
exhibit free will, though the need to exercise it diminishes inversely.  
 
The impersonality of agency does not imply that there are no self-regulative/agential abilities. It 
is how they are understood that matters, not whether they exist. An enlightened being might 
never need to exercise self-regulative ability, so it’s not clear that enlightened beings actually ‘have’ agential abilities (cf. Coseru, this volume), although some Buddhists claim that practice 
must continue after enlightenment (Chinul 1983), which implies post-enlightenment agency. I’ll 
offer additional reasons below to think enlightened beings retain agential abilities. 
 
 
The Argument from Non-Self 
 
We began with the idea that if there is no self, there cannot be an autonomous self. But analysis 
of the no-self idea might be used to defend free will, ironically. The manipulation argument rests 
on the premise that manipulation undermines free will. If there is no self, even gods lack a self 
and thus the ability to determine/manipulate anyone’s behavior. Without any self, there can be 
neither manipulators nor manipulatees, and thus no manipulation argument, technically. The 
remaining question is whether individuals—however impersonally conceived as closely 
clustered causal processes—can control themselves sufficiently for attributions of moral 
responsibility. 
 
	  	   386	  
To use a bodily-control analogy, some individuals are continent, others not. It doesn’t matter 
whether continent or incontinent individuals possess a self, nor whether continence is caused 
deterministically or indeterministically. Only those with functional sensorimotor feedback loops 
from the bladder through volitional centers can control bladder release; absent feedback loops, 
bladder release is controlled by hydraulics. Only those who can control their bladders are 
responsible for their release. By extension, only the ‘volitionally continent’, who can control their 
actions, respond to moral reasons, guide their actions in accord with higher-order preferences, 
and so on, are responsible for their actions. Āryas cultivate these abilities in abundance.  
 
While it is speculative to form any position on the ‘agentless’ agency of enlightened beings who 
lack a false self-sense, I doubt that the same sort of purely impersonal causal conditions that 
control the weather controlled the Buddha’s bladder; nor was he incontinent. Likewise, 
environmental circumstances alone cannot act on the Buddha’s vocal chords, producing speech 
appropriately formed for its audience the way inputs on a keyboard can produce un-minded/non-
intentional responses from a computer. The Buddha exhibited masterful agency in every word, 
gesture, and action, however spontaneously. Lacking false self-sense and thus ego-volitions, 
compassion spontaneously guided his actions. But, arguably, they had to be actions, not mere 
events.  
 
The relevant question is not whether the individual has a correct understanding of self, but 
whether she has the appropriate auto-regulative abilities. By analogy, a thermostat presumably 
lacks a self-sense, but the question about it is whether it regulates the climate system it is 
designed to control. Likewise, is the individual self-regulative? Manipulation cases imply it is 
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not the individual self who is causing her own behavior, but another self—but if nobody has a 
self, true manipulation is impossible, and other ‘selves’ are irrelevant. The question is: where is 
the control? Conversely, if manipulation—one individual controlling another—is conceptually 
possible in a self-less world, then so is self-control. 
 
To borrow a classic Buddhist teaching, in the same way the wheels, axle, etc. (configured the 
right way, enabling the chariot to roll) ground the conventional use of the term ‘chariot’ without 
imputing ultimate existence to a chariot-essence independent of these things (Milindapañha), so 
too the metavolitional/volitional, sensorimotor responsiveness, etc. (configured right, enabling 
the individual to self-regulate) ground a metaphysically deflated conventional use of the term ‘agent’ without thereby imputing ultimate existence to an agent-essence, ātman or trans-empirical 
self independent of these things. Agency-lite, so to speak, is causally efficacious, but 
metaphysically insubstantial (Aronson 2004). 
 
Similarly, the consequence argument threatens to undermine the idea that the agent is the 
originator of her actions, since it locates their origination through distal causal chains predating 
the agent—as if the causal sequence leading to the agent’s control sphere removes control from 
the agent, rendering the agent a puppet or robot of pre-agential forces. However, if there is no 
real agent, then there can be no worry that such a being lacks originative control over her actions 
because pre-agential forces control her. The enlightened being experiences no self, thus loss of 
originative control to pre-agential control is a non-issue. As Kalupahana put it, “The term 
nibbāna (Skt. nirvāṇa) conveys the same negative sense associated with the conception of 
freedom whenever the latter is defined as ‘absence of constraint’” (Kalupahana 1992, p. 91). One 
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man’s drink is another’s poison: the ‘loss’ of self is liberating, but doesn’t necessarily remove ‘self-control’. 
 
The question—akin to that regarding continence—is whether the individual exerts proximal 
control over herself sufficient for moral attributions. If determinism is true, deterministic forces 
predating the agent determine whether she is continent, but if she is, she exerts a form of 
proximal control over herself that the incontinent doesn’t, both of which hold in the absence of a 
metaphysically substantive self, and only the continent is responsible for her bladder release. 
Likewise, thermostats may be determined, but differ from avalanches, which lack self-regulative 
ability the thermostat possesses, though both—lacking cognition and volition—lack anything 
remotely appearing to function like a self. 
 
Only a being that has free will can suffer its loss: a rock cannot suffer weakness, or loss, of will 
(Frankfurt 1971). Likewise, it is no deficit in a number that it cannot do as it pleases: it cannot 
appropriately be said to lack free will. If the absence of a self implies the absence of an entity 
that could fail to have free will, then there is no implication from non-self to unfree will. 
However, questions about proximal causality remain: whether the individual self-regulates is 
independent of the question of self. The relevant difference between a thermostat and a person 
here is that the person has greater self-regulative abilities. This causal/functional difference 
obtains, relatively proportionately, between the ārya and the ordinary person. The ārya self-
sculpts her hierarchical will in accord with the Dharma, increasing her self-regulative control 
thereby, despite her increasing recognition of the ultimate unreality of her self. Thus, self-control 
(autonomy) is not inconsistent with non-self, contra Goodman and Strawson (both this volume). 
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The Argument from Desert 
 
The argument from desert is similar to the argument from non-self, and also flips the reasoning 
about the agent/self. (Repetti 2012b offers a more elaborate version of this argument.) Goodman, 
for example, has argued that because Buddhist causation is deterministic and impersonal, nobody 
is ultimately responsible for what they do, and thus nobody deserves praise or blame, though we 
may have desert-independent reasons for incapacitating those who commit immoral acts; for 
example, we may quarantine them to protect them from harming the innocent, or to rehabilitate 
them (Goodman 2009; cf. Repetti 2012b).  
 
It seems sensible and humane to quarantine Jones if Jones did X and X is illegal/immoral, 
without blaming Jones or punishing her, on the assumption that nobody is a true agent or author 
of her actions. Assuming Jones can control her doing X, it seems reasonable to try to rehabilitate 
her. Rehabilitative justification thus rests on agential ability, and presupposes a kind of 
compatibilism: Jones need not do what she does, though her behavior is determined—she can do 
otherwise in the future, and she/we can intentionally bring about circumstances that make her 
doing what she’s done evitable.  
 
However, if Jones cannot control her doing X, and is not therefore capable of being rehabilitated, 
it seems reasonable to quarantine Jones to contain the danger of her doing X, and this danger-
restricting non-rehabilitative quarantine seems justifiable because Jones did X, and presumably 
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Jones is likely to do X again (Goodman 2009). Let’s examine this more carefully. Did Jones 
actually do X? Attributing X to Jones is analogous to attributing causal authorship to someone, 
say, who suddenly passes out behind the wheel of a car due to the first symptom of an unknown 
medical condition, crashing into others. If Jones is not capable of controlling her ‘doing’ X, then 
Jones is not the author of X. Absent that control, arguably, there is no more reason to quarantine 
Jones than to quarantine anyone. The only justification for singling-out Jones is the assumption 
that Jones controls X. But if Jones controls X, then Jones possesses agential abilities. This is a 
compatibilist intuition: If Jones is capable of controlling X, that is what justifies differentiating 
Jones from among everything else regarding preventing X.  
 
If the wind against Jones tosses Jones through the air like a dangerous projectile, then it would be 
a mistake to attribute to Jones the power of levitation or the fault of recklessly flying, since it is 
the wind that is responsible for Jones’s aerial recklessness, not any failure of self-control in 
Jones. Jones did not commit an act of aerial recklessness. In fact, Jones didn’t ‘do’ anything. 
Jones’s behavior doesn’t count as an action, but as an event. Likewise, if Jones lacks agential 
abilities, Jones is not the author of Jones’s other behaviors, even if they involve elements 
typically constituting intentional behavior, say, bodily movements, speech, and so forth (as some 
imagine the Buddha’s behavior might be). Jones might be sleepwalking and compulsively 
cursing, for example.  
 
However, the no-desert idea Goodman and other free will skeptics (ed. Caruso 2013) propose 
suggests everyone is in the same categories as recklessly-air-bound-somnambulist-cursing Jones, 
since nobody authors their actions. But that cannot be right. When not air-bound or 
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sleepwalking, suppose Jones often engages in intentional behavior like the rest of us, who exert 
proximal self-regulative or agential control over ourselves. Thus, it does not follow that because 
we lack selves we lack self-regulative abilities sufficient for desert. Agents are unlike air-bound-
sleepwalking Jones because they exhibit proximal control over their behavior, rendering their 
behaviors things they do, rather than things that happen to them. This distinction stands 
regardless of the ultimately impersonal nature of individuals. Aristotle didn’t discuss free will or 
the self, but he identified the grounds of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness (on analysis, 
positive and negative cases of moral desert, respectively) with voluntariness or continence 
(enkratia), which he contrasted with lack of control or volitional incontinence (akrasia) (1999). 
 
Relying on the Buddha’s equation of karma with volition/intention, and echoing Fischer’s (2006) 
reason-responsiveness criterion for moral responsibility, Wallace makes a closely related point:  
 “Only voluntary actions produce karmic results, and the magnitude of the moral 
consequences of one’s actions corresponds directly to the degree of one’s mental balance, 
intelligence, and understanding” (2011, p. 221).  
 
Resembling Frankfurt’s distinction between those with and without free will, Wallace adds,  
 “the moral consequences of the actions of a person who is mentally ill or brain-damaged 
are relatively light, while those of a person of sound mind and clear understanding are 
relatively heavy” (2011, p. 221, citing AN I.249–253).  
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Thus, impersonality not only doesn’t lead to universal exculpation or non-desert, but analysis of 
the differences between intentional actions and unintentional happenings reveals that the 
causal/functional characteristics that make a difference regarding desert are our auto-regulative 
abilities, irrespective of the impersonal nature of agency (or the character of causation).  
 
 
Dharma-responsiveness, Soft Compatibilism, and Buddhist Semi-compatibilism 
 
I’m in a position now to use the āryas’ Dharma-responsive abilities to construct a possible 
Buddhist theory of free will—again, not one necessarily held by any Buddhist, or by me, but 
simply an available position with potential explanatory purchase. Dharma-responsiveness is a 
species of the reason-responsiveness touted by semi-compatibilists as sufficient for determinism-
friendly agency and moral responsibility (Fischer 2006). Reason-responsiveness is the ability of 
an agent to recognize, understand, deliberate on, evaluate, and voluntarily/effectively react 
rationally to reasons for action, particularly moral reasons. This skill may obtain in a 
deterministic or indeterministic universe (Mele 1995), and is thought by compatibilists to be 
sufficient for a weak-to-moderate form of agency and moral responsibility.  
 
The compatible part of ‘semi-compatibilism’ is between determinism and reason-responsive 
moral agency. The incompatible part is between determinism and a more robust or strong form 
of agency whereby the agent doing X could have done otherwise, ~X, under identical conditions 
(‘contracausally’)—impossible in a deterministic world, but conceivable in an indeterministic 
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one. Semi-compatibilists differentiate between two forms of control corresponding to these 
weak/strong conceptions of free will: guidance control versus regulative control (Fischer 2006).  
 
Consider the control a driver exerts over the movements of a vehicle in a deterministic world: by 
turning the wheel left, the car moves left, and so forth. So, if Jones makes a left turn, she exerts 
guidance control and ‘weak free will’ (though her own intentions, beliefs, and so on leading to 
her making a left are themselves determined), for her voluntarily moving the steering wheel left 
nonetheless causes the car to go left. However, if we lived in an indeterministic world, it is 
possible Jones could have turned the wheel right under otherwise identical circumstances. If 
Jones can do otherwise under identical conditions, she has regulative control, ‘strong free will’. 
Regulative control is impossible in a deterministic world because whatever caused Jones to turn 
left would necessarily cause her to do so under identically determinative conditions. 
 
However, consider driving instructor Smith, accompanying Jones, possessing a second steering 
wheel, gas pedal, and brakes, which, if applied, override Jones’s control, as in some driver’s 
education vehicles. Smith has a kind of relative regulative control with respect to Jones, for if 
Smith sees Jones making a dangerous move, Smith can do otherwise, and steer the car to safety. 
In a deterministic world Smith’s actions are equally determined, so Smith’s relative regulative 
control is only pseudo-regulative. However, Smith has more actual, causal/functional, practical 
control than Jones, and we can imagine greater forms of pseudo-regulative control consistent 
with determinism that an agent could have over herself. The ārya, in fact, possesses significantly 
greater relative self-regulative control (Meyers 2014 and this volume), and it is an empirical 
question whether the world is purely deterministic (Balaguer 2009), and thus whether her 
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regulative control is ‘merely’ pseudo-regulative. Although some Buddhists think the Buddhist 
understanding of causation is deterministic (Goodman 2002, 2009), most think it is neither 
purely deterministic nor purely indeterministic (Rāhula 1974; Story 1976; Gómez 1975; 
Kalupahana 1976, 1992, 1995; cf. Griffiths 1982; Garfield 2001; Gier and Kjellberg 2004; 
Wallace 2011),5 what I have termed ‘wiggly determinism’ (Repetti 2010c), but the issue seems 
irrelevant to the causal/functional mechanics of her control.  
 
In fact, adding an element of indeterminacy will neither decrease nor increase the ārya’s practical 
self-regulative ability because it doesn’t matter whether the conditions influencing her mental 
state are deterministic or indeterministic, nor whether they are subject to manipulation. She 
possesses a virtuoso-level self-regulative ability—a powerful practical skill—that appears to be 
causally/functionally superior to that of the relatively basic ability to simply do otherwise that 
might be exhibited, say, in Jones being able to have turned right though she turned left. The ārya 
exhibits a robust form of reason-responsiveness that is informed by the Dharma and embodied as 
a regularly-exercised skill in the relationship between her cognitive, conative, affective, somatic 
system and her metacognitive, metavolitional meditative muscles, so to speak. She is able to 
approve of and act on dharmic volitions, and disapprove of and refrain from acting on adharmic 
volitions (M 37-38), regardless of their deterministic, indeterministic, or manipulative causal 
origins. Her highly effective metavolitional control over her own volitional processes is 
analogous to the driving instructor’s control over the student driver, as she can override her own 
volitional processes at the metavolitional level. As Wallace notes, a key skill in this regard is her 
control over her own attention (this volume), the central control lever, so to speak, as well as 
over how she frames/interprets experience. 
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 ‘Hard incompatibilism’, the most powerful free-will-skepticism, claims free will is not only 
incompatible with determinism, but with indeterminism. The ārya instantiates the opposite: ‘soft 
compatibilism’, an evitabilist self-regulative agency that is compatible with determinism and 
indeterminism (Repetti 2015; see Mele 1995, for a defense of the view that autonomy is 
compatible with both determinism and indeterminism). Given these powerful agential abilities, 
non-Buddhists might wish to use these arguments to defend a view of autonomous agency that 
reifies the agent/self, but Buddhists would avoid this. That’s why I emphasize that the Buddhist 
theory of agency be considered only ‘semi-compatible’ in a way that differs from Western semi-
compatibilism. Western semi-compatibilism asserts compatibility between determinism and 
weak-to-moderate moral agency (involving guidance control), and incompatibility between 
determinism and robust or strong agency (involving indeterminism-requiring regulative control). ‘Buddhist semi-compatibilism’ asserts compatibility between causality (determinism or 
indeterminism) and a strong form of self-regulative agency that suffices for moral responsibility, 
but incompatibility with a substantive agent/self. Another way of identifying Buddhist semi-
compatibilism, which Siderits does without using the term (1987, 2008, and this volume), is in 
terms of ultimate versus conventional truths: there is robust conventional agency, but ultimately 
no self. Meyers and Harvey (both this volume) seem to argue for a similar view. 
 
Such a model coheres well with the Buddha’s explicit rejection of inevitabilist doctrines, and his 
enlightenment insight to the effect that, although most of us are typically very powerfully 
deluded by primal confusion about the very nature of our own minds, bodies, beliefs, desires, 
and perceptions, to the point where we are relatively equivalent to somnambulists being thrown 
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about by powerful winds, there are things we can do to completely reverse the process, wake up, 
and free ourselves from erroneous beliefs, misguided desires, and self-defeating actions: we can 
attain total mental freedom through our own efforts. Although freedom of the will—per 
Frankfurt (1971), the ability to have the sort of will one wants to have—is not the goal of the 
Buddha’s prescription, it is a wholesome side effect (‘collateral non-damage’) that the ārya 
cultivates a highly effective, dharmic, metavolitional/volitional will on the road to agentless 
agency. 
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1 “MN” abbreviates Majjhima Nikāya; “SN” abbreviates Saṃyutta Nikāya; and “M” abbreviates 
Milindapañha. Classical Buddhist texts are identified here first by title, subsequently (if 
reference to them recurs) by initial letter(s) abbreviations, akin to Nichomachean Ethics (“NE”), 
and follow the numbering of the Pāli Text Society editions. Online versions of most are available  
at www.accesstoinsight.org [accessed January 25, 2016]. 
2 “DN” abbreviates Dīgha Nikāya; “AN” abbreviates Aṅguttara Nikāya. 
3 In the Buddha-Carita, Aśvaghoṣa describes one of Siddhartha Gautama’s first meditation 
masters, Arāḍa Kālāma, as a follower of Sāṃkhya (see “Sāṅkhya” entry in Internet 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy). 
4 See Meyers (2014 and this volume) on the extent of this control, which is claimed to rise to 
supranormal if not supernatural levels. 
5 Meyers (2014) suggests Buddhist causation is consistent with indeterminism. 
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